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This article examines the impact of the (de)securitization of the Kurds by regional and significant external securitizing actors on relations and cooperation between regional states, non-state actors and significant external actors engaged in Middle East politics. It argues that the security framings of the Kurds constructed by securitizing actors provide an epistemological and political base for conducting relations and establishing cooperation between regional states under the influence of the external actors. Considering multilateralism as an essentially cooperative activity based on certain principles or values, the article suggests that, by constructing contradictory or coherent visions of (in)security, (de)securitization affects relations and shapes multilateralism. Even if the (in) security framings of actors are conflicting, multilateral cooperation remains possible since these actors may not openly reject the other's securitization moves. However, such a framework challenges multilateralism, and further transforms it by making cooperation fragile, value-free, temporary, unreliable and informal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: COVID-19 has hit the world in an unprecedented way causing serious repercussions on several aspects of our life. Multiple determinants have affected various nations' level of success in their responses towards the pandemic. The Arab Levant region in the Middle East, notoriously known for repeated wars and conflicts, has been affected, similarly to other regions, by this pandemic. The combination of war, conflict, and a pandemic brings too much of a burden for any nation to handle.Methods: A descriptive analysis of data obtained from the health departments of various Arab Levant Countries (ALC) was performed. ALC include Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine. The data collected involves incidence, recovery rate, case fatality rate and number of tests performed per million population, Global Health Security index, government stringency index, and political stability index. The information obtained was compared and analyzed among the ALC and compared to global figures. An extensive electronic literature search to review all relevant articles and reports published from the region was conducted. The 2019 Global Health Security (GHS) index was obtained from the "GHS index" website which was made by John Hopkins University's center for health security, the Nuclear threat Initiative (NTI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Government stringency index and political stability index were obtained from the University of Oxford and the website of "The Global Economy", respectively. Other world governance indicators such as government effectiveness were obtained from the World Bank website.Results: In terms of incidence of COVID-19, Iraq has the highest with 9665 per one million population, Syria the lowest at 256 per million. Deaths per million population was highest in Iraq at 237, and the lowest in Syria at 12. As for number of tests per million population, Lebanon ranked first at 136,033 with Iraq fourth at 59,795. There is no data available for the tests administered in Syria and subsequently no value for tests per million population. In terms of recoveries from COVID-19 per million population, Iraq had the highest number at 7903 per million, and Syria the lowest at 68 per million. When compared as percent recovery per million, Palestine ranked first (84%) and Syria last (27%). The government response stringency index shows that Jordan had the highest index (100) early in the pandemic among the other countries. Palestine's index remained stable between 80 and 96. The other countries' indices ranged from 50 to 85, with Lebanon seeing a drop to 24 in mid-August. Even with improved stringency index, Iraq reported an increased number of deaths.Conclusion: In countries devastated by war and conflict, a pandemic such as COVID-19 can easily spread. The Arab Levant countries represent a breeding ground for pandemics given their unstable political and economic climate that has undoubtedly affected their healthcare systems. In the era of COVID-19, looking at healthcare systems as well as political determinants is needed to assess a country's readiness towards the pandemic. The unrest in Lebanon, the uprising in Iraq, the restrictions placed on Syria, and the economic difficulties in Palestine are all examples of determinants affecting pandemic management. Jordan, on the contrary, is a good example of a stable state, able to implement proper measures. Political stability index should be used as a predictor for pandemic management capacity, and individual measures should be tailored towards countries depending on their index. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the policy failures from regime change efforts in the Middle East in the book "Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East" by Philip H. Gordon. Topics discussed include the implication of the failure of the U.S. to understand the Middle East culture, role of failure to prevent regime change in state stability, and the need for the administration of President Joseph Biden to determine the proper approach to Iran.

Traditional understandings of Middle Eastern politics place tribes as critical supporters of ruling families; this dynamic is considered particularly strong within the smaller Gulf states, which are oftentimes even referred to as 'bedouinocracies'. While tribes undoubtedly hold political capital throughout the Middle East, it is uncertain to what extent they remain clients of Gulf regimes or are in fact independent, and potentially oppositional, actors. This paper examines electoral outcomes for the Kuwaiti legislature, Qatari municipal council, and Emirati consultative council to understand the extent to which major tribal groups take collective action through electoral campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions will individuals mobilize law to resist states that operate above the law? In authoritarian countries, particularly in the Middle East, law is a weapon the state wields for social control, centralizing power, and legitimation. Authoritarian legal codes are overwhelmingly more deferential to state authority than protective of citizens' rights. Nevertheless, people throughout the Arab world deploy law to contest a broad array of state abuses: land expropriations, unlawful arrests, denials of jobs and welfare, and so on. Using detailed interviews in Jordan and Palestine, I outline a theory of law as a tool for resisting authoritarian state actors. Integrating qualitative insights with survey experiments fielded in Egypt and Jordan, I test this theory and show that aggrieved individuals mobilize law when they expect courts are powerful and attainable allies in contentious politics. My results further demonstrate that judicial independence does not uniformly increase authoritarian publics' willingness to access courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Co-optation via elections in authoritarian regimes, in which leaders ward off threats to their rule by granting parties electoral access in exchange for their support, is a ubiquitous phenomenon that has received considerable attention from scholars. Two important questions that remain unanswered, however, are who exactly from among the opposition is being co-opted and why do parties accept offers of co-optation? We argue that among ethnopolitical minorities, authoritarian leaders co-opt parties that will acquiesce to their rule in exchange for patronage perks. However, due to limited information, leaders selectively legalize organizations with regime-friendly goals that make them potential candidates for co-optation, and then use elections strategically to allow the most viable candidates to self-select into the electoral process. In turn, this structure of co-optation shapes the electoral incentives of opposition parties. Using data on ethnopolitical minority organizations in authoritarian regimes across the Middle East from 1980–2004, we find support for the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The longevity and depth of regional challenges in the Middle East have elevated political and security concerns to a new level within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in recent years. Three conflicting worldviews have confronted one another, resulting in debilitating consequences for the region. Increasing fragmentation of Arab politics, in turn, has engendered attempts at enforced Arab unity that have ultimately failed, further dividing and destabilizing the regional order. This article delineates the background of the Gulf crisis of 2017 within the broader context of the Arab Spring and analyzes the ensuing attempts at mediation, the US role in the region, political developments in Kuwait and Oman, normalization efforts with Israel, and the recent resolution of the Gulf crisis by examining various actors' political roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the modern Russian press covers the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict, both historically and currently. Since print media are some of the most popular sources of information in Russia, such analysis helps us understand the media's priorities in presenting the conflict to Russian society. The article focuses on the inherently manipulative, albeit hidden, essence and layout of this material, which increases the likelihood of information bias. While the quality of the reporting on this conflict demonstrates the proximity of contemporary Russian media to the interests of the country's ruling powers, it also provides opportunities for the government to influence its audience's comprehension of Middle East politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution develops three major lines of argument. Firstly, it argues that identifying 'popular culture' is not simply a definitional exercise but is also purposeful and performative. Secondly, it contends that 'popular cultures' are always implicated in power relations in multiple ways. Finally, it maintains that using a performative lens adds to our understanding of the political dimensions of 'popular cultures'. Taking examples chiefly from the Middle East and North Africa, it avers that studying 'popular cultures' highlights the links between the political and the performative, understood both as acting out (theatrical) and as bringing into being (effective). The term 'culture(s) of the public(s)' is used to capture the idea of the public as a plurality of active citizens, distinct from the politically charged term 'the people'. These publics claim space as their right, experiencing agonistic encounters with the different generations, genders, classes, ethnicities that use their own repertoires to assert their claims. Thus, the cultures of the plural public can help to fashion the public self as citizen, but for that same reason can also provoke ferocious repression from those who feel most threatened by such a development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that autonomous militaries can play a balancing role during major internal political crises. However, when militaries' autonomy is curtailed by political leaders before the crisis, militaries cannot maintain the political balance between rulers and opponents, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict. The article first explains the main concepts relevant to the discussion (autonomy, political crisis, balancing role), exploring their possible interlinkages and presenting several hypotheses. Subsequently, it discusses four relevant cases from the Middle East before and during the Arab revolts of 2010–2011: Egypt in 2011 and Lebanon in 1958, which demonstrate the balancing capacities of autonomous militaries during major political crises, and Lebanon in 1975 and Syria in 2011, which reveal that nonautonomous militaries cannot play a balancing role in such circumstances. The article concludes with several observations regarding the military's balancing role during major internal political crises in divided and homogenous states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Napoleon Bonaparte's attempt to reach India, firstly through Egypt and then through Qajar Persia, inaugurated the 'Middle East' as a coherent political space in international politics. The ostensibly existential threat posed by French schemes to British dominion over India prompted British Indian officials to perceive Egypt, Persia and the Gulf Emirates through the lens of Indian defence and European geopolitics for the first time. By the end of this period, these lands were imagined as a salient, somewhat coherent political space between "the Indus and Constantinople". This first 'Middle East' was the product of the globalization of European geopolitics and the need to defend British India, auguring the future of the region, in which its political importance, and even its location, was constructed in relation to the broader context of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a chronology of events that took place during April 16 – August 15, 2019 in Middle East including Israeli government's reduction of the permitted fishing zone in the Gaza Strip and Arab League's agreement to pay 100 million U.S. dollars to the Palestinian Authority.

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the difference between monarchies and republics appears more profound than ever. Aside from Bahrain, all of the Middle Eastern monarchies avoided major anti-governmental protests, and no armed conflict has occurred in any of them since 1979. Inspired by Middle Eastern case studies, this article argues that traditional legitimacy contributes to peace in Middle Eastern monarchies. The article explores the argument with time-series cross-sectional data covering 19 Middle Eastern countries from 1947 (or independence) to 2009. Traditional legitimacy is not measured directly but assumed to be embedded in the monarchical regime type, and the results show that alternative covariates are unable to fully explain the monarchical peace. Moreover, the study finds that horizontal discrimination increases the risk of intrastate conflict in authoritarian republics but that discrimination has no effect in monarchies. Future conflict studies should therefore consider legitimacy connected to authoritarian regime types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1979, Edward Said attended a colloquy on Middle East politics hosted by Jean-Paul Sartre and Les Temps Modernes in the apartment of Michel Foucault. He would later go on to publish his reflections on this experience in a short piece titled “Diary.” Reading this piece alongside Said’s larger oeuvre, as well as those of his predecessors Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, this article attempts to offer a theory of intellectual responsibility that may be applied to the BDS movement today. In turn, Orientalism and The Question of Palestine, published in the same year as the colloquy, offer a salient political allegory for the relation of the United States to the question of Palestine writ large when read as a dyad as they are intended to be. In closing, the article attempts to apply the theory of intellectuals derived from Said’s work by reflecting on the potential for the particular case of BDS to speak to a set of universal concerns on the Left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In article the author criticizes Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's decision to convert Hagia Sophia museum into an Islamic mosque. Topics include that the action inspires right wing Islamists who aspire for a caliphate; and Turkey's military campaigns in the Middle east especially in Iraq, Syria and Libya that have caused instability.

The article looks on the current position of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and its possibilities of transformation by the decision of administration of Donald Trump, president of the U.S. Topics include rivalry between Russia and the U.S. for power, geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and end of dual leadership of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and ascension of leadership of Saudi Arabia in Arab world. It also discusses the Kurdish independence movement in Syria.

This article argues that part of the reason why some Middle Eastern states remain democratically challenged is the emergence, operation, and political influence of "security networks" and "deep states" -- informal actors in the area of national security. The article explains what these actors are, situates them in a broad theoretical and comparative perspective, assesses their impact on democratic development, and provides examples from Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Predictions about the future of the Middle East have proliferated in step with recent events and escalating tensions in the region. This paper highlights the usefulness of historical comparative research for addressing predictive questions and, specifically, those relating to the current Islamic revival. It challenges assumptions that have prevented researchers from exploring this avenue of research; and describes a generally overlooked chapter in modern European history: Europe's nineteenth century revival of militant, literal, religion, and the region-wide, battle it unleashed between religious and secular forces through the region. It then highlights similarities, both in the nature of revivals in Europe and the Middle East and of the socio-economic structures which sustained them. Finally, it suggests how and why the battle between religious and secular forces in Europe came to an end. While, it does not offer predictions for the Middle East, it suggests how comparative insights might contribute to producing better ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We analyse the nature of robust determinants of differences in democracy levels across countries taking explicitly into account uncertainty in the choice of covariates and spatial spillovers. We make use of recent developments in Bayesian model averaging to assess the effect of a large number of potential factors affecting democratisation processes and account for several specifications of spatial linkages. Our results indicate that spatial spillovers are present in the data even after controlling for a large number of geographical covariates. Addressing the determinants of democracy without modelling such spillovers may lead to flawed inference about the nature of the determinants of democratisation processes. In particular, our results emphasise the role played by Muslim religion, population size, trade volumes, English language, natural resource rents, GDP per capita, being a MENA country and the incidence of armed conflicts as factors affecting democracy robustly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the state of sociopolitics in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and focuses on the likelihood a Palestinian state would not develop into a failed state. It discusses the concept of a failed state and how these political conditions exist in the Arab territorial nation-state system created after World War I. The article goes on to cover Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's claims that the Palestinian Authority has failed.

This article applies the concept of securitization to the Middle East with a focus upon the securitization of the Shi’a other. Such processes occur across time and space and are not restricted to state borders, escaping the Westphalian straitjacket. As a consequence, one must consider the construction of space and political structures across the region in order to understand the traction that such moves can find. It appears then, that in seeking to maintain short-term survival, regimes have sacrificed long-term stability, but the impacts of such moves transcend the typically linear constructed audiences within securitization moves. A key contribution of this article is to consider the extent to which audiences within the Middle East, both intended and unintended, transcend the linear audiences found within conventional processes of securitization. The article uses two case studies as a means of exploring the extent to which securitization can be applied to the Middle East. Such an approach helps us to identify the logics that are involved within the process of securitization, with consideration of the idea that we can populate a broad framework about the universal application of securitization to context specific cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some ethno-political organizations get support from their diaspora while others do not? There is little analysis that examines why some organizations (both violent and nonviolent) get support. Using data on 112 organizations in the Middle East we examine how factors like the power of the organization, ideology, political behavior, and government treatment might impact the likelihood of an organization getting support from its diaspora. We argue that contentious political behavior should have the largest impact on such support. We find that those that do the best job of getting attention through visible action get the most support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1921 to 1923, Turkey and the United Kingdom contended for control of the Vilayet of Mosul, now known as northern Iraq. The United Kingdom was the mandatory power in Iraq at that time. Although this crisis, which is known as the Mosul affair, was settled in 1925 in favour of Iraq, Turkey never totally relinquished its historical claim to this strategically important border region. Turkey's persistent claim to the area, and the fact that the region is predominantly inhabited by Kurds whose nationalism shows no signs of waning, make northern Iraq a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. The article will discuss the historical roots of Mosul frontier affairs, which is a legacy of colonialism in the Middle East. This international conflict has many dimensions, but the article will confine itself to the study of the distinguished career of Ali Shafiq, also known as Ozdemir, a Turkish statesman and the architect of Turkish policy during the Mosul affair. This is, to a large extent, a political history of the conflict and the author utilizes British and Turkish archival material and contemporary memoirs, journals, and relevant secondary sources in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and English. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about transforming the military force structure of the nations of the Middle East. Topics discussed include revolutionary transformations in governance structures brought about by Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004, the Arab Spring in 2011, the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and the emergence of the Islamic State.

Involving sixty countries, the Belt and Road Initiative sparked a global debate because of its potential economic and political implications. Sceptics argue this project cannot achieve its objectives as it requires close cooperation amongst many countries whose national interests are on a collision course. The optimists contend the initiative provides a win-win scenario for participating countries. This paper argues that success of the project in the Middle East depends on overcoming several challenges including: eliminating security threats and terrorist organizations; finding sustainable solutions to political tensions and armed conflicts; and consolidating good governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a critical examination of the vocabulary associated with the study of 'sectarianism' in the Middle East. It surveys Arabic- and English-language works on 'sectarianism' to illustrate how the term's lack of definition has allowed it to be used in contradictory ways that render it, not simply meaningless, but distortive to our understanding of the region. In addition, the term 'sectarianism', with its inescapably negative connotations, has been used as a tool to neutralize political dissent and stigmatize people's religious identity and otherwise legitimate acts of expression and mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the interaction between territory, sovereignty, and statehood in the Middle East and North Africa. Various groups have aspired -- and have failed -- to become states since the contemporary regional system's inception after World War I. Since the 2011 uprisings, movements claiming territory and sovereignty have emerged or become more viable throughout the region, including the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Rojava, Cyrenaica, Azawad, and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Each poses different challenges to the regional system and holds out different hopes for rectifying historical missteps in state-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the summer of 2013, millions of Egyptians returned to Tahrir square in Cairo to demand the resignation of the country's first democratically elected president. This article examines the two key terms mainly used to describe the ousting of President Mohamed Morsy, 'coup' and 'revolution', and how these terms can be understood as arguments for two different interpretations of the event. Particular focus is given to the press corps of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which reveals a discrepancy between the interpretation of Scandinavian online press and the Egyptian majority, meaning that the Scandinavian press corps is telling a story that is not recognized by those it is about. While many media producers speak of a severe polarization, it is found that the divide is actually small in number, but grows over time, raising questions about journalistic practice and media ethics. It is concluded that Scandinavian reporting on the Middle East needs to be seriously evaluated and reformed in order to improve its credibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protests that swept the Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are expected to have influenced two key civic attitudes fundamental to well-functioning democracies: trust and tolerance. However, systematic comparative assessments of the general patterns and particularities in this region are rare. This contribution theorizes the uprisings' impact and presents new society-level measurements of trust and tolerance for the MENA, synchronizing over 40 Arab Barometer and World Values Survey surveys on Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings. The analyses firstly show political-institutional trust falling in the uprisings' aftermath in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change. It appears that politicians misbehaving and reforms not resolving social problems hurt people's trust in politics. Secondly, in democratic transition countries Egypt and Tunisia, a decrease in social trust reflected the pattern of political-institutional trust indicating a spill-over effect. Thirdly, ethnoreligious tolerance dropped region-wide after the uprisings, indicating that the aftermath of religious conflict impacted the entire Arab region. These results support rational-choice institutionalist theories, while at the same time refining them for the MENA context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present informative report discusses 8 of the 45th US President Donald Trump's team members, who have to do with the Middle East policy. These are: Mike Pence (Vice President); Rex Tillerson (Secretary of the State); General James Mattis (Secretary of Defence); Mike Pompeo (CIA Director); General Michael Flynn (National Security Adviser) Jason Greenblatt (Special Envoy for International Negotiations); Jared Kushner (White House Senior Adviser); and David Friedman (US Ambassador to Israel). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle East holds a unique significance for the rest of the world due to religious, political, economic, ethnic and geographic factors, this region is in the state of turmoil for a host of domestic, regional and international reasons. The ongoing conflicts, Yemen, Syria, campaign against ISIS have undermined security in the Middle East. Iran's likely emergence has been following the 5+1 nuclear deal at Vienna on 4 July, 2015. Middle East holds a unique significance for the rest of the world that has impacted on the regional dynamics in many ways. The quest for supremacy by regional players like Saudi Arabia and Iran has worsened the ethnic and sectarian divide and provided space to extra regional players to pursue their own interests. Turkey is reasserting its traditional role in the region. Israel appears to be the main beneficiary of this turmoil. The complex and turbulence situation in the Middle East makes any prediction regarding its future difficult to make; however, it can be reasonably assumed that violence and instability are not likely to abate at least, in the short term. In view of its numerous linkages with the Middle Eastern regions, Global World cannot remain immune to developments in that region. However, its interests will be best served by eschewing aligning with any of the rival parties. International actors may therefore maintain a balance in relations with the Middle East, while at the same time seeking to promote understanding between them wherever possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arab uprisings of 2011 put into question previously held understandings about the stability of authoritarian regimes in North Africa as well as the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with countries in its southern neighbourhood. Despite early calls on behalf of the EU to change its policies, the Union’s responses in the early stages seemed mostly characterised by continuity. This article claims that certain dispositions and background knowledge developed over several decades vis-à-vis EU’s Mediterranean policies served as a baseline from which EU officials and diplomats acted. Drawing on insights from practice approaches, the article argues that the practical understandings on what the EU can (and cannot) do vis-à-vis partner countries in North Africa create a kind of power politics of practical dispositions. The article focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy - the EU’s flagship initiative - and builds on a unique set of data that combine policy documents and interviews with about 30 EU officials and national diplomats from before and after the Arab uprisings. In this way, it illustrates how practice relates to change in that even though the EU’s responses drew on an established repertoire of practice, enacting it in a new context opened up new possibilities for action. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Middle East peace process has become the most important international Middle Eastern politics phenomenon during the recent decades. Since the U.S. has realized the political, military and economic power of Iran and its influence as peace building in the Middle East, diplomacy with a common approach on the agenda has developed between these two countries. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate American and Iranian role in the Middle East and diplomatic relations between the two countries in the process of establishing peace in the region. The main question in the present research is that; what is the role of American and Iranian Middle East policy in the peace process in the Middle East during 2001-2016? To response to the question, a descriptive--analytical approach is implemented. The results suggest that the lack of diplomatic relations between Iran and America in the years 2001-2016 is one of the main reasons of the lack of security and peace in the Middle East. Accordingly, creating opportunities and establishing diplomatic relations (political, economic, social, and etc.) between Iran and America with the interests of the two countries as the two poles of influence in all parts of the region, not only provides security, but also is an indicator to stabilize discipline and a lasting peace in the region. Last but not least, communication between Iran and the U.S. ensures safety of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that Christianity is essentially secular. Hence, secularisation not only has a theological connotation concerning Christian faith but also it is the highest and most perfect realisation of Christian religion, since it signifies the cross that is in the centre of Christian faith. As Christians take upon themselves secularisation as an existential choice, namely the powerlessness of God and of the human being, they simultaneously take the worldly-human existence as 'here' and 'now' upon themselves. I will argue that this is the culmination of Reformation. Further, I want to demonstrate that secular Christianity, in the sense given in this article, remains a challenge for both Western and Eastern worlds. In order to accomplish this I will reflect in the first part of this article - from a theological point of view - upon some sociological interpretations or theories concerning mainly secularisation in Western Europe and also the contemporary socio-political scene in the Middle East. In the second part of the article I will present several Western and Eastern theological positions that defend secularisation, and through their contributions I will construct my own theological stance for secular Christianity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on establishment of formidable industrial and military capacity of Europe.

The article focuses on political sovereignty in Middle East and mentions violence in the region. Topics discussed include terror attacks, military interventions and civil wars in the region. Other topics which includes political situation in Syria and Iraq are also discussed. Sectarianism and militarization in the region are mentioned.

The Middle East is experiencing one of the darkest periods in its history and a new regional order is still far from being established. Yet, it appears increasingly clear that few matters will affect its developments more than the ongoing regional demographic dynamics. The region’s history and spatial background provide a framework for approaching these epochal shifts and critically examining the ‘ethnic stabilisation’ thesis, which interprets current demographic movements as a kind of normalisation of the region’s ‘original’ demographics. Instead of this ‘medievalization of the Middle East’, many people in the region are keen on ‘gettingbackinto history’ and ‘regaining possession’ of their multifaceted past: a powerful antidote to the geopolitical reductionism so popular nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some ethno-political organizations resort to violence while others abstain? Are ethno-political organizations with a religious/Islamist ideology more violence-prone compared to non-religious ones? In addition to commonly cited factors such as grievances, political opportunities/constraints, resources, and organizational characteristics, I argue that the existence of youth bulges in a society also increases the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend to be likely recruits for violent organizations. I use the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset, which includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa to test my hypotheses. The findings suggest that youth bulges, economic grievances, group fractionalization, external support, and state repression increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations whereas religious ideology is insignificant. Youth bulges foster violence especially in autocratic countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a necessity to build a new republican regime in the Great Middle East, based on a broad sense of citizenship, on a respect for pluralism, and on re-evaluating difference as a positive element rather than as a threat. However, this re-building will succeed only when it is accompanied by a restoration of the religious space. The reformist national model is the best and most appropriate model for real situations within the current historical period. It is a model that is able to develop according to each society’s developmental and political experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate over the effectiveness with which late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid caliphs negotiated their respective rights and duties with provincial elites during the second/eighth century. The focus is on the relationships that evolved between the caliphs and those elite families residing in the Ḥijāz whose ancestors had helped to establish the Muslim community and the early caliphal empire in the mid-first/seventh century. The article's analysis centres on a series of four revolts in the Ḥijāz over the second/eighth century and examines developments in the enthusiasm with which local elites either supported or opposed those revolts. This discussion demonstrates that, aside from a brief period during the first decades of ʿAbbāsid rule, Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs during the second/eighth century were actually quite successful at inspiring loyalty among the local elites of the Ḥijāz. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]