Search

The Asia-Pacific region presents geographic challenges for US based amphibious operations. Given the current and potential for crisis response ranging from humanitarian disaster relief to security enforcement in the Asia-Pacific, the US needs to ensure it has the ability to sustain an amphibious force, and be prepared to do this at multiple and near simultaneous locations within this region. This will be feasible if the US Marine Corps abandons the larger Marine Expeditionary Brigade sized landing force and uses the smaller Marine Expeditionary Unit, coupled with an aggressive equipment acquisition process dedicated to lighter and more expeditionary equipment sets, and finally by increasing emphasis on integration with regional partners for forward staging and logistical support.

Over the last 237 years, the Marine Corps has used innovation, ingenuity, and determination to provide the United States with a forward thinking, relevant military capability. The periods between wars have shown a flurry of creative and at times desperate activity by the Marine Corps. Three particularly active periods were post World War I, post World War II, and post Korean War. After World War I, Major General John A. Lejeune worked on updating a force based on lessons learned fighting in the American Expeditionary Force while steering the organization towards the development and refinement of amphibious doctrine and equipment. The Marine Corps would from that period forward define itself as an amphibious force. The accolades the Marine Corps received during World War II for direct actions in the Pacific Theater and indirect contributions to amphibious activities in the European Theater were not enough to ensure survival of the organization in the postwar downsizing era. General Alexander Vandegrift found himself in a similar position to Lejeune and again focused efforts on improving the Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities, simultaneously developing and integrating the newly invented helicopter into operations. Activities post World War II proved prescient for the Marine Corps, and provided a capability that General Douglas MacArthur used effectively to conduct a surprise amphibious assault that turned the tide of the Korean War. Capitalizing on the success of the Korean War, the Marine Corps parlayed amphibious success into a forward deployed capability that again found a niche within the Department of Defense. Doctrine, amphibious heritage, and a culture of boldness and innovation have served the Marine Corps well during critical interwar periods. However, the upcoming postwar situation, post-Operation Enduring Freedom, may prove to be more challenging than anything the Marine Corps has faced to date., The original document contains color images.

The selective employment of the MPF T-AKEs to provide sea-based sustainment for amphibious operations is one way for the Department of the Navy (DoN) to address the shift in the national military strategy towards the Asia Pacific Region while optimizing the amount of forward positioned equipment and supplies afloat. This would be taking a big step towards operationalizing the MPF for steady-state requirements c;tnd shattering the break glass in time of war perception of the MPF. Beginning in July 2012 the DoN will incorporate the first of two T-AKEs into the Marine Corps prepositioning program. The T-AKEs will contribute to the prepositioning of Marine Expeditionary Brigades by providing selectively offloadable sea-based sustainment to forces afloat and ashore. The ships' ability to distribute and restock underway brings a new capability to the MPF which should also be employed to augment the concept of sustainment for amphibious operations. By incorporating the T-AKE into amphibious operations the DoN could relieve some pressure from the task saturated lover-embarked amhibious fleet and further justify the utility of the MPF., The original document contains color images.

India has seen robust growth in its economy in the recent years. This growth has seen the country slowly emerging as a major player on the global arena. With this new stature have come increased responsibilities, threats, and challenges. These challenges develop rapidly and have seen India's armed forces operating tempo increase manifold and operate in countries from Lebanon to Indonesia. These include terrorism leading to extra vigilance along India's coast and island territories, piracy and its threat to India's energy security, peace-keeping "operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to name a few. Most challenges develop rapidly and call for rapid response and it would be ideal for a composite force, with"the wherewithal and ability to operate independently-both within and at distances from India, to deal with them. The carving out of an independent amphibious force from the existing defense structure would enable India to assemble the ideal force that is capable of operating independently. This independent force would be India's "force "in readiness" and the first military response prior to induction of additional forces as the circumstances dictate. Therefore there is an urgent need to develop a modern, well equipped, and competent amphibious force that has the advantage of being staged at sea for prolonged duration while a situation is still evolving and capable of being deployed at immediate notice.

Naval forces offer unique capabilities and unparalleled flexibility to our national decision makers and operational commanders. An analysis of their capabilities is conducted to highlight the versatility and value that naval forces offer due to their expeditionary nature. Naval surface and amphibious forces are examined in order to identify the range of operations that they can conduct. Capabilities, limitations, and the inherent flexibility of naval surface and amphibious forces are examined. Current U.S. National military Strategy emphasizes forward presence and crisis response. This will expand the naval force's traditional role as the force of choice for forward presence and crisis response operations. Therefore, included is a study of the concerns and friction associated with these operations. Naval Forces offer the solution to an amazingly wide range of crises and conflicts.... Expeditionary nature and flexibility of naval forces.

A shopworn canard within military circles is that military planners and strategists devote inordinate amounts of time and energy preparing for the most recently fought war and that the Marine Corps is particularly adept at backing into the future with its eyes fixed confidently on the past. The experience of the Marine Corps through the midpoint of this decade would seem to demolish such a view. Dramatic enhancements in firepower and in air, sea, and land mobility are being wedded in theory and in practice to emerging doctrine and operational concepts that promise to bring about the most far-reaching changes in amphibious warfare since the emergence of the vertical assault capability in the late 1940s. The introduction of air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) breaks the shackles of an 8- to 10-knot ship-to-shore movement that has been a hallmark of amphibious forces for nearly a half century, bringing the promise of a true over-the-horizon assault capability closer to operational reality. Aviation developments, in terms of both tactical mobility and close air support, are keeping pace with these changes, if not leading the way. And a series of enhancements to strategic mobility, embodied in land and maritime prepositioning programs, offers the best assurance in years that marines will be able to move to threatened areas in sufficient time and in adequate strength to dampen crises, deter major conflict, or fight if deterrence fails. Small wonder, then, that some exuberant commentators have referred to the 1980s as another golden age of amphibious warfare. But where is all this leading? And what else, besides amphibious warfare, must be considered in evaluating the current status of the U.S. Marine Corps and in making valid projections for its future? Considering the accelerating rate of change in international developments, the crystal balls of military prognosticators are understandably murky.

Annexes include: reconnaissance plan; night demolition plan; day demolition plan; air support and fire support plan; plan for distribution of UDT and marine personnel and intelligence; and communications plan. The group's goal is to approach assigned beaches, remove natural and man-made underwater obstacles and anti-boat mines to facilitate the landing of troops and materials. ComUDTsPhibsPac Operation Plan No. A 1-45.

Aid to training engineer amphibian unit. Covers amphibious operations, engineer special brigades, engineer boat and shore regiments, engineer boat battalions, engineer boat companies, engineer shore battalions, engineer shore companies, brigade signal communications, medical service, ordinance maintenance companies, quartermaster service, marine maintenance and weapons.

The purpose of landing reconnaissance patrols on hostile shores is to secure information concerning the enemy, the terrain and hydrography of the shores and deception.

Over the last 237 years the Marine Corps has used innovation, ingenuity, and determination to provide the United States with a forward thinking, relevant military capability. The periods between wars have shown a flurry of creative and at times desperate activity by the Marine Corps. Three particularly active periods were post World War I, post World War II, and post Korean War. After World War I, Major General John A. Lejeune worked on updating a force based on lessons learned fighting in the American Expeditionary Force while steering the organization towards the development and refinement of amphibious doctrine and equipment. The Marine Corps would from that period forward define itself as an amphibious force. The accolades the Marine Corps received during World War II for direct actions in the Pacific Theater and indirect contributions to amphibious activities in the European Theater were not enough to ensure survival of the organization in the post war downsizing era. General Alexander Vandegrift found himself in a similar position to Lejeune and again focused efforts on improving the Marine Corps amphibious capabilities simultaneously developing and integrating the newly invented helicopter into operations. Activities post World War II proved prescient for the Marine Corps and provided a capability that General Douglas MacArthur used effectively to conduct a surprise amphibious assault that turned the tide of the war. Capitalizing on the success of the Korean War, the Marine Corps parlayed amphibious success into a forward deployed capability that again found a niche within the Department of Defense and the National Security Strategy. The Marine Corps evolved amphibious forces into a continuous presence deployed globally that is able to conduct operations with little or no notice. Not merely fighting for existence for perpetuity's sake, key Marine Corps leaders' stewardship allowed it to fill a critical position that was both required by the nation and incapab

The United States Marine Corps developed Operational Maneuver from the Sea in the 1980s and codified it as a Marine Corps concept in 1996. In brief, Operational Maneuver from the Sea seeks to exploit the sea as maneuver space to defeat access denial systems and exploit gaps in an adversary's defense. Forces move directly from the sea to attack land-based centers of gravity without securing a beachhead or establishing a land based logistics node. Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a theory and as such cannot avoid the influence of its context. This context requires careful analysis if militaries are to apply the theory in other contexts separated by time, geography and governed by different strategies. Such considerations are directly relevant to the Australian Military because in 2009, Australia affirmed its commitment to a maritime strategy. Central to this strategy is the ability to project force from the sea to control maritime approaches and defeat armed incursions into Australian Territories. Whilst the Australian Defence Force practiced amphibious operations in World War Two, its repository of concepts and doctrine has eroded. The planned introduction into service of two Landing Helicopter Docks in 2014 has brought this conceptual erosion sharply into focus. The Australian Defence Force is analyzing international exemplars of amphibious operations with an eye to refining its amphibious concepts. This monograph argues that the Australian Defence Force should not consider Operational Maneuver from the Sea as an operational concept for its amphibious forces and posits an operational concept that serves the aspirations of Australian strategy, nests with Australian Army theory, and considers the tactical possibilities of the force.

The intent of this monograph is to analyze whether a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is suitable to function as an operational reserve for an echelon above corps (EAC) headquarters. In conducting this analysis the structure of a MAF is dissected to provide its composition and capabilities. A historical example is then studied to describe any synergistic effects the Marine air/ground team has on the enemy. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of a MAF as an operational reserve are examined during both offensive and defensive operations. The author concludes that should a MAF be available for commitment to sustained ground combat its use as an operational reserve for an EAC commander is an excellent use of its fighting capabilities. Its employment could well mean the difference between defeat or victory during the early stages of a war. With much of a potential MAF already loaded and at sea the possibility of a MAF fighting ashore for sustained periods grows as the defense budget shrinks.

With the current changes in world structure, alliances and the reduction in the size of the armed forces of the U.S., operational art and AirLand Battle become increasingly important as concepts. FM 100-5, Operations, published in 1986, establishes what operational art is, yet this concept is usually associated with a European scenario and mature theater of war. With the current changes taking place in the world, it becomes increasingly possible that future crises and commitment of forces will be in the Third World region. Even with this change in focus, an understanding of the operational level of war is important. The purpose of this study is to determine if amphibious operations could be utilized in the Third World to exercise operational art and execute the operational level of war. Given that the majority of conflicts in the Third World will be in an immature theater, this suggests conditions that will require flexibility, self-sustainment, and a force capable to meet multiple threats. The study draws on the main concepts of operational art from FM 100-5, historical examples of amphibious operations as operational art, and how these operations may be utilized in the future in conjunction with the military options available to the NCA. The conclusions show that amphibious forces and amphibious operations offer a potent operational response in a Third World theater of operations. However, this type of response may not be the total answer. Force ratios, time-distance relationships, and response time are key issues that must always be considered.

The United States strategic environment has changed drastically in the past ten years. As a result of numerous, complex factors, the United States carried out a significant redeployment and retrenchment of its military forces. Ironically, as the United States reduced and withdrew its military forces, the threats to national security have become more numerous and more uncertain, thereby increasing the need for the United States to maintain a capability to project power across the oceans. This paper uses three illustrative scenarios in which amphibious forces perform missions representing the spectrum of conflict, to determine the amphibious forces' requirements for support. The capabilities of naval gunfire assets are then determined and compared against the support requirements to determine if their capabilities meet the requirements. Where the capabilities fall short of meeting the requirements, the capabilities of other supporting agencies are then examined to determine if other agencies can compensate for the shortfalls of naval gunfire. Finally, the net shortfalls and their impact on the abilities of the NCA and Unified Commanders to achieve the national security objectives are determined. This monograph shows that the current naval gunfire assets cannot support amphibious operations across the spectrum of conflict. As a result of their insufficiency, the capabilities of United States amphibious forces are significantly degraded. They cannot adequately conduct a conventional amphibious assault against a defended beach, and accept much greater risk while conducting missions at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

This study is an examination of historical data to determine the effectiveness of air power in supporting operations during the battle for Saipan during June and July 1944. The battle was fought during a critical phase of World War II, over an island whose strategic significance would become manifest during the war's closing months. The Japanese correctly believed that losing Saipan would mean the beginning of the end for the Empire. The study determines that the role of air power was critical in protecting the amphibious force, defeating the Japanese fleet, decimating land-based Japanese air forces, and supporting the troops on the ground. Air power at Saipan created an environment which made an American victory inevitable. The study examines the assets available and their effectiveness in various types of air support employed at Saipan, and looks at joint air employment. It concludes that anti-air combat and airfield interdiction were highly successful, while fleet action and close air support were moderately successful. It examines factors involved and the results produced. It concludes that joint operations were conducted, but that these were operations of coexistence rather than real coordination.

Recommends the reorganization of the 2nd Engineer Amphibian Brigade as a Shore Brigade and revision of Engineer Special Brigade T/O's and E's to correspond.

Expeditionary Forces, with landing missions, are numerous. in history, but the circumstances of organization and equipment of other Armies, are entirely foreign to that of our army. It is therefore necessary to branch out upon a new field, giving consideration only to organization that is familiar and equipment and transportation that is now in use or undergoing experiment in our own forces.