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Bisphenol A (BPA) is an endocrine-disruptive chemical derived from plastics and epoxies which have been linked to atherosclerosis and obesity. Cardiovascular disease (CVD) also disproportionately affects minority populations. Among environmental toxins, Black Americans are found to have higher BPA levels than the general population. In this study, we assessed the hypothesis that if BPA leads to higher mortality outcomes among individuals with hypertension only in Non-Hispanic Black Americans.From the 2003-2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, we analyzed data on adults (≥ 20 years), with mortality data obtained through 2015. Hypertension status was determined from medication usage information and self-report status. The causes of death for adults (N=3407) were defined using the International Classification of Disease coding (ICD-10). Urinary BPA levels were considered elevated at ≥1.97 μg/g. Complex Samples Cox Regression was used to assess if BPA levels influence the effect of hypertension on mortality and if this pattern persists across races. Out of the Non-Hispanic Black respondents, 10.5% of males died from hypertension versus 13.1% of females. During the 8.6-year follow-up, the unadjusted hazard ratio (HR) of hypertension to no hypertension for Non-Hispanic Black Adults was 3.22; 95% confidence interval [CI: 2.19-4.75]. The adjusted HR was elevated, 2.98 (CI 1.19-7.46, p = 0.02), among BPA-exposed individuals but closer to 1.0 (1.08 CI 0.45-2.59, p = 0.87) among unexposed individuals, after controlling for medical and demographic risk factors. However, among Non-Hispanic White individuals, increased BPA levels did not significantly influence mortality in those individuals with hypertension. In conclusion, there was increased mortality outcomes among BPA-exposed, Non-Hispanic Black individuals experiencing hypertension than those individuals without hypertension. Due to the chronicity of exposure among environmental hazards, social disparities are compounded over a long period of time. Environmental exposures like BPA should be monitored especially among vulnerable populations and thereby improve hypertension related health outcomes.

The study of reputation is one of the foundational topics of modern international relations. However, fundamental questions remain, including the question of to whom reputations adhere: states, leaders, or both? We offer a theory of influence‐specific reputations (ISR) that unifies competing accounts of reputation formation. We theorize that reputations will adhere more to actors who are more influential in the relevant decision‐making process. We employ two survey experiments, one abstract and one richly detailed involving a U.S.‐Iran conflict, to evaluate ISR. We find evidence of large country‐specific reputations and moderately sized leader‐specific reputations. Consistent with the theory of influence‐specific reputations, leader‐specific reputations are more important when leaders are more influential.

In this article, we argue that international law can help state leaders reach a settlement in territorial disputes by suggesting a focal point for negotiations. International law is more likely to serve as a focal point when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are clear and well established and when one of the states in the dispute has a stronger legal claim to disputed territory. When these two conditions are present, we expect the state with a legal advantage to push for and receive favorable terms of settlement. In our analysis of all negotiated settlements in territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000, we find strong support for the importance of international law in influencing the terms of settlements. States with a strong legal advantage are more likely to secure favorable terms, whereas states lacking a strong legal claim are more likely to receive unfavorable terms.

In this paper, we investigate how international law shapes leaders' decisions regarding the use of force in the context of territorial disputes. We argue that if the legal principles relevant to the dispute are capable of suggesting a focal point, international law will have a powerful role to play in informing leader behavior. Specifically, if a focal point exists, the state that it favors will avoid using force and prefer negotiations when considering an initial challenge to the status quo. However, we expect focal points to have the opposite effect once states are involved in a militarized dispute. Under these circumstances, the state with a legal advantage will be more likely to escalate the level of military force. Using a series of statistical tests, we find strong support for our theoretical argument.

In this article, we explain the role of international law in the resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000. In doing so, we focus on three outcomes of interest. First, when do states choose to revise the territorial status quo through negotiations instead of force? Second, when are states able to reach a final settlement? Third, when do states prefer a process of legal dispute resolution (i.e., adjudication or arbitration) to bilateral negotiations? To answer these questions, we argue that when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are unambiguous and clearly favor one side, a law-based focal point will emerge. This focal point, in turn, facilitates the settlement process by helping leaders overcome distribution problems, a central obstacle in reaching a final agreement. We find strong and consistent empirical support for our hypotheses regarding international law and peaceful dispute resolution. I s a legal advantage an important source of bargaining leverage for state leaders as they negotiate over security issues in international disputes? Does international law provide the foundation for the peaceful settlement of security-related disputes? In a system defined by anarchy, there are reasons to question whether international law can play a central role in the orderly and peaceful resolution of disputes when security issues are at stake for leaders. Indeed, many would argue that the shadow of military power is an ever-present influence over such bargaining processes and that international law is, therefore, not a viable substitute for military strength and credible threats of force to secure the peace. As a result, although law may have an important role to play in governing international economic relations (e.g., Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; von Stein 2005; Zangl 2008), where the parties will often have strong incentives to coordinate their behavior, the role of law in settling disagreements over security-related issues is a far more contentious question among scholars and policy makers. In such situations, leaders will often have divergent preferences over how the issue should be resolved, making the identification of a mutually acceptable solution difficult. The security aspect of the dispute compounds this problem because leaders will be reluctant to sign any agreement that they believe might decrease

In this article, we seek to advance the theoretic and empirical literature on the diversionary use of force. We argue that state leaders are more likely to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior when opposition groups from within the winning coalition press for policy changes, but the government rejects those policy demands. Only when domestic unrest threatens a loss of political support from groups that are politically important to the leadership do we expect leaders to try and rally their support through heightened international conflict. We test this argument in an analysis of Japanese foreign policy behavior from 1890 to 1941 regarding (i) the initiation of military threats, (ii) concessions in negotiations, and (iii) the escalation of military confrontations. Drawing upon new data sets collected on Japanese domestic politics and foreign relations, we find strong support for our argument in a series of statistical tests.

In this paper, we argue that the greater accountability of democratic leaders to their citizens creates powerful pressures on leaders to reduce the human costs of war. In an analysis of a new dataset of fatalities in interstate wars (1900 to 2005) we find that highly democratic states suffer significantly fewer military and civilian fatalities. We argue that democracies limit their war losses primarily by adopting four specific foreign and military policies. First, democracies generate higher military capabilities than nondemocracies in times of war. Second, democracies are more likely to augment their national capabilities by joining more powerful coalitions of states during war. Third, democracies are more likely than other states to utilize battlefield military strategies that minimize their fatalities. Finally, democracies are more likely to fight wars on battlefields that are not contiguous to their home territories, thereby shielding their civilian populations from the fighting.

Killer cell immunoglobulin-like receptor (KIR ) genes encode for activating and inhibitory surface receptors, which are correlated with the regulation of Natural Killer (NK) cell cytotoxic activity. Reduced NK cell cytotoxic activity has been consistently reported in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) patients, and KIR haplotypes and allelic polymorphism remain to be investigated. The aim of this article was to conduct a pilot study to examine KIR genotypes, haplotypes, and allelic polymorphism in CFS/ME patients and nonfatigued controls (NFCs). Comparison of KIR and allelic polymorphism frequencies revealed no significant differences between 20 CFS/ME patients and 20 NFCs. A lower frequency of the telomeric A/B motif ( P < 0.05) was observed in CFS/ME patients compared with NFCs. This pilot study is the first to report the differences in the frequency of KIR on the telomeric A/B motif in CFS/ME patients. Further studies with a larger CFS/ME cohort are required to validate these results.

We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the “political cover” of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be easier for leaders to justify the making of concessions if they are mandated as part of a ruling by an international court or arbitration body. We test a series of domestic-level hypotheses using a dataset comprised of nearly 1,500 rounds of talks concerning disputed territorial claims. Our multivariate analyses indicate that state leaders opt for legal dispute resolution when they are highly accountable to domestic political opposition, as well as when the dispute is highly salient to domestic audiences.

The arrangement and composition of flowpath types within a given network are thought to govern its functioning. This concept assumes that different flowpath types are functionally distinct. We investigated this assumption in a fluvial ecosystem by comparing the riparian zone, parafluvial zone (in-channel gravel bars), and surface stream. We hypothesized that differences in advection, uptake, and sorption would render material cycles more (a) open and (b) mutable in the surface stream, whereas the converse would occur in the riparian zone, and an intermediate state would be seen in the intervening parafluvial zone. To test our first hypothesis, we predicted that spatial heterogeneity in solute concentrations would be least in the surface stream, greater in the parafluvial zone, and greatest in the riparian zone. Using a null model, we ascertained that this pattern was shown by all solute species we examined (nitrate, ammonium, total dissolved inorganic nitrogen [DIN], dissolved organic N, total dissolved N, soluble reactive phosphorus, dissolved organic carbon, and chloride). To test our second hypothesis, we predicted that temporal change in spatial heterogeneity would be greatest in the surface stream, less in the parafluvial zone, and least in the riparian zone. Nitrate, DIN, and chloride showed this pattern. In particular, surface stream inorganic N was less spatially variable following months of high rainfall. According to an extant hypothesis, these results suggest that inorganic N processing may be a stable function in this ecosystem. Other solute species did not support our second prediction, perhaps because their retention and release dynamics are influenced principally by geochemistry. Generally, our findings indicate that a geomorphic template can generate spatial patterns in ecosystem function, warranting an expansion of the spiraling framework to a variety of flowpath types.

Do the international laws of war effectively protect civilian populations from deliberate attack? In a statistical analysis of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003 the authors find no evidence that signatories of The Hague or Geneva Conventions intentionally kill fewer civilians during war than do nonsignatories. This result holds for democratic signatories and for wars in which both sides are parties to the treaty. Nor do they find evidence that a state's regime type or the existence of ethnic or religious differences between combatants explains the variation in civilian targeting. They find strong support, however, for their theoretical framework, which suggests that combatants seek to kill enemy civilians when they believe that doing so will coerce their adversaries into early surrender or undermine their adversaries' war-related domestic production. The authors find that states fighting wars of attrition or counterinsurgency, states fighting for expansive war aims, and states fighting wars of long duration kill significantly more civilians than states in other kinds of wars.

The health of humanity varies enormously: by genetic endowment, environmental conditions, and access to health care; by age, gender, income level, and country.1 Some people live long healthy lives in peace and affluence; many others’ lives are briefer and burdened by major disabilities from disease or injury, and often the characterization “nasty, brutish, and short” is all too apt. Our central claim in this chapter is that politics plays an important role in influencing public health conditions, but unfortunately political scientists and other scholars have only conducted limited systematic research on the topic.2 As a result, the existing literature on the comparative cross-national analysis of the determinants of public health performance is largely based on the work of economists and public health experts in which political processes and conditions are understudied.3 We believe that political scientists can contribute substantially to a better understanding of why public health conditions vary in systematic ways across countries.

A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is divided into three separate stages so that hypotheses about the initiation and outcome of both negotiations and military confrontations, and opposing patterns of war and dispute settlement, can be tested. Results provide strong support for a number of hypotheses concerning the importance of electoral cycles and the strength of opposition parties in explaining patterns of both conflictual and cooperative behavior by democratic states.

▪ Abstract The utility of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international relations research. Rational choice models have provided the foundation for theorizing about the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake. Over the past two decades, scholars have tested propositions from rational deterrence theory utilizing both statistical and comparative case study methods. Although the empirical results from these tests have supported a number of hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature, they have also challenged some theoretical arguments and have sparked vigorous debates about both theory and research designs for conducting empirical research.

The author tests a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which major powers intervene with military support for states that are threatened in a crisis. The hypotheses are derived from a general theoretical approach that integrates a realist framework with recent works that focus on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy. Seven of the eight hypotheses tested are supported by the results of logit analysis on major power interventions in 272 international crises from 1918 to 1988. The broad theoretical implication is that scholars drawing on realist approaches to studying international politics should think rigorously about the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decisions.

The literature on the democratic peace has emerged from two empirical claims: (1) Democracies are unlikely to conflict with one another, and (2) democracies are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. Together these assertions imply that the democratic peace is a dyadic phenomenon. There is strong support for the first observation, but much recent scholarship contravenes the second. This paper assesses whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic, a monadic, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect. Our analysis offers two important advances. First, our model directly compares the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as the unit of analysis rather than the potentially problematic dyad. Second, our model controls for an important but overlooked confounding variable: satisfaction with the status quo. Our results indicate that the initiation of violence within crises is predominantly a dyadic phenomenon, but we also find evidence suggesting a strong monadic effect regarding the emergence of crises.

Justifications for war often invoke reputational or social aspirations: the need to protect national honor, status, reputation for resolve, credibility, and respect. Studies of these motives struggle with a variety of challenges: their primary empirical manifestation consists of beliefs, agents have incentives to misrepresent these beliefs, their logic is context specific, and they meld intrinsic and instrumental motives. To help overcome these challenges, this review offers a general conceptual framework that integrates their strategic, cultural, and psychological logics. We summarize important findings and open questions, including (a) whether leaders care about their reputations and status, (b) how to address the tension between instrumental and intrinsic motives, (c) how observers draw inferences, (d) to whom and across what contextual breadth these inferences apply, and (e) how these relate to domestic audience costs. Many important, tractable questions remain for future studies to answer.

Background High ambient summer temperatures have been shown to influence daily mortality in cities across Europe. Quantification of the population mortality burden attributable to heat is crucial to the development of adaptive approaches. The impact of summer heat on mortality for 15 European cities during the 1990s was evaluated, under hypothetical temperature scenarios warmer and cooler than the mean and under future scenarios derived from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES). Methods A Monte Carlo approach was used to estimate the number of deaths attributable to heat for each city. These estimates rely on the results of a Bayesian random-effects meta-analysis that combines city-specific heat-mortality functions. Results The number of heat-attributable deaths per summer ranged from 0 in Dublin to 423 in Paris. The mean attributable fraction of deaths was around 2%. The highest impact was in three Mediterranean cities (Barcelona, Rome and Valencia) and in two continental cities (Paris and Budapest). The largest impact was on persons over 75 years; however, in some cities, important proportions of heat-attributable deaths were also found for younger adults. Heat-attributable deaths markedly increased under warming scenarios. The impact under SRES scenarios was slightly lower or comparable to the impact during the observed hottest year. Conclusions Current high summer ambient temperatures have an important impact on European population health. This impact is expected to increase in the future, according to the projected increase of mean ambient temperatures and frequency, intensity and duration of heat waves.

Realism has been the dominant paradigm in the study of international conflict. Within this paradigm, two leading alternative approaches have been deterrence theory and structural realism. We test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984. We derive a set of hypotheses from each model, operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis, and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great-power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis. The results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support, whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported.

General deterrence, unlike immediate deterrence, has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner. We outline a research design for doing so, by studying the circumstances under which, in a set of enduring rivalries, challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes. We indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often-competing theoretical frameworks: rational deterrence, a general model of rational conflict initiation, and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception. The results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models.

The authors investigate the relationship between system structure and the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers. The central hypotheses concern the interaction between system uncertainty and the risk propensity of national decision makers. The authors employ a research design that enables them to incorporate explanatory variables from various levels of analysis into their theoretical model. The model is tested by probit analysis on a pooled time series of Great Power rival dyads from 1816 to 1975. The empirical results support the central hypothesis that the effects of the international system are mediated by the risk propensity of decision makers. In addition, the authors find that dyadic- and unit-level variables such as arms races, power transitions, and the current and past dispute behavior of rivals also have significant effects on conflict behavior. Finally, the results indicate that nuclear weapons do not seem to have a systematic impact on the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers.

There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are magnified by methodological confusion, especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results. Serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests. Rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure.

Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons.

Two-component hydrograph separations were performed for three, nested, snowmelt-dominated catchments in Sequoia National Park. The purpose of the hydrograph separations was to: (i) differentiate between the old and new water contributions to discharge during snowmelt using δ18O signatures; (ii) identify the fraction of snowmelt that travelled through the subsurface (reactive) compartment during the snowmelt period using silica or sodium; and (iii) investigate the impact of changing end-member signatures on the separations. 'Old' water refers to water that was stored in the watershed during the previous year, whereas 'new' water is current snowmelt. Hydrograph separations were performed for both a high-accumulation (1998, annual precipitation 2·4 m) and an average year (1999, 1·3 m). The proportion of old water contribution to discharge during the rising limb of the hydrograph was 10-20%, with 80-100% of snowmelt being reactive, i.e. passing through soil and talus. Estimates of old and new soil water and direct snowmelt entering the stream varied among the catchments in 1999. Differences between these components were minimal in 1998, regardless of varying topography and differing proportions of soil, rock and talus. Using time-dependent rather than constant δ18O meltwater and silica soil-water signatures made a meaningful impact on both new and old water, and reactive and unreactive, estimates. © 2004 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.

Why do some wars result in the intentional killing of large numbers of civilians? In this article we examine the incidence of mass killing in all wars from 1945 to 2000. In the statistical analysis of our data set of 147 wars, we find strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that mass killing is often a calculated military strategy used by regimes attempting to defeat major guerrilla insurgencies. Unlike conventional military forces, guerrilla armies often rely directly on the local civilian population for logistical support. Because guerrilla forces are difficult to defeat directly, governments facing major guerrilla insurgencies have strong incentives to target the guerrillas' civilian base of support. We find that mass killing is significantly more likely during guerrilla wars than during other kinds of wars. In addition, we find that the likelihood of mass killing among guerrilla conflicts is greatly increased when the guerrillas receive high levels of active support from the local population or when the insurgency poses a major military threat to the regime.For their helpful comments on previous versions of this article the authors thank Bear Braumoeller, Alex Downes, Jim Fearon, Hazem Goborah, Stathis Kalyvas, Gary King, Will Lowe, Matthew Krain, Lisa Martin, Manus Midlarsky, Bruce Russett, Nicholas Sambanis, Naunihal Singh, Abdulkader Sinno, Allan Stam, Jeremy Weinstein, and the anonymous reviewers of International Organization. We are also grateful to Wolfgang Moehler for his research assistance. Our coauthor Dylan Balch-Lindsay was killed in an automobile accident on 1 September 2002, cutting short a promising career. He was a gifted young scholar, without whom this article would not have been possible. He is sorely missed by his friends and colleagues. Donations in his name can be sent to the Dylan Balch-Lindsay Memorial Fund for Graduate Education/Foundation of the University of New Mexico, c/o Carol Brown, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 87131-1121.

down by age, gender, and type of disease or condition. We test hypotheses about the impact of civil wars and find substantial long-term effects, even after controlling for several other factors. We estimate that the additional burden of death and disability incurred in 1999, from the indirect and lingering effects of civil wars in the years 1991-97, was approximately equal to that incurred directly and immediately from all wars in 1999. This impact works its way through specific diseases and conditions and disproportionately affects women and children.

Obviously, the conclusions from any systematic investigation of historic crises may require modification when new information becomes available. In the previous article, David Welch claims that new information about the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the most thoroughly documented of the 19 crises in our study of the relationship between decisionmaking process and outcome (Herek et al., 1987), casts doubts on our findings. Further, he questions the main conclusions of our entire study, not only on the basis of this new evidence but also because our "conception of a high-quality decision making process" (embodied in our definitions of the symptoms of defective decision making) is "seriously flawed" (p. 432). Are his claims warranted? At first glance, Welch's article might seem convincing to some readers; it seems sensible as well as sophisticated. But such favorable impressions, we believe, cannot survive detailed scrutiny of the veracity of his assertions concerning both our article and the new evidence he describes. In this rebuttal, we shall explain why Welch's claims are wrong by documenting two major types of errors that permeate his entire critique. Unfortunately, we cannot be brief. We feel it necessary to point out many misleading oversimplifications and misrepresentations in Welch's article that must be corrected both to assess the relationship between process and outcome reported in our paper and to extract

The performance of code division multiple-access (CDMA) systems is determined using direct-sequence spectral spreading. Asynchronous users are assumed so that there is no network control. Under relatively ideal conditions, the degradation in system performance as a function of the number of users is shown to have a threshold effect. This basic limitation in the number of users of the system is further limited if the powers are unequal. For two users, system performance as a function of their power ratios also has a threshold effect. System performance as a function of the amount of spectral spreading is determined. The performance of both coded and uncoded systems is predicted.

This study investigated the hypothesis that high-quality decision-making procedures during crises are associated with better crisis outcomes than are defective decision-making procedures. Presidential decision making during 19 international crises since World War II was examined for seven symptoms of defective decision making proposed by Janis and Mann (1977). Crisis outcomes were rated by outside experts in terms of their effect on U.S. vital interests and on international conflict. Results indicated that crisis outcomes tended to have more adverse effects on U.S. interests and were more likely to increase international conflict when the decision-making process was characterized by a large number of symptoms. Alternative explanations are considered and the implications of these results for improving decision makers' procedures are discussed.

Bandwidth-conserving modulation techniques, which trade average power for bandwidth in a favorable exchange, have recently found widespread application in digital radio and satellite communication systems. Multiple-amplitude- and phase-shift-keying (MAPSK) techniques have been known for some time to be very efficient in bandwidth. One attractive type of MAPSK, from a practical point of view, is quadrature-amplitude-shift-keying (QASK). In conventional commanication systems, QASK is used with a coherent (or partially coherent) receiver. One way to protect a conventional communication system from interference or jamming is by frequency hopping the carrier over a large bandwidth. However, for widespread frequency hopping, the carrier phase is noncontinuous from hop to hop. In this case, a differentially coherent receiver provides a practical solution to the effect of phase discontinuities introduced by frequency hopping. The differentially coherent detection of QASK has not been discussed in the literature. Therefore, in this Part I, the concept of differentially coherent detection of differentially phase-encoded QASK signals (DQASK) is described, and a receiver structure proposed. The remainder of Part I analyzes the performance of DQASK in the presence of a Gaussian noise environment with comparisons made to coherent detection of QASK.

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

Durch Anwendung der Gelfiltrationstechnik lassen sich die Serumeiweiskorper einfach nach ihren Molekulargewichten sortieren und die Diagnose von Storungen der Serumeiweiszusammensetzung einfach und rasch im Hinblick auf Makroglobulinamien sowie Plasmocytomkrankheiten usw. differenzieren. Es wird uber die Entwicklung und Anwendung der Technik berichtet.

Morphologische Untersuchungen (Blindstudie) bestätigen, daβ Fett-infusionen bei kombinierter Applikation mit Endotoxin zu einer Aktivierung intravasaler Gerinnungsprozesse mit Mikrothromben-bildung besonders im Bereich von Milz, Lunge, Niere und Leber führen können. Dabei wurde zunächst Endotoxin in einer Dosierung von 50 μg/kg Körpergewicht injiziert und nach 2 Stunden Fett in einer Dosierung von 1 g/kg Körpergewicht und Stunde über zwei Stunden infundiert. Verglichen wurden die Fettemulsionen Lipofundin® S und Intralipid® auf der Basis von Sojabohnenöl. Morphologische Zeichen einer Verbrauchskoagulopathie fanden sich in beiden Ver-suchsgruppen. Die disseminierte intravasale Koagulation war aber in der Endotoxin-Lipofundin® S-Gruppe deutlich starker ausgeprägt als in der Endotoxin-Intralipid®-Gruppe. Auch kam eine massive glomeruläre Mikrothrombose nur in der Endotoxin-Lipofundin® S-Gruppe vor. Schlieβlich war die Letalität einer kombinierten Applikation von Endotoxin und Lipofundin® S gröβer als die einer kombinierten Applikation von Endotoxin und Intralipid®.

This study builds on earlier work on extended (third-party) immediate deterrence. We analyze fifty-eight cases and summarize previous findings that extended deterrence is likely to succeed when the immediate or short-term balance of forces favors the defender, when any previous crisis involving the same adversaries resulted in stalemate rather than clear victory for either, and when the military and diplomatic bargaining process is characterized by tit-for-tat or firm-but-flexible strategies rather than bullying or appeasement. The long-term balance of forces and the defender's possession of nuclear weapons make little difference. We then focus on cases where deterrence has failed and the defender must make a decision whether to fight. The defender is more likely to fight when the short-term balance of forces favors it, when it is bound to the third party by alliance ties or geographic proximity, and when it has followed a firm-butflexible bargaining strategy during the crisis. Generally, these results emphasize the importance of different interests and perspectives of attackers and defenders. Even clear-sighted vision of its own interests may bring war if a state fails to tread a delicate balance between making credible threats and humiliating its adversary.