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Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine hat zu einer neuen Auswanderungswelle aus Russland geführt. Auf der Grundlage qualitativer Forschung in Deutschland und in Georgien gehen wir der Frage nach, inwiefern sich regimekritische Migrant:innen politisch und zivilgesellschaftlich engagieren. Der Aktivismus kann unterschiedliche Formen annehmen. Er lässt sich nicht darauf reduzieren, lediglich aus den Aufnahmegesellschaften nach Russland hineinzuwirken. Unsere Forschung zeigt, dass sich das Engagement transnational gestaltet und sich an verschiedene Zielpublika richtet. Die Zielgruppen überlappen sich bisweilen und sind stark von dem konkreten Kontext in der jeweiligen Aufnahmegesellschaft geprägt.

Nicht nur wegen des russischen Angriffskrieges gegen die Ukraine lohnt sich die Beschäftigung mit den baltischen Staaten, insbesondere mit Estland. Brennglasartig verdichtet lässt sich hier der Aufstieg des Rechtsextremismus beobachten: Mit der EKRE-Partei reüssiert ein Familienunternehmen, das erfolgreich einen nach der 1991 erfolgten Unabhängigkeit des Landes existenten Patriotismus in die Richtung eines xenophoben, revisionistischen Nationalismus gelenkt hat. Der Beitrag analysiert aus estnischen Primärquellen, wie in den letzten Jahren der Rechtsextremismus salonfähig werden konnte. Dafür sorgten etwa öffentlich geschürte Phantomdebatten um eine angebliche Massenimmigration 2015/16. EKRE dockt dabei an ungelöste und unaufgearbeitete Fragen der Vergangenheit an. Das schließt Reminiszenzen an den Faschismus ein. Erstaunlich ist, dass EKRE als Teil der Regierung ebenso akzeptiert wurde wie die Partei auch generell als wichtiger politischer Faktor im Land gilt. Der offenbar in Politik und Gesellschaft anschlussfähige Traum einer Ethnokratie wird in einem Land kultiviert, das vor allem durch die Konfliktline zwischen ethnisch estnischen und russischstämmigen Menschen geprägt ist. Not solely because of the Russian war against Ukraine, a closer look to the Baltic states, especially Estonia, matters. Here, the current rise of right-wing extremism via EKRE can be observed in compacted form: being a family business, the party turned the existent patriotism after the country gained reindependence in 1991 into the direction of xenophobic nationalism. The following contribution uses Estonian primary sources from recent years to analyse how right-wing extremism could become socially acceptable in the country. Virtual debates around the migration debate 2015/16 gave EKRE a lot of ground for mobilisation. More importantly, the party is dealing with unsolved taboos in the society such as the fascist past of Estonia. The embracement strategy for bringing EKRE into power and accepting the party as new influential political power factor indicates a certain acceptance. The dream of an ethnocracy is revitalized in a country which has been shaped by the cleavage between ethnic Estonians and Russians.

Mit dem Begriff wissenschaftsbezogener Rechtspopulismus/-extremismus fokussiert der Beitrag solche (extrem) rechten Organisationen, Praktiken und Diskursstrategien, die sich auf das Feld der Wissenschaft beziehen. Dabei rückt in einer qualitativen Interview-Studie die Betroffenenperspektive in den Mittelpunkt, die ein blinder Fleck der Forschung ist: Wie nehmen Betroffene wissenschaftsbezogenen Rechtspopulismus/-extremismus wahr und welche Umgangsweisen finden sie? Präsentiert werden Ergebnisse zur widersprüchlichen Erscheinungsform von wissenschaftsbezogenem Rechtspopulismus/-extremismus. Neben erwartbaren Phänomenen (zum Beispiel (kultur-)rassistischen, misogynen, antidemokratischen und verschwörungstheoretischen Positionierungen) zeigt sich dieser insofern widersprüchlich, als dass er zwischen Inanspruchnahme von Wissenschaftlichkeit sowie Wissenschaftsfreiheit auf der einen Seite und Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit auf der anderen Seite oszilliert. Er trifft mit Hochschulen auf Institutionen, deren Strukturen einen kritischen Umgang erschweren, und er wirkt weit über die jeweils konkreten Situationen seines Erscheinens hinaus. Unsere Analysen untermauern die Notwendigkeit, die Bedeutung von wissenschaftsbezogenem Rechtspopulismus/-extremismus in seiner Widersprüchlichkeit über die jeweiligen Situationen hinaus zu erkennen und wissenschaftsspezifische Antworten zu finden, die dieser Widersprüchlichkeit Rechnung tragen - und sind damit eine Aufforderung an Hochschulen und alle dort tätigen Personen. With the term science-related right-wing populism/extremism, this article focuses on far right organisations, practices and discourse strategies that relate to the field of science. The focus of the presented qualitative interview study is on the perspective of those affected by science-related right-wing populism/extremism, which is a blind spot in research: How do affected people perceive science-related right-wing populism/extremism and in what ways are they dealing with it? The article presents findings on the contradictory manifestation of science-related right-wing populism/extremism. In addition to expected research results, for example findings of (cultural) racism, misogynism, anti-democratic and conspiracy-theoretical positions, it is contradictory that science-related right-wing populism/extremism is claiming scientificity and academic freedom and is hostile towards science at once. Sciencerelated right-wing populism/extremism takes place in academia. These institutions have structures that are making a critical approach difficult, whilst science-related right-wing populism/extremism has an effect far beyond the respective concrete situations of its appearance. Our analyses highlights the need to recognise the significance of science-related right-wing populism/extremism in its contradictoriness, to find science-specific responses.

Im Vorfeld der für den Herbst vorgesehenen Parlamentswahlen erlebt Polen eine bedenkliche Abkehr von einer sachorientierten Politik, die darauf abzielt, drängende staatliche, wirtschaftliche, soziale und bildungspolitische Probleme zu lösen und das Land weiter zu modernisieren, damit es sich in den global unruhigen Zeiten im europäischen Gefüge behaupten kann und ein geachtetes Mitglied der EU bleibt. Vielmehr dreht sich die Politik fast ausschließlich um Themen, die von den regierenden Nationalkonservativen in ihrem ausgeprägten Willen zum Machterhalt gesetzt werden und der Diskreditierung jedweder Oppositionspolitik dienen. Die oppositionellen Parteien tun sich schwer, dem etwas entgegenzusetzen, und streiten vor allem darüber, wie Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) aus der Regierungsposition gedrängt werden kann, statt ihr gezielt mit inhaltlichen Vorschlägen und Initiativen den Wind aus den Segeln zu nehmen.

Kurzfassung Eine Reihe parawissenschaftlicher Tendenzen in der russischen Sozialwissenschaft hat zur Vorbereitung des Ukraine-Krieges beigetragen. Neben den Propaganda- und Desinformationskampagnen des Kremls ist eine intellektuelle Deformation der russischen Elite durch manichäische Ideen von Theoretikern wie Lew Gumiljow und Alexander Dugin mitverantwortlich für die zunehmende Abspaltung Russlands von Europa. Spekulative, oft verschwörerische, teils okkultistische und rassistische Theorien haben den öffentlichen Diskurs im postsowjetischen Raum infiziert und ihre Verfechter haben anerkannte Sozialwissenschaftler und Historiker aus intellektuellen und medialen Debatten verdrängt. Dieser öffentliche Diskurs ist seit Beginn von Glasnost vor 35 Jahren zu beobachten und ein Bestimmungsfaktor für den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine im Jahr 2014 geworden.

Diese Analyse beschreibt das Entstehen einer neuen feministische Generation in den 2010er Jahren in Russland, ihre Eigenschaften und wie sie in der Lage war, in einem zunehmend repressiven Kontext Aktivismus zu betreiben. Die Analyse basiert auf einer Studie, die feministischen Aktivismus in St. Petersburg und Moskau untersucht. In der vorliegenden Analyse werden die Forschungsergebnisse im Dialog entwickelt mit den Ereignissen des Jahres 2022, d. h. mit der gegenwärtigen großflächigen Invasion der Ukraine durch Russland, und den feministischen Reaktionen, insbesondere Widerstand.

Tunisia's political system suffers from recurrent problems with governability and proportionality. A volatile party landscape, frequent cabinet reshuffles, and political gridlocks repeatedly jeopardized stability and democratic progress since the Arab Spring. Major and minor electoral reforms were undertaken in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2022, but they were unable to diffuse either of these issues. This analysis is therefore driven by two central questions: How have Tunisia's electoral laws changed since the Arab Spring? And why have these reforms failed to improve both governability and proportionality? It will be argued that because Tunisia's party landscape is fractured and volatile only on the secularist side of the spectrum, coalitions with and against Ennahda are costly to all parties involved, worsening the overall quality of political representation. By analyzing the trajectory of major and minor electoral reforms longitudinally, this paper finds that Tunisia's electoral reforms incrementally restricted the electoral system by limiting parties' and candidates' capacity to compete in elections. Through modifying legislation on campaign finance and subsidies, gender parity, and candidacy requirements, and finally abolishing Tunisia's closed list PR-system in 2022, reforms benefit established older parties and wealthier candidates while fortifying the electoral system against newer and less wealthy contenders. Tunisia's electoral reforms are inadequate in addressing governability and proportionality because restricting electoral competition alone cannot improve the quality of representation through political parties. Seit dem Arabischen Frühling wird Tunesiens demokratische Stabilität durch häufige Kabinettsumbildungen, politische Stagnation, und einer volatilen Parteienlandschaft gefährdet. Regierungsfähigkeit und Proportionalität sind wiederkehrende Herausforderungen geblieben. Obwohl in den Jahren 2014, 2017, 2019, und 2022 Wahlrechtsreformen durchgeführt wurden, konnten diese Probleme jedoch nicht tiefergehend behoben werden. Diese Analyse verfolgt daher zwei Leitfragen: Wie hat sich Tunesiens Wahlgesetzgebung seit 2011 verändert? Und warum konnten diese Reformen weder Regierungsfähigkeit noch Proportionalität in der politischen Repräsentation verbessern? Da die tunesische Parteienlandschaft hauptsächlich auf der säkularen Seite fragmentiert und volatil ist, werden Koalitionen sowohl mit als auch gegen die konservative Ennahda-Partei kostspielig für alle Beteiligten. Das vermindert die Repräsentationsfähigkeit vieler Parteien und begünstigt politische Gridlocks. Die Analyse des tunesischen Wahlrechts und dessen Verlauf zeigt auf, dass der Zugang zu politischem Wettbewerb zunehmend restriktiver wurde. Änderungen in der Gesetzgebung zur Finanzierung von Kampagnen, Genderparität, und den Voraussetzungen für Kandidaturen bringen Wettbewerbsvorteile für etabliertere und wohlhabendere Kandidaten und Parteien. Neuere Wettbewerber mit weniger finanziellen Ressourcen werden hingegen strukturell benachteiligt und so vom Wettbewerb ausgeschlossen. Tunesiens Wahlgesetzgebung trug daher wenig zur Verbesserung von Proportionalität und Regierungsfähigkeit bei, da eine restriktivere Wahlarena die durch intra-parteiliche Zersplitterung verminderte Repräsentationsfähigheit von Parteien nicht beheben kann.

Die russische Gesellschaft von heute lehnt den Einmarsch in die Ukraine nicht sichtbar ab. Es gibt weder Barrikaden noch Massenproteste auf den Straßen, selbst die Teilmobilmachung hat nicht zu einer offenen Konfrontation zwischen der Bevölkerung und den Behörden geführt. Trotz mehrerer aktiver Auswanderungswellen aus Russland schweigt die Mehrheit, wenn man den Umfragen der Soziologen des russischen Lewada-Zentrums Glauben schenken darf. Aber bedeutet dieses Schweigen auch Zustimmung und Unterstützung für den Krieg? In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die verschiedenen Formen des Protests, an denen sich die Russen beteiligen, wobei wir uns auf die weniger sichtbaren, "stillen" (und daher näher zu betrachtenden) Formen des Widerstands gegen das Regime konzentrieren. Dabei handelt es sich um kleine Akte des Dissenses, die im Allgemeinen individuell, spontan und unbewaffnet sind und in Räumen der alltäglichen Sozialisation stattfinden. Auch wenn es sich dabei nur um Worte oder Symbole handelt, sind sie nicht unbedeutend, da sie die Uneinigkeit mit den Machthabern demonstrieren.

Electoral authoritarian regimes have sought to use a variety of tactics to remain in power even as they have opened themselves up to competition through multiparty elections. These tactics have included an array of measures targeting opposition women. They became significant in Africa after the 1990s as most countries adopted multiparty systems and ruling parties needed to maintain vote share. Ruling parties in African authoritarian countries strengthened their patronage networks by promoting women as leaders. At the same time, women in opposition parties have fared poorly compared to women in ruling parties and male opposition candidates. This has been the case even where one finds the special dispensation of a gender quota in the form of reserved seats. This article looks at how Uganda’s ruling party has used various tactics to advance women leaders, responding to pressures from both the women’s movement and international actors while seeking to ensure its continued dominance. It reveals an essential feature of authoritarianism in Africa today, namely the instrumental use of women leaders to entrench the ruling party in power.

While women have increasingly gained access to the position of opposition leader, we still know very little about their pathways to that office. Therefore, this article seeks to uncover the dynamics and patterns that distinguish the ascendency of women politicians to the office of opposition leader from a comparative perspective. In this article, opposition leaders are understood as the parliamentary party group leaders of the largest non-governing party in a given legislative assembly, which marks the closest equivalent to the Westminster understanding of leaders of the opposition that continues to dominate international notions of opposition leaders and oppositional leadership in parliamentary democracies. We draw on data from opposition leaders in 28 parliamentary democracies between 1996–2020 to identify opportunity structures that allow women opposition leaders to emerge across countries. In addition, we test how factors on the individual level (e.g., previous experience in party and parliament as well as in government) and at the party level (e.g., ideology) affect the likelihood that a parliamentary opposition leader is a woman. Our analyses demonstrate that the share of women in parliament significantly increases the likelihood that at least one of the parliamentary opposition leaders of the past 25 years was a woman. Moreover, opposition leaders in leftist parties are more likely to be women than their more rightist counterparts. Surprisingly, and contrary to our expectations, previous political experience does not shape the probability of women becoming opposition leaders. Thus, overall, the institutional and ideological contexts of selecting parliamentary opposition leaders seem to matter more than the experience and qualifications of individual candidates.

A democracy is built on free and fair elections. India is one of the world's most populous democratic countries. In 2018, the Indian government launched a new electoral bonds scheme to fund elections. Electoral bonds influence election funding and make it easier for corporate entities to conceal political donations by concealing the bond’s buyer and beneficiary details. The new electoral bonds scheme lures companies and facilitates money laundering. The present article critically evaluates the electoral bonds scheme by analyzing the various acts and statutes. However, the Indian judiciary evaded its role as guardian of the constitution and final interpreter of the constitution by not deciding the cases pending in court. The scheme provides an unfair advantage to the ruling party. Anonymity and secrecy harm accountability in a democracy. The new election funding scheme undermines transparency and fair elections. This new election funding scheme has exacerbated the situation in Indian democracy. This new mechanism of election funding keeps voters in the dark about whether the governing party favors corporate donations.

This article explores the reasons behind the high economic and social rankings for Finland. It also refl ects on why Finland is considered the “happiest” country in the world (according to a World Happiness Report). Using empirical data from two studies – an article comparing high-andlow-tax countries, and the aforementioned recent World Happiness Report – it compares Finland with its Nordic neighbours and other Western, especially Anglo-American, countries. The essay outlines a so-called “Finnish model’ and looks for the roots of this model. Comparing measures in several dimensions – effort, culture, institutions, and economic and social outcomes – the essay tries to find characteristics that are particular for Finland. Education, innovation, and economic security, as well as trust, gender equality, resilient conflict solutions, and geo-historical luck, are crucial to Finland’s success. Three notable Germans – Luther, Hegel, and Marx – have influenced Finnish culture and society in different ways. Is Finland the country that comes closest to the ideal – “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (Marx, 1875).

The use of party cues is a fundamental process of how voters adopt policy preferences. While research has shown that party identification is an important driver of political attitudes in general and policy positions in particular, we know little about how negative party identification (identifying as an opponent to a party) impacts voters' political preferences. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by combining an experimental and observational empirical analysis of the effect of negative party identification on voters' issue preferences in the context of direct democratic decision‐making. First, we analyze a survey experiment conducted during a real‐world campaign on affordable housing for a popular ballot in Switzerland. Using continuous measures of party identification, we show a causal relationship between negative party identification and voters' policy preferences. Second, we use longitudinal observational data of vote choice on direct democratic policy proposals and show that voters adopt policy preferences that contrast with the policy positions of parties they oppose. In sum, the two complementary designs show that voters tend to position themselves not only in alignment with their preferred parties but also in opposition to parties with which they negatively identify. Furthermore, the results indicate that, when adopting policy preferences, negative cues may carry as much weight as positive party cues. Our analysis has important implications for understanding voters' adoption of policy preferences in general and specifically in the direct democratic context. Supplementary Files: https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/5702/2767

While growing attention has been devoted to candidates’ use of incivility in campaigns, its role in informing voters’ feelings toward candidates is still debated. This study embraces a constructionist perspective on incivility and focuses on the relationship between perceptions of candidate incivility and candidate sympathy. Its contribution is twofold. First, it extends incivility research generalizability by testing the association between voters’ perceptions of candidate incivility and candidate sympathy during three election campaigns beyond the US context. Second, it builds upon the notion of incivility as a norm violation and tests the hypothesis that perceptions of a candidate’s uncivil behavior are negatively associated with candidate sympathy when this behavior is inappropriate (i.e., it violates injunctive civility norms) and especially when it is uncommon (i.e., it violates descriptive civility norms). These interests are pursued through post‐electoral survey data collected in the Netherlands, Germany, and France. Findings show that incivility perceptions can, but not always, correspond to more negative feelings toward candidates. Furthermore, it is the incivility of candidates relative to that of their competitors that really counts for candidate sympathy. Supplementary Files: https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/5677/2795

The goal of this article is to explore the role of mobilization in the foreign policies of populists in power. To do so, we focus on the main features and changes of Bolivia’s foreign Policy under its populist president Evo Morales (2006-2019) with regard to its two most prominent conflictive bilateral relations, with the US and Chile. In both domains, Morales departed from the foreign policy of previous governments. By ending cooperation with the US, the Morales government sought to establish a sovereign counternarcotics policy in line with its core constituency’s demands of legalizing coca crops. On the key issue of relations with Chile seeking to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the Morales government exhibited more continuity initially. However, by referring the stalemated conflict to the International Court of Justice, Morales eventually changed his country’s approach to finding a resolution. Tracing Morales’ discourse over time reveals an intensification of populist as well as hostile rhetoric in periods of domestic political instability. Thus, our findings support the theoretical expectation of a particularly close link between domestic politics and foreign policy under populists in power. Thereby, populism may lead to a more conflictive foreign policy in some cases. However, neither does populist mobilization over foreign policy matters necessarily drive foreign policy change, nor does it preclude genuine bilateral dialogue.

Extant research has analysed the impact of security policies, truces and informal agreements on both the dynamics and traits of organized violence in El Salvador. However, less is understood about variation in the levels of lethal violence across subnational units. This article contributes to filling this gap. Based on a case study of the municipality of Chalatenango, the analysis shows that community organization and translocal dynamics are crucial to explaining violence containment. Local communities have managed to control the levels of lethal violence and deter criminal actors amid a national context characterized by state neglect and chronic violence. Community organization is not territorially bound but extends across transnational networks. Migrants are a source of livelihoods for the local population; they also contribute to providing public goods and participate in local forms of organization. Transnational networks have forged a migration corridor that enables immigration to the United States. In addition, community organization informally contributes to the capacity of the local state to perform its functions, thereby shaping cooperative state - society relations. This analysis sheds new light on the conditions shaping the variation in levels of violence at the subnational level and local governance dynamics.

Conspiracy mentality (CM), the general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories, has been linked to political behaviors, prejudice, and non‐compliance with public health guidelines. While there is increasing evidence that conspiracy beliefs are pervasive, research on individual‐level predictors of CM is scarce. Specifically, we identify three gaps in research: First, evidence on the question which individual‐level characteristics predict CM is inconsistent and often based on small samples. Second, personality, political, and religious predictors are usually examined in isolation. Third, differences on the societal level have been mostly neglected. In the present research, we gathered CAWI (Study 1) and CATI (Study 2) data on generalized interpersonal trust (GIT), right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), and religiosity in two politically and culturally different European countries, namely Germany (N = 2,760) and Poland (N = 2,651). This allowed for a well‐powered test of three theoretically relevant predictors of CM, including their unique predictive value. Moreover, we were able to explore whether these associations replicate across or are moderated by country context. Our findings underline the role of GIT and RWA in predicting CM in both countries. Analyses based on RWA subdimensions yielded a differentiated picture of the role of RWA. Furthermore, we found cross‐country differences with stronger associations of GIT and RWA with CM in Germany. Findings are discussed concerning political and religious differences between the examined countries.

Allianzen durch die Verbindung von Esoterik, Verschwörungsmythen und Rechtsextremismus, haben Konjunktur. Die sogenannte Anastasia-Bewegung ist ein solches Querfront-Phänomen. Verbindungen bestehen unter anderem durch unterschiedliche Verschwörungsmythen. Bislang war die Marginalisierung der Primärquellenanalyse im Forschungsbereich Anastasia auffällig. Daher wird im vorliegenden Auszug der Schwerpunkt auf dem Primärquellenstudium der deutschen Übersetzungen der Anastasia-Buchreihe liegen, um die Anschlussfähigkeit der Anastasia-Lehre an rechtsradikale Ideologeme, Strukturen und Netzwerke anhand der wichtigsten Bausteine zu untersuchen. Fokus des Artikels ist die analytische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anastasia-Lehre, welche Antigenderismus, Ethnopluralismus, Verschwörungsmythen und Antisemitismus beinhaltet. Die Bestandteile sind in ein übergeordnetes antisemitisches Verschwörungsnarrativ eingebettet. Alliances such as the combination of esotericism, conspiracy myths and rightwing extremism are booming. The so-called Anastasia movement is such a Querfront phenomenon. Connecting links of this alliance are recognizable, among other things, in different conspiracy ideologies. So far, the marginalization of primary source analysis in the Anastasia research field has been conspicuous. Therefore, in this excerpt, the emphasis will be on primary source study of the German translations of the Anastasia book series in order to examine the connectivity of Anastasia doctrine to radical right-wing ideologies, structures, and networks based on the most important elements. Focus of the article is the analytical examination of the Anastasia doctrine, which includes antigenderism, ethnopluralism, conspiracy myths, and antisemitism. The components are embedded in an overarching antisemitic conspiracy narrative.

Soziologische Zeitdiagnosen suggerieren, dass tiefgreifende gesellschaftliche Krisen wie die COVID-19-Pandemie unsere Wertorientierungen infrage stellen und auch relativ kurzfristig ändern könn(t)en. Von dieser Beobachtung ausgehend, wird untersucht, ob es in Österreich im Zeitraum Mai 2020 bis März/April 2021 zu signifikanten Verschiebungen von Wertprioritäten nach der Skala von Shalom Schwartz kam. Als Datenmaterial dienen die beiden ersten Wellen der Panelstudie Values in Crisis. Für die Interpretation der Ergebnisse sind zwei theoretische Annahmen zentral: erstens die These eines zunehmenden Konservatismus und zweitens die These der Wirkmacht politischer Diskurse in Zeiten des (wieder)aufkeimenden Populismus. Besondere Berücksichtigung findet im Beitrag zudem eine methodologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Wandel der Bedeutung von Fragebogenitems aufgrund der COVID-19-Pandemie. Die empirischen Analysen bestätigen - entgegen einigen aktuellen Zeitdiagnosen - eine deutliche Stabilität von Wertorientierungen. Verändert hat sich vor allem der Wert der Konformität, indem er für einen Teil der Bevölkerung wichtiger wurde; gleichzeitig verlor der Wunsch nach einer hedonistischen Lebensweise etwas an Bedeutung. Konformität wurde insbesondere für die Wähler*innen der Regierungsparteien wichtiger, während sich dieser Trend vor allem bei den Wähler*innen der FPÖ nicht zeigte. Da die beobachteten Verschiebungen von Wertprioritäten vor allem "pandemie-sensible" Wertedimensionen betreffen, lässt sich auf der Basis der vorliegenden Ergebnisse insgesamt eher von einer kurzfristigen Reaktion auf die Krise und weniger von einem längerfristigen Wertewandel ausgehen. Recent sociological diagnoses suggest that profound social crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic challenge our value orientations and could change them even in the relatively short term. Based on this observation, we investigate whether significant shifts in value priorities according to the Shalom Schwartz scale took place in Austria in the period May 2020 to March/April 2021. The first two waves of the Values in Crisis panel study serve as data material. Two theoretical assumptions are central to the interpretation of the results: first, the thesis of a trend toward conservatism and second, the thesis of the effective power of political discourses in times of (re)emerging populism. The article also pays special attention to a methodological discussion of changes in the meaning of questionnaire items due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The empirical analyses confirm a clear stability of value orientations. Above all, the value of conformity has changed, becoming more important for a significant part of the population; at the same time, the desire for a hedonistic lifestyle lost some of its importance. Conformity became more important, particularly for voters of the governing political parties, while this trend was not apparent, especially among voters of the FPÖ. Since the observed shift in value priorities mainly concerns “pandemic-sensitive” value dimensions, the results suggest a short-term reaction to the crisis rather than a long-term change in values.

Recently, scholars of populism have increasingly started to theorise and capture susceptibility to populism at the individual level. Most of these studies, however, focus on the consequences of populist attitudes on political behaviour. Less attention has been paid to the question of which citizens have high levels of populist attitudes and why. While some scholars argue that populist attitudes more resemble an unchangeable personality trait, meaning that individuals may be more or less populist, others argue that it is a response to outside grievances or discontent. The latter suggests that levels of populist attitudes are dynamic and may change if grievances are addressed (or remain unaddressed). We contribute to this literature by asking how discontent fuelled by unfulfilled policy preferences affects the level of populist attitudes. Following the conception of populism as a thin-centred ideology, we argue that high levels of populist attitudes are not connected with certain issues per se. Rather, our argument is that people are more populist when they feel poorly represented on policy issues that they care strongly about. This argument provides an explanation for the observation that even voters of non-populist parties sometimes show high levels of populist attitudes. We test the impact of policy discontent on populist attitudes using data from the GLES 2021 Pre-Election Cross Section survey by combining information on citizens’ issue specific discontent with the perceived salience of respective issues. The results are in line with our expectations: Individuals with higher policy discontent are more populist.

The authoritarian turn in Turkey compelled many citizens to change life trajectories which included extreme measures such as migration and exile. Thousands of people left Turkey in the last decade, this recent wave constituting one of the largest Turkish migrations to Europe and beyond. The profile of the migrants included those who were comfortable with and/or opposed the current regime's political and social policies, members of oppressed minority groups, Gülen movement members who are accused of orchestrating the failed 2016 coup attempt as well as white collar and secular Turkish citizens who made lifestyle migration choices because of the political and economic developments in the country. The article focuses on the narratives of a specific group within this new wave, those whom we refer to as Turkey's intelligentsia in exile, and who decided to leave Turkey following the Gezi protests in 2013. The findings are based on 25 interviews conducted in 2021 with former academics, activists, artists, journalists and politicians who migrated to a variety of locations as a result of pending trials or arrest warrants against them, dehumanization discourse that pro-regime politicians directed toward them, as well as lack of freedom of speech and assembly.

How do welfare state policies affect the political support for environmental action of economically vulnerable social groups? Two competing hypotheses can be delineated. On the one hand, a synergy logic would imply that welfare state generosity is associated with higher support for environmental action among economically vulnerable groups due to the insecurity reducing effects of the welfare state. On the other hand, a crowding-out logic would suggest that welfare state generosity is associated with lower support for other policy priorities like environmental action. We test these two hypotheses using 2019 Eurobarometer survey data and country-level indicators of welfare state generosity in 22 European countries. We find that the working class and the elderly are particularly opposed to individual and national environmental action and that the welfare state plays a complex moderating role. Consistent with a synergy logic, welfare state generosity increases pro-environmental behaviour among the working class, but its association with more positive attitudes towards national environmental policies is less strong. Consistent with a crowding-out logic, the elderly appear less likely to behave in environmentally friendly ways if retirement benefits are high. To explore the mechanisms behind this association, we show that the working class who struggle to pay their bills are most opposed to environmental action. Overall, economic insecurities are key obstacles for support of environmental actions and the effects of the welfare state depend both on which social group is concerned and whether individual behaviour versus policy preferences are considered.

Der Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung der Wählerschaft von Bündnis90/Die Grünen seit der Gründung der Partei. Die Datengrundlage bilden die kumulierten ALLBUS-Erhebungen der Jahre 1980-2018. Über den Untersuchungszeitraum hinweg zeigt sich für Westdeutschland ein steigender Trend in der Unterstützung von Bündnis90/Die Grünen. Mittels einer hierarchischen Alter-Perioden-Kohorten-Analyse mit fixen Kohorteneffekten (HAPK-FC) wird gezeigt, dass die Unterstützung für Bündnis90/Die Grünen in der Generationenfolge zunimmt. Lebenszykluseffekte existieren hingegen nicht. Darüber hinaus lässt sich ein positiver Effekt der Zugehörigkeit zur sozialen und kulturellen Dienstklasse auf die Wahl der Grünen nachweisen. In abgeschwächter Form zeigen sich diese Befunde auch in Ostdeutschland. This article examines the development of the electorate of Alliance90/The Greens since the party's founding. The data basis was formed by the cumulative German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) surveys from 1980 to 2018. Over the period under investigation, an increasing trend in support for Alliance90/The Greens emerged for western Germany. Using a hierarchical age - period - cohort analysis with fixed cohort effects, it is shown that support for Alliance90/The Greens increased with the succession of generations. Life cycle effects, on the other hand, are not observed. Furthermore, a positive effect of belonging to the social and cultural service class and voting for the Green Party can be demonstrated. In a weakened form, these findings are also evident in eastern Germany.