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Ratings of perceptual experience on a trial-by-trial basis are increasingly used in masked priming studies to assess prime awareness. It is argued that such subjective ratings more adequately capture the content of phenomenal consciousness compared to the standard objective psychophysical measures obtained in a session after the priming experiment. However, the concurrent implementation of the ratings within the priming experiment might alter magnitude and processes underlying semantic priming, because participants try to identify the masked prime. In the present study, we therefore compared masked semantic priming effects assessed within the classical sequential procedure, in which prime identification is psychophysically assessed after the priming experiment, with those obtained in a condition, in which prime awareness is rated within the priming experiment. Two groups of participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT) on targets preceded by masked primes of 20, 40, or 60 ms durations, to induce the variability of prime awareness. One group additionally rated prime visibility trials-wise using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), whereas the other group only performed the LDT. Analysis of reaction times (RTs) as well as drift diffusion modeling revealed general priming effects on RT and drift rate only in the PAS-absent group. In the PAS-present group, residual priming effects on RT and the non-decisional component t0 were obtained for trials with rated prime awareness. This shows that assessing subjective perceptual experience on a trial-by-trial basis heavily interferes with semantic processes underlying masked priming, presumably due to attentional demands associated with concurrent prime identification.

For a very long time, theorizing in the cognitive sciences was dominated by the assumption that abstract concepts, which lack a perceivable referent, can only be handled by amodal or verbal linguistic representations. In the last years, however, refined grounded cognition theories emphasizing the importance of emotional and introspective information for abstract concepts, in addition to verbal associations and sensorimotor information, have received increasing support. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence with regard to the processing of concrete and abstract concepts. Based on this literature review, we argue that abstract concepts should not be treated as a homogenous conceptual category, whose meaning is established by one single specific type of representation. Instead, depending on the feature composition, there are different subgroups of abstract concepts, including those with strong relations to vision or action, which are represented in the visual and motor brain systems similar to concrete concepts. The reviewed findings with regard to concrete and abstract concepts can be accommodated best by hybrid theories of conceptual representation assuming an interaction between modality-specific, multimodal and amodal hub areas.

Unlike classical theories of automaticity, refined theories suggest that unconscious automatic processes depend on cognitive control settings. Cognitive control influences on unconscious word and object processing are well documented, but corresponding findings in the field of face processing are heterogeneous. The present study therefore investigated, whether subliminal face priming in a gender categorization task is susceptible to feature-specific attention. Participants performed a gender decision task by orthogonally varying gender congruency (prime-target: same vs. different gender) and emotion congruency (prime-target: same vs. different emotional facial expression) using a masked priming paradigm. Perceptual vs. emotional induction tasks, performed prior to prime presentation, served to activate corresponding attentional task sets. Subliminal gender priming (faster reactions to gender-congruent primes) differed as a function of induction task and emotional congruency. Following perceptual induction, gender priming was only obtained in the emotionally congruent condition, whereas following emotional induction gender priming was observed independently of emotional congruency. In line with the classical notion of automaticity, subliminal gender priming did not depend on a specific attentional focus. However, attention to shape facilitated subliminal processing of task-irrelevant emotional facial expressions. Most likely, mutual facilitation of emotionally congruent prime and target representations enhanced gender priming compared with emotionally incongruent pairings.

The relation of abstract concepts to the modality-specific systems is discussed controversially. According to classical approaches, the semantic content of abstract concepts can only be coded by amodal or verbal-symbolic representations distinct from the sensory and motor systems, because abstract concepts lack a clear physical referent. Grounded cognition theories, in contrast, propose that abstract concepts do not depend only on the verbal system, but also on a variety of modal systems involving perception, action, emotion and internal states. In order to contribute to this debate, we investigated the semantic content of abstract concepts using a property generation task. Participants were asked to generate properties for 296 abstract concepts, which are relevant for constituting their meaning. These properties were categorized by a coding-scheme making a classification into modality-specific and verbal contents possible. Words were additionally rated with regard to concreteness/abstractness and familiarity. To identify possible subgroups of abstract concepts with distinct profiles of generated features, hierarchical cluster analyses were conducted. Participants generated a substantial proportion of introspective, affective, social, sensory and motor-related properties, in addition to verbal associations. Cluster analyses revealed different subcategories of abstract concepts, which can be characterized by the dominance of certain conceptual features. The present results are therefore compatible with grounded cognition theories, which emphasize the importance of linguistic, social, introspective and affective experiential information for the representation of abstract concepts. Our findings also indicate that abstract concepts are highly heterogeneous requiring the investigation of well-specified subcategories of abstract concepts, for instance as revealed by the present cluster analyses. The present study could thus guide future behavioral or imaging work further elucidating the representation of abstract concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]