Search

Conditional multi‐item promotions are a prevalent marketing tactic whereby consumers have to buy a certain number of products to get a discount. This paper examines how framing a multi‐item promotion in terms of savings on multiple items versus a single item (e.g., “buy two, get X% off on both” vs. “buy two, get 2X% off on the cheaper item”) affects consumers’ decision‐making and product choices. Two laboratory studies and a field study at a boutique clothing store demonstrate that the “2X% on cheaper” framing makes consumers more likely to select similarly priced primary and secondary items. This strategy is driven by increased focus on promotional savings under the “2X% on cheaper” framing, which leads consumers to spend more on their secondary items. Overall, this research shows how a subtle change in the framing of multi‐item promotions changes consumers’ product selection strategies and shopping basket composition.

Consumers often have to make trade‐offs between desirable, “more is better”, and undesirable, “less is better”, attributes. What drives whether the desirable or the undesirable attributes will be weighed more heavily in decisions? We show that the extent to which consumers focus on desirable versus undesirable attributes depends on the overall attractiveness of their consideration sets. The less attractive the options under consideration are – the higher is the weight allocated to undesirable attributes, such as price. Three experiments set in the contexts of lottery ticket purchasing (study 1), hotel booking (study 2), elections (study 3), and a conjoint study of online course evaluations (study 4) (N = 2,149, p‐curve power estimate 90%), demonstrate that unattractive sets increase the relative weight of “undesirable” attributes (e.g. price of a product, workload of a course); and lead to increased preference for options superior on these attributes.

Consumers’ price evaluations are influenced by the left-digit bias, wherein consumers judge the difference between $4.00 and $2.99 to be larger than that between $4.01 and $3.00, even though the numeric differences are identical. This research examines when and why consumers are more likely to fall prey to the left-digit bias. The authors propose that the left-digit bias is stronger in stimulus-based price evaluations, wherein people see the focal price and the reference price side by side, and weaker in memory-based price evaluations, wherein people have to retrieve at least one price from memory. This is because in stimulus-based price evaluations, people tend to rely on perceptual representations of prices without rounding them. In memory-based price evaluations, they rely more on conceptual representations, which makes them more likely to round the prices. Results from six studies—five experiments and a scanner panel study—support the hypothesis that the left-digit bias is stronger in stimulus-based evaluations. These results inform managers about when to use left-digit pricing and characterize fundamental differences between stimulus-based and memory-based evaluations.

The target article by John Jost (2017 – this issue) focuses on political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatism) and its association with personal characteristics, cognitive processing style, and motivational interests. Jost's arguments and data are very compelling and will inspire consumer psychologists to do more research in the political domain. To enable this goal further, we complement the target article by focusing on partisanship, another major determinant of political judgments and decisions. Whereas political ideology refers to people being more liberal or conservative, partisanship refers to how strongly people identify with a specific political party (e.g., Republicans or Democrats). In reviewing the literature on partisanship, we concentrate on voting behaviors and attitudes, an area not addressed by Jost, but of great importance for consumer psychologists given the large expenditures on political advertising. Adding to Jost's discussion of the link between political ideology and systematic processing, we examine the interplay between these two constructs and partisanship.

Contains fulltext : 228242.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Drawing on the concept of a gale of creative destruction in a capitalistic economy, we argue that initiatives to assess the robustness of findings in the organizational literature should aim to simultaneously test competing ideas operating in the same theoretical space. In other words, replication efforts should seek not just to support or question the original findings, but also to replace them with revised, stronger theories with greater explanatory power. Achieving this will typically require adding new measures, conditions, and subject populations to research designs, in order to carry out conceptual tests of multiple theories in addition to directly replicating the original findings. To illustrate the value of the creative destruction approach for theory pruning in organizational scholarship, we describe recent replication initiatives re-examining culture and work morality, working parents’ reasoning about day care options, and gender discrimination in hiring decisions. Significance statement It is becoming increasingly clear that many, if not most, published research findings across scientific fields are not readily replicable when the same method is repeated. Although extremely valuable, failed replications risk leaving a theoretical void - reducing confidence the original theoretical prediction is true, but not replacing it with positive evidence in favor of an alternative theory. We introduce the creative destruction approach to replication, which combines theory pruning methods from the field of management with emerging best practices from the open science movement, with the aim of making replications as generative as possible. In effect, we advocate for a Replication 2.0 movement in which the goal shifts from checking on the reliability of past findings to actively engaging in competitive theory testing and theory building. Scientific transparency statement The materials, code, and data for this article are posted publicly on the Open Science Framework, with links provided in the article. 19 p.

People can make decisions by choosing or by rejecting alternatives. This research shows that changing a task from choice to rejection makes people more likely to rely on deliberative processing, what we label the task-type effect. To demonstrate this effect, we use a set of established decision biases that can be attenuated under deliberative processing. We show that changing a task from choice to rejection makes people express more consistent preferences between safe and risky options in the Asian disease problem (study 1A) and in financial decision making (study 1B), even with real monetary consequences (study 1C). Further, switching a task from choice to rejection increases the quality of consideration sets in the context of hotel reviews (study 2) and leads to more rational decisions in the context of cell phone plan selection (study 3). Studies 4 and 5 tap into the process underlying the effect of task type. We demonstrate that a rejection task produces decisions similar to those observed in a choice task when decision makers are cognitively depleted (study 4) or encouraged to rely on their feelings (study 5). The findings provide insight into the effect of task type on deliberation and decision outcomes.

We present the data from a crowdsourced project seeking to replicate findings in independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. In this Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) initiative, 25 research groups attempted to replicate 10 moral judgment effects from a single laboratory’s research pipeline of unpublished findings. The 10 effects were investigated using online/lab surveys containing psychological manipulations (vignettes) followed by questionnaires. Results revealed a mix of reliable, unreliable, and culturally moderated findings. Unlike any previous replication project, this dataset includes the data from not only the replications but also from the original studies, creating a unique corpus that researchers can use to better understand reproducibility and irreproducibility in science.

This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientific research, in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative final results. To illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted replications of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had 'in the pipeline' as of August 2014. Six findings replicated according to all replication criteria, one finding replicated but with a significantly smaller effect size than the original, one finding replicated consistently in the original culture but not outside of it, and two findings failed to find support. In total, 40% of the original findings failed at least one major replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication on a large scale are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)