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This Article uses a massive collection of data to document, for the first time, the interplay between the substantive subject areas, the intensity, and the procedural complexity of federal civil litigation. The results indicate that like substance, intensity and complexity are pivotal features of litigation. These findings suggest that what might be termed "our uniformity"--the de jure uniform applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other procedural law--should be understood as a broader phenomenon than the traditional focus on transsubstantivity. The Article documents extensive variation in measures of intensity and complexity among cases sharing the same broad substantive legal subject matter, such that intensity and complexity may vary more importantly within than across substantive areas. For example, it is true that patent cases have comparatively high average intensity as measured by their numbers of docket entries, but there are also plenty of patent cases that terminate without having enormous docket activity. It is also true that patent cases are much more likely than, say, contract cases to be extremely intense, but because there are so many more contract than patent cases, my data have nearly twice as many highly intense contract cases as highly intense patent cases. The Article's twin key conclusions are, thus: (1) even for cases in areas thought to be especially intense or complex, there are cases with both high and low intensity and complexity, and (2) intensity and complexity are transsubstantive--e.g., there are highly intense and highly complex cases in most substantive areas of litigation, not just the usual suspects such as patents, antitrust, or securities. The Article closes by treading gingerly into normative waters. One unavoidable consequence of our uniformity with respect to formal procedural rules is that judges exercise enormous case-level discretion. Further, in part due to legislative forays in the securities and patent arenas, we have some degree of substance-specificity in our procedure. The Article suggests considering formal procedural tracking as an alternative to each of these approaches. That approach, which has been suggested in the past and is used in some states and other countries, might allow us to break out of some of our ossified debates about matters such as the rancor set off by the pleading revolution the Supreme Court effected a decade and a half ago in Twombly and Iqbal. If the plausibility standard is here to stay because of its role in limiting intense and complex litigation, perhaps it could be revisited in simpler cases that don't pose the challenges the Supreme Court first flagged in Twombly. Whether this is possible depends on our capacity to identify cases' likely intensity and/or complexity early in the litigation life cycle, which is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. Still, we ought to consider the possibility of a certification process for intense, complex cases, like the one we have for class actions, so that procedure might be adjusted where doing so makes sense. The Article's contributions include its use of docket-level data on more than 500,000 cases whose dockets could be followed for at least seven years. In addition, the Article offers a novel approach to measuring procedural complexity by showing how links between entries in docket reports may be viewed as mathematical networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Google Android and Google Search (Shopping), along with other ongoing digital market antitrust enforcement actions like United States v. Google LLC, are based on foreclosure conduct that has raised difficult doctrinal questions for courts, regulators, and scholars. This emerging form of foreclosure, which some have termed "cognitive foreclosure" because of its behavioural economic foundations, has encountered difficulties in being conceptually subsumed under existing antitrust frameworks. Yet as a demand-side market failure, enforcers and scholars must be cautious about automatically categorising these market failures as antitrust issues, given that such market failures are usually governed by the more de-minimis consumer protection regime. This Article proffers a new legal test to aid courts and regulators in appropriately "identifying" behavioural market failures that would justify antitrust scrutiny. The test's limits are subsequently justified from moral hazard perspectives given the potential reduction in societal rationality due to antitrust over-enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The burden of proof to determine the “reasonable probability” that a merger violates Section 7 is not clear. Using the insightful puzzlement expressed by the court in the recent Bertelsmann merger case as a starting point, this short article explains the confusion arising from the fact that the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff is to show that it is at least “more likely than not” that a merger “may be” substantially to lessen competition. This amounts to a standard that requires establishing a sufficient probability of exceeding another specific probability—that is, a “probability of a probability.” Analysis of the legislative history of Section 7, merger case law, and the record of recent merger enforcement suggests that false negatives (including under-deterrence) should be seen as raising greater competitive concerns than false positives (including over-deterrence), whereas Section 2 tends to worry more about false positives than false negatives. This analysis also suggests that the Section 7 “reasonable probability” standard (along with variants such as “appreciable danger” and “reasonable likelihood”) should not require the plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy a more-likely-than-not probability standard. The plaintiff should have a lower evidentiary bar, one that is limited to showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the merger “may be” likely to substantially lessen competition, which amounts to a more interventionist standard. Similarly, the standard of proof for potential entry mergers of “noticeably more than fifty percent” applied by the court in the FTC’s Meta-Within merger case makes no economic sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses changes in the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division's policy regarding pre-indictment "pitch" meetings, where parties recommended for criminal prosecution present their position to prosecutors. It explores the historic availability of these meetings and recent policy shifts, highlighting the benefits of such meetings in enhancing transparency, credibility, and the strength of cases.

The article explores the phenomenon of "litigating the fix" (LTF) in merger cases, where merging firms seek judicial approval of remedy proposals rejected by antitrust agencies. It outlines recent trends in LTF cases and discusses various outcomes, including deal abandonment, failed LTF attempts, and successful LTF with or without additional relief. The agencies mixed track record in LTF trials is also highlighted.

The article descrbes the case of fictional student-athlete Peter Playmaker who is able to make money off his Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL). Topics discussed include an overview of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) as an institution, prominent NCAA cases, and how NIL provides a viable, less restrictive alternative that helps to tip the scales in favor of the NCAA in an antitrust rule of reason analysis.

In 2014, I published a pair of articles—Administrative Antitrust and Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust—that argued that the Supreme Court’s recent antitrust and administrative law jurisprudence was pushing antitrust law out of the judicial domain and into the domain of regulatory agencies. The first article focused on the Court’s then-recent antitrust cases and argued that the Court, which had abrogated most areas of federal common law, had shown a clear preference for handling commonlaw-like antitrust law on a statutory or regulatory basis where possible. The second article evaluated and rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) long-held belief that its interpretations of the FTC Act do not receive Chevron deference. This Article will revisit those articles in light of the past decade of Supreme Court precedent. In reviewing those articles, this Article will argue that, for the same reasons that the Court seemed likely in 2013 to embrace an administrative approach to antitrust, today it is likely to view such approaches with great skepticism unless they are undertaken on a cautious and incrementalistic basis. That is, the Court will embrace an administrative approach to antitrust where it will prove less indeterminate than judicially defined antitrust law. If the FTC approaches antitrust law aggressively, decreasing the predictability of the law, the Court seems likely to close the door on administrative antitrust for reasons sounding in both administrative and antitrust law. This conclusion differs from other current work examining the Commission’s authority—such as on major questions grounds or whether the Commission has substantive “unfair methods of competition” rulemaking authority—in that it is primarily based on the Court’s views on the relationship of antitrust and administrative law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article explores the history of Hollywood and the regulations the industry and its executives were forced to follow. Such regulations, specifically those established through the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (i.e., The Paramount Decrees), were rooted in Anti-Trust laws. The United States Department of Justice sought to end the near monopolistic reign of major film studios in Hollywood. Recently, the Decrees have been terminated. However, with streaming services gaining similar control over the industry, the decision to end the control of the Decrees should be reconsidered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Case C-252/21 Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt, Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) of 4 July 2023 (ECLI:EU:C:2023:537) Case C-252/21 Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt dealt with a number of important questions regarding the relationship between data protection and competition law, as well the lawfulness, from the standpoint of the Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1, of the processing of personal data from third party online sources. This case note summarises the judgement and reflects, in the commentary, on Big Tech's reliance on consent as a lawful ground for processing, on the opportunities of using data protection as a benchmark in competition law and finally, on challenges of seeing data protection through the prism of competition law in the online context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The CK Telecoms judgement shed the light on the difficulties to apprehend unilateral effects, aka insufficient individual rivalry, in the context of a merger. This paper examines the overall European competition law framework applicable to these effects. After underlining the difficulties related to their apprehension by the competition authorities, the adequacy of the solely ex ante-based European competition regime will be assessed as well as the use of the New Competition Tool as an option to solve the identified drawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the biggest problems faced by consumers seeking redress for financial harm is the prohibitive expense and impracticality of bringing low-value individual legal proceedings. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 introduced a new regime for collective redress for competition law infringements whereby for the first time, claims may be brought on an opt-out basis. The new regime was examined by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Merricks v Mastercard. The Mastercard claim raises important questions about consumer remedies, access to justice, litigation funding and practical enforcement issues. This paper examines the decision through the lens of behavioural science, seeking insights into the availability and accessibility of redress for consumers and considering the implications for the regulation of lenders in the future. The influence of behavioural science on the development of the law is reviewed, the progress of the Mastercard claim and the Supreme Court's decision is analysed, and some conclusions are proposed about possible future developments and the effectiveness of the collective redress regime from a behavioural perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2009, the European Commission accused Microsoft of extending its monopoly from the operating system market to the browsers market by preinstalling Internet Explorer (IE) and setting it as the users' default. Microsoft settled the case agreeing to display a choice screen to its users located in the European Economic Area, Croatia, and Switzerland, whose default web browser was Internet Explorer. The remedy would allow Microsoft's users to freely choose whatever internet browser they preferred. After March 2010, IE's market share did go down in the EEA, Croatia, and Switzerland. It seems straightforward to attribute IE's decline to the choice screen itself. However, when considering other developed jurisdictions as a comparison group, the impact of the choice screen on IE's market share is negligible (roughly, between 1.4 and 2 percent). This finding invites us to assess the potential causes of default effects and the effectiveness of strategies that analysts, policymakers, and enforcers have assumed to be effective. This work argues that the theory of harm and the remedies that may address consumers' inertia should be re-examined. Primarily, which types of consumers may stick to default applications, whether choice screens may change the users' preferences after they have familiarized themselves with an experience good, whether choice screens have so far facilitated the development of competing applications, as well as the reach of choice screens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a general framework for courts and agencies to use in confronting practices and transactions in platform cases. It discusses litigation evidence, economic theory to explain why the approach and reasoning of the Amex decision. It offers some practical suggestions for courts and legislators to help Amex behind us and right the ship of platform antitrust.

Among the factors of court performance—a crucial element of the institutional environment for a well-functioning market economy—productivity (disposition time) and adjudicatory quality (minimum legal errors) are significant. This paper investigates presumed quantity-quality tradeoff in Russian commercial courts when considering claims to annul administrative infringement decisions, on the example of antitrust cases. Using a dataset of the first instance court decisions regarding claims to annul decisions of Russian competition authority during 2008–2015, we explore the influence of extra efforts by a judge to assess the evidence on the probability of appealing and annulling her decision. The effect is not found to be statistically significant which means the absence of adjudicatory quantity-quality tradeoff. We discuss then the implications of the finding to the rules for additional evidence presented in the courts when considering a case. We conclude, first, that in Russia the rules on reasonable disposition time and the motivation of judges to prevent backlog do not increase the probability of legal errors. Second, new evidence acquired during judicial review does not statistically improve the legal quality of court decisions. The policy implication is that the recent initiative of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to limit additional evidence when considering claims to annul administrative antitrust decisions is reasonable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lower courts have long struggled to interpret and apply the professional baseball antitrust exemption created by the Supreme Court. Some courts have interpreted the antitrust exemption broadly, and others have interpreted it very narrowly. Given the MLB's recent potentially anticompetitive behavior related to sports data, it could find itself facing an antitrust suit. This Note suggests that district courts should adopt a narrow interpretation of the baseball antitrust exemption and argues that even under the broadest interpretation of the baseball antitrust exemption, the actions of the MLB do not fall within the scope of the exemption. This Note also argues that the collection and distribution of sports data is an independent industry wholly collateral to the game of baseball and, therefore, outside the scope of the professional baseball antitrust exemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case in which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a district court ruling stating that the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) limiting education-related compensation violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In the case NCAA v. Alston, the NCAA's restrictions on compensation unrelated to education. Also cited is the ruling in the case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.

Private cartel damages litigation is on the rise in Europe since early 2000. This development has been initiated by the European courts and was supported by various policy initiatives of the European Commission, which found its culmination in the implementation of the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages end of 2016. This article explores the impact of this reform process on effective compensation of damaged parties of cartel infringements. For that purpose, we analyse all European cartel cases with a decision date between 2001 and 2015, for which we analyse litigation activity and speed. Overall, we find a substantial reduction of the time until the first settlement (increase in litigation speed) together with a persisting high share of cases being litigated (high litigation activity). This supports the view that the reform not only increased the claimant's expectation about the amount of damages being awarded but also resulted in an alignment in the expectations of claimants and defendants in the final damages amount, ie the European Commission succeeded in reaching its objective to clarify and harmonize legal concepts across Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antitrust class actions involve extremely high stakes and are vigorously contested by the parties. In particular, motions for class certification are invariably hard fought and increasingly turn on the question of whether plaintiffs can use multiple regression analyses and other statistical techniques to demonstrate that the impact of the alleged antitrust violation on class members and the damages they have suffered on account of the violation can be shown with proof that is common to all class members and that predominates over any individual questions. This Essay discusses the Supreme Court 's decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v . Bouaphakeo, a class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), in which the Court upheld the plaintiffs' use Of statistical evidence to satisfy the predominance requirement of Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and to prove damages to the class at trial. This Essay demonstrates that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tyson Foods applies with equal force outside of the FLSA context and is particularly well suited to antitrust cases. It focuses on why properly specified regression analyses, which calculate industry-wide overcharges and detect the probability that the overcharges were widespread, are relevant and probative in antitrust actions. Regression analyses can also be used to measure aggregate damages sustained by the class. These analyses and other statistical evidence can help courts and juries reach more well-informed decisions, and the allowance of such evidence promotes the strong public policy in favor of enforcement of the antitrust laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antitrust law makes it illegal For dominant firms to use their Success to impede the Competitive markets, but who Defines "impede" and "competitive?" Today's column steps back from the fray and characterizes the strengths and weaknesses of the present system. The discussion aims at somebody who wants to understand the status quo, and why the present system works sometimes, and why proposals might want to change it. It is possible to illustrate many basic features of the U.S. approach to antitrust by comparing a settled lawsuit against a pending case. The settled case is the historical case against Microsoft. More than two decades ago, Microsoft fought a high-profile federal case over the governance of its PC operating system. It can be compared with the pending case against Alphabet, who owns and operates Google, the dominant search engine. A federal suit seeks to end exclusive deals that Google makes with others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A trend in litigation is rapidly emerging in the EU market, where the actions of holders of exclusive rights are restricted based on the existing economic approach of EU competition law to intellectual property rights. This fact presupposes the need to examine this economic approach and determine whether the actions of holders of exclusive rights are restricted disproportionately, without regard to the potential consequences of such restrictions and the existing benefits of intellectual property rights. This article addresses the problems of the economic approach of EU competition law to intellectual property rights, which make it highly likely that the current actions of holders of exclusive rights are restricted disproportionately at the expense of innovations in favour of the existing effective competition. This article also aims to develop an alternative and more dynamic economic approach of EU competition law to intellectual property rights, which could justify the actions of holders of exclusive rights not only in terms of elements relevant to EU competition law, but also in terms of the benefit of the existing system of intellectual property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a market-based compensation approach to antitrust litigation and other cases of price overcharges. Instead of lump-sum compensation, paid either directly or through coupons, defendants are required to lower their prices for a certain designated period, i.e. price-cap compensation (PCC). We show why previous criticism of PCC was misguided. And, in sharp contrast to the common view in the literature, implementing PCC may have many substantive and procedural advantages. Importantly, although PCC is implemented vis-à-vis direct purchasers only, it reconciles the U.S. and European Union legal approaches and solves the challenge of passed-on damages to indirect purchasers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this piece lies with extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of the application of the EU competition provisions. Whereas the doctrine of effects has been established in the context of US antitrust law more than 50 years ago, it has not been until recently that the ECJ confirmed such an approach for the establishment of the jurisdiction of the EU competition provisions in its judgement in Intel. However, the latter decision has not been without criticism, as the ECJ put together different sets of abusive conduct and assessed Intel's behaviour in its entirety. For that reason, also conduct with an arguably very tenuous link to the EU/EEA, that is, behaviour between Intel in the US and Lenovo in China was considered in the Court's judgement. Hence, this article aims to critically analyse the ECJ's decision, also taking into account the first-instance ruling of the General Court as well as the AG opinion. It will conclude that considering other concepts developed in the context of the competition provisions, the ECJ's reasoning seems sound. Furthermore, the adoption of the qualified effects test seems also welcome in order to meet the challenges imposed by our global economy and digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for a new understanding of what constitutes "procedural justice" in EU competition law enforcement. This is done via an exploration of the concept of procedural justice, followed by a synthetization of this concept with the conceptual underpinnings of EU competition law. The modern realities of EU competition law are then examined, with a particular focus on the Commission's approach to Google. The general thrust of the argument presented is that considering the nature of the problems facing the Commission, it is not necessary, as a matter of justice, to consider large tech firms as being endowed with a huge panoply of procedural justice rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers comments on the critical aspects of the calculation of reasonable royalties and injunctive relief, specifically standard-essential patents from the perspective of U.S. patent and antitrust litigation. It examines a three-step methodology for calculating reasonable royalties, with a focus on the difficulties with incremental value. Methodologies for identifying fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties are also discussed.

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In a patent infringement suit, the alleged infringer wins with a ruling of either invalidity or non-infringement, and may strictly prefer either outcome. Invalidity may increase current-period competition, but removes constraints to future innovation. We adapt the Segal and Whinston (Am Econ Rev 97(5):1703–1730, 2007) model, and show that a legal regime that considers infringement before validity maximizes the entrant patentee's innovation incentives. But the incumbent alleged infringer may prefer litigating validity first if the future blocking effect of validity is strong. This litigation strategy effect may reduce innovation levels. Antitrust policy should seek to attenuate this effect by reducing the advantage to incumbency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in American Needle v. National Football League. etal. were to be summarized in a single sports headline, it might well read, "American Needle Kicks Three Field Goals; Shuts Out NFL 9-0." In a relatively rare venture into antitrust permissibility in the sports industry, the nine Supreme Court justices handed plaintiff American Needle a unanimous win and gave a small Illinois embroidery company a chance to try its case against the National Football League (NFL) in federal court on remand. At the crux of the case lay an issue central to all of sports law--whether a league, in this case the NFL, should be (a) deemed a "single entity" and granted antitrust immunity for certain claims arising under Section I of the Sherman Act or (b) characterized as a joint venture of individual teams that compete against each other. For many years, American Needle had a contract to produce apparel for NFL teams. The contract was not renewed when the NFL partnered with a sole licensee, Reebok, in 2000. American Needle filed suit alleging that the exclusive NFL-Reebok merchandising contract represented an illegal restraint of trade under antitrust laws. The NFL defended against the lawsuit by arguing that the league, its affiliates, and teams were a single entity and, in turn, shielded from such antitrust inquiry. The purpose of this legal case brief is twofold. First, it will provide an overview of the decision and summarize the underlying legal rationale and doctrines. Second, it will discuss how the American Needle opinion may affect the sports industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study of the emergence of the film industry in the U.S. between 1893 and 1920 contributes to the growing literature linking legal environments and population dynamics. This was an era characterized by a shift to active anti-trust policy, which manifested itself in legal action to disband a trust that had dominated the industry, the Motion Pictures Patents Corporation (MPPC). We use archival data to show that mortality was reduced by trust membership and increased with the market share of the trust members. The effects of litigation are varied, with litigation filed by trust members enhancing mortality and litigation filed against trust members decreasing mortality. Analysis of coded headlines from media reports on the emerging industry shows that a shift in the view of the trust in the normative environment toward a more negative view was also associated with decreased mortality. Results also show that learning and the compensatory fitness enjoyed before anti-trust law was enforced prevented the MPPC members from recognizing changes in the marketplace; as a result, they were less likely to move from making short films to making increasingly popular feature-length films. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the history of, and addresses certain perceived procedural misunderstandings in, Hush-A-Phone v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1956) and its progeny In re Carterfone (F.C.C. 1968) to illuminate what the Hush-A-Phone Corporation actually did in its dispute with AT&T prior to the breakup of AT&T's century-long telephone monopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An arrangement to fix, control or maintain prices is the classic competition law per se offence, and is deemed to substantially lessen competition under s 30 of the Commerce Act 1986. However, it is currently unclear when arrangements that do not explicitly concern price fall within the ambit of s 30. This article examines the recent Court of Appeal decision in Commerce Commission v Lodge Real Estate Ltd which found that the defendants were liable under the per se offence provisions.1 It contends that the Court of Appeal took the overseas case law out of context, misunderstood key factual findings made by the High Court at first instance and overlooked important legal and policy considerations. As a result it is argued that Lodge sets an unfortunate precedent that should be overruled or strictly confined to its own facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the distinction between unlawful behavior and antitrust abuse and, on the other hand, questions the necessary causality between infringement of the law and abuse of market power in Germany. The view of the consent to the use of data as a competitive factor with relevant asset is also addressed.

The article discusses opinions written by U.S. Judge Richard Posner about antitrust law. Topics include the notion of vertical restraints on distribution, Posner's assessments of resale price maintenance (RPM) regulation, and Posner's opinions in cases including In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, Jack Walters & Sons Corp v Morton Building, Inc., and USA Petroleum Co v Atlantic Richfield Co (ARCO).

The article focuses on a court case of German court Bundeskartellamt wherein the plaintiff has filed a case against social networking company Facebook on the grounds of violating data protection laws. Topics discussed include relationship between data protection and antitrust laws, and prohibition on antitrust laws.

The US Supreme Court ruling in American Express marks a breakthrough for antitrust enforcement in two-sided markets. Not surprisingly, the ruling has sparked lively discussions in the antitrust law and economics community. The majority of the Court argues that if both groups of players are needed to participate simultaneously for a transaction to occur, then both sides of the platform must be included when defining the relevant market. Furthermore, indirect network effects must be duly considered when carrying out antitrust analysis of transaction platforms. Hence, no inference of anti-competitive effects can be derived from price increases on one side of the platform, this being only a natural consequence of differences in the two groups' demand elasticity. Moreover, the Court stresses the relevance of the business model when carrying out the antitrust evaluation of a commercial practice. By drawing a comparison with the EU scenario, the paper analyses how the two-sidedness of platforms may affect the definition of the relevant market, and the assessment of competitive effects and undertakings' business models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]