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Nüzhet Sabit was a typical Ottoman intellectual of the Second Constitutional Period(19081918). He distinguished foreign politics from domestics politics, and discussed them separately in his articles. When the Constitution was restored in 1908, the Young Turks intended to establish friendly relations with both France and England. Towards Germany, which had supported Abdülhamid II, on the other hand, they had a more distanced attitude. In time this preference changed, and Germany was once more seen as an ally. The break-out of World War I, however, forced the heads of the Ottoman State to take sides. Eventually, it joined the alliance led by Germany and stayed in this group until the end of the war, which it would conclude in defeat for them. In this article as an opponent intellectual and journalist Nüzhet Sabit's views are explained about the foreign policy of Committee of Union and Progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the degree to which national political setting, namely domestic political opportunity structures, influences the transnational activities of women's groups in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The literature suggests that social groups are more likely to choose international activity when national institutions provide fewer opportunities for domestic activity (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Using data about women's groups' activity from a content analysis of news wires from 1980 to 2008, we conclude that women's groups act in the domestic sphere significantly more than they act in the international arena-even when acting on transnational issues-and that groups choose international action when domestic opportunities are less hospitable to group action. Thus, we argue that the domestic sphere continues to be a major influence on social movement activity even as globalization and transnationalism increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'échec du projet britannique de pacte tripartite franco–anglo–soviétique révèle quelques traits majeurs des relations entre la France et le Royaume-Uni au XXème siècle. Le premier est l'existence de divergences qui concernent davantage l'accessoire que l'essentiel. Si les deux pays sont d'accord pour considérer qu'une alliance entre Paris, Londres et Moscou est essentielle à l'équilibre européen, ils divergent sur la forme à lui donner, les Français préférant un système de pactes bilatéraux à la formule tripartite proposée par les Britanniques. En outre cet épisode se caractérise par une absence de consultation entre les deux diplomaties. Les incidents qui en découlent pourraient prêter à sourire s'ils n'étaient pas le signe d'un climat de suspicion réciproque. Celui-ci est d'ailleurs plus marqué à Paris qu'à Londres. Tous ces éléments participent aux difficiles relations franco–britanniques et expliquent qu'il ait fallu attendre le 4 mars 1947 pour voir l'alliance franco–britannique se matérialiser par le traité de Dunkerque. Abstract: The failure of the British project of a tripartite pact between France, Britain and the USSR exemplifies some of the main features of the Franco–British relationship in the twentieth century. The first is the existence of divergences, which concern more incidental details than essential matters. If the two countries agreed to consider that an alliance between Paris, London and Moscow was essential for European balance, they differed on the form it should take. The French preferred a bilateral pact system to the tripartite pact formula proposed by the British. Moreover, this episode was distinguished by an absence of consultation between the two diplomacies. The incidents that followed could be risible if there were not signs of a climate of mutual suspicion which was, incidentally, more distinct in Paris than in London. All these elements contributed to the difficult Franco–British relationship and explain why one had to wait until 4 March 1947 to see a Franco–British alliance realized by the Dunkirk Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the transformation of French policy of the Labour Party of Great Britain during the Phoney War. Labour leaders' advocacy of the establishment of a permanent Anglo-French alliance by 1940; Postwar organization of European security; Doubt about the usefulness of terms such as 'realistic' or 'idealistic.'

This article focuses on Great Britain's ambiguous stand over Algeria and the uncomforts it brought to the British embassy in France. For the first four years of the Algerian War, British ministers and officials reciprocated that while supporting the French position in North Africa they will not support their policies. But with successive conservative governments, there was a shift in the policy as they sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defense. Concerned about the prospective decline of Western influence in North Africa that could open the way for the communism and further add humiliation for France coming on the heels of Indochina, the whole scenario could lead to a "neutralist" government in Paris, which was unfavorable to Western alliance. Besides this, Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of UN Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb particularly difficult.

Questions the role of the government of Great Britain on the coexistence between U.S. and French views on European security and defense in 2001. Relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain; Evolution of a European security and defense policy in the 1990s; Examination into the convergence of British and French visions of Europe.

Evaluates the triple alliance negotiations between Britain and France that provided Molotov's formal introduction to the diplomatic world. How the two sides approached the negotiations; Stages of the negotiations; Conclusion.

Addresses the actions of Great Britain, France and Italy as they competed for influence and interfered in the affairs of League of Nations members in Southeastern Europe. Minorities in the Balkans and the League of Nations; Role in border disputes; From collective security to special guarantees for peace in the Balkans; High price of appeasement.