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Motivated by Cao et al. (2015) , we utilize China’s one-child policy reform as a unique and exogenous setting to examine the economic impact of a potential rise in bequest motives among family firms, which is driven by the prospect of family and clanship expansion after the reform. A bequest motive is the economic incentive to accumulate wealth presently for inheritance by heirs in the future. It causes short-term present economic decisions to be influenced by long-term future utility expectations. On the one hand, the reform may strengthen stewardship as a means to maximize firm value for present family wealth enhancement and future inter-generational succession. On the other hand, the reform may weaken innovation and competitiveness by inducing reluctance against takeovers or outsider succession. Consistent with a positive economic impact, we observe that family firms experience (i) favorable ex-ante market reactions to the news of the reform and (ii) ex-post decline in managerial expropriation through tunneling after the reform. These findings of ex-ante investor anticipation and ex-post real effect are both stronger among less transparent family firms where Type-II agency problems are likely to be more pronounced. Further analyses also provide supportive evidence of a post-reform rise in the long-term value, measured by Tobin’s Q, and a decline in stock-selling by controlling shareholders among family firms. Our combined findings imply that this reform could induce positive externality on family firm governance.

We apply the discontinuity methodology from the accounting literature to a political economy setting of GDP reporting and examine whether Chinese local governments manage regional GDP numbers. We find strong evidence of discontinuities around zero in the distribution of actual minus target GDP growth rates. The frequencies of just meeting or beating GDP growth targets are about five (four) times the frequencies of just missing targets at the prefecture (province) level. The results are stronger for governors with longer tenures and those without political connections to higher-level officials as well as for local governments with more resources under their control.

Purpose The performance of the first batch of listed companies since the restart of new initial public offerings (IPOs) in January 2014 and their accounting information face repeated and volatile questioning from different sides. This paper aims to take Guirenniao (China) Co. Ltd. (GRN for short), one of the first batch of listed companies in 2014 that suffered performance decline, as an example to analyze how it managed earnings before IPO. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines earnings management signs that exist in GRN through analysis of its financial statements compared to those of its industry peers. This paper then uses the modified Jones model to detect its accrual earnings management and build three models, which are abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, to detect real earnings management. Findings This paper finds that GRN managed earnings through accrual and real activities in 2012 and 2013. Finally, this paper provides evidence on the specific methods of earnings management, which are easing credit policy to recognize revenue in advance, abnormal expansion, decreasing costs and connected transactions. Originality/value This paper examines earnings management signs exist in GRN through analysis of its financial statements comparing to those of its industry peers. This paper then uses the modified Jones Model to detect its accrual earnings management and build three models which are abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to detect real earnings management.

We examine whether accounting academics on the board of directors affect their firm's financial reporting quality. While regulations mandate firms to include financial experts as outside directors to enhance transparency, there is also a shortage of suitable individuals with both the relevant expertise and the appropriate management and communication skills. Although increasing evidence suggests that academics as outside directors improve firm performance, previous studies do not focus on the role of accounting professors per se on accounting quality. The prevalence of hiring academics as outside directors renders China a suitable research setting. We observe greater value relevance of reported earnings when accounting academics serve as financial experts in the board, especially in firms where their influence is expected to be more pronounced. Our evidence implies that accounting scholarship contributes to the efficiency of the capital market, and can potentially supply the boardroom demand for financial experts.

This study examines whether the compensation regulation designed to deal with “excessive” executive compensation works as expected to solve social problems and hence create value for shareholders. ...