1. Which Access to Which Assets for an Effective Liberalization of the Railway Sector?
- Author
-
Frédéric Marty, Axel Gautier, Patrice Bougette, Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA), Université Côte d'Azur (UCA), Université de Liège, and SRM
- Subjects
050210 logistics & transportation ,asymmetric regulation ,Liberalization ,anticompetitive practices ,JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation ,JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L92 - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation ,05 social sciences ,JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L98 - Government Policy ,Management Science and Operations Research ,[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance ,General Business, Management and Accounting ,JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust Law ,Competition (economics) ,0502 economics and business ,liberalization ,essential facility ,Business ,050207 economics ,rail ,Industrial organization - Abstract
International audience; In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasiessential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF