1. Hardware Trojan Designs Based on High-Low Probability and Partitioned Combinational Logic With a Malicious Reset Signal
- Author
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Weitao Pan, Zhang Xinyuan, Jiang-Yi Shi, Zhengguang Tang, Pei-Jun Ma, and Li Pengfei
- Subjects
010302 applied physics ,Combinational logic ,Very-large-scale integration ,Computer science ,business.industry ,02 engineering and technology ,01 natural sciences ,Signal ,020202 computer hardware & architecture ,CMOS ,Hardware Trojan ,Embedded system ,Logic gate ,0103 physical sciences ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,False positive rate ,Electrical and Electronic Engineering ,business ,Reset (computing) - Abstract
To counteract logic-testing methods and trust verification methods for hardware Trojan (HT) detection, two HT design strategies based on high-low probability and partitioned combinational logic with a malicious reset signal are proposed. Using these two strategies, a power consumption HT and a forced reset HT are designed in a self-developed RISC-V processor. The processor is implemented using SMIC 55nm CMOS technology. Experiments show that, compared to the HTs designed with low-probability nets, the HTs designed with high-low probability strategy can reduce the triggering probability by 87.5%. The HT designed by partitioning combinational logic strategy can increase the false positive rate of HT to 40%. The result can defeat FANCI effectively. In order to enhance the stealth of the HTs, we partitioned combinational logic by using flip-flops with a malicious reset signal. The reset signal participates as a part of the trigger condition, which significantly reduces the trigger probability of HTs.
- Published
- 2021