1. Ultimatum Game Behavior in a Social-Preferences Vacuum Chamber
- Author
-
Benndorf, Volker, Große Brinkhaus, Thomas, and von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Subjects
C72 ,induced-value theory ,learning ,ultimatum game ,ddc:330 ,C92 ,D91 ,strategic interaction ,social preferences - Abstract
We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the behavior of human players from the previous wave. We apply our method to investigate trembling-hand perfection in a normal-form version of the ultimatum game. We find that behavior remains far off from a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium under selfish preferences even towards the end of our experiment. The likely reasons for our findings are strategic uncertainty and incomplete learning.
- Published
- 2021