Search

In this work we offer results drawn from a dataset of a post-provincial election survey in eight Canadian provinces to assess the impact of party system congruency on partisanship. We postulate that partisanship will be more likely and stronger in provinces that share a similar political party system to the federal level. We extend this preliminary analysis to test the underlying mechanism by examining the impact holding partisan ties at the provincial level has on the likelihood and strength of federal identification, according to party system similarity. Our results show very limited support for the party system congruency factor, raising further questions of its applicability in the Canadian context. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Between 1990 and 2010, a gradual process of institutional change has affected Canada's immigration and integration governance regime. The central characteristic of this process is the emergence of a new legitimate institutional group of actors: Canadian provinces. This change corresponds to a federalization of Canada's immigration and integration governance regime. It is a break from the previous pattern of federal dominance and provincial avoidance. It is not the result of diminished federal intervention in immigration and cannot be explained by exogenous shocks. Current explanations of this evolution focus on federal decisions and have trouble explaining provincial mobilization. Using a mechanistic approach to the analysis of social processes and insights on gradual institutional changes, this article demonstrates that provinces have been the central agents bringing about the federalization of Canada's immigration and integration governance regime between 1990 and 2010. Via a mechanism of province building centred on immigration, provinces have triggered and maintained in movement a decentralizing mechanism. The interactions of these two mechanisms, over time, gave rise to the federalization of immigration and integration in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We analyze the expected impact of the new Canada Health Transfer (CHT) on the capacity of Canadian provinces to provide universal Medicare coverage. We found the new CHT formula, recently redesigned by the federal government, fails to address the differing capacity of provinces to provide Medicare coverage due to the unavoidably higher costs imposed by the population's age structure and geographical dispersion. We propose a modified capitation formula that adjusts for these 'unavoidable' cost factors. The redistributive impact on the provinces is examined as well as the extent to which the proposed CHT fits with other federal transfer, especially Equalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the public indebtedness of the Canadian provinces and the US states (including a share of the federal debt) over the 2000–2007 period. It presents rankings of the most indebted subnational jurisdictions based on five public debt concepts. Among the provinces, Quebec (with the lowest average rank) and Alberta (with the highest average rank) display the most stable position across the rankings. All other provinces show important fluctuations in their position in the rankings. Hence, allocating the federal debt to subnational states and the specific debt concept being considered significantly influence the rankings, quite spectacularly in some instances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On November 6, 2013 the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan Assembly voted to repeal the Senate Nominee Election Act. Immediately thereafter the Premier introduced a motion that the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan supports the abolition of the Senate of Canada. Following speeches by the Premier, the Leader of the Opposition and other members the motion was adopted. The Government House Leader then asked the Speaker to transmit copies of the motion and verbatim transcripts to the Prime Minister of Canada and the leaders of the opposition parties in the House of Commons, as well as the premier of each Canadian province and territory. This article is a slightly abridged version of the Premier's speech on the motion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes a new approach to the study of federal–provincial relations by arguing that in the conduct of intergovernmental relations in Canada, whether on major constitutional issues or the mundane, ordinary intergovernmental negotiations, partisanship has an effect. An examination of the Meech Lake Accord constitutional negotiations (1987–1990) and the Child Care Agreements (2004–2005) reveals that where traditional factors fail to provide a reason for conflict or cooperation between governments, the partisan variable offers valuable explanatory power. The impact is found in the process of federal–state bargaining and not in the substance of agreements themselves—in other words, partisanship can influence how an agreement is reached and whether it is kept. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the development of immigration federalism in Australia and Canada (expressed through the establishment of state/provincial/territorial immigrant selection programs) and its implications for immigrants’ rights and immigration opportunities. Given the very limited scholarship on the issue, and the lack of previous comparative studies on immigration federalism in Australia and Canada, our research is exploratory by nature. Our finding is that provincial/state/territorial programs offer some advantages to prospective applicants (such as increased immigration opportunities), but, at the same time, raise a number of concerns (such as an increased dependence on employers). As our study reveals, the costs and benefits of immigration opportunities under state/provincial/territorial programs differ for skilled and low-skilled workers, whereby the latter are given only limited access to permanent residence, and on more onerous conditions than skilled workers. Drawing on these findings, we identify areas in need of further research and policy response. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that the prospects for US state and Canadian provincial climate policy innovation and diffusion are limited in several respects. Subnational climate leaders tend already to be the cleanest states and provinces, and even they have been strategic in the sectors they regulate and the instruments they employ. In some cases, this selectivity appears to be motivated by opportunities to shift compliance costs to other states. Efforts to pool risks through state and provincial collaboration also are flagging in the wake of the Canadian and US federal governments' failure to adopt nation-wide policies to level the playing field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key challenge for comparative politics is to explain the varying degrees of political conflict triggered by the territorial redistribution of financial resources. Federal systems pose this question particularly acutely since they typically operate equalization programs that generate different levels and patterns of intergovernmental conflict. For instance, in Canada equalization has generated serious conflict between federal and provincial governments whereas in Australia it has only led to low-level grumblings on the part of some states which have taken shots at others. This article sheds light on the causes for conflict around the territorial redistribution of financial resources by explaining why equalization has produced more severe intergovernmental conflict in Canada than in Australia. It argues that institutional factors linked to the governance structures of equalization and the nature of federalism are at the heart of the cross-national difference. More specifically, the presence of an arms-length agency administrating equalization in Australia compared to executive discretion over the program in Canada and the weaker status and lesser power of states in comparison to Canadian provinces means that equalization policy is more subject to political challenges in Australia than in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Official participation in Canadian First Ministers' Conferences has long been exclusive to federal and provincial first ministers. In March 1992, however, the membership of this intergovernmental arena was expanded permanently to include territorial premiers. Using the tools of historical institutionalism and drawing upon relevant literature and eleven elite interviews with former first ministers and senior civil servants, this paper seeks to explain why this instance of incremental institutional change occurred. It finds that significant friction between the institutional and ideational layers of the Canadian federation during a period of mega-constitutional reform allowed federal, provincial and territorial actors to draw upon ideas about democracy and the political and constitutional maturation of the territorial North to expand permanently the membership of First Ministers' Conferences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Canadian Issues / Thèmes Canadiens is the property of Association for Canadian Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Fiscal equalization is a key political issue in many federal countries, including Canada. Yet, relatively few scholars have paid systematic attention to the political dimensions of Canada’s federal equalization program. Taking an historical and institutionalist perspective, this article explores the politics of equalization policy in Canada, with a focus on the mid-2000s, a period when equalization policy suddenly became a major source of intergovernmental conflict. The main objective of the article is to explain why and how such political struggles over equalization developed. The explanation focuses on four factors: (i) the importance of executive discretion over the equalization program; (ii) the “inter-state” nature of Canadian federalism; (iii) the concentration of non-renewable natural resources in certain provinces; and (iv) the perceptions that surround the program. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, we take a look at restructuring initiatives involving functional departments. First, we review the documented reasons leading to the decision to restructure. Next, we compare recent restructuring activities in three Canadian provinces and at the federal government level. The examples used provide us with information on the reasons for engaging in the restructuring process, and its implications. The cases reported (all territories combined) reveal that some areas seem more problematic than others (for example, economic development, environment) – that is, they are the focus of more frequent restructuring, and the subsequent outcome is not always satisfactory. The reasons for explaining the restructurings point to the complexity of the file and government priorities. Furthermore, the consequences of the restructuring process fall into three main areas: implications at the administrative and budgetary levels (costs related to moving, printing, etc.), implications revolving around the department's direction (mission and vision), and implications on personnel (loss of employment, impact on employees' morale, etc.). On a practical level, the premiers must particularly avoid the restructuring of departments during Cabinet shuffles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stephen Harper's minority Conservative government has allegedly pursued a decentralized vision of Canadian federalism. This vision includes pledges to limit the federal spending power and the declaration of Québec as a "nation." Controversially, this commitment has also extended to the foreign relations of Canadian provinces. Québec recently negotiated a bilateral labour mobility agreement with France and was also granted formal standing in Canada's delegation at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Ottawa has also promised to support an autonomous subfederal role in trade promotion and the negotiation of international economic agreements. This study will argue, however, that Canadian provinces have exercised partial and signifi cant autonomy in terms of foreign offices, trade policy, cross-border functional relations, development assistance, and the environment, long before the arrival of Harper and the Conservatives. In fact, this policy capacity is due to long-term trends related to the intrusiveness of international trade agreements, federalism's response to these pressures, and the ongoing decentralization of federal-provincial relations in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several drinking water advisories which have been issued in Canadian provinces and territories as of 2015, and it mentions how the Canadian federal government is responsible for the drinking water that is provided to the First Nation Indian reservations in the country. Advisories regarding the drinking water quality on First Nation reserves in places such as Quebec are examined, along with public trust principles, National Water Policy, and Canadian government agencies.

The article discusses the role of federalism in accountabilities of social policy in Canada. It says that provincial governments tend to equate accountability with federal funding. The Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAA) released a report, stating that no government met all of the performance and reporting requirements of intergovernmental agreements on child welfare policy between 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) found that half of the provinces are reporting to their citizens individually.