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We present a theory of mental architecture and development focusing on general intelligence (g). The theory integrates psychometric and developmental theories of intelligence into an overarching framework. The paper first focuses on the composition of g. It is shown that g involves attention control, flexibility, working memory, cognizance of mental processes, and inference. We then present a model of intellectual development involving four cycles - episodic, realistic representation-based, rule-based, and principle-based thought - and summarize several studies showing how the processes involved in g interact in each cycle. We then present research aiming to increase intelligence. Finally, we discuss the implications of this theory for psychometric, cognitive, and developmental science and show how it solves long-standing theoretical and practical problems not solved by other theories, such as the decreasing likelihood of attaining high intelligence, the differentiation of abilities with development, and the training fade-out problem.

We explored the relations between academic performance, cognition, and personality. This study examined 689 participants from 10 to 17 years of age, by a cognitive battery addressing several reasoning domains (inductive, deductive, quantitative, causal, and spatial), and inventories addressing self-representation about reasoning domains and general cognitive processes, and the Big Five factors of personality. School performance in mathematics, science, and language was measured. Cognitive ability strongly and self-representation and personality (conscientiousness) moderately related with school performance. These relations varied with age and ability: the effects of cognitive ability on academic performance decreased and the effects of self-representation and personality increased with increasing age and ability. The implications for cognitive developmental theory and educational implications are discussed.

This study explored longitudinally how cognizance mediates between executive and reasoning process from 4 to 10 years of age. Four-, 6-, and 8-years old children were tested twice by executive (inhibition, flexibility in shifting, and working memory), cognizance (awareness of perceptual and inferential origins of knowledge, first- and second-order ToM, and awareness of similarities and differences between cognitive processes), and reasoning tasks (deductive and Raven-like fluid reasoning tasks). Perceptual awareness, first-order ToM, and simple inductive and deductive reasoning were acquired at preschool; inferential awareness, awareness of cognitive processes, and relational and deductive reasoning were mastered later in childhood. The various processes preserved their relative functional autonomy; however, there were two factors standing for their interactions: one for the state of ability at a time and one for general change dynamics. Latent change score modeling and latent transition analysis showed that cognizance was the best proxy of the general change factor collecting reasoning and executive influences early and leading transitions to higher level reasoning later. Implications for developmental, psychometric, and developmental psychopathology theories are discussed.

We explored relations between academic performance and cognition from 9 to 15 years of age. Participants were examined on executive control processes, reasoning in several domains, self-evaluation of performance in these domains, and language. Structural equation modelling showed that cognitive and language ability highly predicted school performance. These relations changed with age; cognitive flexibility, working memory and reasoning dominated from 9 to 11 and reasoning and language dominated from 13 to 15 years. Self-evaluation was related with academic performance only in secondary school, but this relation was masked by reasoning. SES influenced school achievement directly on top of cognitive influences in both primary and secondary school. The implications for cognitive developmental theory and educational implications are discussed.

Integration/differentiation of mental processes is major mechanism of development. Developmental theories ascribe intellectual development to it. In psychometric theory, Spearman’s law of diminishing returns postulates that increasing g allows increasing differentiation of cognitive abilities, because increased mental power allows variable investment in domain-specific learning. Empirical evidence has been inconsistent so far, with some studies supporting and others contradicting this mechanism. This state of affairs is due to a developmental phenomenon: Both differentiation and strengthening of relations between specific processes and g may happen but these changes are phase-specific and ability-specific, depending upon the developmental priorities in the formation of g in each phase. We present eight studies covering the age span from 4 to 85 years in support of this phenomenon. Using new powerful modeling methods we showed that differentiation and binding of mental processes in g occurs in cycles. Specific processes intertwine with g at the beginning of cycles when they are integrated into it; when well established, these processes may vary with increasing g, reflecting its higher flexibility. Representational knowledge, inductive inference and awareness of it, and grasp of logical constraints framing inference are the major markers of g, first intertwining with in their respective cycles and differentiating later during the periods of 2–6, 7–11, and 11–20 years, respectively. The implications of these findings for an overarching cognitive developmental/differential theory of human mind are discussed. 5 2 23 ID: Accession Number: edsdoj.30142ae5fa2d43f59de6440e567319e7; Item Citation: Journal of Intelligence, Vol 5, Iss 2, p 23 (2017); Related Material: http://www.mdpi.com/2079-3200/5/2/23; Related Material: https://doaj.org/toc/2079-3200; Accession Number: edsdoj.30142ae5fa2d43f59de6440e567319e7; Publication Type: Journal Article; Source: Journal of Intelligence, Vol 5, Iss 2, p 23 (2017); Language: English; Format: electronic resource; Publication Date: 20170501; Rights: Journal Licence: CC BY; Imprint: MDPI AG, 2017.

This article answers some of the criticisms and suggestions of the three commentaries. We showed, in agreement with Coyle, that (i) variability is indeed distinct from speed, (ii) they both additively reflect processing efficiency and (iii) that they differentially relate to WM and gf during development. In agreement with Kail, we showed that developmental intelligence and psychometric intelligence are (i) related but distinct, they additively contribute to school learning and (iii) their role varies with developmental phase. Finally, in agreement with Pascual-Leone, we proposed a number of higher level hidden constructs to account for the data patterns observed between empirical constructs, such as speed, variability, WM, and reasoning. © 2013 Elsevier Inc. 41 5 744 749 Cited By :8; Export Date: 21 July 2017

This study investigated intellectual development in 4-7. years old Greek and Chinese children. They were examined on speeded performance, working memory, reasoning, and self-awareness tasks in order to investigate possible effects of learning the Chinese logographic system on possible differences in intellectual development between these ethnic groups. Speeded performance was examined with commonly familiar objects and tasks related to reading (i.e., Latin, Arabic, and Chinese characters). Chinese outperformed Greeks in (1) reading-related processing efficiency tasks but not in common objects (2) spatial but not verbal WM, (3) cognitive, and (4) the self-awareness tasks. Structural equation modeling showed that performance is organized in four systems (i.e., domain-specific problem solving, representational capacity, inference, and consciousness) integrated by g, in both ethnic groups. There were differences between the two ethnicities in the strength of relations between constructs, attributed to Chinese logographic experience. That is, the massive practice in visuo/spatial processing and memory seemed to provide an advantage in the communication between systems of the mind causing increased general cognitive fluidity, expressed in higher intellectual performance among the Chinese. © 2012 Elsevier Inc. 40 6 622 637 Cited By :5; Export Date: 21 July 2017

This study examines the organization and development of 5 domains of reasoning (categorical, quantitative, spatial, causal, and propositional) and the construct validity of a test designed to measure development from early adolescence to early adulthood. The theory underlying the test is first summarized and the conceptual design of the test is then illustrated. Each domain was addressed by tasks tapping abilities known to be acquired in this age period. The test was administered to 629 adolescents ranging in age from 12 to 18 years. Confirmatory factor analysis validated the 5 domains of reasoning and revealed a common factor underlying all domains. The Rasch model was used to scale the items and specify the reliability of the test across the whole sample and within different groups of participants (female, male, students of gymnasium, and students of lyceum). This model showed that the test is highly reliable and invariant across groups. Cluster analysis and the saltus model were applied to uncover successive developmental stage-like levels of difficulty and showed the presence of five such levels. The procedural and representational characteristics of these levels were also specified and their implications for developmental and cognitive theory were discussed. 76 2 209 242 Cited By :11

This article summarizes a comprehensive theory of intellectual organization and growth. The theory specifies a common core of processes (Abstraction, representational Alignment, and Cognizance, i.e., AACog) underlying inference and meaning making. AACog develops over four reconceptualization cycles (episodic representations, representations, rule-based concepts, and principlebased concepts starting at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively) with two phases in each (production of new mental units and alignment). This sequence relates with changes in processing efficiency and working memory in overlapping cycles such that relations with efficiency are high in the production phases and relations with WM are high in the alignment phases over all cycles. Reconceptualization is self-propelled because AACog continuously generates new mental content expressed in representations of increasing inclusiveness and resolution. Each cycle culminates into insight about the cycle's representations and underlying inferential processes that is expressed into executive programs of increasing flexibility. Learning addressed to this insight accelerates the course of reconceptualization. Individual differences in intellectual growth are related to both the state of this core and its interaction with different cognitively primary domains (e.g., categorical, quantitative, spatial cognition, etc.). The relations between this theory and brain research are discussed. 2014 3 365 396 Cited By :9; Export Date: 21 July 2017

This paper aims to integrate research and theorizing about problem solving, self and personality into a comprehensive theory. With this purpose, the paper attempts to answer three questions: how do humans become aware of themselves and how do the products of self-awareness interrelate to produce an integrated self-system, which includes the domains of cognition and personality? How do persons know and influence each other? How do these processes change with development? The answers given to these questions by self, personality and cognitive developmental psychology are critically examined. It is concluded that an overarching model would have to assume a multilevel and multidimensional architecture. This would involve three main levels: the first includes general-purpose processes and functions, such as processing efficiency and working memory, which define current cognitive potentials; the second includes several domain-specific systems directed to different aspects of the environment; the third includes self-oriented processes that register, represent and regulate processes at the other two levels. Each person's self-concepts result from the application of the third level on the other two and they differentially reflect their condition. Personality reflects the interaction between these self-concepts and dispositions to act inparticular ways. Because humans share this architecture they can negotiate and affect each other's self- and reflected representations. Thus, the formation of mind, self and personality results from a continuous flow of interactions between the levels and domains of mind within and across persons. The article summarizes a series of studies lending support to this general model. 2 4 387 409 PT: J

This rejoinder attempts to show that Bickhard's criticism is irrelevant to our theory and epistemologically one-sided. It is irrelevant because our theory is pragmaticist and interactivist at a number of levels ignored by Bickhard. It is epistemologically one-sided because it assumes that interactivism is the only proper model of mind. Thus, we try to show that different approaches can be used to model different levels or phrases in the organization and development of the mind. The discussion focuses on how interactivism, connectionism, computationalism and experientialism may complement each other as tools for modeling cognitive architecture and change. We also try to respond to various other, less central, criticisms that Bickhard leveled against our theory. © 1999 Academic Press. 19 3 389 414 Cited By :6; Export Date: 20 July 2017

This article presents three studies, two of them longitudinal, which investigated the relations between age, processing speed, working memory (WM), and fluid intelligence (g f) from 4 to 16years of age. Structural equation modeling showed that speed was a powerful covariate of age (~-.6 to -.7) from 4 to 13years, declining thereafter (to ~-.2). WM was stably related to speed through the whole age-span studied (~-.4 to -.5). A large part (59%) of age-related changes in g f (83%) from 4 to 7years and a lower but significant part later on, especially in adolescence (~10-20% out of ~40-50%), were mediated by WM. However, with speed and age controlled, WM was almost fully commensurate with g f (~.9), from about the age of 8-9years onwards. A series of models suggested an ever present efficiency level defined by speed and control and a representational level defined by WM and gf, which are increasingly differentiated with development. All processes develop in cycles concerted by a dynamic G. Change in each process over time originated from within the processes themselves and G, in proportions varying with developmental phase. Overall, speed signified age-associated changes in processing capabilities, partly expressed in WM expansions and g f reconstructions. An overarching model is proposed integrating differential with developmental theories of human intelligence. © 2012 Elsevier Inc. 41 1 34 50 Cited By :37; Export Date: 21 July 2017

This study investigated the structure and development of processes involved in g. One hundred and forty children, about equally drawn among primary school grades 1-6 were examined by four types of Stroop-like speeded tasks addressed to processes of increasing complexity (i.e., speed of processing, perceptual discrimination, perceptual control, and conceptual control) and tasks addressed to working memory, information integration, and reasoning. Structural equation modelling showed that these processes are hierarchically organized so that the processes at each subsequent higher level in the hierarchy include the processes of all previous levels together with processes specific to this level. Speed of processing and perceptual control were the most powerful predictors of the state of processes residing higher in the cascade. Analysis of variance showed that all of these processes improve systematically with age and that developmental differences in higher level processes are partly accounted for by lower level processes and by factors germane to themselves. The implications of these findings for the general theory of intelligence are discussed. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 36 5 437 454 Cited By :23; Export Date: 21 July 2017

Introduction: the what, how and why of developmental change: The emergence of a new paradigm Andreas Demetriou and Athanassios Raftopoulos 1. Mind, intelligence and development: a cognitive, differential and developmental theory of intelligence Andreas Demetriou 2. Types of cognitive change: a dynamical, connectionist account Athanassios Raftopoulos and Constantinos P. Constantinou 3. Developmental patterns in proportional reasoning Hans van der Maas, Brenda Jansen and Maartje Raijmakers 4. Building general knowledge and skill: cognition and microdevelopment in science learning Marc Schwartz and Kurt W. Fischer 5. Cognitive change as strategy change Joke Torbeyns, Laurence Arnaud, Patrick Lemaire and Leaven Verschaffel 6. The emergence of mind in the emotional brain Mark D. Lewis 7. Practices of quantification from a socio-cultural perspective Geoffrey B. Saxe 8. Contributions of central conceptual structure theory to education Sharon Griffin 9. Accelerating the development of general cognitive processing Philip Adey 10. Dealing with change: manifestations, measurements and methods Elena Grigorenko and Paul A. O'Keefe 11. Dynamic modelling of cognitive development: time, situatedness and variability Paul van Geert 12. Modelling individual differences in change through latent variable growth and mixture growth modelling: basic principles and empirical examples Jan-Eric Gustafssoln Index.

Modelling and the representation of phenomena In her book Life with Picasso , Francoise Gilot recalls a discussion about the portrait that Picasso painted of Gertrude Stein in 1906 (Gilot and Lake 1964). Many people first found that the portrait was not a very good likeness. Later, however, many began to think that, over the course of the years, Gertrude Stein had come to resemble the portrait. Picasso had predicted that although the portrait was not a very good likeness, Stein herself would become a good likeness of the portrait. Gertrude Stein's portrait reminds us of a basic feature of what a model should be, namely the representation of what the modeller sees as the essence of the modelled phenomenon (Casti 1997). However, it also reminds us of the fact that resemblance runs both ways. If the model is powerful enough, it will come to dictate what the essence of the modelled phenomenon should be. A model leaves out those aspects that are not considered essential or important and it exaggerates or idealizes what it considers characteristic. In that sense, what a model does not show, what it considers not characteristic, is about as interesting as what the model does show. The dictum that what must be left out of representation is more fundamental than what is actually displayed is probably more characteristic of traditional Japanese than of Western art, but it is nevertheless applicable to all forms of art, including the art of modelling.

This study compared Greeks with Chinese, from 8 to 14 years of age, on measures of processing efficiency, working memory, and reasoning. All processes were addressed through three domains of relations: verbal/propositional, quantitative, and visuo/spatial. Structural equations modelling and rating scale analysis showed that the architecture and developmental patterning of the various processes are basically the same in the two ethic groups. The Chinese clearly outperformed the Greeks in all tasks addressing visuo/spatial processing, from processing efficiency through working memory and reasoning, but neither in g nor in processes where the two groups have equivalent experience. This advantage was associated to the massive practice in visuo/spatial processing that is required to learn the Chinese logographic writing system. The implications for general theory of intelligence and intellectual development are discussed. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 33 2 109 141 Cited By :27

We posit that fluid intelligence (Gf) develops in four cycles, with two phases in each cycle, each distinctly connected with changes in processing speed and working memory. New representational units emerge in the first phase of each cycle at 2-4 (representations), 6-8 (inference based concepts), and 11-13 years (principles) and they are integrated into wider systems in the second phase, at 4-6, 8-11 and 13-16 years. We hypothesized that cycle transitions are better predicted by speed and phase transitions by working memory. To test this hypothesis several published studies were selected which measured speed, WM, and Gf at one or more of the age phases concerned. In structural equation models applied on each phase speed was regressed on age, working memory was regressed on age and speed, and Gf was regressed on all three. In line with the hypothesis, in the first phase of each cycle the speed-Gf relations were high and WM-Gf relations were low; this pattern was inverted in the second phase. The role of executive processes strengthened in the second phase of all cycles. The implications for developmental and differential theories of intelligence are discussed. © 2014 Elsevier Inc. 46 1 107 121 Cited By :19; Export Date: 21 July 2017

A model of the Stroop phenomenon is proposed which postulates that the classic effect is an additive function of three parameters, that is, dimension selection (decision making about which dimension to respond to), dimension identification (encoding and identification of the relevant dimension), and interference control (filtering out of interference from non-relevant dimensions). The study used stimuli addressed to three symbol systems (verbal, numerical, and figural), two types of stimulus composition (compatible vs. incompatible), and two types of dimension selection (decision needed about the to-be-identified dimension vs. no decision needed). Participants were 9, 11, 13, and 15 years old and they were tested twice. The model was found to hold under all stimulus and presentation conditions. Moreover, it was found that the three parameters are differentially related to age. The implications of the model for general theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 16 4 987 1005 Cited By :10

This article presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of the mind. Thus, the architecture of the mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. This article then specifies the types of changes that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the article and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience are discussed throughout. © 1999 Academic Press. 19 3 319 368 Cited By :26; Export Date: 20 July 2017