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On September 1, 2023, Texas made important revisions to it its decades-old statute granting legal safe harbor immunity to physicians who withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment over the objection of critically ill patients' surrogate decision-makers. However, lawmakers left untouched glaring flaws in a key safeguard for patients-the transfer option. The transfer option is ethically important because, when no hospital is willing to accept the patient in transfer, that fact is taken as strong evidence that the surrogates' treatment requests fall outside accepted medical practice. But there are serious shortcomings in how the transfer option is carried out in Texas and many other states, which undermines the ethical usefulness of the process. We identify these shortcomings and recommend revisions to state statutes and professional guidelines to overcome them., (© 2024 The Hastings Center.)

Futility in medicine has been defined as excessive medical intervention with very little prospect of altering the clinical outcome in a positive manner. If treatments fail to release our patients from the preoccupation with the illness and do not allow them to pursue their life goals, then perhaps that treatment is futile.

Courts in England and Wales, Australia, and New Zealand have insisted the question of when it is acceptable to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining medical treatment from a child must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Over the last 40 years a number of cases have considered whether treatment is objectively in the child's best interests. This article seeks to identify whether there are factors identified and weighed in a consistent manner across cases. Thirty cases involving decisions about the provision of life-sustaining medical treatment to children three years old or younger were identified. Judges regularly refer to the need to weigh benefits and burdens and these factors were identified and assigned scores. Eight key factors were identified, and a scoring range was assigned to each. The factors focus on the condition and position of the child and the burdens of invasive medical treatment. The review demonstrates there are factors consistently identified and despite criticisms of the indeterminacy of the best interests test, there may be a broadly consistent approach to decision-making. Cognitive capacity and unavoidably imminent death appear to be the two most influential factors in determining whether life-sustaining treatment should be provided., Competing Interests: None.

In caring for dying patients, family medicine practitioners intentionally adopt care plans that affect the manner and timing of death. These decisions are morally weighty. This article provides guidance regarding the ethical and legal appropriateness of practitioner decisions near the end of life. Topics include surrogate decision making, advance care planning, medical nutrition and hydration, double effect, futile care, physician-assisted death, voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, palliative sedation to unconsciousness, and cultural humility., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

As our population ages, there will be an increasing number of patients with life-limiting disease who may be referred for major elective surgery and more pressingly may present acutely, requiring major emergency surgical intervention. Owing to the high risk of perioperative and postoperative complications associated this group of patients, it is paramount that specific advance care planning that encompasses a patient's goals of care and resuscitative status be clarified before undergoing surgery in this acute period. In doing so, this will lead to a better quality of life for patients with a limited trajectory and allow for more informed decisions to be made about their health care. Furthermore, it will help to prevent futile and inappropriate treatments that do not respect a patient's wishes and their clinical status. In this case discussion, we explore the key themes about the challenge of perioperative advance care planning for patients with life-limiting disease and provide a framework to help guide conversation in this crucial period., (Copyright © 2019 American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

There is a curious asymmetry in cases where the use of religious language involves a breakdown in communication and leads to a seemingly intractable dispute. Why does the use of religious language in such cases almost always arise on the side of patients and their families, rather than on the side of clinicians or others who work in healthcare settings? I suggest that the intractable disputes arise when patients and their families use religious language to frame their problem and the possibilities of solution. Unlike clinicians, they are not bilingual and thus lack the capacity to understand and negotiate differences in terms that are responsive to those who work in healthcare settings. After considering a representative case, I explore whether an ethics consultant or chaplain can function as a translator and suggest that, at best, such efforts at mediation depend on contingent aspects of a case and will only be partially successful. To appreciate limits on the role for bilingual translators, I consider a futility dispute where a parent using religious language demands that everything be done for a permanently unconscious child. I challenge the traditional interpretation that says the parent values "mere duration of biological life irrespective of quality." From a religious perspective, human life is never "merely biological." This effort to slot the dispute into standard philosophical schemas misses what is crucial in the dispute. I suggest that a better interpretation views the dispute at a meta-level as one about whether withholding and withdrawing care is morally distinguishable from killing. Curiously, this interpretation makes the advocate of futile care into an ally of those "quality of life" advocates who also challenge this distinction. The crux of their dispute now rests on the normative ethics of killing. While I think my interpretation comes much closer to the views of many who demand 'futile care,' I suggest that it still falls short because of the way it reconstructs the religious concerns in nonreligious terms. I close by considering an analogy between the language of suffering and the language of faith, suggesting that both require a much richer understanding of the narratives that orient the lives of patients and their families.

Patient and family demands for the initiation or continuation of life-sustaining medically non-beneficial treatments continues to be a major issue. This is especially relevant in intensive care units, but is also a challenge in other settings, most notably with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Differences of opinion between physicians and patients/families about what are appropriate interventions in specific clinical situations are often fraught with highly strained emotions, and perhaps none more so when the family bases their desires on religious belief. In this essay, I discuss non-beneficial treatments in light of these sorts of disputes, when there is a clash between the nominally secular world of fact- and evidence-based medicine and the faith-based world of hope for a miraculous cure. I ask the question whether religious belief can justify providing treatment that has either no or a vanishly small chance of restoring meaningful function. I conclude that non-beneficial therapy by its very definition cannot be helpful, and indeed is often harmful, to patients and hence cannot be justified no matter what the source or kind of reasons used to support its use. Therefore, doctors may legitimately refuse to provide such treatments, so long as they do so for acceptable clinical reasons. They must also offer alternatives, including second (and third) opinions, as well the option of transferring the care of the patient to a more accommodating physician or institution.

Limiting intensive care is paid increasing attention. In the echoing call for physicians' ethical self-restriction, it is easily overlooked, however, that ethics needs a critical epistemological analysis before it can suffice as an emergency brake to futile treatment. This analysis is provided by the present essay. The authors suggest that the difficulties of resolving moral dilemmas related to limiting intensive care may just be due to the unclarified epistemological status of moral claims. Even if normative ethics cannot prescribe right decisions, but only draw conclusions from defined premises, the premises may or may not be true. Their intertwined descriptive and normative evidence is endorsed in an academic and political discourse. There will necessarily be various demands for rationality in prudent decisions between physicians, their patients and society. These demands are formulated dialogically through critical questions and justified answers. A good argument is the convincing one that, finally and ideally, leads to the absence of open objections. Thus, in the end the rightness of a given decision does not depend on axiomatic moral principles, but is comparative and conditional, as it is given in an omnilateral argument. Neither is it the democratic process of shared decision making that we should evaluate, but rather the argumentative state itself, when we judge the morality of health politics and clinical practice., (© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Respect for patient autonomy involves providing sufficient information to patients to allow them to make informed decisions, and then honoring their requests unless they are unethical or futile. At times, the factors that patients consider may not be purely biologic ones but rather will include "spiritual" factors (a sense of control in a home birth). When patients balance biologic risks against spiritual gain, physicians may not be comfortable giving deference to patients' choice. In order to explicate this issue we explore two clinical scenarios: home birth, and cesarean section for a periviable fetus; and we consider futility and limits on affirmative autonomy. We argue that bodily integrity must remain inviolate. However, conversations regarding a patient's affirmative rights invoke the moral agency of both patient and provider. Those conversations must include considerations of patient values as well as medical facts. Physicians' values are also part of counseling, but they are appropriately considered only when they are medical values (beneficence, truth telling), not personal beliefs (e.g., children with impairments should have, or not have, a 'do not resuscitate' order). Physicians have the right to refuse to participate if they think that the biologic risk overwhelms a potential value-based benefit, but they should be loath to do so if the balance is anywhere close to equipoise, and the patient's values are deeply held., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Care for children as they near the end of life is difficult and very complex. More difficult still are the decisions regarding what interventions are and are not indicated during these trying times. Occasionally, families of children who are nearing the end of life disagree with the assessment of the medical team regarding these interventions. In rare cases, the medical team can be moved to enact a do not attempt resuscitation order against the wishes of the patient's parents. This article presents one such illustrative case and discusses the ethical issues relevant to such challenging clinical scenarios. The authors posit that such a unilateral do not attempt resuscitation order is only appropriate in very limited circumstances in pediatric care. Instead, focus should be placed on open discussion between parents and members of the clinical team, shared decision making, and maintenance of the clinician-parent relationship while simultaneously supporting members of the clinical team who express discomfort with parental decisions. The authors propose an alternative framework for approaching such a conflict based on clinician-parent collaboration and open communication., (Copyright © 2017 American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

There have been several recent publications related to therapeutic obstinacy and futility in the Intensive Care Unit. However, little has been published about "the family obstinacy" in persisting with invasive measures in seriously ill patients, despite the appropriate information provided to them about the patient's poor short-term prognosis. On certain occasions, these critical patients are unable to make decisions on the proposed treatments and, unfortunately, many of them have not previously indicated their preferences in terms of limits to invasive measures (advanced directives). Thus, the patient's relatives are the ones who finally assume this arduous task and, in several occasions, they make decisions that do not correspond with the patient's actual wishes. Palliative medicine is of invaluable help in the difficult goal of improving communication among doctors, patients and patients relatives. Limits to intervention can be difficult and vague, generating multiple problems in the decision-making process. On certain occasions and despite adequate information provided by therapists and palliative care doctors, patients' relatives do not accept professional directives indicating to stop invasive interventions. Understanding futility justification may be relevant to the appropriate resolution of these disputes. In this article, we intend to discuss the subject "futility in Intensive Care Unit" and how to face the seldom addressed "family obstinacy" issue in potentially unrecoverable situations, despite adequate medical information.

The concept of futility has been debated for many years, and a precise definition remains elusive. This is not entirely unsurprising given the increasingly complex and evolving nature of modern medicine. Progressively more complex decisions are required when considering increasingly sophisticated diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Allocating resources appropriately amongst a population whose expectations continue to increase raises a number of ethical issues not least of which are the difficulties encountered when consideration is being given to withholding "life-preserving" treatment. In this discussion we have used decompressive craniectomy for severe traumatic brain injury as a clinical example with which to frame an approach to the concept. We have defined those issues that initially lead us to consider futility and thereafter actually provoke a significant discussion. We contend that these issues are uncertainty, conflict and consent. We then examine recent scientific advances in outcome prediction that may address some of the uncertainty and perhaps help achieve consensus amongst stakeholders. Whilst we do not anticipate that this re-framing of the idea of futility is applicable to all medical situations, the approach to specify patient-centred benefit may assist those making such decisions when patients are incompetent to participate.

This paper reframes the futility debate, moving away from the question "Who decides when to end what is considered to be a medically inappropriate or futile treatment?" and toward the question "How can society make policy that will best account for the multitude of values and conflicts involved in such decision-making?" It offers a pragmatist moral epistemology that provides us with (1) a clear justification of why it is important to take best standards, norms, and physician judgment seriously and (2) a clear justification of why ample opportunity must be made for patients, families, and society to challenge those standards and norms., (© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Introduction: When terminal illness exists, it is common clinical practice worldwide to withhold (WH) or withdraw (WD) life-sustaining treatments. Systematic documentation of professional opinion and perceived practice similarities and differences may allow recommendations to be developed., Materials and Methods: Speakers from invited faculty of the World Federation of Societies of Intensive and Critical Care Medicine Congress that took place in Durban (2013), with an interest in ethics, were approached to participate in an ethics round table. Key domains of health care professional end-of-life decision making were defined, explored by discussion, and then questions related to current practice and opinion developed and subsequently answered by round-table participants to establish the presence or absence of agreement., Results: Agreement was established for the desirability for early goal-of-care discussions and discussions between health care professionals to establish health care provider consensus and confirmation of the grounds for WH/WD, before holding formal WH/WD discussions with patients/surrogates. Nurse and other health care professional involvement were common in most but not all countries/regions. Principles and practical triggers for initiating discussions on WH/WD, such as multiorgan failure, predicted short-term survival, and predicted poor neurologic outcome, were identified., Conclusions: There was majority agreement for many but not all statements describing health care professional end-of-life decision making., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The Texas Advance Directive Act allows physicians and hospitals to overrule patient or family requests for futile care. Purposefully not defining futility, the law leaves its determination in specific cases to an institutional process. While the law has received several criticisms, it does seem to work constructively in the cases that come to the review process. We introduce a new criticism: While the law has been justified by an appeal to professional values such as avoiding harm to patients, avoiding the provision of unseemly care, and good stewardship of medical resources, it is applied incompletely. It allows physicians and institutional committees to refuse "futile" treatments desired by patients and families while at the same time providing no way of regulating physicians who recommend or even push "futile" treatments in similar cases. In this sense, the TADA is incomplete on its own terms.

Ethics is an essential dimension of the management of periviable birth in both clinical practice and research. The goal of clinical care in periviable birth is to improve outcomes for current pregnant and fetal patients. The goal of research in periviable birth is to improve outcomes for future pregnant patients and fetal patients. This paper provides an ethical framework for professionally responsible clinical management and research to improve the outcomes of periviable birth. The ethical framework is based on the professional responsibility model of obstetric ethics, which rejects rights-based reductionism. This model elaborates the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient in terms of beneficence-based and autonomy-based obligations to the pregnant woman and beneficence-based obligations to the fetus and emphasizes that the fetus is not a separate patient. Guidance is provided for counseling pregnant women about the management of pregnancies at 22 weeks of well-documented gestation, for which directive counseling in the form recommending non-aggressive obstetric management is ethically justified. At 24 weeks and later of gestation, directive counseling in the form of recommending aggressive obstetric management is ethically justified. For the period between 22 and 24 weeks gestation, non-directive counseling is ethically justified. Guidance is also provided for counseling pregnant women about participation in clinical trials and in innovative intervention for fetal benefit. Non-directive counseling should be strictly followed for both., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The authors consider the legal and ethical considerations of offering a time-limited trial of a potentially non-beneficial intervention in the setting of patient or surrogate requests to pursue aggressive treatment. The likelihood of an intervention's success is rarely a zero-sum game, and an intervention's risk-to-benefit ratio may be indiscernible without further information (often, a matter of time). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Endoscopic prostate surgery is an established treatment for male lower urinary tract symptoms (LUTS) and is recognized to have low mortality rates. We aimed to describe factors that may have contributed to death following endoscopic prostate surgery using data from the Australia and New Zealand Audits of Surgical Mortality (ANZASM). Methods: All urological related deaths reported to ANZASM from January 1 2012 to December 31 2019 were reviewed. Deaths related to endoscopic prostate resection (transurethral resection of prostate – TURP, laser procedures) were included. Peer reviewers identified up to three clinical management issues (CMIs), and these were analysed. CMIs were classified in order of least to most concerning: area of consideration, area of concern and adverse events. Results: Of 1127 total urological deaths, 77 deaths were related to endoscopic prostate surgery (7.0%). Most procedures were monopolar TURP. The mean age of patients was 80.9 years (range 57.0–96.2). Leading causes of death were cardiovascular events 23/77 (29.9%) and respiratory failure 14/77 (18.2%). Assessors identified 39 CMIs in 26/77 (33.8%) patients. Twenty‐three were areas of consideration, nine were areas of concern and seven identified adverse events. The most common CMIs were regarding post‐operative care (14/39) and the decision to operate (13/39). Conclusion: Most deaths did not elicit concerns from the ANZASM peer assessors. However, the main concerns identified were surrounding decision making and rationale for operating. This highlights the importance of clear counselling and documentation during the treatment decision process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the issue of "futility" in therapy and sheds light on specific treatment situations at the end of life, with incapacitated adults and with a desire for maximal therapy. Ineffective measures have no effect in favor of the treatment goal, contraindicated measures harm the patient, and measures with an unfavorable benefit-risk ratio do not need to be included in the decision-making process unless the patient asks for them. Doctors must explain their assessments transparently and inform the patient unless there is no reasonable doubt about the evaluation. In end-of-life situations, life-sustaining measures should be replaced by palliative measures. In the case of incapacitated patients, a patient representative should be involved in the decision-making process. [Extracted from the article]

Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is typically viewed as a time-limited intervention—a bridge to recovery or transplant—not a destination therapy. However, some patients with decision-making capacity request continued ECMO support despite a poor prognosis for recovery and lack of viability as a transplant candidate. In response, critical care teams have asked for guidance regarding the ethical permissibility of unilateral withdrawal over the objections of a capacitated patient. In this article, we evaluate several ethical arguments that have been made in favor of withdrawal, including distributive justice, quality of life, patients' rights, professional integrity, and the Equivalence Thesis. We find that existing justifications for unilateral withdrawal of ECMO support in capacitated patients are problematic, which leads us to conclude that either: (1) additional ethical arguments are necessary to defend this approach or (2) the claim that it is not appropriate to use ECMO as a destination therapy should be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The law does not require health professionals to provide medical treatment that is of no benefit to the patient. Despite this, medical staff who are caring for patients at the end of their lives frequently experience pressure from the patients' families to prolong their lives. This article considers the Australian law relating to the right to demand treatment when a loved one is dying, and whether an increasing emphasis on shared decision-making has introduced uncertainty. It discusses factors that affect the application of the law, including widespread ignorance of the law, the difficulty of deciding whether a treatment is futile and the need to ration scarce health care resources. It also introduces the perspectives of three senior medical practitioners on disputes with families of dying patients. The article concludes that community education is needed on legal and medical issues at the end of life, including conversations about advance care directives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The aim of this study is to determine the rate of prematurely terminated clinical trials (CTs) and describe primary reasons and characteristics, and suggest strategies to improve. Methods: We performed a retrospective, observational, cross-sectional study including all CTs registered in the Spanish Registry of Clinical Studies (REec) from January 1, 2013 to November 31, 2021. A descriptive analysis of reasons for premature termination was made. To assess characteristics associated with a premature termination, the relative risks (RR) with a 95% confidence interval were calculated. Results: In total, 21% (718) of CT were prematurely terminated. Reasons for premature termination included patient recruitment issues in 25% (179) of cases, efficacy or futility problems in 18% (132), and commercial or strategic decisions from the sponsor in 12% (87). Characteristics significantly associated with an increased risk of premature termination included the following: presence of placebo (RR 2.08); multiple study sites (RR 1.32); pediatric and geriatric populations (RR 1.29 children; RR 1.47 preschoolers; RR 1.92 newborns; RR 1.27 > 64 years of age). In addition, circumstances such as investigations in phase II (RR 1.21), of cancer (RR 1.37), and of digestive pathology (RR 1.65) were also associated with increased risk of premature termination. Conclusion: Recruitment of the study subjects in a CT must be meticulous and account for age of participants. In addition, CT study sites should be evaluated to ensure they have appropriate resources and the desired patient population. Based on intermediate analyses, CT protocols should describe the criteria to terminate a study due to futility. These approaches are essential to avoid harm to participants, ensure internal validity of studies, and improve the use of resources in CT development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even with optimal treatment, some persons with severe and persistent mental illness do not achieve a level of mental health, psychosocial functioning and quality of life that is acceptable to them. With each unsuccessful treatment attempt, the probability of achieving symptom reduction declines while the probability of somatic and psychological side effects increases. This worsening benefit–harm ratio of treatment aiming at symptom reduction has motivated calls for implementing palliative approaches to care into psychiatry (palliative psychiatry). Palliative psychiatry accepts that some cases of severe and persistent mental illness can be irremediable and calls for a careful evaluation of goals of care in these cases. It aims at reducing harm, relieving suffering and thus improving quality of life directly, working around irremediable psychiatric symptoms. In a narrow sense, this refers to patients likely to die of their severe and persistent mental illness soon, but palliative psychiatry in a broad sense is not limited to end-of-life care. It can – and often should – be integrated with curative and rehabilitative approaches, as is the gold standard in somatic medicine. Palliative psychiatry constitutes a valuable addition to established non-curative approaches such as rehabilitative psychiatry (which focuses on psychosocial functioning instead of quality of life) and personal recovery (a journey that persons living with severe and persistent mental illness may undertake, not necessarily accompanied by mental health care professionals). Although the implementation of palliative psychiatry is met with several challenges such as difficulties regarding decision-making capacity and prognostication in severe and persistent mental illness, it is a promising new approach in caring for persons with severe and persistent mental illness, regardless of whether they are at the end of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Health care professionals have to judge the appropriateness of treatment in critical care on a daily basis. There is general consensus that critical care interventions should not be performed when they are inappropriate. It is not yet clear which chances of survival are considered necessary or which risk for serious disabilities is acceptable in quantitative terms for different stakeholders to start intensive care treatment. Methods We performed an anonymous online survey in a random sample of 1,052 participants recruited via email invitation and social media. Age, sex, nationality, education, professional involvement in health care, critical care medicine and treatment decisions in critical care medicine as well as personal experience with critical illness were assessed as potential influencing variables. Participants provided their opinion on the necessary chances of survival and the acceptable risk for serious disabilities to start a high-risk or uncomfortable therapy for themselves, relatives or for their patients on a scale of 0–100%. Results Answers ranged from 0 to 100% for all questions. A three-peak pattern with different distributions of the peaks was observed. Sex, education, being a health care professional, being involved in treatment decisions and religiosity influence these opinions. Male respondents and those with a university education would agree that a risky and uncomfortable treatment should be started even with a low chance of survival for themselves, relatives and patients. More respondents would choose a lower necessary chance of survival (0–33% survival) when deciding for patients compared to themselves or relatives to start a risky and uncomfortable treatment. On the other hand, the majority of respondents would accept only a low risk of severe disability for both themselves and their patients. Conclusion No cut-off can be identified for the necessary chances of survival or the acceptable risk of disability to help quantify the “inappropriateness” of critical care treatment. Sex and education are the strongest influencing factors on this opinion. The large variation in personal opinions, depending on demographic and personality variables and education needs to be considered in the communication between health care professionals and patients or surrogates.

Persons with mental disorders who are resistant to evidence‐based treatment can be referred to as patients with severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI). Some patients with SPMI develop a strong wish for assisted dying. Switzerland has the longest history of non‐medicalized assisted dying, which is considered a civil right even in non‐pathological situations. Public debate in Switzerland about the issue of suffering in the context of assisted dying is current and ongoing. The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences recently revised its end‐of‐life policy and specified intolerable suffering due to severe illness or functional limitations (and acknowledged as such by a physician) as a core criterion for assisted dying. We argue that suffering is a necessary but insufficient condition for assisted dying, and that the criteria should also include decision‐making capacity and refractoriness of suffering. We further contend that suffering is a subjective experience that can only be quantified by the patient and cannot be objectively compared across individuals. Some patients with SPMI and refractory suffering who maintain decision‐making capacity will meet the criteria for assisted dying. We advocate for palliative psychiatric care that relinquishes any disease‐modifying therapy, accepts limited survival chances, and focuses on measures that enhance the patient's quality of life, understood in a very broad sense beyond only health‐related quality of life. This approach should also relieve suffering as much as possible while remaining open to the possibility of assisted dying following conscientious assessment of the criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines several decision-making models that have been proposed to limit the use of CPR for COVID-19 patients. My main concern will be to assess proposals for the implementation of unilateral DNRs — i.e., orders to withhold CPR without the agreement of patients or their surrogates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Health care professionals have to judge the appropriateness of treatment in critical care on a daily basis. There is general consensus that critical care interventions should not be performed when they are inappropriate. It is not yet clear which chances of survival are considered necessary or which risk for serious disabilities is acceptable in quantitative terms for different stakeholders to start intensive care treatment.Methods: We performed an anonymous online survey in a random sample of 1,052 participants recruited via email invitation and social media. Age, sex, nationality, education, professional involvement in health care, critical care medicine and treatment decisions in critical care medicine as well as personal experience with critical illness were assessed as potential influencing variables. Participants provided their opinion on the necessary chances of survival and the acceptable risk for serious disabilities to start a high-risk or uncomfortable therapy for themselves, relatives or for their patients on a scale of 0-100%.Results: Answers ranged from 0 to 100% for all questions. A three-peak pattern with different distributions of the peaks was observed. Sex, education, being a health care professional, being involved in treatment decisions and religiosity influence these opinions. Male respondents and those with a university education would agree that a risky and uncomfortable treatment should be started even with a low chance of survival for themselves, relatives and patients. More respondents would choose a lower necessary chance of survival (0-33% survival) when deciding for patients compared to themselves or relatives to start a risky and uncomfortable treatment. On the other hand, the majority of respondents would accept only a low risk of severe disability for both themselves and their patients.Conclusion: No cut-off can be identified for the necessary chances of survival or the acceptable risk of disability to help quantify the "inappropriateness" of critical care treatment. Sex and education are the strongest influencing factors on this opinion. The large variation in personal opinions, depending on demographic and personality variables and education needs to be considered in the communication between health care professionals and patients or surrogates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine healthcare organizations' responses to high profile cases of doctor–parent disagreement. We argue that, once a conflict crosses a certain threshold of public interest, the stakes of the disagreement change in important ways. They are no longer only the stakes of the child's interests or who has decision‐making authority, but also the stakes of public trust in healthcare practitioners and organizations and the wide scale spread of medical misinformation. These higher stakes call for robust organization‐level responses. There are responsible and thoughtful ways for healthcare organizations to directly engage with these cases. Hospitals should seek an alliance with the parents around the goal of public discussion and utilize web‐based platforms to provide the public with information about medical conditions, experimental treatments, and how clinical ethics deliberation in hospitals works. We outline five important lessons for healthcare organizations to keep in mind when responding to such cases. Approached with care, these cases could become "teachable moments" for both healthcare organizations and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: ICU patients/surrogates may experience adverse outcomes related to perceived inappropriate treatment. The objective was to determine the prevalence of patient/surrogate-reported perceived inappropriate treatment, its impact on adverse outcomes, and discordance with clinicians.Methods: We conducted a multicenter, prospective, observational study of adult ICU patients.Results: For 151 patients, 1,332 patient, surrogate, nurse, and physician surveys were collected. Disagreement between patients/surrogates and clinicians regarding "too much" treatment being administered occurred in 26% of patients. Disagreement regarding "too little" treatment occurred in 10% of patients. Disagreement about perceived inappropriate treatment was associated with prognostic discordance (P = .02) and lower patient/surrogate satisfaction (Likert scale 1-5 of 4 vs 5; P = .02). Patient/surrogate respondents reported "too much" treatment in 8% of patients and "too little" treatment in 6% of patients. Perceived inappropriate treatment was associated with moderate or high respondent distress for 55% of patient/surrogate respondents and 35% of physician/nurse respondents (P = .30). Patient/surrogate perception of inappropriate treatment was associated with lower satisfaction (Family Satisfaction in the ICU Questionnaire-24, 69.9 vs 86.6; P = .002) and lower trust in the clinical team (Likert scale 1-5 of 4 vs 5; P = .007), but no statistically significant differences in depression (Patient Health Questionnaire-2 of 2 vs 1; P = .06) or anxiety (Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 Scale of 7 vs 4; P = .18).Conclusions: For approximately one-third of ICU patients, there is disagreement between clinicians and patients/surrogates about the appropriateness of treatment. Disagreement about appropriateness of treatment was associated with prognostic discordance and lower patient/surrogate satisfaction. Patients/surrogates who reported inappropriate treatment also reported lower satisfaction and trust in the ICU team. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Significant challenges arise for clinical care teams when a patient or surrogate decision-maker hopes a miracle will occur. This article answers the question, “How should clinical bioethicists respond when a medical decision-maker uses the hope for a miracle to orient her medical decisions?” We argue the ethicist must first understand the complexity of the miracle-invocation. To this end, we provide a taxonomy of miracle-invocations that assist the ethicist in analyzing the invocator's conceptions of God, community, and self. After the ethicist appreciates how these concepts influence the invocator's worldview, she can begin responding to this hope with specific practices. We discuss these practices in detail and offer concrete recommendations for a justified response to the hope for a miracle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Institute of Medicine and the American Heart Association have issued a “call to action” to expand the performance of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in response to out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. Widespread advertising campaigns have been created to encourage more members of the lay public to undergo training in the technique of closed-chest compression-only CPR, based upon extolling the virtues of rapid initiation of resuscitation, untempered by information about the often distressing outcomes, and hailing the “improved” results when nonprofessional bystanders are involved. We describe this misrepresentation of CPR as a highly effective treatment as the fetishization of this valuable, but often inappropriately used, therapy. We propose that the medical profession has an ethical duty to inform the public through education campaigns about the procedure's limitations in the out-of-hospital setting and the narrow clinical indications for which it has been demonstrated to have a reasonable probability of producing favorable outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Objectives: To update the Society of Critical Care Medicine's guidelines for ICU admission, discharge, and triage, providing a framework for clinical practice, the development of institutional policies, and further research.Design: An appointed Task Force followed a standard, systematic, and evidence-based approach in reviewing the literature to develop these guidelines.Measurements and Main Results: The assessment of the evidence and recommendations was based on the principles of the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation system. The general subject was addressed in sections: admission criteria and benefits of different levels of care, triage, discharge timing and strategies, use of outreach programs to supplement ICU care, quality assurance/improvement and metrics, nonbeneficial treatment in the ICU, and rationing considerations. The literature searches yielded 2,404 articles published from January 1998 to October 2013 for review. Following the appraisal of the literature, discussion, and consensus, recommendations were written.Conclusion: Although these are administrative guidelines, the subjects addressed encompass complex ethical and medico-legal aspects of patient care that affect daily clinical practice. A limited amount of high-quality evidence made it difficult to answer all the questions asked related to ICU admission, discharge, and triage. Despite these limitations, the members of the Task Force believe that these recommendations provide a comprehensive framework to guide practitioners in making informed decisions during the admission, discharge, and triage process as well as in resolving issues of nonbeneficial treatment and rationing. We need to further develop preventive strategies to reduce the burden of critical illness, educate our noncritical care colleagues about these interventions, and improve our outreach, developing early identification and intervention systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparatively little scholarly attention has been given to the question of futility in chronic psychiatric disorders, with the exception of a small body of work on so-called end-stage anorexia nervosa (AN). A review of this literature provides the background for a critical examination of whether the concept of futility has any clinically meaningful, ethically justifiable, and legally defensible application to AN. In this article, the arguments for and against futility judgments in AN are analyzed with special emphasis on determinations of capacity in this serious mental illness. Parallels between the futility disputes in medical and psychiatric disorders, where applicable, will be drawn to further illuminate whether or not the concept that continued psychiatric treatment for AN is ever truly futile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doctors have no ethical obligation to provide futile treatment. This has been true since the time of Hippocrates who warned physicians not to treat patients who were "overmastered by their disease." This principle remains valid today but, as the Society for Critical Care Medicine notes, it is difficult to identify treatment as absolutely futile in all but a few clinical situations. Far more common, they note, are "treatments that are extremely unlikely to be beneficial, are extremely costly, or are of uncertain benefit." These, they say, "may be considered inappropriate and hence inadvisable, but should not be labeled futile." So what should doctors do when they have a case that seems close to the futility threshold but does not, perhaps, quite cross it? In such cases, is it appropriate to make unilateral decisions to withhold life-sustaining treatment even if the family objects? Or should treatment be provided knowing that it might cause pain and suffering to an infant with no likelihood of benefit? To address these questions, we present a case of an extremely premature infant with a giant omphalocele and ask 3 neonatologists, Dr Dalia Feltman of Evanston Hospital, Dr Theophil Stokes of the Walter Reed Medical Center, and Dr Jennifer Kett, a neonatologist and fellow in bioethics at Seattle Children's Hospital, to comment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Both legal and ethical issues may be encountered by intensive care practitioners on a regular basis. A keen knowledge of the law and of professional guidelines will assist decision-making in challenging clinical cases. Four bioethical principles can be utilized in ethical dilemmas to provide a framework upon which to base moral decisions. Being able to assess mental capacity and ascertain a patient''s best interests are both key requisites for the intensive care practitioner. The application of these principles to common scenarios is discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Most discussions of medical futility try to answer the Futility Question: when is a medical procedure futile? No answer enjoys universal support. Some futility policies say that the health care provider will answer this question when the provider and patient (or surrogate decisionmaker) cannot agree. This raises the Decision Question: who has the moral authority to decide what to do in cases where futility is disputed? I look for a procedural answer to this question, an answer that does not turn on whether a given party happens to answer the Futility Question correctly. I argue that these policies get it right; the provider should decide because providers have a right of conscientious refusal that extends to refusing procedures on grounds of futility. This is a procedural answer because providers have this right even if they are sincerely mistaken about whether a procedure is futile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When life-threatening illness robs a patient of the ability to express their desires, medical personnel must work through the issues of management and prognosis with relatives. Management decisions are guided by medical judgement and the relatives' account of the patient's wishes, but difficulties occur when distance grows between these two factors. In these circumstances the counselling process may turn into a doctor-led justification of the medical decision. This article presents two strands of dialogue, in which a doctor, counselling for and against continuation of supportive treatment in two patients with liver failure, demonstrates selectivity and inconsistency in constructing an argument. The specific issues of loss of consciousness (with obscuration of personal identity), statistical 'futility' and removal of autonomy are explored and used to bolster diametrically opposed medical decisions. By examining the doctor's ability to interpret these issues according to circumstance, the author demonstrates how it is possible to shade medical facts depending on the desired outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this chapter I consider the ethical decisions surrounding the provision and limitation of treatment offered to children requiring intensive care. I focus on the processes surrounding end of life decision making and consider how the concepts of futility, burden and uncertainty should impact upon these decisions. I also examine resource allocation to children''s critical care services. The discussion does not provide a structure that will solve any given situation. It does take a practical approach to the issues faced by considering why we should engage in life limiting discussions; When they should occur; Who should be involved; How they should be carried out; and where and by what means withholding or withdrawal should occur. I have drawn the discussions closer to clinical practice with the intention of making them more useful, for those engaged in direct patient care, than those focused around philosophical principles. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Life saving or life sustaining treatment may not be instigated in the clinical setting when such treatment is deemed to be futile and therefore not in the patient's best interests. The concept of futility, however, is related to many assumptions about quality and quantity of life, and may be relied upon in a manner that is ethically unjustifiable. It is argued that the concept of futility will remain of limited practical use in making decisions based on the best interests principle because it places such high demands on the individual responsible for decision making. This article provides a critical analysis of futility (in the context of the best interests decision-making principle), and proposes an ethically defensible notion of futility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a narrative approach to understanding the process of clinical reasoning in complex cases involving medical uncertainty, moral ambiguity, and futility. We describe a clinical encounter in which the pediatric health care team experienced a great deal of conflict and distrust as a result of an ineffective process of interpretation and communication. We propose a systematic method for analyzing the technical, ethical, behavioral, and existential dimensions of the clinical reasoning process, and introduce the Clinical Reasoning Discussion Tool—a dialogical and interpretive device aimed at improving communication, understanding, empathy, and moral deliberation in the clinical setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Engaging with ethical issues is central to the management of neonatal encephalopathy (NE). As treatment for these neonates evolves, new ethical issues will arise and many existing challenges will remain. We highlight three key ethical issues that arise in the care of neonates with NE treated with therapeutic hypothermia: facilitating shared decision making, understanding futility, and defining the boundaries between standard of care and research. Awareness of these issues will help clinicians counsel families in light of evolving treatments and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors relate that a study by A. E. Barnato and colleagues which determined the relationship between patient care and physician treatment decisions using high-fidelity simulation was exceptional in terms of novel methodology and promise for advancing the practical science of research. The study found that physicians involved in the study made the same decisions for the Africans as the European Americans. The authors believe that the study offered timely and clinically relevant insights into end-of-life decision making.