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The article discusses the figure of pedagogical tact in its cultural and social entanglements and transformations. Tact is reconstructed from a dialectical-relational perspective as a utopian figure which arises both within pedagogical relationships and from the relationships to the respective cultural and social conditions – more precisely: from a criticism of them. In this dialectical tension, it is argued that relationships are both transformative and, in turn, require transformations in order to enable tactful pedagogical action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that our current situation is one that both prevents us from telling 'grand narratives' and necessitates us to 'think big'. This makes the task of the essay today a dialectical one. Following Adorno, the essay is not merely seen as a literary genre but also as a mode of thought that reflects and criticises a particular socio-historical condition. The essayistic mode of thought attempts to reinstate or revive particularity as well as our experience of it, in a world wherein all things appear as a function or exemplar of something else. At the same time, however, and exactly through this intense focus on the particular object or experience, the essay brings to light something universal. This makes the essay the philosophical and aesthetic form par excellence of our current time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Notes Muzyczny is the property of Akademia Muzyczna im. Grazyny i Kiejstuta Bacewiczow w Lodzi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Journal of Political Philosophy / Las Torres de Lucca is the property of Revista Las Torres de Lucca. Facultad de Filosofia, Ciudad Universitaria and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Post-Kantian philosophers typically hold there to be a coincidence between reason and freedom. In this paper, I question their ability to secure this coincidence. I do so in particular by examining the work of John McDowell: probably the leading light of contemporary analytic post-Kantian philosophy, and certainly someone for whom the coincidence is important. Working through McDowell, I argue that in order to be considered 'rationally free' in relation to the external world, the world itself needs to, at at least some level, elude rational understanding. In the conclusion, I claim that this invites greater engagement – particularly by post-Kantian philosophers working in the analytic tradition – with the work of Theodor Adorno. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay makes three connected moves. First, it examines various modalities of ‘the end’ in philosophy and contemporary neoliberal culture, asking what new political lessons might be drawn from each. Second, it looks at different dialectical ideas of catastrophe: Günther Anders’ and JeanPierre Dupuy’s notion of ‘enlightened doomsaying’; and Maurice Blanchot’s and Theodor Adorno’s contention that only in the face of extinction does humanity become visible in the first place. Third, the essay concludes by proposing a move beyond Blanchot and Adorno. We don’t just need to look the negative (extinction) in the face, but to move into the zone of politics proper: to recognise that only the negation of this world – a world of converging and multiplying catastrophes – ends the prospect of the end of the world – understood not as a sudden death, but rather as an incremental decay, the slow unravelling of intimately entangled forms of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article draws out a critical, yet under-appreciated political theme in Adorno's Negative Dialectics, namely his emphasis on guilt and atonement. First, the article assesses how Adorno's Marxism allows him to think justice and guilt beyond the familiar legalistic frame. Second, the article reconstructs Adorno's treatment of guilt as a distinctly political capacity to imagine one's boundedness and indebtedness to others, and the affective engine enabling us to engage in a political ethic distinct from familiar categories of reparation. Third, the article shows how the themes of guilt and atonement give us a more complete picture of Negative Dialectics. This inquiry also intervenes in contemporary debates regarding the political status and emancipatory potential latent within guilt-feelings, and claims Adorno gives us a path forward to imagine the relation between guilt and politics in a novel way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Picasso and Stravinsky are renowned in their respective fields for their primitivism, Adorno's evaluation of them seems to be in sharp contrast, with one being endorsed and the other repudiated. His criticism of Stravinsky, in particular, has been under attack as well. It is thus necessary to explore the dialectical reasoning and critical engagement underlying Adorno's antithetical judgement as well as its justification. Based on the dialectic of enlightenment, Adorno regards Picasso's primitivism as a strong return of the ugly in modern art, which can be traced to the primitive fear. It is also regarded as a critique of enlightenment as well as an inherent need for the spiritualization of art and artistic autonomy. In contrast, regarding the primitive elements and expression of ugliness and discord in Stravinsky's art, Adorno denounces them as regressive, a fabrication of new myths, and even complicit with fascist ideology. Such a view is relevant to Adorno's critique of the collective unconscious in psychoanalysis and authenticity in phenomenology, an extension of his critique of identity in art. In contrast to his positive evaluation of Picasso, Adorno's negation of Stravinsky should not be regarded as mere denigration and demonization. The alienation and falsehood expressed in Stravinsky's primitivist music is indeed avant-garde as its truth content. Adorno's "negation" of Stravinsky, therefore, should also be considered as dialectical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Adorno and Horkheimer's legacy is incomplete without reference to their infamous political quietism. To thinkers such as Habermas, this was the unfortunate consequence of their alleged evacuation of reason. Attending to the treatment of Nietzsche in Dialectic of Enlightenment illuminates the distinct irony of such charges. Here, in their most popular book, Nietzsche is presented as precisely that which they praised him for warning against elsewhere: an advocate of cruelty animated by a reactionary morality. I contend that this exaggeration is not accidental, but rather illustrative; the authors present a consciously hyperbolized version of Nietzsche in order to articulate how he made possible his own misappropriation, and to distinguish themselves sharply from Nietzsche given their disagreements about the necessity of reason. Ultimately, however, even though Adorno and Horkheimer performatively differentiate themselves from the nihilism they saw in Nietzsche, their alternative would ironically be subject to precisely the same charges of irrationalism and political aporia that they sought so desperately to avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite appearing side by side as keynote speakers at a congress in 1962 devoted to the question of progress, Löwith's and Adorno's accounts of progress have never been linked. This paper is an attempt to establish this missed connection, to reveal important connections, striking similarities, and a fundamental difference between these two eminent thinkers' work on progress. For one, Löwith diagnoses the three main problems that Adorno attempts to solve with his dialectical account of progress. Moreover, each is sympathetic towards crucial aspects of the other's account: Löwith towards Adorno's claim that progress is dialectical, Adorno towards Löwith's claim that progress necessarily has a redemptive aspect. A fundamental disagreement nevertheless divides them: whether the problem of suffering in history is part of our ontological condition, or something we must struggle against and overcome through political action. By establishing this missed connection, I hope to show how progress might still have an important role to play in our present-day historical and political consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within anthropology, assemblage theory has achieved broad disciplinary traction, yet the theory's philosophical premises are rarely explored. This article therefore revisits the Deleuzian notion of difference that underpins assemblage theory as a step towards rendering the theory more consonant with a relational anthropology. In place of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's conception of discrete elements related only externally to each other within an assemblage, I propose a dialectical conception, whereby assemblage is taken to be a heterogeneous ensemble whose constituent elements also relate to each other internally. To arrive at this understanding, I examine the dialectical logic of Theodore Adorno. I then consider the implications of a dialectical notion of assemblage for recent work on the anthropology of capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current paper addresses the need to respond critically to the theoretical challenges that arise from the matrix of decolonial thinking and its relation to Theodor W. Adorno's negative dialectics. Methodologically, a conceptual framework has been developed to establish the possible communicating vessels between the different elaborations on decolonial thinking and Adorno's theoretical production. Bearing in mind the Castro-Gómez critique of Foucault, this approach disassociates itself from the idea that a thinker is Eurocentric on the mere basis of the locus of enunciation. This work posits that it is perfectly feasible to find an analytical exercise that allows a closer approach to Adorno's thinking. This implies a paradoxical double movement in the analysis. One is the critical study of the Adornian approach or negative dialectic from decolonial criticism, and the other is determining the possibility of tracing plexuses of concrete interpenetration between both theoretical universes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To make Adorno's difficult notion of "identity thinking" more amendable to sociological research, this project brings his Negative Dialectics into conversation with Schutz's theory of typification. When revised with Adorno's attention to political economy and the pathologies of reification, Schutz's framework allows for an analysis of identity thinking in everyday life. Both theorists argue that categories of thought: (1) automatically subsume objects for pragmatic yet socially conditioned reasons, (2) are socially formed, transferred, and selected, and (3) suppress particularizing characteristics of objects. Their overlapping arguments are cross-fertilized to propose a critical approach to cognitive sociology that can engage in a form of ideology critique that illuminates forms of thinking that conceal social contradictions. This approach is useful for explaining the "mundane dialectic of enlightenment": the daily reproduction of unreflective rationalization that breeds irrationality in the form of social domination and environmental harm, a contradiction which finds its ultimate expression in climate change inaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay revisits Adorno's relation to Marx through a reading of his recently translated seminar on Marx (1962) within the broader context of the two thinkers' views on the dialectic. While Adorno's critical comments in the seminar seem to be applicable to some of Marx's bold assertions about Hegel's dialectic, taken in isolation, they fail to challenge Marx's more rigorous analysis of the dialectic, as presented in his introduction to the Grundrisse. Nevertheless, read alongside Adorno's mature critique of identity, the text of the seminar could be interpreted as pointing to a much more serious criticism of Marx, that is, the criticism of the primacy of economy that animates Marx's dialectic from within. The essay is concluded with a warning against reducing Adorno's position on Marx to his criticism of the primacy of economy, followed by a brief reference to the fundamentally transitory character of critical theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Frankfurt School formulated a negative dialectics that keeps open the possibility for alternative social futures by explaining and diagnosing the non-existence of 'real possibilities' to actualize a better world. Ernst Bloch's category of 'mere possibility' makes a 'warmer' negative dialectics viable, a form that faces a grim reality head on yet loosens the prohibition against identifying pathways toward alternative social futures latent in social conditions, possibilities with the potentiality (the objective-external dimension of possibility), but lack the capacity (the subjective-internal dimension of possibility), to become actual. This allows negative dialectics to engage in relatively programmatic 'prospect-exploration' when tackling dire issues like climate change, even if the proposed solutions are deficient. Identifying merely possible climate change solutions skirts three problematic tendencies in prescriptive assessments of climate politics: (1) promoting the continuation of ineffective mitigation strategies (e.g., carbon markets), (2) calling for a revolution without a revolutionary subject, and (3) fatalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Laocoonte is the property of Sociedad Espanola de Estetica y Teoria de las Artes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the darkest days of the Second World War Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno overturned the wisdom of modern times by suggesting that the idea of a constant struggle between Enlightenment and myth overlooked an unacknowledged identity between these alleged eternal combatants. This paper will briefly explain this claim and examine it in its historical context, consider the responses of the subsequent generation to the first iteration of Dialectic of Enlightenment with its radical negation of this tradition, before concluding with a contemporary evaluation of its remaining relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay presents a careful interpretation of Adorno’s classical text The Essay as Form, published in 1958 as the introduction to his Notes on Literature. Since it thickly condenses many of Adorno’s general views, the Essay poses great hermeneutic challenges to readers. The paper, first, elaborates on the essay more broadly as a genre and identifies a spectrum between science and art each individual essay draws from to forge its particular hybridity. Second, the example is discussed as an epistemologically potent trope oscillating between subsumption and singularity. This internal tension renders the example particularly qualified to serve as the conceptual basis on which interpretative themes in the essay can be discovered. Three lines of interpretation are suggested: (a) poetological for the essay/Essay’s definition, goal, and method; (b) critical/dialectical for its treatment of concepts and in relation to content; and (c) epistemic for the modern separation of art and science. The conclusion comes back to the issue of exemplarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the problem of the possible relation between psychoanalytic concepts and social critique in the perspective of Adorno's social thought. The title refers to Adorno's idea that psyche as individual spontaneity has now lost the weight it used to have in the liberal era. As a brief introductory remark, I clarify the status of theory for Adorno, i.e., the circularity between interpretation and description as grounded by the nature of the social object itself. Then I analyse his core idea of “social objectivity” as an impersonal mechanism which is at the same time produced by men and reified, heteronomous for them, and I argue that, for Adorno, the discontinuity existing between individual and society prevents an immediate shift of psychoanalytic concepts to the social world: the example of fascism clearly proves that the determining social forces today, while instrumentally exploiting deep psychical materials, are not themselves psychological. In the final part, I show how, for Adorno, psychology and sociology nevertheless need to be mediated with each other, while avoiding the superficial synthesis the so-called “revised psychoanalysis” aims to, and I point out some similarities between psychoanalytic practice and social critique as conceived by him.

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this article is to introduce foundations of the epistemological proposal of Jürgen Habermas, which are found in his works previous to The theory communicative action. The text addresses the dispute between Popper and Adorno and then focuses on Habermas' proposal based on The analytical theory of science and dialectics. Finally, it discusses how Habermas portrays, in his debate with others contemporary authors, his proposal at Technology and science as "ideology", considered a landmark for Frankfurt School. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Phenomenological accounts of technology, mediation, and embodiment are beginning to problematize traditional distinctions between subject (human) and object (machine). This shift is often attributed to a material or post-human turn since it is usually associated with an interest in the non-human actors and objects that make media interfaces possible. This article contends that these tendencies should also be considered part of a deeper lineage of dialectical thought in critical theory. Using videogames as an example, I argue that academic debates related to the player/game relationship can be read through the lens of Adorno’s aesthetic theory. Developing Adorno’s concept of mimesis, I argue that the interface is often treated as a dialectical question of how the space between subject and object should be traversed. I reflect on the possible advantages of focusing on this contested space through a discussion of game controllers and the Aristotelian concept of techne. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims at an exploration of the relation between contemporary Adornian philosophical assumptions and analytical techniques, while avoiding the usual pitfalls of reflections based on typologies or false projections of the past on the present or treatises ending up in a fruitless relativism. As a critical reflection on contemporary philosophical assumptions on the basis of practical and score-based analyses of specific compositions appears to be more rewarding, the basic premise is assumed that (contemporary) aesthetic assumptions, which are highly subjective, are necessarily posited positively by the composer, while the problematic connection between idea and technique still needs to be discovered by means of an analysis of musical artworks. This method is illustrated by a practical and score-based sketch of the Adornian reception of (the) child(hood) in the piano cycle Ein Kinderspiel (1980) of Helmut Lachenmann. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay performs Adorno’s philosophical practice of negative dialectics by attending to two contemporary artworks: Vadim Zakharov’sAdorno Monument(2003) and Siah Armajani’sAn Exile Dreaming of Saint Adorno(2009). After first developing an understanding of Adorno’s work as a series of etudes capable of enhancing the creative capacity of philosophers in the present, the essay then reveals each artwork’s inherent aporetic tension. Proceeding negatively from each aporia to the environment housing each artwork, the author forges an argument supporting the need for Adorno’s philosophy, especially in situations where the antinomy of art and life opens a space for reflection and critical thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Adorno’s re-conceptualisation of the traditional concept of the sublime, arguing that for Adorno the sublime aesthetic experience foregrounds an awareness of non-identity and the “priority of the object.” For Adorno, tears, shudders, and the emotions of shock and terror remain authentic responses to artworks because they remind the ego of its affinity with nature. Adorno’s treatment of the sublime in modern art and in relation to his theory of the dialectic of enlightenment invites a radical critique of the claim of reason to autonomy and control. His notion of the sublime is illustrated by the performance work of Franko B (Italy/UK) as a contemporary example of the confrontation with the bodily sublime, which produces a “limit-experience,” a mode of subjective decentring as a result of our exposure to the impossible and the formless. While Adorno’s “negative” sublime is devoid of reconciliatory metaphysical meaning, it calls forth an altered subjectivity that opposes the withering of experience otherwise dominant in contemporary culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘Immanent criticism' has been discussed by philosophers of quite different persuasions, working in separate areas and in different traditions of philosophy. Almost all of them agree on roughly the same story about its origins: It is that Hegel invented immanent criticism, that Marx later developed it, and that the various members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, refined it in various ways, and that they are all paradigmatic practitioners of immanent criticism. I call this the Continuity Thesis. There are four different claims that interest me. (i) Hegel is the originator of immanent criticism. (ii) Hegel's dialectical method is that of immanent criticism. (iii) Adorno practises immanent criticism and endorses the term as a description of his practice. (iv) Adorno's dialectical method is fundamentally Hegelian. In this article, I offer an account of immanent criticism, on the basis of which, I evaluate these four claims and argue that the Continuity Thesis should be rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, I show that Adorno can do so consistently because of how he reshapes Hegelian dialectic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The influence of the thought of the great German Idealist philosopher G.W.F Hegel on the thought of Theodor Adorno, the leading thinker of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, is unmistakeable, and has been the subject of much commentary. Much less discussed, however, is the influence of Hegel's prominent contemporary, F.W.J. Schelling. This article investigates the influence of Schelling on Adorno, and the sometimes striking parallels between fundamental motifs in the work of both thinkers. It argues that Adorno's critique of Hegelian (and indeed of his own, negative) dialectics, his conception of the relation between nature and spirit, and his philosophy of history (amongst other aspects of this thought) owe a considerable debt to Schelling. Furthermore, when adequately explicated, Schelling's position on a range of problems which confronted German Idealist philosophy often prove intrinsically preferable to those of Hegel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]