Search

Your search keyword '"JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments"' showing total 15 results
Start Over Descriptor "JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments" Topic economics
15 results on '"JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments"'

1. Income hiding and informal redistribution: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal

Author

Marie Boltz, Paola Villar, Karine Marazyan, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), IEDES, UMR Développement et Sociétés, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Institut national d'études démographiques (INED), Université de Namur [Namur] (UNamur), This work was supported by the CEPREMAP, the PSE Research Fund, the Sarah Andrieux Fund, the Chair G-Mond, the IRD, the UMR Développement et Société, the Agence Nationale pour la Recherche [through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10-LABX-93-01]. This research is also part of the NOPOOR project, which is funded by the European Union under the 7th Research Framework Programme (Theme SSH.2011.1) - Grant Agreement No. 290752., ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), European Project: 290752,EC:FP7:SSH,FP7-SSH-2011-1,NOPOOR(2012), ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Ouvrir la Science Economique - Opening economics(2010), Instutut d'Études du Développement de la Sorbonne (IEDES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), and UMR Développement et Sociétés (DEVSOC)

Subjects
Lab-in-the-field experiment, Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, Resource allocation decisions, Field experiment, 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Extended family, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), Development, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Informal redistribution, Africa, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development, 0502 economics and business, Economics, resource allocation decision, 050207 economics, Extended families, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, Income observability, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

International audience; We estimate the hidden cost of social obligations to redistribute exploiting data from a controlled setting in urban Senegal, which combines lab-in-the-field measures and out-of-lab follow-up data. We estimate a social tax of about 9 percent. When given the opportunity to get hidden income, individuals decrease by 26 percent the share of gains they transfer to kin — mostly outside the household — and increase health and personal expenses. We expand on prior literature by both identifying the individual cost of informal redistribution and then relating it to postexperiment resource-allocation decisions, and by disentangling intra- and interhousehold redistributive pressure.

Published
2019
Full Text
View/download PDF

2. La charité commence-t-elle à la maison pour réduire la pollution de l'air ? Une mise en évidence de l'altruisme intrafamilial

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Stéphane Luchini, Olivier Chanel, University of Wyoming (UW), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), The French Environment Ministry (Primequal grant no 36/98), The French ecological transition agency ADEME (Primequal grant CEPEM no 1862C0011), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011), ANR-11-LABX-0061,OTMed,Objectif Terre : Bassin Méditerranéen(2011), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Chanel, Olivier

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, air pollution, Air pollution, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics, medicine.disease_cause, Altruism, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 03 medical and health sciences, familial altruism, Willingness to pay, 11. Sustainability, 0502 economics and business, medicine, Economics, Air quality index, media_common, 050210 logistics & transportation, Contingent valuation, Public economics, 030503 health policy & services, 05 social sciences, Public good, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 3. Good health, Test (assessment), Econometric model, field experiment, Modeling and Simulation, [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, 0305 other medical science, willingness to pay, contingent valuation
Abstract

International audience; We propose a structural econometric model that incorporates altruism towards other household members into the willingness to pay for a public good. The model distinguishes preferences for public good improvements for oneself from preferences for improvements for other household members. We test for three different types of altruism - ‘pure self-interest’, ‘pure altruism’ and ‘public-good-focused non-pure altruism’. Using French contingent valuation data regarding air quality improvements, we find positive and significant degrees of concern for children under the age of 18, which are explained by determinants related to health and subjective air quality assessment. All other forms of pure or air-quality-focused altruism within the family are insignificant, including for children over 18, siblings, spouses, and parents. This result suggests that benefit estimates that do not consider altruism could undervalue improvements in air quality in France.

Published
2021
Full Text
View/download PDF

3. Performance Feedback and Peer Effects

Author

Marie Claire Villeval, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Marginal cost, Disappointment, peer effects, Social learning, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Social preferences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Feedback, peer effects JEL codes: C9, Microeconomics, Incentive, M5, medicine, Economics, D91, J3, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, medicine.symptom, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Productivity, Rivalry, Externality, performance, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Abstract

This paper reviews studies conducted in naturally-occurring work environments or in the laboratory on the impact of performance feedback provision and peer effects on individuals' performance. First, it discusses to which extent feedback on absolute performance affects individuals' effort for cognitive or motivational reasons, and how evaluations can be distorted strategically. Second, this paper highlights the positive and negative effects of feedback on relative performance and rank on individuals' productivity and persistence, but also on the occurrence of antisocial behavior. Relative feedback stimulates effort by informing on the marginal return or the marginal cost of effort, and by activating behavioral forces even in the absence of monetary incentives. These behavioral mechanisms relate to self-esteem, status concerns, competitive preferences and social learning. Relative feedback sometimes discourages or distorts effort, notably if people collude or are disappointment averse. In addition to incentive schemes and social preferences, the management of self-confidence affects the way relative feedback impacts productivity. Third, the paper addresses the question of the identification of peer effects on employees' performance, their size, their direction and their heterogeneity along the hierarchy. The mechanisms behind peer effects include conformism, social pressure, rivalry, social learning and distributional preferences, depending on the presence of payoff externalities or technological and organizational externalities..

Published
2020
Full Text
View/download PDF

4. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), University of Wyoming (UW), University of Alaska-Anchorage, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung (WZB), Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC), Region Grand-Est, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Tax Administration Research Centre, University of Exeter (TARC), The authors thank the Conseil Régional de Lorraine for its financial support., Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University of Exeter, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Declaration, oath, Tax evasion, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Compliance (psychology), honesty, Consistency (negotiation), JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H27 - Other Sources of Revenue, Honesty, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, 050205 econometrics, Law and economics, media_common, Commitment device, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Oath, 05 social sciences, commitment, part-time Lying, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Lying, Finance
Abstract

International audience; Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.

Published
2020
Full Text
View/download PDF

5. Money illusion, financial literacy and numeracy: experimental evidence

Author

Elisa Darriet, Marianne Guille, Mariko Shimizu, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action (LIRSA), Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] (CNAM), HESAM Université (HESAM)-HESAM Université (HESAM), Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée (LEMMA), Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2)-Sorbonne Université (SU)

Subjects
Inflation, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, media_common.quotation_subject, Context (language use), Monetary economics, Behavioral economics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, 050105 experimental psychology, JEL: G - Financial Economics, PsycINFO Classification code: 2260, 2340, 2343, Numeracy, 0502 economics and business, Money illusion, Economics, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, Applied Psychology, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, media_common, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Deflation, Behavioral sciences, Behavioral finance, Financial literacy, [SCCO.PSYC]Cognitive science/Psychology, Design of experiments
Abstract

We would like to thank the editor Stefan Trautmann, the two anonymous reviewers, Hélène Huber for their helpful comments and the LEMMA, University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas for its financial support.; International audience; Money illusion is usually defined as the inability of individuals to correctly account for inflation or deflation when making decisions. Empirical evidence shows that money illusion matters in financial decisions, particularly those made by households. In this article, we analyze money illusion at the individual level within the context of financial choices and study its relationship with numeracy and financial literacy. To do so, we propose an original measure of money illusion via an experimental task. This task consists of a series of choices between a pair of simple bonds whose returns are affected only by inflation (or deflation). We provide a fine-grained measure of money illusion that is correlated with typical measures (questionnaires) of it. Moreover, we show that money illusion depends on the choice context (e.g., inflation or deflation) and participants’ abilities. Individuals with financial knowledge are less sensitive to money illusion than others, while there is no evidence of an impact of numeracy.

Published
2020
Full Text
View/download PDF

6. Social preferences and coordination: An experiment

Author

Raphael Soubeyran, Nicolas Quérou, Mamadou Gueye, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine (LEDa), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)

Subjects
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Economics and Econometrics, inequality, Inequality, media_common.quotation_subject, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics, Affect (psychology), Social preferences, Outcome (game theory), JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Coordination game, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, media_common, 05 social sciences, Stochastic game, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, coordination game, Negative relationship, inequality aversion, total payoff motivation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, Inequity aversion
Abstract

International audience; In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of social preferences in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Inequality is increased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, inequality aversion may lead to a negative relationship between inequality and coordination success, while total payoff motivations lead to a positive relationship. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that more inequality unambiguously yields a higher level of coordination success. Furthermore, this result holds even for subjects whose payoffs remain unchanged. Our results suggest that total payoff motivations drive the positive relationship between inequality and coordination success found in this experiment. Moreover, our data highlight that the order of treatment matters. Groups facing over time a reduction in inequalities reach the efficient outcome more often, over the entire experiment, compared to groups facing over time an increase in inequalities. This study thus contributes to understanding whether social preferences and variations in inequality affect the outcome of coordination problems.

Published
2020
Full Text
View/download PDF

7. Is Informal Redistribution Costly? Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal

Author

Marie Boltz, Paola Villar, Karine Marazyan, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), IEDES, UMR Développement et Sociétés, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Institut national d'études démographiques (INED), Université de Namur [Namur] (UNamur), and The authors are thankful to the CEPREMAP, the PSE Research Fund, theSarah Andrieux Fund, the Chair G-Mond, the IRD, and the UMR Développement et Sociétés for their financial support forthis research project. This project received the IRB certification of J-Pal Europe (CE/2014-005).

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, MIGRATION, 050204 development studies, Field experiment, informal redistribution, Social pressure, Development, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, INFORMAL ECONOMY, Willingness to pay, Income distribution, REDISTRIBUTION, income observability, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, EXTENDED FAMILY, 050207 economics, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics, Lab-in-the-field experiment, Informal sector, 05 social sciences, 1. No poverty, Extended family, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O15 - Human Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, INCOME OBSERVABILITY, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth, Africa, WILLINGNESS TO PAY, extended families, JEL: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements, willingness to pay, Finance
Abstract

In Sub-Saharan Africa, individuals frequently transfer a substantial share of their resources to members of their social networks. Social pressure to redistribute, however, can induce disincentive effects on resource allocation decisions. This paper measures and characterizes the costs of redistributive pressure by estimating individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to hide their income. The study estimates a social tax due to informal redistribution of 10 percent. Moreover, it shows that individuals are willing to escape from the redistributive pressure exerted mainly by extended family members.

Published
2019
Full Text
View/download PDF

8. Do upfront investments increase cooperation? A laboratory experiment

Author

Fortuna Casoria, Alice Ciccone, Dao, Taï, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institute of Transport Economics, University of Oslo (UiO), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, genetic structures, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, Experiment, Prisoners' dilemma, 0502 economics and business, Economics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, 050207 economics, Investment opportunities, Enforcement, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Industrial organization, health care economics and organizations, 050205 econometrics, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games, 05 social sciences, Stochastic game, Prisoner's dilemma, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Cooperation, Upfront investments, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, Business, Laboratory experiment, Finance
Abstract

In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized upfront investments increase cooperation in settings where there is no enforcement mechanism and cooperation is not easily sustained voluntarily. Such investments are a cost that individuals incur before deciding whether to cooperate or not, and increase the payoff resulting from the choice to cooperate. We study whether the effect of investments on cooperation depends on the investments being voluntary or mandatory. While cooperation rarely emerges spontaneously when investments are not possible, we show that introducing investment opportunities boosts overall cooperation levels. If investments are low and voluntary, cooperation is lower than when the same investments are mandatory. For high investments, cooperation is not significantly different between the two conditions. This is consistent with low investments being interpreted as a signal for unwillingness to cooperate, triggering non-cooperative choices.

Published
2019

9. Experiments in macroeconomics: methods and applications

Author

Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin (TU)

Subjects
Macroeconomics, 050208 finance, laboratory experiments, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E0 - General, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, Economics, ddc:330, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, macroeconomics
Abstract

This chapter lays out in what ways laboratory experiments can be useful for macroeconomics and discusses some of the methods used in such experiments. Among the main advantages are: bench-testing of alternative policies, capturing strategic uncertainty and biases from standard preferences or Bayesian updating, and accounting for heterogeneity in agents’ expectations and behavior. It is explained how DSGE models are implemented in laboratory experiments and how heuristic switching models can be used to analyze expectations out of equilibrium. A short literature review provides some results from direct tests of the various elements of microfoundation on which DSGE models are built. The methods of testing consumption smoothing and informational frictions are discussed in more detail. While experimental macroeconomics is a growing field, which has been useful in many respects, this chapter also discusses its challenges and limitations.

Published
2019

10. Referenda Under Oath

Author

Jason F. Shogren, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, Nicolas Jacquemet, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University of Oxford [Oxford], Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, University of Wyoming (UW), ANR-10-LABX-0093,OSE,Opening economics(2010), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming, and University of Oxford

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Dichotomous Choice Mechanism, Hypothetical bias, Oath, Preference revelation, Dichotomous Choice Mechanism,Hypothetical bias,Oath,Preference revelation, Voting, Honesty, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, media_common, Law and economics, Valuation (finance), 05 social sciences, Public good, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, Incentive compatibility, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, Null hypothesis, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Abstract

International audience; Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

Published
2016
Full Text
View/download PDF

11. COOPERATION: THE POWER OF A SINGLE WORD? SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON WORDING AND GENDER EFFECTS IN A GAME OF CHICKEN

Author

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin, Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation (CREAM), Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société (IRIHS), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and École normale supérieure - Cachan (ENS Cachan)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods, social dilemma, wording effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, social dilemma,Game of Chicken,cooperation,label framing effects,wording effects,gender effects, 05 social sciences, cooperation, Social dilemma,Game of Chicken,cooperation,wording effects,gender effects.,Dilemme social,jeu de la poule mouillée,effet liés à la terminologie,effet de genre, Social dilemma, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Game of Chicken, 0506 political science, Framing (social sciences), 0502 economics and business, label framing effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, 050602 political science & public administration, Economics, 050207 economics, Social psychology, gender effects
Abstract

Wording has been widely shown to affect decision making. In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether and to what extent, cooperative behaviour in a Game of Chicken may be impated by a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies. Our within-subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially-oriented wording (‘I cooperate'/‘I do not cooperate') or colours (red/blue) to designate strategies. The level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially-oriented context, but only when the uncertainty as regards the type of the partner is manipulated, and especially among females., On connaît l'importance des mots sur la perception des messages. L'impact de la terminologie employée sur la prise de décision a ainsi été largement docummenté. Dans cet article, nous tentons de répondre expérimentalement à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure le comportement de coopération dans un jeu de la poule mouillée est-il affecté par un changement mineur dans la dénomination des stratégies ? Notre protocole expérimental met en jeu deux traitements (soumis aux mêmes sujets). La seule différence entre ces traitements est que l'un utilise une terminologie qui met l'accent sur l'aspect relationnel des stratégies (‘je coopère'/‘je ne coopère pas'), tandis que l'autre opte pour une dénomination plus neutre de ce point de vue en recourant à des couleurs (rouge/bleu). Le principal résultat de l'étude est que les sujets tendent à coopérer davantage dans le contexte "relationnel", mais seulement lorsque l'incertitude concernant le type du partenaire dans le jeu varie, et les femmes plus que les hommes.

Published
2012
Full Text
View/download PDF

12. Cooperation and framing effects in provision point mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Author

David Masclet, Douadia Bougherara, Laurent Denant-Boèmont, Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires (SMART-LERECO), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)

Subjects
framing effects, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, Public economics, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, 05 social sciences, Public good, Public goods experiment, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Environmental resource, Framing effect, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, Private good, Framing (social sciences), provision point, 0502 economics and business, Public goods game, Economics, 050207 economics, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, General Environmental Science
Abstract

International audience; Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources.

Published
2011
Full Text
View/download PDF

13. The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation

Author

David Masclet, Claude Montmarquette, Cathleen Johnson, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CIRANO, Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en ANalyse des Organisations, Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), and Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Direct tax, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Tax reform, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Microeconomics, Tax credit, Ad valorem tax, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Sales tax, experimental economics, perfect monitoring, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, Public economics, 05 social sciences, tax, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_GENERAL, Value-added tax, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue, State income tax, Finance, Indirect tax, reference dependent effect
Abstract

International audience; Tar noncompliance is a quantitatively important phenomenon that significantly affects government revenues. and thus raises challenging questions about the determinants of tax reporting and the appropriate design of a tax system. This paper provides empirical insights regarding the nature of tar noncompliance, using an experimental approach to evaluate the effects of systematic sales tax monitoring and identify the determinants of sales tax compliance The results suggest that if perfect monitoring of a single revenue source is introduced without other complementary policies, an increase in tax revenues is not the likely, outcome as evasion increases for other revenue sources That is, the data suggest that once taxpayers have chosen their level of tax compliance, they, will try to recover their losses following any policy changes, even if it implies assuming more risks.

Published
2010
Full Text
View/download PDF

14. Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game

Author

Ben Loerakker, Maximilian Hoyer, Nadège Bault, Frans van Winden, Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB), Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA), Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
Level playing field, Economics and Econometrics, spite, Welfare economics, spite,destructive behavior,public good,relationship,laboratory experiment, Social value orientations, Public good, laboratory experiment, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Constructive, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Framing (social sciences), destructive behavior, public good, Framing (construction), Phenomenon, Spite, Economics, relationship, Positive economics, Laboratory experiment, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Abstract

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices.

Published
2013
Full Text
View/download PDF

15. Temporal stability of risk preference measures

Author

Katerina Straznicka, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice, Temporal instability, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty, 05 social sciences, Time stability, Stability (learning theory), Experimental economics, Individual level, Time stability,Risk Preferences,Personality Theory,Experimental economics, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Market game, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Preference, Personality Theory, 0502 economics and business, Econometrics, Economics, 050207 economics, Laboratory experiment, Big Five personality traits, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Risk Preferences, Social psychology, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

We examine the temporal stability of risk preference measures obtained by different elicitation methods in a controlled laboratory experiment at two distinct times. Our results indicate remarkable temporal stability of risk measures at the aggregated level and temporal instability at the individual level. We control for the impact of, first, personality traits, and second, performance realized in a market game. When better market performers demonstrate more stable risk preferences, the impact of personality traits is marginal.

Published
2012

Catalog

Books, media, physical & digital resources
See catalog results