Professionalizing, Fragmenting and Perpetuating the Military-Tribal-Commercial ComplexA marginal actor in international politics and a state still in its formative stage, Yemen has turned into a frontline in the US-led âGlobal War on Terrorâ (GWoT). GWoT is premised on the assumption that states deemed weak, thus viewed as a âbreeding groundâ for terrorist organizations, are tantamount to a direct threat to international security. This equation has been articulated specifically through the notion of âstate failureâ which, for the West, necessitates bundling state building, development and reform together with security in a single, all-encompassing strategy. Accordingly, Yemen receives substantial Western military and intelligence assistance intended to reinforce state powers and predicated on a strategy of developing local counter-terrorism capabilities. This consists essentially of rebuilding and upgrading Yemeni military and security organisations with the aim of attaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and effective control over national territory. As such, security sector reform is one, albeit crucial, facet of Western-led efforts, and of indirect US intervention in particular, to build and reshape the state in Yemen. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the changes wrought by GWoT in the Yemeni state, focusing on its military-security structure and the distinct institutional, socio-economic and territorial ordering that underpins it. This involves breaking away from the dominant âstate failureâ narrative through which experiences, modes of governance and economies of state political systems that operate in ways only superficially akin to those associated with the European sovereign state model, are expressed in terms of deviation from such model and conceptualised as dysfunctional. Central to this narrative are assumptions of externally-driven modes of socio-political order, domestic âendemicâ weakness and, by extension, lack of proper historicity and political agency. In contradistinction to this approach, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the state, through a mixture of appropriation, resistance and accommodation, has proven able to alter the nature and direction of GWoT in Yemen as a means of actively refashioning its authority and role. Rather than being solely imposed from the outside, US counter-terrorist discourse and policies are reformulated and reworked from within by the Yemeni regime according to its own strategic priorities and to its need for enhanced domestic legitimacy. This has led to quite different trajectories and outcomes than anticipated. In the course of its engagement with US-led counter-terrorist policies, the Yemeni military has been reconstituted and strengthened in ways that invest it with novel functions and opportunities, and intersect with multifaceted trajectories of state-society relations. First, the military in Yemen consists in multiple, sprawling and fragmented apparatuses rather than in a singular, cohesive institution. In the absence of a comprehensive and unified strategy, external assistance fuels a tendency to segmentation, duplication and competition among security apparatuses and their missions. Second, the Yemeni military does not yield the kind of military cast-like insulation and autonomy from civil society and politics conventionally associated with it in the West. It is characterized by a systematic straddling of public and private, civil and military, licit and illicit logics. The Yemeni military's hybrid nature epitomises the regime's subtle balancing act between overlapping and intersecting social, economic and political networks... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]