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According to a rights forfeiture theory of punishment, liability to punishment hinges upon the notion that criminals forfeit their rights against hard treatment. In this paper, I assume the success of rights forfeiture theory in establishing the permissibility of punishment but aim to develop the view by considering how forfeited rights might be reclaimed. Built into the very notion of proportionate punishment is the idea that forfeited rights can be recovered. The interesting question is whether punishment is the sole means for reclaiming forfeited rights. I argue for a pluralistic theory of rights reclamation, according to which, there are multiple ways by which a wrongdoer can recapture her forfeited rights. In particular, I argue that offering remorseful compensation is a valid means by which a wrongdoer might partially, or fully, reclaim her right against punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under criminal jurisprudence, a crime is generally different from an offence, however, in Pakistan, both of them are seen as the same thing. There are different categories of crimes under Anglo-American jurisprudence, however, Pakistan does not follow this model and has categorized offences into three types on the touchstone of the presence of mens rea as the significance of mens rea is such that its presence or lack thereof changes the whole category of crime altogether. There are three essential elements of a crime: mens rea, actus reus, and concurrence, and the Pakistani Courts with a handful of exceptions mention the first two as the only elements while forgetting concurrence. While there is a presumption of mens rea for every offence, the same can be ruled out by the statute itself. The onus to prove the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution through reliable and admissible evidence as a person is deemed innocent until proven guilty. The methodology used in this paper is doctrinal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper examines the role of mens rea and actus reus in determination of terrorism charges in a case. In spite of substantial worldwide comprehensive efforts to curb the menace of terrorism, on the legal side there is still a gap. There is no universally accepted definition of this term. In Pakistan, the broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism in the ATA has led legal jurisprudence to overlaps with regular penal laws. There have been two approaches developed under ATLs: one, the mens rea-based approach; and second, the actus reus-based approach. This study discovers the use of these two approaches in execution and prosecution of ATLs. This research uses a comprehensive analysis of existing legal scholarship, judicial opinions, and landmark case-laws. It concludes that mens rea-based approach can significantly enhance the precision and fairness in determination whether a case falls under terrorism laws or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains and identifies the existence of mens rea in the dissemination of news packaged into content through various social media platforms, implicitly containing hate speeches, so that it can be viewed as an electronic-based criminal offense uploaded either verbally or non-verbally. An ability to communicate within the scope of society in the use of language is not owned by everyone, especially in the era of social media where there are those who use language in an inappropriate way. For example, it is used for swearing, defamation, making fake news or hoaxes, threats, persecution speech, to hate speeches that can harm the interlocutor. This study aims to determine the existence of mens rea in the use of language about hate speech committed by individuals through social media platforms. Their point of view will be studied through the perspectives of criminal law. The study’s objective was to examine the use of language in individual uploads through several social media platforms that contain hate speech and ‘SARA in the context of criminal law. In sampling, the author uses descriptive qualitative research methods and legal research methods based on the available data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fight against corruption is a national and international primary concern for lawmakers and enforcement officials. Corporate criminal liability is an aberration of imputing criminal responsibility on a corporation against a natural person, which requires a combined effect of the actus reus and mens rea. A corporation incapable of committing a crime imputes corporate mens rea through its directors, senior managers or officers that constitute executive powers. In doing so, Malaysia uses the identification doctrine to impute mens rea. This article evaluated the most effective technique of establishing mens rea in dealing with modern corporate criminal responsibility. It used a doctrinal librarybased research method to review pertinent corporate criminal liability literature, cases and legislations. The journal articles, cases and legislations were collected and analysed according to the themes to achieve the research objective. It was discovered that Malaysia still uses identification doctrine to prove corporate mens rea, making it difficult and near impossible to find large and multinational corporations liable since the directing mind and will are not actively involved in the corporations' day-to-day operations. However, intention can still be imputed on the corporation based on its corporate culture. Hence, for section 17A of the MACC Act 2009 (2018 amendment) on bribery to be effective, there is a need for a shift from the use of identification doctrine in proving mens rea to corporate culture as that would balance the discrimination and unfairness of the identification doctrine and make it easier for large and multinational corporations to be charged with corporate criminal liability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insider trading, although might profit the offender himself, it nevertheless brings more harm to society than its benefits. Several elements need to be proved before a person can be convicted under insider trading. As this is not a strict liability offence, the elements of mens rea need to be proved and it is quite difficult to prove it by using direct evidence. Therefore, indirect evidence is produced before the court to charge a person with insider trading. This raises a question whether it is reliable and sufficient to hold a person liable under this offence. The objective of this research is to examine whether the circumstantial evidence may be accepted by the court in cases involving insider trading and to analyze how circumstantial evidence helps the court to decide the mens rea by deducing it from the offender's behavior at the time of the commission of the offence. Qualitative methodology using primary sources such as statutes and cases is used to analyze the application of circumstantial evidence by the courts while secondary sources referred to are academic books and articles. It is found that most of the judges accepted circumstantial evidence to prove the elements of insider trading. It helps the court to understand the state of mind of the offender, decide who is an insider and determine the type of information whether it is material and generally available to the public. This research suggests that circumstantial evidence is necessary to assist the courts in the cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Burglary is, as Dame Victoria Sharp noted, "an offence that is very different in kind to aggravated trespass" and unlike the latter, it 'did not therefore "build" on or "grow out of" the tort of trespass in the way that aggravated trespass did and was designed to do' (at [49]). Does Aggravated Trespass Require Proof of Mens Rea in Relation to the Trespass? The trial judge proceeded to find that the offence of aggravated trespass requires proof of knowledge or recklessness in relation to the trespass, and accordingly acquitted the respondents. [Extracted from the article]

Through examination of conflict of laws as to U.S. federal courts and tribal law, this study highlights the impact of culture upon legal meaning. Disparities stem from long-standing norms which underpin legal concepts. These terms which give rise to legal philosophy and the judicial process defy clear English interpretation. Examples include the Latin term mens rea which serves as the foundation for Anglo-American punishment theory, and the Navajo term hózhó from which all conceptualizations of social order emanate. An exploration of these examples in the context of a recent case underscores the close link between law and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

#Boycotts represent digital advocacy attempts in which users publicly punish an organization as a lurata (i.e., jury), which assesses the guilty intent, the mens rea (i.e., guilty mind), from a set of visible acts, the actus reus (i.e., wrongdoings). Yet, we know little about the quasi‐legal narratives advocated by users. To this aim, we developed a mixed method study of the #deleteuber boycott on Twitter. Our findings suggest that while users advocate both an Uber‐specific and a shared mens rea of Uber with sharing economy firms or the tech giants of Silicon Valley, the latter narrative is the most prominent one; its use depends on whether users are part of a lurata of influencers or not. These findings provide a contribution to studies on public affairs that focus on online activism, boycotts in social media and digital advocacy because they increase our understanding of the opaque legal motivations that provoke boycotters. Also, they highlight that social media blurs the boundaries between boycotts directed at the firm from the boycotts arising indirectly due to the shameful acts of the industry or peers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, there have been some powerful calls in the media for the law to adopt an affirmative consent model in relation to the law on rape. This article explores this proposal. It argues that while there is much that is attractive about the concept of affirmative consent, it needs considerable unpacking and explanation before it can be accepted. Indeed, if adopted at a simplistic level, it carries considerable dangers. The article presents six ambiguities around what is meant by affirmative consent but concludes with a proposal as to what an appropriate nuanced model of could look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has there ever been a law criminalizing mental states in themselves? We show that there has been, and still is: the Treason Act 1351. We argue for what we call 'the Mental Interpretation' of the Act, over against the interpretation that it criminalizes a complex of a mental state and an 'overt act'. We also provide authority for the stronger thesis that the overt act functions purely as evidence for the mental state. We discuss other laws in various jurisdictions that have historically criminalized mental states in themselves. We conclude by considering the objection that the European Convention on Human Rights rules out our interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voluntary, or intentional, acute intoxication does not qualify for an insanity defense. However, in many jurisdictions, voluntary intoxication can create a diminished capacity to form a specific intent necessary for a criminal offense. This is a type of mens rea defense. Homicide provides a clear example where the absence of a required specific intent can lead to a lesser included crime that does not require that specific intent. Thereby, a mens rea defense may lessen a first-degree murder charge to a lesser degree or even manslaughter, depending on the jurisdiction. After reviewing the history of mens rea defenses and voluntary intoxication, we performed a search of LexisNexis for state statutes and case law regulating the use of voluntary intoxication in mens rea defenses, focusing on homicide-related offenses. In this article, we compare the different approaches that have developed to address this complex issue. We discuss why knowledge of these different approaches is essential to the practicing forensic examiner in relevant jurisdictions and explore developing issues in the area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the ICC's Bemba et al. Trial and Appeal Judgments concerning aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute. It analyses three issues that were addressed at trial and some of which were considered on appeal: (i) the actus reus contribution threshold; (ii) encouragement or moral support and the principal perpetrators; and (iii) the mens rea of 'purpose'. It concludes that the Bemba et al. Trial Judgment provided clarity on the mens rea under Article 25(3)(c), while the Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment settled the question of whether a principal perpetrator needs to be aware of the aider and abettor's encouragement or moral support for it to have an effect on the crime. However, the Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment ignored the question of whether there is a minimum contribution threshold for the actus reus of aiding and abetting, despite the issue being clearly raised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main argument of this article is that only a clear conception of the purpose of punishment can orient the debate about the positioning of the fault requirement and strict liability doctrine in criminal law. A categorization of the varieties of strict liability offenses, as well as an adequate model for normatively appraising the legitimacy of these deviations from the principle of culpability, should be based on a systematic analysis of criminal law's role and function in society. As is argued, the original purpose of criminal law consists in the stabilization of norms by means of punishment. Taking up that finding, this work provides a detailed view of the distinct mechanism of placing blame, allowing for the presentation of a clear scheme for categorizing and appraising the variety of strict liability offenses. It is stated that offenses substantively deviating from the standard mechanism of placing blame can potentially result in over-punishment, which is dysfunctional and not justifiable. Properly placing blame is essential for the appropriate fulfillment of criminal law's purpose in society. Therefore, the claim of the principle of culpability and critiques of strict liability doctrine find their basis not only in considerations of fairness, but also social necessity. By presenting a systematic categorization of strict liability offenses, this research offers a clear approach to a frequently discussed doctrine and establishes new arguments against its legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia is the property of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article proposes a new offence of theft, based on intentionally or recklessly taking or keeping another's property, knowingly or recklessly without consent. It discusses how this new law is in practical terms an improvement over the current law, and how without legislative reform the current law might be improved through case law. It argues that the proposed law is also a better fit in theory, in terms of characterising the wrong of theft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses both "defect of reason" and the first limb of the M'Naghten Rules in order to explore the relationship of both to that of general mens rea. In doing so it explores some cases from one of my empirical studies in order to discover more about the application of the first limb and to inquire why these cases came to be dealt with under the Rules rather than simply as ones where D might have been acquitted due to a lack of mens rea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hacettepe Law Review is the property of Hacettepe Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper we aim to define the legal-criminal concept of action, highlighting its internal, subjective dimension. This concept allows to lay bases to differentiate, on the one hand, action from nonaction, and, on the other, absence of action from absence of culpability. There is a dialectical relationship between absence of action and absence of culpability: the more one of them is expanded, the more the other is reduced. We defend the necessary dialogue between criminal law and neuroscience, and, at the same time, we note that scientific advances seem to increase the number of cases of absence of action, and, correspondingly, to reduce the occurrence of hypotheses of absence of culpability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recklessness involves unreasonable/unjustified risk-taking. The argument here is that recklessness in the criminal law is best understood as nevertheless containing an element of reasonableness. To be reckless, on this view, the defendant must reasonably believe that she is exposing others to a risk of harm. If the defendant's belief about the risk being imposed by her conduct is unreasonable, she should not (normally) be considered reckless. This point is most important in relation to offences of endangerment where recklessness sets the outer limits of criminal liability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk is at the core of criminal recklessness, but its exact constitution comes into focus only in unusual cases. In rethinking criminal law, Larry Alexander and Kimberley Kessler Ferzan say that risk in criminal recklessness ought to be constituted by the subjective belief of the person whose action is being evaluated: the gravity of the harm risked and its probability of resulting is what the person believed it to be, not what it actually was. This means that recklessness can be found in the absence of any "real" risk. This article critiques the authors' argument for subjective risk in recklessness. They exaggerate the arbitrariness in identifying risk non-subjectively and do not sufficiently acknowledge risk as an inter-subjectively constituted practical concept. Fixing risk subjectively, as advocated by the authors, nonetheless may appear useful for inchoate criminal liability. The article considers and rejects this idea of occasionally subjectivising risk in recklessness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely agreed that the top three Model Penal Code culpability levels suffice for criminal liability, but the fourth is controversial. And it isn't just the particular MPC wording; that negligence should be on the list at all is controversial. My question is: What (if anything) makes negligence so different? What is it about negligence that gives rise to the view that it should not suffice for criminal liability? In addressing it, I draw attention to how we conduct the debate, and how our framing of the issues is shaping it (maybe leading some scholars to view negligence as less suitable as a species of mens rea than it in fact is, maybe leading those who want to argue that it does suffice for criminal liability to develop an account of negligence that meets some requirement that should not have to be met). My hope is to prompt thought and discussion on just what we want the element of mens rea to provide, and to draw attention to background assumptions that shape our views of what it should take for negligence to count as a species of mens rea (or, framed differently, to suffice for criminal liability). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to analyze how to prevent mens rea corruption candidates for legislators in Indonesia with a psychological approach with the concept of conformity. The results showed that there were legislative candidates who had received permanent verdicts as corruptors but nominated themselves as legislative members. Psychology approach emphasizes the aspect of mens rea. Simultaneously in addition to a juridical approach in the form of punishment, also a psychological approach in the form of inculcation of local cultural values, and to be effective, real cooperation is carried out between the government, business activists, and academics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to eradicate human trafficking continue, with the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report calling on governments to improve the detection and prosecution of all involved in this crime, with specific reference to recruitment agencies. Yet despite calls to examine the wider scope of potential trafficking perpetrators, an important element remains problematic; namely, establishing that all involved in the recruitment and movement of individuals possess the requisite mental element for this crime. This article examines this mental element and applies it to the different actors commonly involved in the migration and alleged trafficking of migrant domestic workers. The article concludes that establishing such experiences as human trafficking and attributing the mental element of the offense to all people in the supply chain becomes less attainable. The flexibility permitted under the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, as to the national threshold for the crime's mens rea, has resulted in disparities as to what and who the crime of human trafficking encompasses. The specific intent element of the Protocol is at odds with the constructive knowledge element incorporated in some states, a reality that runs counter to the intentions of the Protocol's drafters for a unified definition and jeopardizes the prosecution of trafficking cases. In rectifying this, it is pivotal for states to ensure that alternative legal provisions are available to capture those who often pave the way to migrant domestic workers' exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of accountability for international crimes committed by children is one of the most complex legal and moral conundrums in international criminal justice. While children are excluded from the jurisdiction of international criminal courts, they can be sometimes the authors of heinous crimes, including international crimes. In the first section, the author examines whether prosecution at national level may be a solution in these cases. He then discusses if a minimum age of criminal responsibility should be agreed at international level and, if so, what this age should be. The issue of whether child soldiers possess the necessary mens rea for the commission of international crimes is also discussed. In the final section, the author suggests that more emphasis should be put on the accountability of those who use children to commit these crimes, notably through the legal concept of indirect participation, included in the ICC Statute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the recent presidential election, a bipartisan congressional effort was made to pass a criminal justice reform bill. The bill faltered in part because of a proposed default mens rea provision: statutes silent on mens rea, that were not explicitly identified as strict liability by the legislature, would be taken to require for guilt proof of knowledge with respect to each material element. This paper focusses on a prominent line of disagreement about the default mens rea provision. Proponents argued that it would reduce the number of unjust verdicts in corporate cases. They noted that there have been convictions of corporations and corporate officers for public welfare offenses in instances in which there was good reason to believe that the defendants lacked mens rea. They touted the legislation, then, as a way of reducing the false positive rate. Opponents noted that the provision would also reduce the rate of true positives in corporate prosecutions—convictions of those possessing mens rea who could not be proven to—and opposed the legislation on those grounds. Both sides, then, accepted that the relevant question was, in part, numerical: under the provision, would the reductions in guilty verdicts of those lacking mens rea outnumber and outweigh the increases in acquittals of those possessing it? This paper critically examines this numerical approach for assessing and justifying the default mens rea provision. The paper argues that there is a small domain under which it is appropriate to reason in such numerical terms about a default mens rea provision, but that that domain is so small as to make such arguments inappropriate when it comes to sweeping legislation, such as that proposed. The paper further argues that in light of this conclusion the default mens rea provision must be examined non-numerically, through appeal to principled considerations about the necessary conditions for morally justified infliction of punishment. When such arguments are freed from numerical considerations of the kind that dominated the public discussion of the legislation, they decide the matter: the default mens rea provision deserves bipartisan support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the “Willful Ignorance Principle,” a defendant is guilty of a crime requiring knowledge he lacks provided he is ignorant thanks to having earlier omitted inquiry. In this paper, I offer a novel justification of this principle through application of the theory that knowledge matters to culpability because of how the knowing action manifests the agent’s failure to grant sufficient weight to other people’s interests. I show that, under a simple formal model that supports this theory, omitting inquiry manifests precisely the same degree of disregard of others’ interests as manifested in knowingly acting criminally. Several surprising implications of this view are described, including that when the agent’s method of inquiry has a non-zero false positive rate, his omission of inquiry does not make the same contribution to his culpability as knowledge, while it does, by contrast, when the false negative rate is non-zero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of criminal law in Western legal systems is often portrayed as a path leading from objective to subjective notions of criminal responsibility. By examining the historical development of the notions of subjective responsibility, this article suggests that the function of a wrongdoer’s subjective mental state, in both its substantive and procedural aspect, as an element in the process of attributing criminal responsibility, remains much the same today as it was in antiquity. This is indicated by what subjectivity, as an essential condition of culpability (actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea), is said to imply: the distinction between intentional and unintentional acts. Although the notions of intent and malice aforethought are attested to in various sources on ancient Athenian law, there are several kinds of cases in which the role played by these aspects—traditionally referred to asmens rea(“guilty mind”)—remain unsolved in contemporary jurisprudence and legal practice. Yet despite the difficulties of establishing facts in particularly complex criminal cases, setting the boundary between “intentional” and “unintentional” remains crucially important in determining criminal responsibility and thus in distinguishing the “licit” from the “illicit,” which is the very foundation of the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A coherent practice of mens rea ('guilty mind') ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action's outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, whereas a positive side effect is not. We report the first empirical investigation into intentionality ascriptions made by professional judges, which finds (i) that professionals are sensitive to the moral valence of outcome type, and (ii) that the worse the outcome, the higher the propensity to ascribe intentionality. The data shows the intentionality ascriptions of professional judges to be inconsistent with the concept of mens rea supposedly at the foundation of criminal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Restorative justice programs have rapidly gained in popularity as a means of peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, the programs raise concerns because in order to join, offenders assume responsibility for their acts, are automatically held culpable, and forfeit their rights under criminal law for representation, judicial review, and uniform sentencing, among others. Restorative justice shares this automatic culpability with strict liability, an older and proven legal tool that has had long experience convicting defendants without the need to prove mens rea. The present article explores the similarities between restorative justice programs and strict liability, with a view toward learning from the experience accumulated by strict liability in dealing with the absence of mens rea. To this end, the article discusses the distinction made under strict liability between incriminating and escalating responsibility, and explores the benefits that restorative justice programs can derive from such a distinction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper constitutes an attempt towards questioning the adequacy of the prevalent approached employed by Islamic jurisprudence and statute law in dealing with mens rea and its manifestations. It also provides a kind of reinterpretation of the concept since it attaches itself to the perspective that the concepts employed in criminal law need evolution in order to preserve their function and practicality; the conditions appertaining thereto necessitating adaptability of the concepts with the contextual conditions as well as the principles of the criminal law. Under criminal law, mens rea is referred to as ‘criminal intent or the state of mind indicating culpability which is required by statute as an element of a crime’ (see, for example, Staples v United States, 511 US 600 (1994)). Under Islamic jurisprudence it is defined as ‘rebellion intent’. These conceptualisations of the mens rea may be subject to evolution as well as the other concepts. The present paper provides a reformulation of these definitions wherein mens rea is considered to be ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Through this reformulation the author replaces the ‘state’ with ‘linkage’ presupposing that the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’, as an independent constituent, shall vary according to the provisions of common sense and the contextual conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that joint enterprise liability should be conceptualised under the doctrine of omissions as conceived in the recent case of Evans. As such, liability under joint enterprise is to be triggered when one is under a duty to rectify a dangerous situation and eventually fails to prevent a prohibited outcome from occurring. This analysis would overcome the two fundamental difficulties pervading the law on joint enterprise: (i) the overly harsh mens rea requirement as the law of joint enterprise currently stands, and (ii) the sheer arbitrariness of the fundamental difference rule. The authors suggest that in view of legislative inaction, the judiciary should take an active role to extend the reasoning in R v Evans so as to cover joint enterprise cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 of Great Britain which criminalises the disclosure of private sexual photographs and films can be called as revenge porn. It mentions that the mens rea requirement of the offence of the distribution of photograph or film without the consent with a probable consequence of the disclosure. It also mentions that individual has the right to control his or her sexual identity and relying on communications offences.

How should the criminal law treat a person who did not pay any attention to the existence of attendant circumstances noted in the definition of an offense? This mental state of lack of attention to the existence of the attendant circumstance is analogous to the existence of a void in the actor's consciousness, and has therefore been awarded the name "cognitive void." Because the criminal law is founded on cognitive theory that offers a binary concept to establish an accused's state of mind depending on the existence or absence of cognition, it is difficult to impose criminal liability on an actor who acted out of a cognitive void. The purpose of this Article is to discuss the difficulty that it engenders and the attempts to solve this difficulty. The Article presents the proposed thesis, suggesting that different states of cognitive void should be examined in accordance with the extent of culpability that they represent. Therefore, the Article calls for the abandonment of the prevalent basic assumption that sees cognitive void as a state indicating lack of subjective mens rea, and suggests replacing it with a normative approach that would recognize cognitive void as a multidimensional term covering a range of different mental states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about the court case that was executed in Great Britain Court of Appeals related to the charges of sexual harassment with the plaintiff. Topics discussed include attempt made by the group of men to have sexual intercourse without the consent of victim, role of intent to commit offence in committing crimes against humanity and significance of men's rea in committing crimes. It further discusses the judgment of the court for the dismissal of appeal of defendant.

This article analyses the recent interpretations of Articles 25 and 30 of the ICC Statute by the Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court. The Court adopts a broad interpretation of the common plan or agreement element; in addition, it appears to distort the mental element which is provided for by Art. 30 of the Statute. Such interpretative trends permit a person to be charged as a co-perpetrator or indirect co-perpetrator in relation to crimes committed by others and which have not been agreed or ordered by the person charged. This implies a violation of the principles of responsibility for one's own actions and of culpability. Therefore, the paper proposes a strict definition of Article 30 that highlights the requirement of the intent to engage in the conduct. This element, understood as the will to act, belongs to every kind of dolus. The paper analyses the interpretation of this requirement in cases of co-perpetration, where the joint will to act is expressed in the common plan or agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article explores two recurring themes in the scholarly writings on ‘transferred malice’ the doctrine designed by Anglo-American law to allow full criminal responsibility where the defendant caused harm to a different object than the one he had in mind, due to either accident or mistake. First, in face of the diversity of views advocating the eradication of transferred malice, the article searches for the provinces in which that doctrine should still have relevance to our legal system. It is often assumed that malice cannot transfer amongst different offences, which has led many scholars to conclude that the doctrine is superfluous. The analysis here offered counters both assumption and conclusion alike, as well as the common view that differentiates between the implications of accident and mistake. Second, reflecting on the different criteria proposed to restrict the implementation of transferred malice such as physical and immediate harm to the actual object, remoteness of the actual harm from the harm intended, and foreseeability as to the actual harm the article provides an analytical framework by which to assess these criteria and to determine which of them proves more persuasive. The result is a notion of transferred malice that strikes a favourable balance with the requirement of mens rea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced significant reforms to the offence of rape, amid concerns regarding the low reporting and conviction rates for rape. One of the key aims of the Act was to improve the law relating to consent, in order to assist a jury in their decision making process. In addition, disquiet had been expressed with regards to the subjective nature of the mens rea of rape. Consequently, the 2003 Act reformulated the law so as to introduce an objective test. This article discusses the findings of a qualitative research project undertaken with 14 Barristers in the North West of England, in order to investigate counsels' opinions regarding the 2003 reforms. Drawing upon data collected from semi-structured interviews, the article examines barristers' perspectives with regards to the definition of consent, the 'consent presumptions', and the reformulated mens rea. In conclusion, it will be argued that while the barristers were not overly optimistic about the reforms introduced by the 2003 Act, they were also opposed to further reform to the substantive law and increased jury directions. Barristers argued that the law relating to rape should remain as simple as possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD) are treated differently by the criminal justice system in sex offense prosecutions, depending upon whether they are categorized as victims or perpetrators. The primary and secondary disabilities associated with prenatal alcohol exposure are often taken into consideration when assessing the capacity of a victim to consent to sexual activity, but generally not considered in determining whether a defendant had the mens rea to engage in criminal sexual conduct. This article traces the historical underpinnings of the mens rea requirement in criminal law and discusses its elimination in most prosecutions for statutory rape. The article recommends that additional research be conducted to determine the impact of prenatal alcohol exposure on an individual's capacity to consent to sexual activity. It suggests that fundamental principles of culpability require an examination of how FASD impacts an individual's capacity to engage in meaningful, responsible, decision making about sexual activity before criminal sanctions are imposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Insanity Defense of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity is the defense used by some mentally disordered defendants who do not have the capacity for understanding right and wrong at the time of their criminal act. This defense has perplexed legal and mental health professionals for centuries. Though it has been a part of the legal system since the early Greeks, it has been and continues to be amended, modified, and in some jurisdictions, abolished. Moreover, despite its infrequent use, many in our society hold onto the belief that defendants can evade criminal responsibility by means of this defense. Furthermore, insanity is often equated with psychosis; however, the two are not the same and have different connotations. It is essential for any clinical psychiatrist to understand the concept of the insanity defense and how it differs from psychosis. This paper will clarify the meaning and purpose of the insanity defense and will differentiate insanity and psychosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anglo-American criminal law traditionally demands a criminal purpose for an attempt conviction, even when the crime attempted requires only foresight or recklessness. Some legal philosophers have defended this rule by appeal to an alleged difference in the “moral character” or “intentional structure” of intended versus non-intended harms. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of any such differences; and that even if conceded, it is only on the basis of an unworkable view of criminal responsibility that such a distinction would support a rule restricting attempts to criminal purpose. I defend instead the “continuity thesis,” according to which attempts are functionally continuous with endangerment offenses: both are legal efforts to regulate unreasonably dangerous conduct. The upshot of the continuity thesis is that there is little substantive difference between attempt and endangerment in principle, no matter how they are labeled in law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]