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In this paper I show that two senses are often assigned to essences in frameworks that award them a significant ontological status. There is both a defining sense and a more concrete-explanatory sense. Once this distinction is recognized, competing forms of essentialism can be differentiated and their implications more easily explored. As an example of work where the defining and the concrete-explanatory senses of essence are tied closely together I consider the essentialism outlined by Rom Harré as part of his analysis of the practices of natural scientists. As an illustration of a position where the two senses are de-coupled and priority given to the defining sense I examine the essentialism Charles Peirce develops in his mature account of natural classes. I show that arguments concerning the scope of essentialism and its relevance for the study of social phenomena depend heavily on the sense of essence prioritized. The focus on these two senses of essence facilitates a better understanding of the forms of essentialism defended by Harré and Peirce and helps identify the challenges contemporary realists face as they seek to defend an essentialism that applies to the social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]