Search

Abstract In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents.

This essay investigates the way in which Wolff takes an interest in the hypothesis of an emendatio of the prima philosophia from Leibniz’s incitement in De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae (1694) to re-found metaphysics. This makes it possible, secondly, to examine the way in which Wolff takes Johannes Clauberg’s ontology as a model, even though it represents in his view only a failed attempt at that same emendatio. Through the analysis of the texts, this article considers the possibility of a new reading of the ‘failure’ attributed by Wolff to Clauberg, which would consist in his having ‘emended’ first philosophy by expelling it from the domain of ontology and finally identifying it with Cartesian prima philosophia.

Cet article a pour but de faire une brève discussion sur les critiques de Leibniz à la philosophie de Descartes. Ayant ce but en vue, on va d’abord discuter l’attaque que Leibniz a déclenchée contre la méthodologie cartésienne. Ensuite, on présente les raisons qui ont aménées Leibniz à rejeter les notions fondamentales de la métaphysique cartésienne. Après cela, on arrive à l’analyse du vigoureux refus dont la physique de Descartes a été l’objet. Finalement, de ces discussions on pourra conclure que, Leibniz se voyait et agissait comme un penseur tout à fait anti-cartésien et qu’il a été l’un des plus agressifs opposants au système philosophique élaboré par Descartes.

Is Immanuel Kant’s critique of the proofs of God’s existence accurate? In order to answer this question, I analyse Leibniz’ proof in his “Monadology” and I determine the relation between the cosmological and the ontological version of this proof. Since Kant often refers (implicitly) to Leibniz’ argument, I examine Kant’s critique of rational theology in the Critique of Pure Reason in the light of Leibniz’ strategy. Kant’s critique of Leibniz’ argument is partly biased by his own concept of “transcendental idealism” and fails to reject it. On the other hand, many questions in Leibniz’ attempt remain still open.

El presente artículo se centra en el esclarecimiento de las nociones de percepciones inconscientes («petites perceptions»), percepciones y apercepciones en la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz con el fin de responder dos preguntas: 1) Ad intra, es decir, intra-sustancialmente: ¿Cómo un evento inconsciente se vuelve consciente dentro de una misma sustancia simple?; 2) Ad extra, es decir, inter-sustancialmente: ¿dónde puede decirse que surge la conciencia en la jerarquía de mónadas? Para responder estas preguntas, seguiré la siguiente metodología. En primer lugar, presentaré la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz enmarcada en su visión metafísica. Presentaré a su vez los pasajes más conflictivos y el problema que surge al momento de definir la conciencia. En segundo lugar, presentaré las interpretaciones más comentadas que existen actualmente acerca de este problema. Me centraré en las posturas de Rocco J. Gennaro, Larry M. Jorgensen, Christian Barth y Alison Simmons. Finalmente, propondré una interpretación propia de la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz.

Este artigo tem como objetivo apontar alguns problemas lógicos ilustrativos das dificuldades que a linguagem pode acarretar, quando aplicada a propósitos científicos, para justificar o surgimento da filosofia da linguagem. Os comentários aqui realizados, porém, se restringem à tradição da lógica clássica, destacando as contribuições de Aristóteles, Leibniz e Frege. Mas busca-se mostrar também que, posteriormente, houve uma grande elevação da complexidade das questões envolvidas, dado o aprofundamento do vínculo da lógica com a matemática.

In the 20th century, Leibniz studies flourished in Italy, as attested by the large number of scholarly articles and translations of his main works. Articles on Leibniz’s philosophy were published in the Archivio di Filosofia, which has long been the journal of the Italian Philosophical Society. This paper examines articles on Leibniz published in Italy, and notably in the Archivio di Filosofia. It is divided into three parts. The first one examines Italian research on Leibniz from 1900 to 1930. The second one takes into account articles on Leibniz published in Archivio di Filosofia from 1930 to 1945. The last part is dedicated to Leibnizian studies published in the same journal after 1945.

The attention paid in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana to the major exponents of seventeenth-century philosophical rationalism, from its foundation by Giovanni Gentile in 1920 until 1979, reveals important changes that provide us with interesting information on Italian Neo-idealism. The small number of articles on Descartes can be interpreted as the result of an overall approach – sanctioned by Gentile – different from that of Hegel, who considered Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy. For Gentile, Descartes represents a stage in the history of philosophy spanning from Humanism to Spinoza, and, in a more particular Italian perspective, from Campanella to Vico. This interpretative scheme persisted also under the direction of Ugo Spirito, when Cartesianism continued to receive little theoretical and historical attention, with the exception of Eugenio Garin’s contributions. In the years from 1945 to 1979, the Giornale critico emphasized instead the interest for Spinoza, a very important author for Gentile, up to the double monographic issue published on the occasion of the third centenary of Spinoza’s death (1977). In turn, the lack of interest for Leibniz was constant and evident from the small number of articles published from 1920 to 1979, which were furthermore not particularly connected with the international, coeval Leibniz scholarship.

Examining the period from the 1920s to the 1970s, one of the key features of the Rivista di filosofia is a lasting interest in the Renaissance and Vico, while the focus on seventeenth-century metaphysics is significantly more time-bound and linked to the activity of some prominent figures in the journal such as Piero Martinetti, Eugenio Colorni, and Gioele Solari. The rise of the Neo-Enlightenment caused a radical change in the editorial choices, and turned the journal’s focus toward the empiricist tradition and the debate on historiographical methodologies.

G. W. Leibniz fue un lector frecuente de la obra filosófica de Suárez, lectura que dejó una huella profunda en su metafísica. En concreto, el uso que Leibniz hace de los principios se puede ver como una aplicación práctica del tratamiento que hace Suárez de los principios en las Disputaciones metafísicas.

En este artículo se presenta la recepción que tuvo en la modernidad la teoría de Leibniz conocida como doctrina del optimismo. Aunque son las interpretaciones de Kant y de Hegel las que nos van a ocupar, para contextualizar la doctrina del mejor de los mundos posibles, será imprescindible referirnos a la acogida inmediata que la tesis tuvo en la Ilustración. A continuación, se analizará el texto de Kant «Algunas observaciones sobre el optimismo» y su defensa de las tesis de Leibniz. Dedicamos el último apartado del artículo a la lección que Hegel dedicó a la cuestión del optimismo de Leibniz en sus Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía.

En el presente artículo, se tratará de dilucidar la caracterización del Barroco europeo que Deleuze propone en El pliegue, con miras a aislar los rasgos idiosincrásicos que comparte con el Barroco hispano, definitorios como son de un ethos encaminado hacia una Modernidad alternativa a la que finalmente se impuso. Transitaremos así de la interpretación de la filosofía leibniziana del sujeto como un «manierismo» que ofrece Deleuze a la caracterización graciana del héroe y el mundo, con miras a mostrar que en ambos planteamientos hay una ontología de la potencia que desmiente el esencialismo a propósito del sujeto característico de la Modernidad de cuño cartesiano, en provecho de una evaluación interna o inmanente del sujeto conformada en tiempos de crisis y con una marcada inspiración estoica.

Due to its crucial role in acquiring knowledge, sense perception and its philosophical foundations have consistently been among the major topics in the history of philosophy. Avicenna, as a peripatetic (Aristotelian) Muslim philosopher, dedicated special attention to this problem. He advocated the unity of the soul despite the separation and multiplicity of the soul’s functional powers, leading him to posit an interaction or correlation between sensory and intellectual faculties. In the modern era, characterized by an emphasis on reason (intellect) and a perceived separation between reason and experience, Leibniz took a different approach. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of scholastic and ancient philosophers, he sought to reconcile elements of both old and new philosophies in forming his metaphysics. He based his metaphysical framework on select principles from Aristotelian logic but developed a unique theory regarding the unity of sensory and rational faculties. This paper aims to examine and compare these two philosophical viewpoints. Both philosophers held that it is impossible to fully grasp the truth of sensible objects, as knowledge is limited to understanding the properties and accidents of objects rather than their true nature. However, they diverged in their philosophical thinking, rooted in their respective worldviews and their stances on unity and plurality. Consequently, they both acknowledged the necessity of sense perception and the experimental method in acquiring knowledge, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of reason and rational methods.

Entre los años 1678 y 1685 Leibniz compuso dos tratados – Circa Geometrica Generalia (C.G.G.) y Notationes Generales (N.G.) – en los cuales expone una críptica teoría del origen de los números enteros positivos estrechamente vinculada al Misterio de la Trinidad. Este trabajo propone una interpretación de las ideas matemáticas del filósofo mediante el concepto de determinatio. Tal hipótesis se utiliza para esclarecer el sentido teológico de la proposición leibniziana.

La ética política de la Escuela hegeliana se caracteriza por el perfeccionismo post-kantiano, un enfoque que difiere de las teorías perfeccionistas precedentes en que tiene por objeto la promoción de la libertad y las condiciones de su ejercicio. Las ideas de actividad espontánea o iniciada por sí misma desplazan los puntos de vista antiguos de la felicidad o la prosperidad (eudaimonia), basados en concepciones fijas de la naturaleza humana. Las nuevas teorías están también pendientes de los intereses conflictivos en la sociedad civil moderna emergente y de la necesidad de transformar sus prácticas e instituciones. Dentro de este enfoque se distinguen dos variantes en la década de 1840, las de Bauer y Marx, de las cuales aquí se examinan sus respectivos compromisos normativos y metaéticos.

En el presente trabajo analizamos la posible influencia de la noción spinozista de sustancia en el desarrollo de la metafísica de Leibniz. Luego de exponer el contexto en el que el filósofo alemán accede a la Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico y su evaluación general de la misma, presentamos esquemáticamente los cambios en la comprensión leibniziana de la sustancia y argumentamos que, a pesar de los reparos particulares que Leibniz hace a la definición de Spinoza, el modo en que este último comprende la actividad de la sustancia tiene repercusiones en la metafísica del primero y constituye un punto de contacto entre sus sistemas filosóficos.

La presente contribución tiene por objeto examinar y describir la génesis y la elaboración de los Nuevos Ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano de Leibniz (1704 (?)). El interés de este estudio recae no sólo en transparentar la articulación histórica y teórica en que tienen lugar las etapas que preceden la redacción misma de los Nuevos Ensayos de Leibniz -equivalente a un período de casi diez años y que coincide con el punto de arranque de la maduración definitiva de su filosofía-, sino también en atenuar la connotación estrictamente epistemológica que suele atribuírsele a dicha obra, subrayando las motivaciones metafísicas y teológicas que lo impulsaron a redactarla en respuesta al Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano de Locke (1690).

To achieve the common origin of "I" and nature, Schelling takes a new approach to the philosophy of nature; demonstrating the falsity of dualism between "I" and nature and showing how nature cannot be reduced to a mechanistic series of causes and effects. By integrating Leibniz's principle of inner purposiveness, Spinoza's monism, and the Kantian concept of teleology, he interprets an organic idea of nature as a totality and founds "I" on the ground of this organic nature. Schelling turns to Leibniz's vitalistic philosophy for presents a self-organizing scheme of nature, and he uses the intensive doctrine of substance to overcome the dualism of modern philosophy. In this view, the parts are to be deduced, in a purely analytic way from the whole, and each unit must include an infinite plurality, so the difference between subject and object is in degree, not in type; Nature is all alive, and no real object is entirely inorganic but is only in a lower degree of organic. In Schilling's point of view, the highest degree of organization of the infinite is the creativity of the artist, who is the culmination of all the organic forces of nature. The main question of this essay is about the fundamental role of Schelling's organic interpretation in his aesthetic essence. in this regard, while the impact of Leibniz's vitalistic approach is analyzed, the reinforcement of the activity of "I" in Schilling's system of thought is examined.

By studying the school editions of Leibniz’s Monadology published on the occasion of this work’s introduction to school programmes in 1880, we will demonstrate two points. First, how the intellectual and political context shapes the interpretations of Leibniz. Then, how these editions can be considered as philosophical positions. We will show how the figure of Leibniz is used to defend secularism, to fight against the eviction of metaphysics by the positive sciences and to found the autonomy of morality. We will also consider how publishers use it as a resource to fuel their own philosophical thought. Editing and commenting the classics contributes to a political and intellectual debate whose actors and issues will be retraced. Thus, the objective of this study is to consider these school editions from a philosophical point of view, and to show the importance of the context of the period for the practice of the history of philosophy.

Este artigo busca caracterizar a matéria musical desde os pontos de vista epistemológico e semiótico de Leibniz. Por um lado, argumenta-se que, segundo a teoria da percepção de Leibniz, nosso acesso ao fenômeno musical é simbólico no sentido de uma percepção do múltiplo na forma de uma unidade. Por outro lado, busca-se explicar a composição em termos de manipulação cega de signos, tendo como exemplo o uso da notação musical tradicional na música tonal. Assim, sustenta-se que, segundo as ideias de Leibniz, o uso de algum sistema semiótico na composição não é um recurso meramente psicotécnico, mas é um elemento constitutivo da própria música.

Abstract In the present paper we study the relationship between the notions of force, cause and subject of motion in Leibniz’s early dynamics. First, we specify the role that the problem of the subject and cause of motion played in the development of his dynamics. Second, we analyze the distinction between force and quantity of motion and the validity and limits of his proof. Third, we study and evaluate the limits of the arguments for establishing that forces are inherent to bodies. Our main goal is to show that between 1678 and 1686 Leibniz dissociates the problem of the subject from the problem of the cause of motion and, furthermore, that even though the problem of establishing that force is inherent to particular bodies played a major role in the discovery of his dynamics, it has no place in its justification.

Kant’s ‘Newtonianism’ has been rightly highlighted by figures like Friedman. The follow-up debates led to a more adequate view on Kant’s natural philosophy and in particular his relation towards Newton. But the discussion that evolved did not point to the asynchronicity that takes place in Kant’s struggle with the central Newtonian concepts. Newtonian space and gravity, in revised form, are of central concern to Kant’s critical philosophy. But Kant adapted and re-evaluated these two concepts in an asynchronous way. While Kant tries to integrate a notion of gravity into his theory of matter in his very first published writing, he has at this stage no adequate notion of space. At this time, as in regard to space, he can neither be called a Newtonian nor a proper Leibnizian and misconceives the necessity of an independent space for the foundations of physics. This perspective changes under the influence of Euler at the end of the fifties of the eighteenth century and finally leads to his writing of 1768 and the adoption of transcendental idealism in 1770. In the following, I depict this asynchronicity by taking central pre-critical writings into account while discussing Kant’s concept of space and gravity. This sharpens the picture of Kant’s work and the different stages his philosophy of nature went through. Further, it helps to understand the influence of Euler on Kant’s development in natural philosophy and his critical philosophy in general, as Kant under the influence of Euler formed deeper-going reflections on Newton’s theory of space and these mark turning points of his development.

Předmětem této studie je polemika mezi Leibnizem a Clarkem ohledně relativity prostoru. Přestože za cíl Leibnizova útoku by se v kontextu této polemiky patřilo označit v prvé řadě substantivalismus, tj. přístup nakládající s prostorem jako se substancí, obvykle bývá do opozice vůči Leibnizovu relacionalismu kladen spíše newtonovský absolutismus. Vzhledem k tomu, že takto pojatý absolutismus nebývá vymezován ontologicky, nýbrž dynamicky, musel by v takovém případě rozdíl mezi jejich pojetími spočívat v odlišném přístupu k inercialitě pohybu. To by tudíž jinými slovy znamenalo, že zatímco Leibniz veškerý pohyb redukoval na inerciální, Newton jej redukoval naopak na neinerciální, případně, že pouze jeden z nich uznával existenci neinerciálních pohybů. Existenci neinerciálních pohybů však ve skutečnosti nepopíral žádný z nich, a přestože Newtonovi se neinerciálním jevil být vskutku veškerý pohyb vůbec, Leibniz na takovou výzvu v rámci clarkovské korespondence již nereagoval.

Frente aquellas lecturas de Leibniz que definen las mónadas como entidades aisladas y carentes de toda posible relación, la presente investigación pretende analizar la ontología monadológica leibniziana y su teoría de la expresión a fin de mostrar que, detrás de su noción de identidad personal, subyace una lógica de la alteridad capaz de dialogar con el personalismo contemporáneo. Esta lógica de la alteridad, si nuestra lectura de Leibniz es correcta, se hace patente en los espíritus, cuya naturaleza expresiva establece no solo un enlace sistemático con la totalidad de seres que componen el mundo, sino que también una noción de identidad personal en el que la alteridad adquiere un carácter prescriptivo: situarnos en el lugar del otro para comprender sus necesidades y, a través de esto, reconocer nuestro puesto en el cosmos. Para lograr todo esto realizaremos cuatro cosas: en primer lugar, analizaremos a profundidad la aplicación de su teoría de la expresión a la ontología monadológica y su notio completa; en segundo lugar, veremos qué implicaciones tienen ambas en el caso específico de los espíritus, enfatizando la naturaleza comunitaria de estas mónadas racionales; en tercer lugar, reconstruiremos la teoría leibniziana de la identidad personal; para, en último lugar, contrastar con algunas de las principales tesis personalistas.

An examination of the history of the development of the philosophical issues in the West indicates that since the Demiurge (Demiourgos) of Plato in the Timaeus created the sensible world in imitation of the intelligible archetypes, failing at the same time, to overcome some necessities, until the beginning of the seventeenth century and the emergence of the Cartesian anthropocentric conception of reality, the common question most often raised by modern philosophers, in their discussions about the nature of God, man and universes in this: What is Justice? Is God just? Was man created in the best form? Is the existing world, the best among all the possible worlds? The answer to these questions among the Christian thinkers before Leibniz (1646- 1716) was mostly based on the principles of dogmatic theology. Even in the fifteenth century the question as to how God's providence and foreknowledge could be reconciled with the human free choice was the pivot and axis of most philosophical and theological problems. In addition, the progress of natural sciences and the emergence of necessary causal laws in the domain of the various sciences impaired the human freedom of choice.Spinoza and Leibniz, each in his own peculiar way, endeavored to prove that the human free choice is compatible with the causal determinism required. By science. In Leibniz, God wills the most harmonious and compossible worlds. In the present article, prior to Leibniz's rational justifications of the principle of "the best possible World", his conception of the world as based on the principle of the pre-established harmony (in the framework of the monads ), along with some other related issues are analyzed.

Durante su intercambio epistolar con Spinoza, Tschirnhaus defiende la imposibilidad de deducir la naturaleza de los cuerpos particulares a partir de la sola extensión. El motivo de esta objeción reside en su dificultad para desmarcarse de la concepción sustancial de los cuerpos como partes finitas de la extensión sostenida por Descartes. Esta dificultad inicial, sin embargo, queda ensombrecida por la intervención de Leibniz en un momento clave de la correspondencia que convertirá la disputa de carácter físico en una controversia teológica. Este artículo demuestra que el problema metafísico detectado por Leibniz consiste en la afirmación radical del principio de plenitud contenida en la proposición 16 de la primera parte de la Ética y las consecuencias heréticas que de ésta se desprenden. El examen del papel que la crítica de Leibniz jugó en el desarrollo de la discusión permitirá leer bajo una nueva luz tanto la paradójica actitud de Tschirnhaus como las enigmáticas y elusivas respuestas de Spinoza.

Sem dúvida a V. A. E. se lembra que quando vossa curiosidade e a da rainha, vossa filha, fez-me falar de filosofia e dos fundamentos da imortalidade da alma, eu apresentei [minha doutrina d]as Unidades sustentando que as almas eram verdadeiras unidades, isso é, substâncias simples onde não entram outras substâncias para compô-las; mas que os corpos são apenas multiplicidades (multitudes) e, consequentemente, que os corpos pereciam pela dissolução de suas partes, a partir das quais eles são compostos, enquanto as almas são imperecíveis.

As reflexões acerca do necessário e do contingente ocupam lugar de destaque na filosofia leibniziana. Elas se evidenciam, sobretudo, no tratamento lógico a partir do qual os conceitos de necessidade e contingência são abordados, vinculando-os às noções de verdade e proposição. Neste sentido, o presente artigo visa discutir de que maneira Leibniz articula algumas ideias na sua tentativa de salvaguardar os fundamentos da contingência, ao mesmo tempo em que procura conciliar a distinção modal com sua concepção da natureza geral da verdade.

Como temos encontrado alguma dificuldade para conduzir nossos alunos por um caminho que permita sair de alguns dos temas mais importantes da Filosofia Moderna para chegar a outros que se tornaram os mais importantes da Filosofia da Matemática e da Lógica, nosso objetivo nesse artigo é justamente esboçar um programa que permita vislumbrar tal encadeamento. Podemos dizer, portanto, que a nossa pretensão é a de oferecer o esboço de uma Introdução à Filosofia Moderna que tenha como centro as problemáticas questões da realidade e significação dos “objetos” matemáticos, incluindo os problemáticos “conceitos” de infinitesimal, infinito e contínuo.

O presente artigo tem como propósito sublinhar a importância do pensamento de Leibniz dentro da obra do filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze, a noção de campo transcendental, elaborada a partir de Lógica do Sentido, é inteiramente devedora do procedimento leibniziano que Deleuze nomeia de vice-dicção; o propósito do artigo é, então, o de indicar em que aspectos tais influências aparecem na obra do filósofo do acontecimento.

A partir do contexto histórico e intelectual que circundava o filósofo alemão Leibniz, discutiremos os modelos epistemológicos sustentados em sua época (euclidiano e cartesiano) e o modelo que ele propôs a fim de sistematizar adequadamente as complexidades.

El artículo estudia dos pasajes de los Principios de la naturaleza y la gracia fundados en razón, de Leibniz, y las cuestiones que surgen de su primera pregunta: ¿por qué hay algo y no más bien nada? Estas son las de la existencia de Dios y de la permanencia de la consciencia, que no se pueden demostrar completamente. Sin embargo, se alcanzan fundamentos insuficientes, pero importantes, en su favor, los que superan los intentos de fundamentación de todo ateísmo dogmático, tan difundido en el pensamiento actual. Ese es el resultado más relevante de este ensayo de metafísica.

Este artigo discute a concepção leibniziana da “notio completa individualis”, segundo a qual todos os predicados atribuídos a um indivíduo constituem sua natureza de forma essencial. O Essencialismo leibniziano é de caráter estritamente lógico e resulta em um universo completamente determinado; mesmo assim Leibniz defende que ele é compatível com noções pré-analíticas de liberdade e responsabilidade moral.

In most histories Western philosophy, entire areas are often obscured, especially that relating to Arab and Islamic philosophy. Chinese and Indian philosophies are no better off. There is a real philosophical problem of understanding and communication between East and West, caused by an endlessly reiterated vision of a self-centered West, fully Christian and not indebted to any other culture, especially not to Arab culture. Important texts have been written to denounce this “falsification of history in the name of ideology”. However, it is not at this controversial and ideological level that we place ourselves. The modest work that we present here attempts a calm analysis of the positions of two philosophers (Ibn Rushd and Leibniz) who, although belonging to two different worlds, meet on many points. We will be particularly interested in the relationship they establish between philosophy and theology. Résumé : Dans la plupart des livres d’histoire relatifs à la philosophie occidentale, se trouvent souvent occultés des pans entiers, notamment celui qui concerne la philosophie arabe et islamique. Les philosophies chinoise et indienne ne sont pas mieux loties. Il y a un réel problème philosophique de compréhension et de communication entre l’Orient et l’Occident suscité par une vision sans cesse réitérée d’un Occident centré sur lui-même, bien chrétien et non redevable à aucune autre culture, surtout pas à la culture arabe. Des textes importants ont été écrits pour dénoncer cette “falsification de l’histoire au nom de l’idéologie”. Cependant, ce n’est pas à ce niveau polémique et idéologique que nous nous plaçons. Le modeste travail que nous présentons ici tente une analyse sereine de la position de deux philosophes (Ibn Rushd et Leibniz) qui, bien qu’appartenant à deux mondes différents, se rencontrent sur de nombreux de points. Nous nous intéresserons en particulier au rapport qu’ils établissent entre la philosophie et la théologie.

To a certain extent, the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG), of which the title alone already reminds Malebranche, still seem to be animated by the Leibnizian imitation of the ‘Malebranche-Limbo’ (the descending movement and ascending from God to creation, then horizontally to creatures, and then going back to souls, spirits and the kingdom of grace). Here we will highlight, on the contrary, the main aspects by which Leibniz diverges from it in the PNG and in fact abandons it altogether. We will also analyze the meaning of the bipartition of Leibnizian writing in two sections, ‘physics’ and ‘metaphysics’, on the background on Leibniz’s classification of sciences and theory of the substance, and from there we will move to the consideration of the different levels of perception that Leibniz’s substances present. Dans une certaine mesure, les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG), dont le titre seul rappelle déjà Malebranche, semblent encore animés par l’imitation leibnizienne du ‘Malebranche-Limbo’ (le mouvement descendant et ascendant de Dieu à la création puis, horizontalement, vers les créatures, et enfin revenant aux âmes, aux esprits et au royaume de la grâce). Nous mettrons ici en évidence, au contraire, les principaux aspects par lesquels Leibniz s’en écarte dans les PNG et en fait y renonce complétement. Nous analyserons aussi le sens de la partition de l’écrit leibnizien en deux sections (‘physique’ et ‘métaphysique’), dans le contexte de la classification leibnizienne des sciences et de sa théorie de la substance, et de là nous passerons à considérer les différents niveaux de perception que les substances présentent selon Leibniz.

In his solution to the problem of sensible knowledge, Leibniz seeks to avoid the extreme positions held by the Cartesians and Hobbes. The conceptual distinctions that Leibniz introduces allow him to overcome difficulties raised by his own earlier definitions of sensus. He is consequently able to reconcile the continuity he introduces between animal and human perceptions with the normative and, at the same time, propositional aspects of perceptual judgments. In this paper I will begin by describing his late conception of both human and animal perception, and I will compare this notion with his early notion of perception and the difficulties it gave rise to; finally, I will show the advantages that his new conception can offer for solving the epistemic problem of perception. La solution leibnizienne au problème de la connaissance sensible cherche à éviter les positions extrêmes que les cartésiens et Hobbes ont proposées. Les distinctions conceptuelles que Leibniz introduit lui permettent de surmonter des difficultés suscitées par ses premières définitions du sensus, et, en conséquence, de concilier les continuités entre les perceptions animale et humaine avec les conditions normatives et, pourtant, propositionnelles du jugement perceptuel. Dans cette étude, je commencerai par la description de cette conception tardive de la perception tant humaine qu’animale, et comparerai cette notion avec la première notion de la perception et les difficultés qu’elle suscite ; finalement, je présenterai les avantages que la nouvelle conception peut offrir pour le problème épistémique de la perception.

From Leibniz’ point of view, the distinction between nature and grace is stripped of all theological reference: the key to reading the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) seems to be found, at the beginning of §7, in the distinction between the physical and metaphysical domains. This study consists of three parts, the first of which is dedicated to the general formulation of the “great principle” of sufficient reason, where Leibniz does not distinguish the plane of knowing and that of being. The second concerns the role of the “nothing” in the formulation of the principle of reason, and its substantivation in the PNGs. Finally, we will consider the relationship between this “nothing” and the possible in Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, and underline that for all of them it is the existence of the pure possible that is opposed to the “nothing”, as indicated by the use of the term aliquid, i.e. “something in general”. Pour Leibniz, la distinction entre la nature et la grâce est dépouillée de toute référence théologique : la clé de lecture des Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) semble se trouver, au commencement du §7, dans la distinction entre le physique et le métaphysique. Cette étude comprend trois parties, dont la première est dédiée à la formulation générale du “grand principe” de raison suffisante, où Leibniz ne distingue pas le plan du connaître et celui de l’être. La deuxième porte sur le rôle du “rien” dans la formulation du principe de raison et sur sa substantivation dans les PNG. Enfin on considèrera le rapport entre ce “rien” et le possible chez Leibniz, Wolff et Kant, pour souligner que dans tous il s’agit d’opposer au rien l’existence du pur possible, comme l’indique l’emploi du terme aliquid, c’est-à-dire le quelque chose en général.

Leibniz chose the title Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) by himself, so this occurrence deserves in our opinion a special research. Indeed, the question remains open as to whether Leibniz is alluding to two different types of principles, each governing their own set of objects, or rather to a single type of principle governing two different types of entities. In §15 of the PNG, Leibniz offers an analogy regarding the relationship between the realm of nature and the realm of grace: in one, God acts as an architect; in the other, like a monarch. This analogy suggests a dualist reading: the principles of creation are not the same as those of governance – at least that is the interpretation I will suggest. I will also try to answer the question, which touches on the nature of the relationship between divine intelligence and will: How can we understand the idea that there are principles of grace? Leibniz a choisi le titre des Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) par lui-même, si bien que cette occurrence du terme mérite à notre avis une recherche à part entière. Or la question reste ouverte de savoir si Leibniz fait allusion à deux types de principes différents, gouvernant chacun leur propre ensemble d’objets, ou plutôt à un seul type de principe gouvernant deux types différents d’entités. Au §15 des PNG, Leibniz propose une analogie concernant la relation entre le royaume de la nature et le royaume de la grâce : dans l’un, Dieu agit comme un architecte ; dans l’autre, comme un monarque. Cette analogie suggère une lecture dualiste : les principes de la création ne sont pas les mêmes que ceux de la gouvernance. C’est du moins l’interprétation que je proposerai. J’essayerais de repondre aussi à la question, qui touche à la nature de la relation entre l’intelligence et la volonté divines : comment pourrions-nous comprendre l’idée qu’il y a des principes de la grâce ?

This paper analyses how the notion of final causation is related to the complex of Leibniz’s account of activity of substances. In doing so I will focus on the 3rd paragraph of the Principles of Nature and Grace and on other texts where a similar thesis is proposed. I aim at showing that final causes are better intended as model of explanation rather than a distinct type of causes. I will first analyse two points raised by the PNG thesis: that it applies to all simple substances and its opposition with causation as it occurs in bodies, with the aim of highlighting some of the features of final causation in substances, to then focus on two questions. Is final causation, being situated at the level of simple substances, the most fundamental causal process in Leibniz’s metaphysics? How should the causal role of goals be understood? L’articolo analizza il rapporto tra la nozione di causalità finale e la concezione leibniziana dell’attività delle sostanze nel suo complesso. Mi concentrerò su una tesi formulata nel terzo paragrafo dei Principi della natura e della grazia, insieme con altri testi in cui si propongono tesi analoghe. Intendo mostrare che le cause finali possono essere intese più appropriatamente come un modello esplicativo che come un particolare tipo di cause. Analizzerò innanzitutto due punti sollevati nella tesi dei PNG (che la causalità finale concerne tutte le sostanze semplici, e che è contrapposta alla causalità che ha luogo nei corpi) allo scopo di evidenziare alcuni caratteri della causalità finale nelle sostanze. Affronterò poi due questioni: la causalità finale, in quanto si colloca al livello delle sostanze semplici, può essere considerata il processo causale fondamentale nella metafisica di Leibniz? Come va inteso il ruolo causale dei fini?

In this paper we inquire whether Leibniz’s metaphysics of the body has undergone a significant change in the last twenty years of his life. This metaphysical conception seems incompatible with the late monadological conclusions. Yet, to explain the body in terms of monadic subordination makes soul and body inseparably united. Far from there being two incompatible ontologies in Leibniz’s late philosophy, we find a seamless connection between what is monadic and what is organic: a single point of view that includes the order of bodies and that of monadic substrates, and a system that accounts for all levels of reality. Ultimately, our topic is whether Leibniz was a realist metaphysician, an idealist one, or whether in the philosophy of his maturity he tried to reconcile the two tendencies. Dans cette étude la question est de savoir si la vision de Leibniz sur la métaphysique du corps a subi un changement important dans les vingt dernières années de sa vie. Il s’agit là d’une conception métaphysique qui semble incompatible avec les conclusions monadologiques tardives. Pourtant, expliquer le corps en termes de subordination monadique, rend l’âme et le corps inséparablement unis. Loin d’être deux ontologies incompatibles dans la philosophie de maturité de Leibniz, on y trouve une connexion sans faille entre ce qui est monadique et ce qui est organique : un point de vue unique qui comprendrait l’ordre des corps et celui des substrats monadiques, un système qui rendrait compte de tous les niveaux de la réalité. Finalement, le sujet de discussion consiste à savoir si Leibniz a été un métaphysicien réaliste, un idéaliste, ou bien s’il a essayé de réconcilier les deux tendances dans sa philosophie de la maturité.

Two main questions will be addressed here: the transformation of Leibniz’s conception of principles will be projected on the model of reconstruction of his philosophy called metaphysics of systemic individuality; the principle of reason will then be analyzed, and especially its practical aspect, i.e. as a principle of action. On the one hand, certain versions of the principle of reason find application in the realm of what can or ought to be done. For example, the principle of reason as the principle of convenience. On the other hand, Leibniz distinguishes between the human subject and the divine subject as two different epistemological points of view, performing what is more convenient in very different ways – from the human point of view, there is a process of ‘perpetual progress’. These practical versions of the principle of reason are linked to the dominant principle of ethics and politics (the principe d’autrui, principle of the other) and with the meta-principle of Leibnizian logic and rationality: the principe de l’ordre, principle of order. Deux questions principales seront ici abordées : la transformation de la conception leibnizienne des principes sera projetée sur le modèle de reconstruction de sa philosophie appelé métaphysique de l’individualité systémique ; le principe de raison sera ensuite analysé et tout spécialement, son aspect pratique en tant que principe de l’action. D’une part, il existe certaines versions du principe de raison qui trouvent leur application dans le domaine de ce qui peut ou doit être fait (par exemple, le principe de raison comme principe de la convenance). D’autre part, Leibniz distingue le sujet humain et le sujet divin comme deux points de vue épistémologiques différents, qui font ce qui est plus convenable de différentes façons : du point de vue humain, il se produit un processus de ‘progrès perpétuel’. Les versions pratiques du principe de raison sont liées au principe dominant de l’éthique et de la politique (le principe d’autrui) et avec le méta-principe de la logique et de la rationalité leibnizienne : le principe de l’ordre.

While an important, even decisive work has been accomplished by Leibnizian researchers concerning Leibniz's conception of the living and the organism, barely a few lines have been devoted to the repercussions of these results on moral philosophy. Indeed the question arises of understanding what becomes of the spirits in the new relational context produced by the monadological approach. Unlike the Monadology, the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) introduce a new approach to subjectivity. Without starting either from the human mind, in Cartesian manner, or from spirits as some ‘panpsychism’ would do, the PNG present, within nature and under the name of spirit, an active subjectivity which proceeds from the dynamic interconnection of all things, and is inserted into it by all its organic fibers: an incorporated subjectivity. Résumé : Alors qu’un travail très important et décisif a été accompli par les chercheurs leibniziens, qui a renouvelé l’approche du vivant et de l’organisme chez Leibniz, quelques lignes à peine ont été consacrées aux répercussions de ces avancées sur la philosophie morale. Or la question se pose de savoir ce que deviennent les esprits dans le nouveau contexte relationnel produit par l’approche monadologique. À la différence de la Monadologie, les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) présentent une approche nouvelle de la subjectivité. Sans partir ni de l’esprit humain à la manière cartésienne, ni des esprits comme le ferait un ‘panpsychisme’, les PNG présentent, au sein de la nature et sous le nom d’esprit, une subjectivité en activité qui procède de l’interconnexion dynamique de toutes choses, et y est insérée par toutes ses fibres organiques : une subjectivité incorporée.

While in Malebranche the specific laws of grace were structurally homogeneous to those of nature, in Leibniz’s view the system of nature, unfolding according to its own rules, at the same time satisfies the moral requirements. Human beings are subjected both to the natural laws, as embodied souls, and to the jurisdiction of the moral law, as citizens of the ‘city of God’. The realm of grace is a “moral world within the natural world”: harmony seems to be required. And what he wants to get from such harmony is that final conciliation of subjective consciousness and divine justice also called for by Locke. But this eschatological outcome is thought of by him in a more intra-mundane way, that is, the reconciliation of nature with the moral ends of the ‘kingdom of grace’ is projected into the future development of this world. Notably, the conceptual framework expressed by the Leibnizian ‘kingdom of grace’ will be taken again by Kant from a transcendental point of view. Mentre in Malebranche le leggi specifiche della grazia erano strutturalmente omogenee a quelle della natura, secondo Leibniz il sistema della natura, sviluppandosi secondo le proprie regole, soddisfa allo stesso tempo le esigenze morali. Gli esseri umani sono soggetti sia alle leggi naturali, in quanto anime dotate di un corpo, sia alla giurisdizione della legge morale, in quanto cittadini della ‘città di Dio’. Il regno della grazia è un “mondo morale nel mondo naturale”: un’armonia sembra essere richiesta. E ciò che Leibniz vuole ottenere con tale armonia è quella conciliazione finale di coscienza soggettiva e giustizia divina richiesta anche da Locke. Ma l’esito escatologico è da lui pensato in un modo più intramondano: la riconciliazione della natura con i fini morali del ‘regno della grazia’ è proiettata nello sviluppo futuro di questo mondo. Significativamente, il quadro concettuale espresso dal ‘regno della grazia’ leibniziano sarà ripreso da Kant da un punto di vista trascendentale.

This study will approach the Principles of Nature and Grace moving from the analysis of the article “Monades (Système des)” in the Encyclopédie méthodique, while placing this article in the context of the reception of Leibniz’s philosophy in France. We will see in particular how the insertion of the Principles of Nature and Grace in the entry on the System of the Monads is accompanied by an unprecedented contextualization of the Leibnizian pamphlet and how the article “Monades (Système des)” offers an example of a new understanding of the history of philosophy. So Naigeon invites us even today to re-read the Principles of Nature and Grace. La présente étude abordera les Principes de la nature et de la grâce à partir de l’analyse de l’article “Monades (Système des)” de l’Encyclopédie méthodique, tout en replaçant cet article dans le contexte de la réception de la philosophie de Leibniz en France. Nous verrons notamment comment l’insertion des Principes de la nature et de la grâce dans l’Encyclopédie méthodique s’accompagne d’une mise en contexte inédite de l’opuscule leibnizien et comment l’article “Monades (Système des)” offre l’exemple d’une nouvelle appréhension de l’histoire de la philosophie. Ainsi Naigeon nous invite-t-il aujourd’hui encore à relire les Principes de la nature et de la grâce.

In the following pages I wish to show, first that the definition of happiness in §18 of the Principles is very original compared to tradition; second, that Leibniz’s rejection of a conception of happiness that we might define as ataraxic is closely linked to Leibniz’s metamorphosis of Locke’s notion of uneasiness. In the first part, I will focus on the beginning of §18, and more particularly on the standard notion of beatific vision, by choosing the Thomist conception as paradigmatic. In the second part, I will show that the pivot of this metamorphosis is Leibniz’s dynamic conception of being. It allows him to redraw the relationship between finite and infinite, crossing the barrier between the two, and thus opening the doors to Romanticism. Dans les pages qui suivent je souhaite montrer en premier lieu que la définition du bonheur dans le §18 des Principes est très originale par rapport à la tradition ; en deuxième lieu que le refus leibnizien d’une conception de bonheur que nous pourrions définir ataraxique est étroitement lié à la métamorphose que Leibniz opère de la notion d’inquiétude de Locke. Dans la première partie, je m’arrêterai sur le début du §18, et plus particulièrement sur la notion standard de la vision béatifique, en choisissant comme figure paradigmatique la conception thomiste. Dans la deuxième partie, je montrerai que le pivot de cette métamorphose est la conception dynamique de l’être propre à Leibniz. Elle lui permet de redessiner les rapports entre fini et infini, en franchissant la barrière entre les deux, et d’ouvrir ainsi les portes au Romantisme.

In the present discussion, I set myself the objective of sketching out Martin Heidegger’s two different approaches to the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz. I will show that Heidegger treats the problematics of the principle of sufficient reason differently in these two texts, the first of which was published in 1929 under the title Die metaphysische Anfagsgründe der Logik nach Leibniz, and the second, of 1955, known under the title of Der Satz vom Grund (Principle of Reason). In my opinion, the question which relates the ‘logical’ and the ‘being’ evokes in a more exact way what, in principle, interests Leibniz – one has to wonder, however: why is Heidegger interested in Leibniz? Dans le présent propos, je me suis fixé comme objectif de faire une esquisse des deux différentes approches que Martin Heidegger propose du principe de raison suffisante chez Leibniz. Je ferai voir comment Heidegger traite la problématique du principe de raison suffisante différemment selon ces deux textes, dont le premier a été publié sous le titre Die metaphysische Anfagsgründe der Logik nach Leibniz de 1929 et le second, notoirement connu sous le titre de Der Satz vom Grund de 1955, Principe de raison. A mon avis, la question qui met en relation le ‘logique’ et l’‘étant’ rappelle de manière plus exacte ce qui, en principe, intéresse Leibniz, sachant que les contextes, approches et méthodes, sont différents chez les deux auteurs. On doit cependant se demander : pourquoi Heidegger s’intéresse-t-il à Leibniz ?

In the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) Leibniz asks two questions, “Why is there rather something than nothing?”, and why the things “must exist thus, and not otherwise”, as an immediate extension of the principle of reason. Differently from Heidegger’s, our hypothesis is that Leibniz thinks the principle of reason in a truly questioning way going deeper into the question why in a metaphysical sense. To verify this hypothesis, we will first study the genesis of the formulation of the principle of reason, starting from the “why” and, in particular, from the substativation of the interrogative adverb, Leibniz’s lexicon identifying in this case “the reason” with “the why”. Secondly, we will study the genesis of the “first question” of §7 of the PNG as far as it defines the primary questioning of metaphysics. Dans les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) Leibniz pose deux questions, “Pourquoy il y a plustôt quelque chose que rien ?”, et pourquoi les choses “doivent exister ainsi, et non autrement”, comme prolongement immédiat du principe de raison. Différemment de celle de Heidegger, notre hypothèse est que Leibniz pense le principe de raison de façon véritablement questionnante grâce à l’approfondissement de la question pourquoi dans un sens métaphysique. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, nous étudierons d’abord la genèse de la formulation du principe de raison à partir du “pourquoi”, et en particulier lorsque l’adverbe interrogatif est substantivé, le lexique leibnizien identifiant alors “la raison” avec “le pourquoi”. Dans un second temps, nous étudierons la genèse de la “première question” du §7 des PNG en tant qu’elle définit le questionnement premier de la métaphysique.

La Mettrie makes reference to Leibniz from the very beginning of his philosophical production, devoting considerable attention to him already in the Natural History of the Soul, and until the end of his life. He does not precisely identify his philosophical sources, but it would not be impossible – quite the contrary – that his knowledge of Leibniz’s thought was based on the Principles of Nature and Grace and on the Monadology. Over and over, La Mettrie insists that there are only two philosophical systems, and two ways of doing philosophy: that of the materialists and that of the spiritualists. He devotes his life to defending the first, Leibniz personifying the second. Like Leibniz, indeed, La Mettrie compares the art of nature and the art of man, natural machines and artificial machines. But the comparison brings him to very different results. La Mettrie se réfère à Leibniz dès le début de sa production philosophique, en lui consacrant une attention considérable déjà dans l’Histoire naturelle de l’âme, et jusqu’à la fin de sa vie. Il n’identifie pas avec précision ses sources philosophiques. Mais il ne serait pas impossible – bien au contraire – que la connaissance qu’il a de la pensée de Leibniz soit fondée sur la lecture des Principes de la nature et de la grâce et sur la Monadologie. A plusieurs reprises, La Mettrie insiste sur le fait qu’il y a seulement deux systèmes philosophiques, deux façons de faire de la philosophie : celle des matérialistes et celle des spiritualistes. Il a consacré sa vie à faire la défense du premier, Leibniz incarnant le deuxième. Comme Leibniz, certes, La Mettrie compare l’art de la nature et l’art de l’homme, les machines naturelles et les machines artificielles. Mais la comparaison l’amène à des résultats bien différents.

Here I will try to show that the term apperception, from its first appearance in the New Essays, undergoes a determinate evolution, i.e. its meaning and its role become more and more defined and, from the Principles of Nature and Grace, it is used to indicate the distinguishing feature of the ontological and cognitive status of spirits, excluding animals. This entails an essential connection to reflective acts. These reflections are not only useful for understanding Leibniz's thought, but they help us determine the meaning of what Wolff writes in his Psychologia rationalis, where he wonders “an bruta apperceptione gaudeant”: here, despite his subtlety, we observe a process which could be called ‘homeopathic’, that is to say, which consists in diluting the original active principle. Je cherche ici à montrer que le terme apperception, dès sa première apparition dans les Nouveaux Essais, subit une évolution précise, c’est-à-dire que son signifié et son rôle deviennent de plus en plus définis et, qu’à partir des Principes de la nature et de la grâce, il est utilisé pour indiquer la caractéristique distinctive du statut ontologique et cognitif des esprits, à l’exclusion des animaux. Le lien avec les actes réflexifs est essentiel. Ces réflexions ne sont pas seulement utiles pour la compréhension de la pensée de Leibniz, mais elles nous aident à déterminer le signifié de ce que Wolff écrit dans la Psychologia rationalis, où il s’interroge “an bruta apperceptione gaudeant” : ici, malgré sa subtilité, nous sommes en présence d’un processus qui pourrait être appelé ‘homéopathique’, c’est-à-dire, qui consiste à diluer le principe actif originaire.

This text aims to contribute to the study of the physical, psychological and metaphysical dimensions that articulate the theme of universal connection and of the envelopment of the future in the present. I will begin by examining how the theme of the monad as a mirror of the world appears in §3 and in §12 of the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) – I will not consider the 3rd occurrence, §14, where it is question of the spirit as image of God. Then I will investigate the relation which exists between the thesis maintaining that, because of the universal connection, the monad perceives (confusedly) all that happens at every moment in the world, and the thesis according to which the monad perceives (confusedly) its whole history past and future. Finally, I will briefly consider the question of the asymmetry between past and future as a temporal property which has no equivalent for space. Ce texte a pour but de contribuer à l’étude de la manière dont s’articulent les dimensions physique, psychologique et métaphysique du thème de la connexion universelle et de l’enveloppement du futur dans le présent. Je commencerai par examiner selon quelles modalités le thème de la monade miroir du monde apparaît dans les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG), dans le §3 et dans le §12 – je ne prendrai pas en considération la 3ème occurrence, §14, où il est question de l’esprit comme image de Dieu –, puis je m’interrogerai sur la relation qui existe entre la thèse qui affirme que, du fait de la connexion universelle, la monade perçoit (confusément) tout ce qui arrive à chaque instant dans le monde et celle qui affirme que la monade perçoit (confusément) toute son histoire, le passé comme le futur. Cela m’amènera à envisager rapidement la question de l’asymétrie entre passé et futur comme propriété temporelle qui n’a pas d’équivalent pour l’espace.