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In a research setting (TRIDENT-2), Dutch pregnant women undergoing prenatal screening for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 with the Non-Invasive Prenatal Test (NIPT), are offered the choice to also receive information about incidental findings. In a recent report, the Health Council of the Netherlands has recommended to retain this option, but to only report those incidental findings that very probably will lead to serious health outcomes for the child. A working group has been appointed to draw up a guideline for this. In this article we argue that actively searching for desired 'incidental findings' in fact amounts to broadening the scope of the screening and that a justification of this choice is still lacking. A core issue is whether the benefits of such broader screening outweigh the drawback of inevitably also generating findings that do not fit in with the aim of the screening: providing meaningful reproductive choices.

Background: Implementation of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in Down syndrome screening programmes requires health policy decisions about its combination with other tests and its timing in pregnancy., Aim: Our aim was to aid health policy decision makers by conducting a quantitative analysis of different NIPT implementation strategies., Methods: Decision trees were created to illustrate all plausible alternatives in a theoretical cohort of 100,000 pregnant women in five screening programmes: classical screening by the first-trimester combined test (FCT), pre-selection of high-risk women prior to NIPT by the FCT, NIPT as the first screening test at 10 weeks and at 13 weeks, and the simultaneous conductance of NIPT and the FCT., Results: Pre-selection by FCT prior to NIPT reduces the number of amniocenteses to a minimum because of a reduction of false-positive NIPT results. If NIPT is the first screening test, it detects almost all fetal Down syndrome cases. NIPT at 10 weeks reassures women early in pregnancy, while NIPT at 13 weeks prevents unnecessary tests due to spontaneous miscarriages and allows for immediate confirmation by amniocentesis., Conclusion: Every implementation strategy has its advantages and disadvantages. The most favourable implementation strategy may be NIPT as the first screening test at 13 weeks, offering the most accurate screening test for Down syndrome, when the risk for spontaneous miscarriage has declined remarkably and timely confirmation by amniocentesis can be performed., (© 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel.)

Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome differs from other forms of population screening in that the usual aim of achieving health gains through treatment or prevention does not seem to apply. This type of screening leads to no other options but the choice between continuing or terminating the pregnancy and can only be morally justified if its aim is to provide meaningful options for reproductive choice to pregnant women and their partners. However, this aim should not be understood as maximizing reproductive choice per se. Only if understood as allowing prospective parents to avoid suffering related to living with (a child with) serious disorders and handicaps can prenatal screening be a publicly or collectively funded programme. The alternative of moving prenatal testing outside the healthcare system into the private sector is problematic, as it makes these tests accessible only to those who can afford to pay for it. New developments in prenatal screening will have to be assessed in terms of whether and to what extent they either contribute to or undermine the stated aim of providing meaningful options for reproductive choice. In the light of this criterion, this article discusses the introduction of the new non-invasive prenatal test (NIPT), the tendency to widen the scope of follow-up testing, as well as the possible future scenarios of genome-wide screening and 'prenatal personalised medicine'. The article ends with recommendations for further debate, research and analysis., (© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Genomic microarray analysis is increasingly being applied as a prenatal diagnostic tool. Microarrays enable searching the genome at a higher resolution and with higher sensitivity than conventional karyotyping for identifying clinically significant chromosomal abnormalities. As yet, no clear guidelines exist on whether microarrays should be applied prenatally for all indications or only in selected cases such as ultrasound abnormalities, whether a targeted or genome-wide array should be used, and what these should include exactly. In this paper, we present some ethical considerations on the prenatal use of microarrays. There is a strong consensus, at least in Western countries, that the aim of prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities should be understood as facilitating autonomous reproductive choice for prospective parents. The tests offered should be valid and useful to reach that purpose. Against this background, we address several ethical issues raised by the prenatal application of microarrays. First, we argue that the general distinction between a targeted and a genome-wide microarray needs to be scrutinised. Then we examine whether microarrays are 'suitable tests' to serve either a screening or a diagnostic purpose. Given the wide range of findings possibly generated by microarrays, the question arises whether microarrays actually promote or interfere with autonomous reproductive decision-making. Moreover, if variants of unknown clinical significance are identified, this adds to the burden and complexity of reproductive decision-making. We suggest a qualified use of microarrays in the prenatal context.

The advent of new genetic and genomic technologies may cause friction with the principle of respect for autonomy and demands a rethinking of traditional interpretations of the concept of informed consent. Technologies such as whole-genome sequencing and micro-array based analysis enable genome-wide testing for many heterogeneous abnormalities and predispositions simultaneously. This may challenge the feasibility of providing adequate pre-test information and achieving autonomous decision-making. At a symposium held at the 11th World Congress of Bioethics in June 2012 (Rotterdam), organized by the International Association of Bioethics, these challenges were presented for three different areas in which these so-called 'new genetics' technologies are increasingly being applied: newborn screening, prenatal screening strategies and commercial personal genome testing. In this article, we build upon the existing ethical framework for a responsible set-up of testing and screening offers and reinterpret some of its criteria in the light of the new genetics. As we will argue, the scope of a responsible testing or screening offer should align with the purpose(s) of testing and with the principle of respect for autonomy for all stakeholders involved, including (future) children. Informed consent is a prerequisite but requires a new approach. We present preliminary and general directions for an individualized or differentiated set-up of the testing offer and for the informed consent process. With this article we wish to contribute to the formation of new ideas on how to tackle the issues of autonomy and informed consent for (public) healthcare and direct-to-consumer applications of the new genetics., (© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The great promise of the pending introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) for trisomy 21 (18 and 13) is that it enables one-step, early and safe testing for these abnormalities. The ethical debate so far has been limited to possible drawbacks of routine access to this type of testing: normalization of testing and abortion and adverse effects on autonomous decision-making. We address the ethical implications of the fact that routine NIPD affects the scope and strategy of current prenatal screening cascades. A decision is needed whether complementary (invasive) testing remains in place in order to avoid a loss of information as compared with current practice. If so, the supposed advantages of NIPD may be less significant than generally assumed. Accumulation of tests challenges informed consent and proportionality. Therefore, an ethical evaluation of the implications of NIPD for the prenatal screening strategy as a whole is needed.

No consensus exists whether women at increased risk for trisomy 21, 13, and 18 should be offered stand-alone rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) or karyotyping. In this paper, the ethical implications of a fast, relatively cheap and targeted RAD are examined. The advantages of RAD seem less robust than its proponents suggest. Fast test results only give a short-term psychological benefit. The cost advantage of RAD is apparent, but must be weighed against consequences like missed abnormalities, which are evaluated differently by professionals and pregnant women. Since pre-test information about RAD will have to include telling women about karyotyping as a possible alternative, the advantage of RAD in terms of the quantity of information that needs to be given may also be smaller than suggested. We conclude that none of the supposed arguments in favour of RAD is decisive in itself. Whether the case for RAD may still be regarded as convincing when taking these arguments together seems to depend on one's implicit view of what prenatal screening is about. Are we basically dealing with a test for trisomy 21 and a few conditions more? Or are there good grounds for also testing for the wider range of abnormalities that karyotyping can detect? As professionals and pregnant women may have different views about this, we suggest that the best approach is to offer women a choice between RAD and karyotyping. This approach is most in line with the general aim of prenatal screening: providing opportunities for autonomous reproductive choice.

This paper explores the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnostic tests (NIPD tests) in prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities. NIPD tests are easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy. Precisely because of these features, it is feared that informed consent may become more difficult, that both testing and selective abortion will become 'normalized', and that there will be a trend towards accepting testing for minor abnormalities and non-medical traits as well. In our view, however, the real moral challenge of NIPD testing consists in the possibility of linking up a technique with these features (easy, safe and early) with new genomic technologies that allow prenatal diagnostic testing for a much broader range of abnormalities than is the case in current procedures. An increase in uptake and more selective abortions need not in itself be taken to signal a thoughtless acceptance of these procedures. However, combining this with considerably enlarging the scope of NIPD testing will indeed make informed consent more difficult and challenge the notion of prenatal screening as serving reproductive autonomy. If broad NIPD testing includes later-onset diseases, the 'right not to know' of the future child will become a new issue in the debate about prenatal screening. With regard to the controversial issue of selective abortion, it may make a morally relevant difference that after NIPD testing, abortion can be done early. A lower moral status may be attributed to the foetus at that moment, given the dominant opinion that the moral status of the foetus progressively increases with its development.

In the Netherlands prenatal diagnosis after screening for chromosomal abnormalities is done by karyotyping and is restricted to pregnant women with an increased risk of a child with trisomy 21, 18 or 13. However, karyotyping will detect a wider range of chromosomal abnormalities. Replacing karyotyping by rapid aneuploidy diagnosis (RAD) - a test with a more narrow scope - is currently under discussion. A possible drawback of RAD is that some rare but clinically relevant abnormalities may be missed. A possible advantage is that pregnant women will not be confronted with outcomes that the screening was not initially directed at. Each delineation of the scope of prenatal testing implies a normative choice that requires justification. Moral principles can be invoked for both narrowing down and further broadening of the scope of testing.

Prenatal screening strategies are undergoing rapid changes owing to the introduction of new testing techniques. The overall tendency is towards broadening the scope of prenatal testing through increasingly sensitive ultrasound scans and genome-wide molecular tests. In addition, non-invasive prenatal diagnosis is likely to be introduced in the near future. These developments raise important ethical questions concerning meaningful reproductive choice, the autonomy rights of future children, equity of access and the proportionality of testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]