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Since the Second World War, the Middle East has been mentioned in connection with the national interest of America manifested by US presidents. This paper looks at the US foreign policy in the Middle East from Truman to Clinton on the premise that the US foreign policy has contributed to creating a breeding ground for dissatisfaction toward the US In this context, the paper focuses on the doctrines in use from the time of President Truman to Clinton. Thus, every American president has a doctrine, and this doctrine tells what political line the president follows regarding domestic and foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do Republican and Democratic presidents vary in their geographic allocations of federal spending? Recent scholarship suggests that US presidents provide more federal outlays to districts represented by their co-partisans, but leave the issue of partisan affiliation unanswered. We explore that question using an updated database that covers federal spending programs over the 1984–2014 period. We show that the alignment effect found in previous studies cannot be observed for Republican presidents. We argue that Republican presidents may not use pork as much as Democratic presidents because their core constituency is fiscally conservative. One implication of the results reported herein is that the electoral benefits of distributive politics depend on the fiscal preferences of the electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of congressional polarization has led presidents to seek alternative ways to pursue their agendas through staffing. I argue presidents use excepted appointments, which are excepted both from advice and consent and competitive hiring processes, when ideological conflict within the Senate is high. I also argue that Schedule C appointments specifically are concentrated in agencies ideologically similar to the president due to their advisory nature. I find preliminary support for these hypotheses using Office of Personnel Management data on Schedule C appointees from 1998 to 2013. In sum, this study shows that excepted appointments are an important yet understudied tool in the president's administrative toolbox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The elections of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 to the role of President of the United States were noted as benchmarks in our country's history. There was a strong societal belief that his historic elections reflected a shift in societal attitudes towards racial differences, primarily between Whites and people of color, specifically African Americans; however, public discourse over time revealed deep-seated hate for the country's first African American president. Despite his efforts to fight for social justice for all, he received unrelenting opposition from Congress, and the US public was subjected to horrifying racial attacks on Obama, his wife Michelle, and his daughters that went largely ignored and dismissed. The racist tenor of the US became much clearer with the election of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential run. What is more troubling is that Christian evangelicals came out in full force to elect a man whose very being is the antithesis of what it means to be a Christian. To better understand this national and global phenomenon, this critical essay will explore the various arguments that White Christian evangelicals have used to rationalize the election of a man whose policies and behaviors are in direct opposition of Christian ideologies and sensibilities. This contradiction was not lost on many others within and outside of the Christian world, including Black Christians and other evangelical communities of color who have had a range of reactions to the racism that has been revealed by their fellow White believers. Thus this essay will offer greater insight into the gulf that exists in the racism of the Christian community through the lens of this historic political election. It will also aim to offer suggestions for reformation in the Christian community that can potentially serve as a model for positive race relations in society and the larger political landscape of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since controversy began to swirl surrounding then-President-elect Barack Obama's alleged overreliance on policy czars in late 2008, political scientists and pundits alike have been quick to view this approach to White House staffing as an extension of the imperial presidency and, to some, a threat to the constitutional order. In this article, I take a step back and ask whether the phenomenon under attack is exactly what scholars assume it is. In doing so, I investigate the conceptualization problem czars pose as well as how and why presidents actually use czars. I conclude with a series of suggestion for future presidents on how best to use policy czars to advance the interests of their administration and manage the executive institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Research on American political institutions correctly emphasizes the ascendency of presidential power over the last century. Nevertheless, Congress possesses tools to influence how the executive branch shapes public policy. I examine how the use of limitation riders in appropriations laws allows Congress to affect the substance of bureaucratic decisions when Congress otherwise would not have much traction with the bureaucracy: under divided government. In examining the history of limitation riders that forbade the issuance of bureaucratic regulations from 1989 to 2009, I find support for this perspective. The findings suggest that, although Congress may be at a disadvantage in shaping law and policy relative to the president in many cases, its constitutionally protected spending authority continues to promote its ability to influence the executive branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this response we reply to Campbell's criticisms of our article in the March 2012 issue of Presidential Studies Quarterly. We demonstrate algebraically that Campbell's preferred model of the economy, which includes a lagged value of the dependent variable, merely disguises the impact of the president on economic performance. We reject his other criticisms and stand by our article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Have Democratic presidents since World War II had economic records that were superior to those of their Republican counterparts? In a previous study, I reported findings that there were no significant differences between the economic records of the presidential parties once the conditions of the economy they inherited from their predecessor were taken into account. Comiskey and Marsh challenged this finding with an analysis that controlled for business cycle effects. This article reexamines the issue and Comiskey and Marsh's analysis. The reexamination reaffirms my earlier findings that the presidential parties have not significantly differed in their economic records once the effects of inherited economic conditions are taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The link between the president's job approval ratings and aggregate election outcomes is well established, but the processes forging the connection have received comparatively little attention. A variety of data from diverse sources across multiple administrations indicates that popular assessments of the president strongly affect how his party is evaluated, perceived, and adopted as an object of identification, which, in turn, helps to account for the president's influence on the electoral fates of his party's candidates. The data also suggest that opinions of Barack Obama have so far had an even larger effect on attitudes toward the president's party than did opinions of his predecessors, including G. W. Bush. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pervasive influence of partisanship on political evaluations is well known and understood. Whether citizens rely on their policy attitudes has received less attention, especially in the context of how people update and revise their evaluations. This paper focuses on presidential assessments and uses panel data covering three presidencies to model the determinants of opinion change. The results indicate that policy preferences (like partisanship) exert a regular and substantial influence on how citizens update their presidential evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we reassess the findings of where presidents visit during midterm elections from 1954 to 2010, with data that, for the first time, segments presidential visits into 'rallies,' fundraisers, and 'virtual' campaigning. On one hand, our findings reflect what others have found-when aggregating all visits together, the total Electoral College votes and the previous state-level winning percentage of the president in the state affect the probability of a visit by the president. However, presidents are more likely to visit states for a 'rally' when they are more popular, and the number of competitive races in the state is greater. Presidents are more likely to host a fundraiser in a state when the number of Electoral College votes is higher but are less likely to visit when there are fewer competitive races. The results suggest that there is value in knowing the purpose for which a president visited a state in a midterm election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inconstant political support is a central problem for presidents, a problem of political authority. This article provides empirical evidence of the decline of political authority for American presidents over the last seventy years by examining several indicators comprising the related concept of political capital. Declining political capital lies at the core of the political authority problem besetting recent presidents. The evidence of declining political capital presented here reveals that none of Barack Obama's post-1965 predecessors solved the political authority problem. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and presently by Barack Obama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that presidents use unilateral powers for particularistic aims to gain electoral support. Specifically, I examine presidential disaster declarations, which allow presidents to unilaterally authorize potentially billions of dollars to specific constituencies. In an analysis extending from 1981 to 2004, I find that a state’s electoral competitiveness influences whether they receive a disaster declaration from the president. A highly competitive state can expect to receive twice as many presidential disaster declarations as an uncompetitive state. This relationship has existed since the passage of the 1988 Stafford Act, which expanded the disaster declaration powers of the president. Additionally, I find that these decisions have the intended electoral benefits—voters react and reward presidents for presidential disaster declarations. A president can expect over a one point increase in a statewide contest in return for a single presidential disaster declaration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Presidential ranking polls communicate far more than an ordered list of names; they communicate the leadership qualities our nation values. Given this, the results of presidential ranking polls have been a source of contention. One recurrent concern is that the academic raters surveyed in the polls, who tend overwhelmingly to be partisan Democrats, may favor some presidents over others. This study looks for evidence of a partisan bias in the ranking polls. Concentrating on the modern presidency, we find that presidential partisanship is a potent predictor of rank; academic raters consistently rank Democratic presidents ten places higher on average than Republican presidents. We also compare the rankings from academics to rankings from non-academics and show that academic raters favor Democratic presidents more than non-academic raters. Our findings suggest, in accordance with previous literature, that partisan attachment affects the subjective judgments that presidential ranking polls inherently require. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the notion of "Christmas pardons" has been around for some time, there has been almost no empirical research on whether federal executive clemency is in any way patterned in a manner that would legitimize the notion of "Christmas" (or even "seasonal") pardons. Furthermore, previous research on clemency from 1789 to 1933 suggests the months of May and June have been the favored months when it comes to the granting of presidential pardons. This analysis explores "seasonal" clemency in monthly data from January of 1931 to January of 2009. The 12 presidents covered have granted 10,626 individual pardons and commutations of sentence across 19 four-year terms. The data show the largest number of pardons and commutations (2,453) has been granted in the month of December (more than two times the figure associated with the second highest month) and it is especially clear that more recent presidents (including George W. Bush) have skewed grants of clemency toward this part of the year. Indeed, one of every two grants of clemency for the last 39 years has appeared in the month of December. Having presented the data, some discussion is provided regarding possible explanations for these trends and troubling ramifications for federal executive clemency in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies of the post-war American political economy find that Democratic presidents have been more successful than Republicans. Most recently, Bartels (2008) found that economic growth had been greater and that unemployment and income inequality had been lower under Democratic presidents since 1948. If true, these findings combined with the frequent success of Republicans in presidential elections pose a challenge to theories of retrospective voting and responsible party government. This reexamination of these findings indicates that they are an artifact of specification error. Previous estimates did not properly take into account the lagged effects of the economy. Once lagged economic effects are taken into account, party differences in economic performance are shown to be the effects of economic conditions inherited from the previous president and not the consequence of real policy differences. Specifically, the economy was in recession when Republican presidents became responsible for the economy in each of the four post-1948 transitions from Democratic to Republican presidents. This was not the case for the transitions from Republicans to Democrats. When economic conditions leading into a year are taken into account, there are no presidential party differences with respect to growth, unemployment, or income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion about the state of public administration in the U.S. following the election of Barack Obama as president. It is noted that the administration of Obama made a image for the government and public service. One problem seen by the author with the presidency of Obama is involving citizens in the political process.

The theory of the unitary executive is sometimes used to suggest that Article II's "executive power" extends to complete control of the executive branch. While presidents have rarely come close to that ideal, for some decades administrative strategies have been key to how presidents have exercised control over governmental outcomes -- and thus, to how they have exercised power. In thinking about the future of presidential power, this essay traces how recent developments in presidential administrative strategies have tilted the bureaucratic playing field in favor of the executive branch. It stresses the role of appointments, regulatory review, managerial directives, and the theoretic underpinning of these through the invocation of presidential "rights" that lead from the Nixon, Reagan, and George W. Bush administrations to the choices facing Barack Obama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research tested whether modern Republican presidents from 1953 through 2004 have consistently supported two of the Party's core values: limiting the size of government (as expressed by a decrease in spending and/or lower taxes that result in reduced spending) and minimizing government intrusiveness (as expressed by restricting the expansion of regulatory agencies at the Federal level). The quantitative approach involved analyzing the federal government's growth and intrusiveness. Government growth was quantified by measuring annual spending, as a percentage of GDP. Then, a year-by-year analysis of the federal debt, as a percentage of GDP, was evaluated to provide an added measurement of how closely Republican presidents have limited the size of government. Three key measures were used to establish the level of governmental intrusion at the federal level: the number of Federal Registry pages printed each year; the number of workers employed by the Federal government annually; and, the yearly administrative costs of managing federal rules and regulations. The primary purpose of this research was to measure the modern-era Republican president's adherence to core conservative values contrasted against their rhetorical support found in previous research conducted by the author. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The preponderance of contemporary institutional analysis concerning the president and war is that the exigencies imposed by world politics and the modalities of conflict in the late 20th and early 21st centuries ineluctably push the American political system away from Madison's constitutionalism towards an expansion of presidential power at the expense of the Congress. This paper will review the contemporary war powers relationship between President and Congress including the recent recommendations of the National Warpowers Commission. The focus of this analysis is on the period since the end of the Cold War for it is during the last two decades that the theory and practice of presidential primacy or "presidentialism" has reached its zenith, surpassing even the "imperial presidency" of the middle Cold War period, i.e. the 1960s and early 1970s. This presidentialism confronts the constitutionalism that Madison and his associates sought to codify at the turn of the 18th into the 19th century and invites analysis of the challenge to and whether the Madisonian vision retains relevance for the institutions and processes of US foreign and national security policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theory of partisan control might expect that during times of divided government, approval of Congress and the presidency would move in opposite directions. Yet, the congressional approval question is an ambiguous one in the minds of voters and makes understanding the movement of the aggregated series much more difficult. Here, monthly congressional and presidential approval data for the 1995-2005 period are studied and found to move in tandem, even during periods of divided government. Multivariate ARFIMA models show a strong and positive relationship between congressional approval and lagged presidential approval, even during the period of fiercely divided government under President Clinton. This means that, rather than paying attention to partisan control, the electorate transfers feelings about the president to the institution of Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bill Clinton's worldview has a serious but still almost wholly unappreciated intellectual provenance, with deep ties to two strands of social contract theory and an informed sensitivity to historical development. Yet Clinton forcefully articulated this worldview to the public only sporadically. The complexity and obscurity of his governing philosophy prevented most observers from understanding it. Inconsistent public articulation kept those who understood it from taking it seriously. Both phenomena fueled the misconception that Clinton lacked a consistent public philosophy. Clinton's inconsistent articulation of his governing philosophy was not random, but strategic. He emphasized contractarian themes at particularly advantageous junctures and subordinated these themes when he thought they would prevent the achievement of his near-term objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the health care issues faced by U.S. President Bill Clinton during his second term. During his first term of office, Clinton failed to pass his Health Security Act which would provide universal health care for all Americans. However, he was instrumental in passing the Health Insurance Reform Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and improving both Medicare and Medicaid programs. The president has promised to continue his support on issues involving breast cancer, poor and uninsured children, HIV/AIDS, and tobacco use and to make further substantial changes to Medicare and Medicaid, which face financing problems. INSETS: Clintons Record on the Health Care Hot Buttons;Advice for Health Care Marketers.