Search

Translational science involves the fruitful interplay between basic research paradigms and related fields of application. One promising candidate for such synergy is the relationship between social and clinical psychology. Although the relation is principally bi-directional, such that either discipline can take the role of the basic and the applied science, we take the perspective of transfer from basic social and cognitive social psychology to applications in the clinical realm. Starting from a historical sketch of some of the earliest topics in the interface of both disciplines, we first come to conclude that truly integrative co-theorizing is conspicuously missing. Then, however, we recognize the strong potential for productive collaboration at the pragmatic level of an adaptive research toolbox containing approved methods and compact theoretical tools that carry over between disciplines. We outline the notion of a generic, provisional toolbox as distinguished from a fixed repertoire of established standard procedures. We provide examples of two subsets of tools, methods and logical principles required proper diagnostic reasoning, and theoretically founded influence tools that can enrich the repertoire of therapeutic interventions. Rather than propagating a normatively prescriptive toolbox, we interpret translational science as a pluralistic endeavor, such that different clinicians complete their personalized toolboxes in manifold ways.

When humans make biased or suboptimal choices, they are often attributed to complex cognitive processes that are viewed as being uniquely human. Alternatively, several phenomena, such as suboptimal gambling behavior and cognitive dissonance (justification of effort) may be explained more simply as examples of the contrast between what is expected and what occurs as well as Wagner's Standard Operating Procedure model based on reward prediction error. For example, when pigeons are attracted to choices involving a suboptimal, low probability of a high payoff, as in unskilled gambling behavior, it may be attributed to reward prediction error or the contrast between the low probability of reward expected and the sometimes high probability of reward obtained (when one wins). Similarly, justification of effort, the tendency to attribute greater value to rewards that are difficult to obtain, is typically explained in terms of the tendency to inflate the value of a reward to justify the effort required to obtain it. When pigeons prefer outcomes that require more effort to obtain, however, it is more likely to be explained in terms of contrast between the effort and the reward that follows. We readily attribute the behavior of animals to contrast-like effects or reward prediction error, however, when similar behavior occurs in humans, we also should be prepared to explain it in terms of simpler learning mechanisms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The present research was designed to test whether the subjective experience of more effort related to more reward valuation as measured by a neural response. This prediction was derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance and its effort justification paradigm. Young adult participants (n = 82) engaged in multiple trails of a low or high effort task that resulted in a loss or reward on each trial. Neural responses to the reward (loss) cue were measured using EEG so that the event-related potential known as the Reward Positivity (RewP) could be assessed. Results revealed no significant differences between low and high effort conditions on the RewP. However, within the high effort condition, a more subjective experience of effort was associated with a larger RewP. This research extends past research on the effort justification paradigm of cognitive dissonance theory by suggesting that effort justification is associated with an implicit measure of reward valuation. It, therefore, challenges recent perspectives on dissonance processes that posit that these evaluative changes should only occur on explicit but not implicit measures.

PurposeA general point of commitment theory is that the more individuals behave in a certain way toward an entity, the more attractive they feel toward that entity. The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether an individual’s perceived attractiveness toward a tourist destination is enhanced by the number of actual visits to each different attraction within the destination, being controlled by satisfaction.Design/methodology/approachIn doing so, data were collected from 613 individuals at major tourist attractions and traffic centers in Daejeon Metropolitan City, South Korea. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to examine the findings, and the conclusions drawn indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between the number of visits to different attractions and the perceived attractiveness of the destination, as well as the interaction effect between the number of visits to different attractions and satisfaction.FindingsThe results are supported by literature in the area of commitment theory, in which various authors state that attitudes are evoked by behaviors. Further examination of the findings and conclusions drawn are described in this paper.Practical implicationsThis mechanism should strategically be applied to practical implications to provide more accessible routes to a destination and a networking system. When visitors engage in a community in various ways, they are more likely to continue to engage in a community because they do not prefer to have intangible or tangible costs associated with disengagement.Originality/valueThis paper is the first application of the concept of commitment traced from its original psychological theory to the field of tourism. The effort justification paradigm of commitment theory postulates that if individuals work or study hard toward a specific goal, they gradually perceive the goal as attractive. This study found that the aforementioned paradigm shift is expanded to various types of behaviors, including that involving travel. This paper contributes to an in-depth understanding of the original commitment theory and its application to tourism.

In the current studies, we addressed the development of effort-based object valuation. Four- and 6-year-olds invested either great or little effort in order to obtain attractive or unattractive rewards. Children were allowed to allocate these rewards to an unfamiliar recipient (dictator game). Investing great effort to obtain attractive rewards (a consonant situation) led 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, to enhance the value of the rewards and thus distribute fewer of them to others. After investing effort to attain unattractive rewards (a dissonant situation), 6-year-olds cognitively reduced the dissonance between effort and reward quality by reappraising the value of the rewards and thus distributing fewer of them. In contrast, 4-year-olds reduced the dissonance behaviorally by discarding the rewards. These findings provide evidence for the emergence of an effort-value link and underline possible mechanisms underlying the primacy of cognitive versus behavioral solutions to dissonance reduction.

Cognitive dissonance theory, as originally set out by Festinger (1957), described dissonance as an intraindividual phenomenon in a social context. Much of the research on dissonance has focused on the intraindividual aspect of dissonance. The limited research that has looked at cognitive dissonance in groups has done so from a range of different perspectives. These perspectives seem to result in contradictory predictions about the role of social information on the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance, despite generally sharing a model of the social self based on, or consistent with, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978). Thinking about how these group-based models of cognitive dissonance fit together may better illuminate the nature of dissonance and also suggest productive avenues for research to integrate these various perspectives on dissonance.

Humans tend to value rewards more if they have had to work hard to obtain them (justification of effort). Similarly they tend to persist in a task even when they would be better off beginning a new one (sunk cost). Humans also often give greater value to objects of good quality than the same objects together with objects of lesser quality (the less is more effect). Commercial gambling (lotteries and slot machines) is another example of suboptimal choice by humans because on average the rewards are less than the investment. In another example of a systematic bias, when humans try to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a low probability event, they often give too much weight to the results of a test, in spite of the fact that the known probability of a false alarm reduces the predictive value of the test (base rate neglect). In each of these examples, we have found that pigeons show a similar tendency to choose suboptimally. When one can show comparable findings of suboptimal choice in animals it suggests that whereas culture may reinforce certain suboptimal behavior, the behavior is likely to result from the overgeneralization of basic behavioral processes or predisposed heuristics that may have been appropriate in natural environments. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: "Tribute to Tom Zentall." Language: en

Oblective:Decision aids (DAs) play an increasingly critical role in supporting patients in making preference-sensitive treatment decisions. One largely untested assumption of DA design is that patients should be encouraged to deliberate carefully about their options after being informed of those options. The purpose of the present research is to test the impact of deliberative versus intuitive decision strategies in medical decision contexts.Methods:In 3 experiments, participants were randomly assigned to make a hypothetical medical decision either intuitively, or using various deliberative strategies. In Study 1, we predicted that deliberation would improve decision confidence while not changing decisions. In Study 2, our aim was to establish whether the observed increase in confidence was due to decision-making effort, confirmation bias, or both. In Study 3, it was predicted that deliberation would cause participants to become more confident in suboptimal decisions.Results:Across 3 studies, participants who deliberated felt better about their decisions and decision process, even when the decision was the same as what would have been chosen intuitively (Studies 1 and 2), and even when the decision was normatively bad (Study 3). Study 2 additionally indicated that participants' confidence was driven by confirmation bias rather than effort justification.Conclusions:Deliberative tasks may often fail to be an effective debiasing tool, and components of patient decision aids that ask patients to deliberate may serve to improve how patients feel without improving the quality of their decisions.

The action-based model of dissonance theorizes that when individuals have conflicting cognitions with action implications , they experience dissonance. This dissonance motivates the individual to value one action tendency over the other, thereby facilitating effective action. Thus, a decrease in the motivation to act (decreased approach motivation) should decrease this tendency to value one action tendency over the other (dissonance reduction). The present research tested this prediction by using an embodied manipulation, a supine posture, to decrease approach motivation. In Experiment 1, relative to an upright posture, a supine posture decreased dissonance reduction in an effort justification paradigm. In Experiment 2, a supine posture decreased the spreading of alternatives following a difficult decision. These results suggest that embodied manipulations that reduce approach motivation decrease dissonance reduction. The findings support the action-based model of dissonance, and suggest that embodied manipulations of reduced approach motivation reduce the rationalization of behavior.

We elevate our constructions to a special status in our minds. This ‘IKEA’ effect leads us to believe that our creations are more valuable than items that are identical, but constructed by another. This series of studies utilises a developmental perspective to explore why this bias exists. Study 1 elucidates the ontogeny of the IKEA effect, demonstrating an emerging bias at age 5, corresponding with key developmental milestones in self-concept formation. Study 2 assesses the role of effort, revealing that the IKEA effect is not moderated by the amount of effort invested in the task in 5-to-6-year olds. Finally, Study 3 examines whether feelings of ownership moderate the IKEA effect, finding that ownership alone cannot explain why children value their creations more. Altogether, results from this study series are incompatible with existing theories of the IKEA bias. Instead, we propose a new framework to examine biases in decision making. Perhaps the IKEA effect reflects a link between our creations and our self-concept, emerging at age 5, leading us to value them more positively than others’ creations.

Justification of effort by humans is a form of reducing cognitive dissonance by enhancing the value of rewards when they are more difficult to obtain. Presumably, assigning greater value to rewards provides justification for the greater effort needed to obtain them. We have found such effects in adult humans and children with a highly controlled laboratory task. More importantly, under various conditions we have found similar effects in pigeons, animals not typically thought to need to justify their behavior to themselves or others. To account for these results, we have proposed a mechanism based on within-trial contrast between the end of the effort and the reinforcement (or the signal for reinforcement) that follows. This model predicts that any relatively aversive event can serve to enhance the value of the reward that follows it, simply through the contrast between those two events. In support of this general model, we have found this effect in pigeons when the prior event consists of: (a) more rather than less effort (pecking), (b) a long rather than a short delay, and (c) the absence of food rather than food. We also show that within-trial contrast can occur in the absence of relative delay reduction theory. Contrast of this kind may also play a role in other social psychological phenomena that have been interpreted in terms of cognitive dissonance.

In a landmark 1994 publication in the British Journal of Social Psychology, Jost and Banaji proposed the existence of a novel, fundamental system justification motive that drives social behaviors. More specifically, they proposed (a) that people have an epistemic need to support social hierarchies and societal systems, (b) that this system justification motive is inversely related to personal and group interests among members of low status groups, and (c) that it is stronger and more effective for people who arc disadvantaged by societal systems than for those who arc advantaged by them, especially when personal and group interests are weak. This system justification theory (SJT) has faced theoretical opposition from social identity researchers (e.g., Spears et al., 2001; Reicher, 2004; Rubin and lIewstone, 2004). In addition, evidence against the theory has recently accumulated from large scale cross-national studies (e.g., Brandt, 20:13; Kelemen et al., 2014) and experimental studies (frump and White, 2015; Owttarnalam et al., 2 0 16). In the present article, we re-examine the key cognitive dissonance assumptions for SJT 's central proposition that support for unequal systems should be higher among members of disadvantaged groups than among members of advantaged groups when personal and group interests are weak.

Theories concerning hatred in personal relationships lack empirical evidence. These two studies address the need to provide empirical information about how hate works in interpersonal, loving relationships. Effort justification theory (Aronson & Mills, 1959) suggests that past hate may have a beneficial function in relationships that remain together; however, if hate is a truly destructive motivation (Rempel & Burris, 2005), this hate may have a lasting irreconcilable impact on the quality of the relationship. By surveying people in both the United States and Norway about their personal loving relationships, we discovered that hatred leaves a lasting deleterious impression on interpersonal relationships. People are more likely to report less intimacy, satisfaction, and love with people they have previously hated. Furthermore, effort justification and cognitive dissonance, when measured as relationship length, was observed in the report of higher commitment to those previously hated. Future assessments of relationship quality should consider measuring hatred and length of relationship.

Building on the multidimensional framework of epistemic cognition proposed by Greene et al. (Educational Psychologist 43:142–160, 2008), this study examined beliefs about justification of knowledge claims in science among 65 Norwegian 10th graders. The first research question asked whether beliefs in personal justification, justification by authority, and justification by multiple sources differed in strength among the participants. It was found that the students most strongly believed in justification by authority, followed by justification by multiple sources and personal justification. The second research question asked whether the three types of justification beliefs differentially and uniquely predicted the comprehension of multiple conflicting documents on a science issue. In a multiple regression analysis with multiple-documents comprehension indicated by essay performance as the dependent variable, both personal justification and justification by multiple sources emerged as unique predictors when topic knowledge was controlled for. Specifically, beliefs in personal opinion as a means of justifying knowledge claims in science was negatively related to multiple-documents comprehension, whereas beliefs in justification through corroboration across multiple sources of information were positively related to multiple-documents comprehension. This study provides new evidence about relationships between epistemic beliefs and new literacy competencies needed in an information society, such as integrating across multiple conflicting sources of information; relationships that may also have practical implications.

If judiciously applied, cognitive terminology can encourage further examination of phenomena in useful ways that may not otherwise be studied. I give examples of 3 phenomena, the study of which have benefitted from a cognitive perspective. For the first, transitive inference behavior, it appears that noncognitive accounts cannot satisfactorily account for the effects that have been found. For the second, functional equivalence, positing the development of common representations has identified the possible nature of those representations. For the third, cognitive dissonance (or justification of effort), producing it in the laboratory with nonhuman animals suggests that a simpler mechanism, such as positive contrast, may be involved. If one approaches cognitive terminology with an open mind and conducts well-designed experiments that juxtapose cognitive accounts against simpler accounts, cognitive terminology can be the impetus for experiments that explore phenomena in novel, exciting, and useful ways and that ultimately have considerable heuristic value.

Affective processes are a key determinant of behaviour: At its simplest, liked stimuli are approached while disliked stimuli are avoided. Although assessing hedonic responses in nonverbal animals can be difficult, one relatively tractable approach relies on detailed analyses of rodents' consummatory behaviour. Rodents typically produce rhythmic sets of licks that can be grouped into clusters on the basis of the intervals between licks. The mean number of licks in a cluster (cluster size) is directly related to the concentration of palatable and unpalatable solutions. These relationships suggest that lick cluster size might be a useful index of an animal's hedonic reaction to the solution being consumed. I begin by reviewing studies of conditioned flavour preference and aversion that support the idea that lick cluster size can provide useful information about rats' hedonic reactions. I then describe how this methodology has been used to address previously intractable issues in the investigation of contrast effects as well as revealing an analogue of effort justification effects that, in humans, are commonly explained in terms of cognitive dissonance reduction. Finally, I consider how lick analysis might provide information about hedonic responses in animal models of human psychiatric disorders. In all these cases, how an animal did something was particularly informative about why it was doing it.

In a trans-paradigm theoretical synthesis of cognitive dissonance research, we examined theoretical variables (e.g., choice, consequences, etc.) and their relationships with dissonance effect sizes. We used structural equation analyses, performed within and across five research paradigms (induced compliance, insufficient justification, disconfirmed expectancies, selective exposure, and free choice), and corresponding to major versions of cognitive dissonance theory, to test several theoretically derived models. None of these models supported Festinger's notion that discomfort mediates dissonance effects. Consistent with conceptualisation of guilt as the drive component of dissonance theory, guilt strongly predicted dissonance effect sizes, virtually irrespective of which model was tested. A theory integrating the guilt and dissonance theories is stronger than either set of theories in isolation.

The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast.

Justification of effort by humans is a form of reducing cognitive dissonance by enhancing the value of rewards when they are more difficult to obtain. Presumably, assigning greater value to rewards provides justification for the greater effort needed to obtain them. We have found such effects in adult humans and children with a highly controlled laboratory task. More importantly, under various conditions we have found similar effects in pigeons, animals not typically thought to need to justify their behavior to themselves or others. To account for these results, I propose a simpler mechanism than justification of effort—a mechanism based on contrast between the end of the effort and the reinforcement (or signal for reinforcement) that follows. This model predicts that any relatively aversive event can serve to enhance the value of the reward that follows it simply through the contrast between those two events. In support of this general model, my colleagues and I have found this effect in pigeons when the prior event consists of (a) more rather than less effort (pecking), (b) a long rather than a short delay, and (c) the absence of food rather than food. We have also found that a pigeon’s preference for food at one location can shift toward a different location if acquiring food at the new location requires that the pigeon work harder to obtain the food. Contrast may also play a role in other social psychological phenomena that have been interpreted in terms of cognitive dissonance.

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the manipulation used by Cunha and Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings.

The negative impact of online gaming on adolescents has received much attention. The question of how to reduce their pathological use of online gaming is a critical issue. Based on the concept of external justification in dissonance theory, this experimental study aimed to examine whether severity of threat and justification of effort would impact adolescent players' attitude change toward online gaming and their subjective estimations of online gaming addiction. The results echoed predictions from classic studies in dissonance theory. When participants engaged in attitude-discrepant behavior, i.e., persuading other adolescents that an apparently interesting online game is not fun at all, their attitudes toward online gaming shifted more dramatically to the negative side in the context of a low level of threat rather than a high level of threat. Additionally, the magnitude of attitude change was more prominent when participants exerted more rather than less effort to engage in attitude-discrepant behavior. Moreover, a similar pattern of participants' evaluations of the likelihood of online gaming addiction was also observed. The findings show that dissonance theory has the potential to be useful for inducing adolescent players to disengage in online gaming.

Previous research suggests a barrier to conflict resolution whereby negotiators inflate their valuation for offers they make due to the psychological process of cognitive dissonance reduction. Research outside of the negotiation context indicates that cognitive dissonance is induced either by being forced to choose among relatively equal options, or by having to justify a counter-attitudinal position. A negotiation involves both choice and justification, so it is unclear which process is responsible for inducing preference inflation. We present two studies in which we examine the independent effect of choosing an opening offer, as well as the additive effect of justifying that choice on preference inflation. Findings suggest that both processes induce negotiator preference change and that justification has an additive effect beyond choice alone. We discuss implications of these results for cognitive dissonance theory and the practice of negotiation.

When behavior suggests that the value of a reinforcer depends inversely on the value of the events that precede or follow it, the behavior has been described as a contrast effect. Three major forms of contrast have been studied: incentive contrast, in which a downward (or upward) shift in the magnitude of reinforcement produces a relatively stronger downward (or upward) shift in the vigor of a response; anticipatory contrast, in which a forthcoming improvement in reinforcement results in a relative reduction in consummatory response; and behavioral contrast, in which a decrease in the probability of reinforcement in one component of a multiple schedule results in an increase in responding in an unchanged component of the schedule. Here we discuss a possible fourth kind of contrast that we call within-trial contrast because within a discrete trial, the relative value of an event has an inverse effect on the relative value of the reinforcer that follows. We show that greater effort, longer delay to reinforcement, or the absence of food all result in an increase in the preference for positive discriminative stimuli that follow (relative to less effort, shorter delay, or the presence of food). We further distinguish this within-trial contrast effect from the effects of delay reduction. A general model of this form of contrast is proposed in which the value of a primary or conditioned reinforcer depends on the change in value from the value of the event that precedes it.

When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.

Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (2000) reported that pigeons prefer discriminative stimuli that require greater effort (more pecks) to obtain over those that require less effort. In the present experiment, we examined two variables associated with this phenomenon. First, we asked whether delay of reinforcement, presumably a relatively aversive event similar to effort, would produce similar effects. Second, we asked whether the stimulus preference produced by a prior relatively aversive event depends on its anticipation. Anticipation of delay was accomplished by signaling its occurrence. Results indicated that delays can produce preferences similar to those produced by increased effort, but only if the delays are signaled.

We humans value intelligence because we tend to have more of it than other species. But the flexibility implied by intelligence is not as reliable as genetically predisposed behavior and is only valuable when environments change. Nevertheless, environments do change and many species do have the flexibility to adapt behaviorally to those changes either through simple Pavlovian or instrumental learning or through more complex cognitive mechanisms. For example, in addition to the absolute properties of stimuli, animals appear to be able to use the relation between stimuli to guide their behavior and they can also learn general principles of learning (learning how to learn). More interesting, perhaps, they can form stimulus classes of stimuli that have perceptually common characteristics (trees or water) and even classes of arbitrary stimuli that share a common meaning (stimulus equivalence). When it comes to memory, animals appear to have flexibility in remembering not only events that they have already experienced (retrospectively) but also events that they expect to experience (prospectively), and they appear to have some control over what they will and will not remember. Evidence suggests further that they have some representation of their environment, such that when necessary, they can take a novel pathway to get to a goal (cognitive mapping), and they have rudimentary numerical competence. Although their ability to reason may be limited, they do show transitive inference behavior, the ability to imitate actions that they cannot see when they perform them, and some animals are able to recognize themselves in a mirror. Interestingly, studying animal intelligence can also lead us to more critically examine the origins of what has been thought to be certain complex human behavior. For example, humans tend to value rewards more when they have to expend greater effort to obtain them (cognitive dissonance or justification of effort) but this tendency is also found in other animals and may more parsimoniously be explained as an example of contrast (between the effort expended and the reward obtained). Similarly, the suboptimal tendency that humans often have to choose alternatives that have a very low probability of a high payoff (commercial gambling) can be found in other animals and appears to result from a general tendency to discount losses and focus on the value of gains rather than their probability. Overall, it appears that other animals have (to some degree), many of the cognitive abilities of humans, while also suffering from some of the suboptimal behavior thought to be attributable to human culture.

This study tested the hypothesis that costs would be more effective than benefits in recruiting individuals for volunteer community service. College students listened to volunteer recruiting messages that emphasized benefits, or combined benefits and costs. Subsequently, took information sheets about volunteer activities and/or signed lists to receive phone calls from volunteer agencies. Students hearing the costs only message or the combined message signed more lists and took more information sheets than those who heard the benefits only message. Results were consistent with past research on overjustification and effort justification. Implications for volunteer recruitment are discussed.

According to system justification theory, people are motivated to defend and legitimize the social systems that affect them. In this chapter, we review 15 years of theory and empirical research demonstrating the motivational underpinnings of system justification processes. We begin by explaining why people are motivated to system justify (i.e., it serves social and psychological needs). We then describe five lines of evidence that corroborate the motivational postulate of system justification theory: (1) Individual differences in self-deception and ideological motivation are linked to system justification; (2) System threat elicits defensive responses on behalf of the system; (3) People engage in biased information-processing in favor of system-serving conclusions; (4) System justification processes exhibit properties of goal pursuit; and (5) The desire to legitimize the system inspires greater behavioral effort. We consider the implications of this motivational approach for understanding situations—including situations involving social conflict—that facilitate resistance to vs. support for social change.

The theory of cognitive dissonance and its major experimental paradigms are described in this article. When an individual holds two or more elements of knowledge that are relevant to each other but inconsistent with one another, a state of discomfort or dissonance is created. Organisms are motivated by the state of dissonance and they may engage in ‘psychological work’ to reduce the inconsistency. Revisions to the original theory and their supporting research are then described. The major theoretical revisions differ primarily in terms of the motivation they posit for causing dissonance reduction. The revisions are self-consistency, self-affirmation, new look, and action-based model.

Context: The principles behind the process of creating new, spontaneous sequences out of previously ordered non-declarative stimuli have been scarcely addressed and, for such reason, remain highly unknown. Objective: This paper has four interconnected goals:(1) Introduce a new software-based neuropsychological test that can be used as a means to assess key aspects of the way people order and reorder non-declarative stimuli, based upon cognitive dissonance principles; (2) introduce a mathematical approach to the latter in ordering/re-ordering of non-declarative stimuli;(3) assess whether the principles of cognitive dissonance in ordering/re-ordering hold for a cohort of young adults with upper socio-economic level;(4) access the extent to which the same holds for children and adolescents and trace a curve of maturation of cognitive dissonance in ordering/re-ordering. Methods: Our multi-age and multi-language social Network Test implies the two stages, first the subject must order figures of human faces in order of preference, next, the software provides him with different pairs of figures which the subject must fulfill in order to built the intermediate arrays that he believe to interconnect the original pair. Our mathematical model is centered around the relation defined by increases in the distance separating these different pairs of figures in the initial order (distances 1, 5 and 11) and related increases in the mean number of intermediate arrays placed in the re-ordering phase; 105 subjects were tested. Results: The tendency to produce reorders that are consonant to the one produced in the initial phase increases with age. This trend inspired us to propose a cognitive dissonance index in spontaneous ordering/reordering of non-declarative stimuli, which may formalize the operation of a previously unknown cognitive dimension of the human mind and may serve as an index of cognitive maturation. To the extent that further studies endorse these perspectives, the tests, formulas, and theoretical principals may support new diagnostic methods and explorations in cognitive science.

Pigeons prefer a positive discriminative (S+) stimulus that follows a less preferred event (a large number of required responses, a longer delay, or the absence of food) over a different S+ with a similar history of reinforcement that follows a more preferred event (a single required response, no delay, or food). We proposed that this phenomenon results from contrast (referred to as within-trial contrast) between the less preferred initial event and the signal for reinforcement. Delay reduction theory (Fantino, 1969) can account for these results by proposing that the less preferred initial event lengthens the duration of the trial, thereby allowing the S+ stimulus to occur later in the trial and thus become a better predictor of reinforcement. In the present experiments, we further explored this effect. In Experiment 1, we controlled for trial duration by using a fixed ratio response (30 pecks) as one initial event and the absence of pecking for the same duration as the other initial event (0 pecks). The pigeons showed a reliable preference for the positive stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event. In Experiment 2, we controlled for trial duration by using 30 pecks as one initial event and 1 peck followed by a delay that matched the duration of the preceding 30-peck trial. (Group Time Same). For Group Time Different, there was no delay following the 1-peck initial event. For Group Time Same, preference for the initial event negatively predicted the pigeons’ preference for the S+ stimulus that followed, supporting the contrast account. A somewhat greater preference for the discriminative stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event was found for Group Time Different suggesting that in addition to contrast, delay reduction also may play a small role. However, the greater initial-event preference found for Group Time Different suggests that contrast can account for the group difference as well.

Quattrone (1985) erasure explanation of the often-reported incongruity between internal states and behavior was tested and used to explain why, in previous studies of effort justification in psychotherapy, predicted behavioral effects have occured without evidence for corresponding changes in attitude. Speech-anxious subjects first engaged in a bogus therapy analogue procedure either high or low in effort. They then provided an extemporaneous speech. Attitude toward public speaking was assessed either before or (as in prior research) immediately after the speech. Replicating prior research, High (vs. Low) Effort subjects were able to speak significantly longer. But they reported more positive attitudes about public speaking only when the attitudinal assessment occurred before the speech. Consistent with an erasure explanation, post-speech (but not prespeech) attitude was positively correlated with evaluations of the just-completed speech. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for an effort justification analysis of therapy as well as for an understanding of the problem of incongruity between internal states and behavior.

Justification of effort is a form of cognitive dissonance in which the subjective value of an outcome is directly related to the effort that went into obtaining it. However, it is likely that in social contexts (such as the requirements for joining a group) an inference can be made (perhaps incorrectly) that an outcome that requires greater effort to obtain in fact has greater value. Here we present evidence that a cognitive dissonance effect can be found in children under conditions that offer better control for the social value of the outcome. This effect is quite similar to contrast effects that recently have been studied in animals. We suggest that contrast between the effort required to obtain the outcome and the outcome itself provides a more parsimonious account of this phenomenon and perhaps other related cognitive dissonance phenomena as well. Research will be needed to identify cognitive dissonance processes that are different from contrast effects of this kind. nt]mis|This research was facilitated by a fellowship from the Fulbright Scholar Program and the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, as well as by a visiting professorship at the University of Lille III for T.R.Z. Preparation of the article was facilitated by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 63726 to T.R.Z. 15;3

PMID: 18927058; International audience; Humans prefer (conditioned) rewards that follow greater effort (Aronson & Mills, 1959). This phenomenon can be interpreted as evidence for cognitive dissonance (or as justification of effort) but may also result from (1) the contrast between the relatively greater effort and the signal for reinforcement or (2) the delay reduction signaled by the conditioned reinforcer. In the present study, we examined the effect of prior force and prior time to produce stimuli associated with equal reinforcement. As expected, pressing with greater force or for a longer time was less preferred than pressing with less force or for a shorter time. However, participants preferred the conditioned reinforcer that followed greater force and more time. Furthermore, participants preferred a long duration with no force requirement over a shorter duration with a high force requirement and, consistent with the contrast account but not with the delay reduction account, they preferred the conditioned stimulus that followed the less preferred, shorter duration, high-force event. Within-trial contrast provides a more parsimonious account than justification of effort, and a more complete account than delay reduction.

We used European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, to investigate the relationship between the cost paid to obtain food rewards and preference between stimuli associated with the resulting rewards. In no-choice trials either 16 1-m flights (high effort) or four 1-m flights (low effort) gave access to differently coloured keys. Pecking at these keys resulted in identical food rewards. When subjects were given choices between the coloured keys in choice trials without having paid any effort, the majority preferred the coloured key that was paired with the higher level of work in no-choice trials. We relate our findings to results in animal behaviour, psychology and economics, and give a theoretical account that has implications for phenomena variously recognized as the 'sunk cost fallacy' (the tendency to invest more in something after much has already been invested), 'work ethics' (valuing an option more as a result of physical effort), 'cognitive dissonance' (making mental effort to overlook or re-evaluate information that does not accord with a dominant internal representation) and the 'Concorde Fallacy' (the readiness to forego more fitness for something that has been responsible for greater fitness compromise in the past). © 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.

Stimuli associated with less effort or with shorter delays to reinforcement are generally preferred over those associated with greater effort or longer delays to reinforcement. However, the opposite appears to be true of stimuli that follow greater effort or longer delays. In training, a simple simultaneous discrimination followed a single peck to an initial stimulus (S+FR1 S-FR1) and a different simple simultaneous discrimination followed 20 pecks to the initial stimulus (S+FR20 S-FR20). On test trials, pigeons preferred S+FR20 over S+FR1 and S-FR20 over S-FR1. These data support the view that the state of the animal immediately prior to presentation of the discrimination affects the value of the reinforcement that follows it. This contrast effect is analogous to effects that when they occur in humans have been attributed to more complex cognitive and social factors.

Improving the 1957 Version on Dissonance Theory A Radical Point of View on Dissonance Theory Toward an Understanding of the Motivation Underlying Dissonance Effects - Is the Production of Aversive Consequences Necessary? Dissonance, Hypocrisy and the Self Concept Self-Affirmation Theory - an Update and Appraisal Unwanted Consequences and the Self - In Search of the Motivation for Dissonance Reduction What Exactly Have I Done? the Role of Self-Attribute Accessibility in Dissonance A Self-Accountability Model of Dissonance Reduction - Multiple Modes on a Continuum of Elaboration Computer Simulation of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction A Multiplicative Power Function Model of Cognitive Dissonance - Toward an Integrated Theory of Cognition, Emotion and Behaviour After Leon Festinger Moving Beyond Attitude Change in the Study of Dissonance-Related Processes "Remembering" Dissonance - Simultaneous Accessibility of Inconsistent Elements Moderates Epistemic Discomfort Appendexes: Social Communication and Cognition Reflections on Cognitive Dissonance - 30 Years Later - Historical Note on Festinger's Tests on Dissonance Theory.

The justification of effort is the tendency for humans to justify the amount of work they have put into an achievement by increasing the perceived value of that achievement after the effort has been expended. A positive effect of effort on reward value has also been reported for pigeons and starlings. The present study examined the effects of different amounts of required physical and discriminative effort on primary reward value in rats. On each day of training, rats underwent one high-effort training session and one low-effort training session in an operant chamber to earn either a grape-flavored reward pellet or a bacon-flavored reward pellet. Half of the rats exerted high effort to earn the grape pellets and low effort to earn the bacon pellets, with the arrangement reversed for the other half. On each test trial, each rat had the opportunity to consume 3 pellets of each flavor at the choice point in a T-maze. Analysis indicated no significant difference between the frequency of high-effort flavor choices and low-effort flavor choices. A positive effect of effort on reward value was not demonstrated in this experiment.

When individuals expend effort for a task that turns out to be boring or trivial they often justify their effort by enhancing the ratings of the task. The present experiment attempted to differentiate between two explanations for this process of effort justification: dissonance and impression management. Subjects completed either a simple (low effort) or difficult (high effort) number-circling task for an experimenter who was either friendly and pleasant (high attractiveness) or rude and unpleasant (low attractiveness). Contrary to impression management theory, and as predicted by cognitive dissonance theory, effort justification occurred only in the presence of the unattractive experimenter.

The aim of this article is to highlight, 25 years on, the innovations of Festinger's theory of dissonance as regards its conception of cognitive functioning. Analysis of the dissonance ratio, on the basis of which Festinger evaluated the total amount of dissonance D/(D + C) gives rise to three propositions: (1) The total amount of dissonance is evaluated on the basis of a particular cognition G. (2) This cognition is neither the denominator, nor the numerator of the dissonance ratio; it is the cognitive expression of an effective conduct. (3) No presupposition is made concerning possible consonance or dissonance-relations between cognitions C and D. Thus reduction in dissonance is not presented as a process that always orients cognitive activity toward greater consistency, but as a rationalization of conduct which may adapt to an increase in certain inconsistencies, and even generate them. This new insight into Festinger's theory may be thought of as a new version that is quite distinct, both from earlier revisions of the theory, and from the various theories of cognitive consistency. It is hoped, moreover, that it will provoke reflection concerning the current orientatlons of cognitivism in social psychology.

Two therapy analog studies attempted to clarify previous ambiguities about whether cognitive dissonance reduction can contribute to improvement in psychotherapy. Study 1 tested whether manipulated therapy effort and personal responsibility for undertaking that effort, each of which has been shown separately to be important in producing behavior change, combine to produce improvement, as dissonance theory predicts. Snake phobics anticipated undertaking a procedure either high or low in effort; decision freedom for engaging in the effort was also varied (high vs low). Consistent with predictions, subjects tended to change their behavior most under high anticipated effort, but only when decision freedom was high. Study 2 was a partial conceptual replication that used a misattribution of arousal paradigm to distinguish dissonance from self-perception or other non-arousal-based explanations for change. Speech anxious subjects anticipated a procedure either high or low in effort and were either provided or not provided with an opportunity to misattribute dissonance arousal. Results indicated that High (vs Low) Anticipated Effort subjects were able to speak longer and tended to speak more fluently when faced with a noxious public speaking situation, but only when no misatribution opportunity had been provided. In both studies, improvement occurred mainly in behavior rather than in attitudes. Possible reasons for this, as well as the routes by which dissonance reduction might lead to improvement, were discussed.

The role of effort justification in psychotherapy was examined. It was hypothesized that the effort involved in therapy, plus the conscious decision to undergo that effort, leads to positive therapeutic changes through the reduction of cognitive dissonance. An experiment was conducted in which overweight subjects attempted to lose weight through one of two forms of “effort therapy”. These therapies were bogus in that they were based solely on the expenditure of effort on a series of cognitive tasks that were unrelated to any existing techniques or theory addressing weight loss. One of the therapies called for a high degree of effort while the degree of effort in the second therapy was low. A no-treatment control group was also included. It was predicted that greater weight loss would occur for high-effort than low-effort or control subjects, and that this weight loss would be maintained or increased over time. Results supported these predictions. Over an initial 3-week period, high-effort subjects lost slightly more weight than low-effort subjects or controls. A 6-month follow-up revealed that the effects of effort on weight loss had increased and were highly significant. Reliable differences remained even 1 year after the initial experimental sessions. Possible mechanisms mediating the dissonance effect were discussed, as were several alternative explanations.

In the research paradigm known as effort justification, people engage in an effortful activity in order to attain a goal. As a result, the goal becomes more attractive. Two experiments were conducted to test the notion that the effort justification sequence can account for the positive changes that result from psychotherapy. In the first experiment, subjects who were afraid to approach a snake underwent one of two types of effortful therapy. One was a modified form of an anxiety-producing therapy known as “implosive therapy”; the other was merely a set of physical exercises. It was reasoned, on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory, that the expenditure of effort would lead to a positive change in the ability to approach the snake but only under conditions of high decision freedom. Half of the subjects in each of the therapy conditions participated with high choice; the other half with low choice. Subjects' improvement in their approach to snakes was assessed. A main effect for decision freedom was predicted and found independently of the type of effort that subjects expended. A second experiment conceptually replicated the findings of the first experiment. Subjects who wanted to become more assertive participated in an effortful, physical exercise therapy or in a modified form of the standard treatment for fear of assertiveness. The results of the 2 × 2 factorial experiment again showed a main effect for decision freedom such that high choice subjects became more assertive. The findings were discussed in terms of dissonance and attribution theories as well as for implications for future consideration of psychotherapy.

Two experiments were conducted to test competing accounts of the distractionpersuasion relationship, thought disruption and effort justification, and also to show that the relationship is not limited to counterattitudinal communication. Experiment 1 varied distraction and employed two discrepant messages differing in how easy they were to counterargue. In accord with the thought disruption account, increasing distraction enhanced persuasion for a message that was readily counterarguable, but reduced persuasion for a message that was difficult to counterargue. The effort notion implied no interaction with message counterarguability. Experiment 2 again varied distraction but the two messages took a nondiscrepant position. One message elicited primarily favorable thoughts and the effect of distraction was to reduce the number of favorable thoughts generated; the other, less convincing message elicited primarily counterarguments, and the effect of distraction was to reduce counterarguments. A Message X Distraction interaction indicated that distraction tended to enhance persuasion for the counterarguable message but reduce persuasion for the message that elicited primarily favorable thoughts. The experiments together provided support for a principle having greater generality than the Festinger-Maccoby formulation: Distraction works by inhibiting the dominant cognitive response to persuasive communication and, therefore, it can result in either enhanced or reduced acceptance.

Three studies explored the relationship between the reward that individuals receive for engaging in an activity and the value that they subsequently place on that activity. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects engaged in an activity more when they had previously received a moderate amount of reward than when they had received either a small or a large reward. Experiment 3 indicated that the shape of this function was determined, in part, by the value the activity had before the reward was give. These results, coupled with those of previous studies in the effort justification paradigm, suggest that reward and cost can influence activity value similarly, through the operation of simple comparison processes as predicted by personal comparison theory. Implications for social judgment, associative, self-perception, and dissonance perspectives were discussed.

Wicklund, Cooper, and Linder (1967) presented evidence that anticipated effort prior to exposure to a counterattitudinal communication enhanced attitude change. Their results supported the dissonance prediction of a direct relation between perceived effort expenditure and task enhancement. However, their results are open to an alternative self-esteem interpretation, as are most experiments using attitude communications. In order to overcome this difficulty two experiments were conducted using a nonpersuasive task situation. In Experiment I Ss circled numbers according to high effort rules or low effort rules. Results showed greater task enhancement under high effort. Experiment II was conducted to rule out any alternatives associated with actual effort. Ss thought they would circle numbers or actually did circle numbers under either high or low effort. Results showed greater task enhancement in high effort conditions for both actual effort and anticipated effort. The results of the two experiments provided strong support for the effort justification hypothesis.

This epperiment represents an attempt to rule out a number of alternative explanations of an effect found in a previous experiment by Aronson and Mills. This effect, that the more a person suffers in order to obtain something, the greater will be the tendency for him to evaluate it positively, was predicted from dissonance theory. By modifying the original experiment in a number of ways, and applying additional treatment variations, these other hypotheses were effectively ruled out, thus lending considerable additional support to the original “suffering-leading-to-liking” hypothesis.