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Elementary theory predicts that the distribution of power will vary as the type of connection varies. Previous research supporting that prediction has shown that power in unilateral monopolies is centralized when the central position is connected exclusively and decentralized when the central position is connected inclusively. Here we extend the theory to networks with compound inclusion-exclusion connections. The theory predicts that exclusion will overwhelm inclusion and that power will be centralized as it is in purely exclusionary structures. Preliminary experimental support is offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the authors' opinion on the article Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational-Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization. Yamaguchi offers a new theory of power in social exchange networks, claiming empirical support superior to that of alternative theories. Internal contradictions are self-defeating to a theory and Yamaguchi's theory (Y's theory) has at least two. Yamaguchi fails to provide a model to specify the value of the coefficient of elasticity of substitution and this failure greatly broadens the range of potentially supportive results. In the computerized Iowa protocol, for instance, the partner offering the best deal is selected automatically which prevents any special commitments or costs of switching partners. However, several factors bias his presentation of the data and each factor reduces the apparent discrepancy between the prediction of Y's theory and the experimental data. Yamaguchi's model simply does not work when the data transformations are done correctly. In sum, contrary to Yamaguchi's claim predictions from his model are inconsistent with results from experimental studies of power in exchange networks.

We evaluate four theories that predict the distribution of power in exchange networks. All four theories--core theory, equidependence theory, exchange-resistance theory, and expected value theory--assume actors rationally pursue self-interests. Three of the theories add social psychological assumptions that place the pursuit of self interest in an interactive context. Predictions of exchange earnings by the four theories are evaluated against data from eight experimental networks, including types of networks not previously studied These networks vary conditions that affect the chances that a position can be excluded from exchange. We find that when the theories base predictions on a network position's structural potential for exclusion, exchange-resistance theory provides the best fit, but when predictions are based on actual experiences of exclusion, expected value theory fits best. Our discussion focuses on the distinction between the a priori potential for exclusion versus experienced exclusion as factors in the genesis of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a theory to explain how actors in social exchange networks reach agreements on division of resources. Social exchange theory grew. from the application of the economic theory of exchange to social relationships. Sociology focuses on a problematic area for economic theory, the exchange of valued objects in, relatively small groups, where actors seek to settle on one optimal outcome out of a range of possibilities. Central to theoretical development today is a class of networks in which subtle power differences occur. This phenomenon is known as weak power. In these weak power networks, some positions may have advantages over others in acquiring resources through exchange. However, unlike the advantages in strong power networks, advantages in weak power networks are not progressive. Over a series of exchanges, a strong power advantage eventually results in one, exchange partner receiving nearly all available resources. Weak power is limited in range and magnitude. This necessitates theoretical refinement because adequate assessment of power differences between positions in weak power structures requires more, precise predictions of exchange rates at equilibrium.

We extend network exchange theory (Markovsky, Wilier, and Patton 1988) to accommodate a new class of power phenomena. Previous theory and research have shown that structural configurations in some networks promote or inhibit exchange opportunities, leading to robust power and resource differentials. The extension identifies a structural basis for subtler forms of differentiation. Using computer simulations and laboratory experiments, we show that the degree to which this "weak power" is manifested in resource accumulations is conditioned by local and global network patterns, and by the experience and strategies of actors in the network. Experimental tests corroborate the predicted weak power effects and the consequences of variations in actors' negotiating experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]