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Original drawing of an oversized United States Army General Norman Schwarzkopf hitting an undersized Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein on the head.

Original drawing of a woman holding a child, wrapped in a blanket in the midst of a snowy mountain landscape. A small packet labeled "MRE" bounces off of her head.

Original drawing of a hand holding a peace-nik glove on stick, surrounded by rubble and smoke. Rocket trails are visible in the sky.

Original drawing of Israeli leader Yitzhak Shamir speaking to U.S. President George H.W. Bush. Bush reads a note that says, "I promise not to hit Saddam back and complicate your life - Shamir."

Original drawing of two men, one holding a U.S. History book, looking at a "I want YOU"/Uncle Sam-style recruitment poster of U.S. President George H.W. Bush. The poster depicts Bush as King George the Third of the United Kingdom, but holding a rifle

Original drawing of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein standing behind a large pipeline, looking on as a U.S. Army sergeant advises a servicemember of unknown origin and rank.

Original drawing of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein holding open the loading chamber of a large piece of artillery labeled "Hussein's Giant Moon-Shooter." U.S. President George H.W. Bush loads two missiles labeled "S. & L. Deficit" into the chamber

Original drawing of two United States Army Lieutenant Generals looking at a map of Libya. A large X on the map is labeled "Chemical Plant."

Examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war in Iraq.

The U.S. created and implemented the Marshall Plan out of necessity. Credited for saving Western Europe, the Marshall Plan assisted European Nations in recovering from the aftermath of WWII while preventing the Soviet Union from absorbing the entire continent. Implementation called for new organizations with experts in politics, agriculture, banking and others. Clear strategic objectives enabled unity of effort by DOS and the international community. In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq without a coordinated synchronized plan for construction operations. An ad hoc creation of an organization to oversee the program changed 3 times and each time it had new objectives, goals and vision. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq ignored the principles of the Marshall Plan. The Plan's basic framework allows for the implementation of reconstruction operations in today's complex environment, just as it did in 1947. The U.S. must consider the creation of a permanent office that follows the Marshall Plan's structural framework. The office executive serves as the central focal point to address all issues concerning nation building to ensure coordination and synchronization of all resources across the interagency.

Since 2001, the United States has led a multinational war on terrorism and expended significant blood and treasure replacing corrupt regimes with fragile, democratic institutions. Yet, in just a handful of years, deteriorating conditions in Iraq threatens to erode the hard-won gains achieved in the early days of the military campaign. Towards that end, the United States should renew efforts to resolve the underlying political problems in Iraq and Syria as part of its long-term strategy to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. Military operations should be conducted as part of a whole-of-government approach, but Coalition military action is just a supporting role to the more important diplomatic efforts. Absent new political frameworks, military action is irrelevant. Additionally, U.S. and Coalition efforts must be actively managed below the national policy level. The existing strategy, if nested within a larger diplomatic effort, balances risk and reward over the long-term and offers the greatest opportunity to succeed.

The formation of an Iraqi National Guard offers significant opportunity for improving Iraq's short and long-term security capabilities and presents a potential reconciliation tool for improving relations with Iraq's Sunni minority. Three case studies -- the use of tribal levies in Oman, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the U.S. Army National Guard -- provide important examples to inform the development of an effective and professional force. Building the Iraqi National Guard into a competent and professional force will require 1) the commitment of U.S. or western advisors over a long period, 2) a sustained commitment of resources, and 3) significant efforts to synchronize operations between the future Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Finally, while this is a positive measure, it must be accompanied by other reconciliation efforts to address the needs of the Sunni minority. Absent these measures, attempts to create an Iraqi National Guard force could be arming participants in a future Iraqi Civil War.

"In American history few foreign policy decisions have been as controversial as the Bush Administration's choice to invade Iraq in 2003. This decision had many supporters but it also had significant, forceful opposition from both domestic and international opponents. The intellectual under-pinning for the opposition largely came from the philosophical doctrine of Just War Theory and the international law it informed. Accepting that war itself is terribly destructive and should be avoided if possible, this theory holds that a nation s decision to go to war is nonetheless justified only if certain criteria are met. This paper briefly discusses the historical origins of Just War Theory, concisely reviews the tenets of Just War Theory as they stand today, and examines if the Bush Administration adhered to the Jus Ad Bellum tenets of Just War Theory prior to its decision to invade Iraq."--Abstract.

"This thesis examines the moral permissibility of First Sergeant John Hatley's decision to kill, and influence others to kill, four unarmed detainees near Baghdad in the spring of 2007. Ethics is an important topic for all members of the profession of arms. With the seemingly constant news reports of ethical indiscretions by U.S. Army Soldiers, many of them by senior U.S. Army leaders, the need for continued Professional Military Ethics (PME) dialogue within the ranks has become exceedingly clear. This thesis will strive to do more than simply understand what took place next to that Baghdad canal; it will evaluate and analyze the killings. The thesis attempts to answer the following questions: Did First Sergeant Hatley possess an inherent right to defend himself against threats of deadly force?, Was taking care of the detainees his only option for survival?, Could the detainees have been considered imminent threats?, and Was he morally justified in acting preemptively?"--Abstract.

"This thesis examines the usefulness of economic sanctions in the prevention of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Focusing on nuclear proliferation and utilizing the existing sanctions literature, this thesis examines three cases where sanctions played a role in U.S. policy. The cases are South Africa, Libya and Iraq, and the thesis’ findings demonstrate that sanctions are a useful nonproliferation tool. Further, this thesis delivers several insights into what factors ensure policy success when using economic coercion to convince countries to give up their WMD. Security assurances, for example, can be useful in using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. By contrast, threats of regime change can create disincentives for leadership to alter WMD-acquisition strategies. This is especially true when the U.S. Congress adds other conditions to WMD-specific sanctions. Inconsistencies in U.S. nonproliferation policy can also motivate states to acquire WMD, if countries believe Washington has turned a blind eye to an enemy’s WMD programs. This thesis takes these insights forward to examine the evolving sanctions regime against Iran’s nuclear program. It concludes that, without cautious adjustment to U.S. policy, these sanctions are likely to fail."--Abstract.

On the front of the coin is a service rifle enclosed in an oak-leaf wreath on a blue backing (the design for the U.S. Combat Infantryman Badge). Below that is a black cross within a circle (the symbol of the 33rd Infantry Division). On the top edge of the coin is the inscription, "2nd PLT A co 1/178th INF" and on the bottom edge is the inscription, "THE ROCK." The reverse side has an image of the country of Iraq in red, white, and black. Near it is the inscription, "OIF 06-08." Along the top and bottom edges are the inscriptions, "SPRING BREAK IRAQ," and, "WHILE YOU WERE CHILLIN WE WERE KILLIN."

"One of the most important questions in military suicide research at this time is whether deployment in support of Operations Iraqi or Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) is associated with an increased risk of suicide. The equivocal research conducted to date on this topic creates a confusing picture for military senior leaders and the American public. The Report of the Blue Ribbon Workgroup on Suicide Prevention in the Veteran Population (Peake, 2008) reviewed this body of literature and concluded that significant limitations and biases in many of the epidemiological approaches conducted to date contribute to the current confusion. The funded study is specifically designed to address many of the recommendations of that report in order to generate seminal results that will fill what is arguably the most important gap in the epidemiological study of military suicide. This collaborative DoD-VA study will utilize multiple enterprise level databases to determine whether a history of deployment in support of OIF/OEF is a risk factor for suicide. In addition, the proposed study will examine the suicide rates of post-deployed National Guard members and Reservists to determine whether these cohorts are at increased risk of suicide. Furthermore, it will examine rates of deaths of undetermined intent in military and civilian populations to determine whether potential misclassifications of deaths may confound military and civilian comparisons of suicide rates. In examining these suicide rates, the funded study will also specifically account for the potential confounding effect of service members who have not completed a full term of service e..g., because of misconduct, substance abuse, etc.) and thus may be more likely to have risk factors for suicide."--Introduction.

A report containing the full results of Office of the Inspector General's review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, which focused on whether FBI agents witnessed or reported detainee abuse in military zones, and how those reports were handled.

"Refugee Crisis in America: Iraqis and Their Resettlement Experience" is the culmination of months of research by a team of Georgetown Law students. The students sought to determine the extent to which Iraqi refugees have been afforded protection and a durable solution through the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP). They conducted extensive interviews with refugees, policy makers, members of Congress, state refugee coordinators, and NGO's in Washington, D.C., Detroit, San Diego, and Amman, Jordan. Their findings include: 1) Iraqi refugees in Jordan lack basic legal protections; 2) Resettlement remains an imperfect, but important solution for Iraqi refugees; 3) The USRAP does not adequately promote the long-term self-sufficiency and integration of Iraqi refugees; and 4) The USRAP is compromised by a lack of strategic planning and coordination

Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through late 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons-learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a detailed chronological history of the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq, threading together a number of themes that presented themselves during the endeavor, including: 1) the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts 2) the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy 3) the turbulence engendered by persistent personnel turnover at every level 4) the waste wrought by inadequate contracting and contract management practices 5) the poor integration of interagency efforts bred by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort

"During the fall of 2005, units of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) were assigned responsibility for stability operations in Iraq's al-Anbar province and the Euphrates River Valley towns of Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit, and Haditha. The I MEF Marines were there to protect the Iraqi citizens against a complex mix of insurgent groups consisting of Saddam Hussein's former regime elements, foreign fighters traveling the Euphrates River Valley from Syria, and the Jordanian-born Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. A Rifle Company from Camp Pendleton operated from a Forward Operating Base (FOB) together with the other companies from their parent battalion."--Introduction, page 4.

To date, some 4,800 US Service members have been killed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and about 33,000 wounded. These military operations have also incurred substantial financial costs, including both direct budgetary costs and associated interest payments on the federal debt. These costs have grown dramatically over the past few years. In addition, some observers argue that as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States has incurred significant economic and social costs that go beyond, and may even exceed, the wars' budgetary costs. Along with the concerns over strategy and the size and duration of the US deployments in these operations (especially in Iraq), the Bush Administration has also been criticized because of the way in which it has budgeted for and financed these wars.

A report containing the full results of Office of the Inspector General's review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, which focused on whether FBI agents witnessed or reported detainee abuse in military zones, and how those reports were handled.

Defines the authority and responsibility for the accountability and operations of USG private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq.

This interview with Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus covers his command of Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2004 through September 2005, and deals specifically with the deployment of the 98th Division (Institutional Training) to Iraq and the evolving concept of the advisory effort. Right before assuming command of MNSTC-I, at the request of General John Abizaid, Petraeus and other soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division went to Iraq to assess the Iraqi security forces. They found very uneven quality among the forces, a general lack of necessary infrastructure, all sorts of equipment and logistical shortages, and no functional institutions to support them. Following this assessment, Petraeus received a briefing that proposed using one of the institutional training divisions to accomplish the training and advising mission which MNSTC-I was about to undertake. Based on MNSTC-I's joint manning document and request for forces, the 98th Division was identified as the first unit for the training and advisory mission. As Petraeus explains, "There was no active duty division sitting out there that hadn't been tapped at this point in time, so the expectation was that the forces were going to come out of the Reserve Component somewhere." He states that a primary challenge was establishing an ad hoc organization for the training and advisory effort, and the 98th constantly strived to match rank and expertise with requirements. Speaking of the reservists, Petraeus said, "We were just glad to get somebody over there to help us out - and the sooner the better. In some cases," he continued, "the 98th had talent that was just off the charts. For example, we had a comptroller who was an executive vice president with Goldman Sachs, the largest investment banking house in the world." He also added that, since most of the reservists were involved in institutional training and very few had seen combat, they were able to grow in experience along with their Iraqi units. Petraeus notes that the training advisors received before meeting their Iraqi charges continually changed over time, pointing to the Phoenix Academy as an example. Overall, Petraeus assesses the 98th's performance as, "Good. I think they should be justly proud of what they did," adding that, in many cases, it was not possible to distinguish Active from Reserve Component. To future commanders in similar circumstances, he recommends that they read all past lessons learned, learn about the culture in which they will operate and about how the country has worked and should work, and moreover learn a bit of the language. Petraeus closes the interview with praise for the reservists of the 98th.

In November 2004, a combined USMC, US Army, and Iraqi Army offensive succeeded in eliminating the enemy in Fallujah in a destructive urban battle. This paper focuses on the ways in which Army and Marine forces operated together in the second Battle of Fallujah. Among the many Army units that participated, Task Force 2-2 Infantry and Task Force 2-7 Cavalry spearheaded the attacks of two Marine regimental combat teams into and through the city. With access to first-person accounts and unit histories from both task forces, narrative describes their role in the battle from notification, to planning, and through the fighting to the conclusion of their role in the battle. Army? Marine interoperability is the theme around which this account is based. Well-educated and professional Army and Marine leaders at the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels overcame many ingrained cultural differences to synchronize operations. Areas in which the Army and Marines must continue to improve their ability to fight side by side is also addressed.

A report of recommendations for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the Middle East region from the Iraq Study Group. Group members were James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamiltion, co-chairs; Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson.

U.S. forces have now been deployed in Iraq for over three years. During this time, tens of thousands of Iraqis have been arrested, detained, and interrogated by U.S. personnel. Many of the detainees--held at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or at central detention centers such as Abu Ghraib prison, Camp Cropper, and Camp Bucca--have been interrogated by personnel from U.S. Military Intelligence (MI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). While some detainees have been insurgents, others have been innocent civilians caught up in U.S. military operations, in the wrong place at the wrong time. There is mounting evidence to show that many detainees have been abused. The Abu Ghraib scandal, which broke in April 2004, brought the issue of detainee abuse to the world's attention, but it is now clear that the scope of the problem is far broader than was known at the time. Since 2003, Human Rights Watch has reviewed hundreds of credible allegations of serious mistreatment and torture of detainees in U.S. custody. Alleged abuses have taken place in locations all over Iraq, in both FOBs and centralized facilities, and have involved CIA agents, military interrogators, MP guards, and ordinary combat soldiers. Abuses have also been alleged in detention facilities in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, where smaller numbers of detainees are held. In many cases, it has taken years for abuses to come to light. This report is based largely on firsthand accounts by U.S. military personnel stationed in Iraq, and describes abuses that took place in three separate locations in Iraq in 2003-2005. Many of the accounts are from soldiers who witnessed and in some cases participated in the abuses. First, the report discusses incidents involving a special military and CIA task force based at Camp Nama, near Baghdad, in 2003-2004, and near Balad in 2004-2005. Second, the report describes abuses in 2003-2004 at a Forward Operating Base on the Syrian border, called FOB Tiger. Third, the report details abuses in 2004 at detention facilities at the Mosul airport. The military's own investigations and reports by journalists and other observers support many of the accounts, and provide further details from soldiers about abuses at these facilities, including abuses in 2005.

The coercive methods approved by senior U.S. officials and widely employed over the last three years include tactics that the United States has repeatedly condemned as barbarity and torture when practiced by others. Even the U.S. Army field manual condemns some of these methods as torture. Although much relevant evidence remains secret, a series of revelations over the past twelve months, brought together here, already makes a compelling case for a thorough, genuinely independent investigation of what top officials did, what they knew, and how they responded when they became aware of the widespread nature of the abuses.

"The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining."--[Preface].

Captain Drew Larson served with the 82nd Medical Company in the U.S. Army during two tours of duty in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. He co-piloted a Black Hawk military helicopter air ambulance. Captain Larson is pictured here in a sleep tent in Kuwait.

Captain Drew Larson served with the 82nd Medical Company in the U.S. Army during two tours of duty in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. He co-piloted a Black Hawk military helicopter air ambulance. Captain Larson is pictured here in the cockpit of his Black Hawk helicopter.