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The article focuses on durable success in the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and challenges to that vision in both competition and consumer protection. It mentions paternalism in consumer protection and populism in antitrust and economic cult based in the University of Chicago somehow dominates FTC thinking particularly in antitrust. It also mentions misuse of courts and governmental agencies is a particularly effective means of delaying or stifling competition.

The article focuses on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1975, particularly Section 13(b) regarding redress. Topics include jurisdiction under the Act, how the FTC can compel compliance, and the prosecution of fraud. Information is provided on the legislative history of the Act and the powers of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

The article discusses the 1930 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case United States v. Standard Oil of California in relation to government policies, politics, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as of March 2012. The formation of the U.S. Oil and Gas Price Fraud Working Group is addressed, along with investigations into allegations of anticompetitive conduct. FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch is mentioned, along with Section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act and consumer welfare.

The article offers brief information on the benefits and potential costs of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-style regulation in protecting the consumers.

In a concurrently published comment in this journal, Professor Wright mischaracterizes both the legal basis and the factual context of the FTC's Three Tenors opinion, recently affirmed by Judge Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Neither opinion relies on the timing of the moratorium agreement. Under either opinion, the agreement to eliminate advertising and price competition would have been proscribed even had it occurred at the formation of the joint venture. Moreover, the factual underpinnings of the case differ from Professor Wright's assertions. In particular, the facts demonstrate that the joint venture did not attempt to promote the combination of various Three Tenors (3T) products. The only coordination with the first two albums was a restriction on their discounting and advertising. In fact, there was none of the usual production, distribution, and promotion among these three albums that is normally associated with an integrated effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses Robert Pitofsky's role as one of the key founding fathers of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Recognition that consumer welfare is the agency's reason for being; Pitofsky's achievements as director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection; Market-based approach to the regulation of advertising; Application of consumer protection principles to the Internet.

Argues that the position of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on monopolization law is wrong. Role of experience in antitrust law in truncated analysis; Factual problems with the agency's analysis on so-called relational contracts and history of monopolization cases; Sample of cases regarding relational contracts.

Discusses the United States Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) decision in the 1988 Massachusetts Board of Registration of Optometry in relation to antitrust law and the rule of reason. Information on the Massachusetts Board existence in antitrust law; Description of the economics of legal rule making; Criticism of the approach used by the FTC in the Massachusetts Board case; Views on the launch of the Joint Venture Project by the FTC.