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Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças, Startup firms and firms with larger proportion of intangible assets have a tendency for higher levels of information asymmetry. Valuing these firms can be challenging when they decide to perform an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and investors usually react adversely to equity offers issued by companies with larger information asymmetries. Taking this into account, venture capitalists can provide value whenever securities are being issued in capital markets and these investors can have an important role in diminishing the information asymmetry of the firms they support. Considering this, it is expected that firms with lower information asymmetries, have lower surprises around earnings announcements and consequently lower stock price reaction and lower trading volume around this event. Using a sample of 1759 firms from United States of America between 2005 and 2020, I formulate several hypotheses based on stock price and trading volume reactions to earnings announcements. Regarding the hypothesis that firms backed by venture capitalists have lower stock price reactions to earnings announcements in the years following the IPO and the hypothesis that trading volume around earnings announcements is smaller for firms backed by venture capitalists, my findings are inconclusive. Considering stock price reactions to earnings announcements in the years following the IPO and the change in trading volume for venture capitalists with higher reputation, no significant conclusions are obtained. This research contributes to the existing literature of venture capitalists and information asymmetries, and it provides insights to analyze how different venture capitalists affect information asymmetries, since they differ in several aspects., Empresas startup e empresas com grandes proporções de ativos intangíveis têm uma tendência para maiores níveis de assimetria de informação. Avaliar estas empresas para as tornar públicas nos mercados financeiros pode ser desafiante e os investidores normalmente reagem adversamente a ofertas de capital emitidas por empresas com grandes assimetrias de informação. Desta forma, os capitalistas de risco podem adicionar valor quando ativos financeiros são emitidos nos mercados de capitais e estes investidores podem ter um papel determinante em diminuir as assimetrias de informação das empresas que apoiam. Assim sendo, espera-se que as empresas com menores assimetrias de informação tenham menores surpresas em torno dos anúncios de lucros, e consequentemente menor reação dos preços das ações e menor volume de transações à volta deste evento. Neste estudo uso uma amostra de 1759 empresas dos Estados Unidos da América entre 2005 e 2020, sendo que formulo várias hipóteses baseadas na reação dos preços das ações e do volume de transações aos anúncios de lucros. Relativamente à hipótese de que as empresas apoiadas por capitalistas de risco têm menores reações dos preços das ações aos anúncios de lucros nos anos após a oferta pública inicial (IPO) e à hipótese de que o volume de transações em torno dos anúncios de lucros é menor para as empresas apoiadas por capitalistas de risco, os resultados obtidos são inconclusivos. Considerando a reação do preço das ações aos anúncios de lucros nos anos após a IPO e as alterações no volume de transações nos mercados financeiros para os capitalistas de risco com reputação mais elevada, não foram obtidas conclusões significantes. Este estudo contribui para a literatura existente acerca de capitalistas de risco e assimetrias de informação. Fornece ainda indicações para analisar como diferentes tipos de capitalistas de risco afetam as assimetrias de informação, uma vez que estes investidores diferem em diversos aspetos.

Entrepreneurial finance is a distinctive aspect of corporate finance, notably with respect to informational asymmetries and investor involvement in portfolio companies. Entrepreneurial finance research has explored four levels of analysis: the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial firm, the organization providing finance to the entrepreneurs, the organizations providing funds to these organizations, and the region or country in which the entrepreneurial firms or investors are established. We discuss recent developments in forms of entrepreneurial finance. We summarize the contributions of the papers published in this issue on entrepreneurial finance at different points in the life cycle, including work on trade credit, debt finance, micro-cap IPOs, venture capital, and angel finance. Also, we highlight avenues for future research focusing on funding gaps, accelerators, crowdfunding, secondary buyouts, boards, and exits.

This essay examines the implications of the evolving environment for the formation and financing new firms. "Unicorn" became an emblem of the newly founded firm that had rapidly grown to a value of a billion or more US dollars. However, there has been a downside, and new dilemmas, with rapidly expanding firms slipping away and like a Cheshire cat, leaving only a smile. After the dot.com crash of 2000, there was a regime change in new firm formation and the number of firms that exited through an initial public stock offering. This change was made possible by the decreased cost, increased speed, and ease of market entry due to availability of open source software, digital platforms, and cloud computing. This facilitated a proliferation of startups seeking to disrupt incumbent firms in a wide variety of business sectors. The eased market entry was accompanied by a growth in the number of private funding sources that now includes crowd-funding websites, angels, accelerators, micro-venture capitalists, traditional venture capitalists, and lately even mutual, sovereign wealth, and private equity funds - all willing to advance capital to young unlisted firms. The result has been the massive growth in the number of venture capital-backed private firms termed "unicorns" that have market capitalizations of over $1 billion. The ease of new firm formation and the enormous amount of capital available has resulted in to a situation within which new firms can afford to run massive losses for long periods in an effort to dislodge incumbents or attempt to triumph over other lavishly funded startups. The result has been remarkable turmoil in many formerly stable industrial sectors, as the new entrants fueled by capital investments undercut incumbents on price. Because the new firms intending to disrupt existing firms are venture capital-finance, they can afford to operate at a loss with the goal of eventually triumphing. Existing firms competing with the disruptors must be profitable to survive, while the disruptors need only keep their investors, the ultimate result is that those firms with access to capital are likely survive and displace earlier firms and, thereby, change their respective industrial ecosystems.

International audience; We overview the papers of this special issue of the Journal of Corporate Finance and explain how they fit within the different segments of the entrepreneurial finance literature, including equity crowdfunding, angel investors, debt, venture capital, and private equity. We point to the growing importance of different sources of capital for entrepreneurs and emerging research trends pertinent to academics, practitioners, and policymakers. We explain common questions and suggest scope in future work for combining segments.

Entrepreneurial finance literature is largely segmented. Different streams of the academic literature between entrepreneurship and finance have become segmented for reasons of theoretical tractability and data availability. In this paper, we discuss the origins and the effects of segmentation by source of financing, by data source, by field, and by country under investigation. We provide a number of examples, mainly from studies on Venture Capital, Initial Public Offerings, and Crowdfunding. We conclude with future research directions, with the hope to help de-segmenting research on entrepreneurial finance.

Governments around the world have set up governmental venture capital (GVC) funds, and are increasingly doing so, with the aims of fostering the development of a private venture capital industry and to alleviate the equity capital gap of young innovative firms. The rationale and the appropriateness of these programs is controversial. In this paper, we borrow from the recent literature on entrepreneurial finance to document the evolution and to compare the effects of the different types of governmental support. In contrast with a lack of success in some countries, there have been successful GVC initiatives, such as the Australian Innovation Investment Fund. Consequently, the proper design of the investment processes of GVC funds is an urgent topic for scholars and policy makers.

We survey the literature on venture capital and institutions and present a case study comparing the development of the venture capital market in the United States and Sweden. Our literature survey underscores that the legal environment, financial market development, the tax system, labor market regulations, and public spending on research and development correlate with venture capital activities across countries. Our case study suggests these institutional differences led to the later development of an active venture capital market in Sweden compared with the United States. In particular, a later development of financial markets and a heavier tax burden for entrepreneurs have played a key role. Copyright 2013 The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC., Oxford University Press.

We survey the literature on venture capital and institutions and present a case study comparing the development of the venture capital market in the US to Sweden. Our literature survey underscores that the legal environment, financial market development, the tax system, labor market regulations, and public spending on research and development correlates with venture capital activities across countries. Our case study suggests these institutional differences led to the later development of an active venture capital market in Sweden compared to the US. In particular, a later development of financial markets and a heavier tax burden for entrepreneurs have played a key role.

This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.

This study analyses the role of private equity investors in solving asymmetric information problems and the relationship to underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going public. According to certification theory, companies backed by private equity investors are expected to have lower underpricing at the moment of an initial public offering, as they have fewer adverse selection problems, and there is less ex-ante uncertainty. However, the relationship between private equity backing and the cost of going public to issuers is less clear. We use a data set of 66 private equity-backed and 94 non-private equity-backed companies that went public on the Milan Stock Exchange between January 1998 and June 2008. Our findings provide evidence that out of the PE-backed firms, only those backed by private equity syndication show lower initial-day returns and indirect issuance opportunity cost, while there is no difference in the certification role between bank-related and non bank-related private equity investors. We also find that the benefits persist for IPOs backed by private equity syndication, although to a lesser extent, even after adjusting for direct costs (gross spreads) the opportunity cost of issuance.

This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.

This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.

This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.

This survey reviews the growing body of academic work on venture capital. It lays out the major data sources used. It examines the work on venture capital investments in companies, looking at issues of selection, contracting, post-investment services and exits. The survey considers recent work on organizational structures of venture capital firms, and the relationship between general and limited partners. It discusses the work on the returns to venture capital investments. It also examines public policies, and the role of venture capital in the economy at large.

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing.The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options.We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marche of France.We find that the high underpricing in these two markets contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders selling behaviour.However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares.In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing.For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany.We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing. The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options. We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marché of France. We find that the high underpricing in these two markets - contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders' selling behaviour. However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares. In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing. For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany. We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.

The idea that network structure and embeddedness affect firms’ competitive behavior and performance is not new both in network literature and in strategic management literature. This study recognizes that the possibility to fully exploit network opportunities is depending on firm specialization choices. By analyzing network embeddedness within the European investment banking industry, I find that banks enhance performance by having a central position in their network and that specialization reduces bank’s benefits of having a central position in the network.

Are private equity investors able to reduce the overall costs of going public? This hypothesis was tested, for the Italian market, on a sample of 155 Ipos (54 Vb and 101 Nvb) during the period 1999-2007. For each company we estimated the direct and indirect costs of listing. The main results are consistent with the hypothesis because total costs of going public are lower for Vb compared to Nvb.

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing. The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options. We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marché of France. We find that the high underpricing in these two markets - contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders' selling behaviour. However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares. In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing. For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany. We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing.The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options.We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marche of France.We find that the high underpricing in these two markets contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders selling behaviour.However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares.In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing.For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany.We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing.The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options.We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marche of France.We find that the high underpricing in these two markets contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders selling behaviour.However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares.In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing.For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany.We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.