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In this paper, we aim to document and analyze the long arc of connectivity between China and Latin America. First, using analytical international trade and economic tools, we provide a new economic perspective of the First Globalization–-the Ming and early Qing China's economic and business links with Latin America and Europe. Second, due to U.S. government trade policies toward China in the 1990s, the Second China's Globalization was ushered in with its entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO). During this second phase, China exchanged manufactured goods with minerals and resources from Latin America. Finally, the tough technology and trade stance by the Trump and Biden Administrations prompted China to intensify the third phase of China interaction with Latin America. For the 2020s and beyond, one important pillar of the Third China-Latin America-Europe Globalization is heightened efforts for China to increase its digital-AI, telecommunication and platform business presence and access into the Latin American markets. To enrich our analysis, we will provide Chinese-style digital-AI business and economic models to help illustrate our discussions. Throughout our paper, we want to point out that government policies were instrumental in bringing forth these Three Globalizations that involve China-Latin America-Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Investors' perceptions of uncertainty have increased since Donald Trump's inauguration, primarily as a result of trade frictions. In the context of China-US trade frictions, this study investigates the joint effects of the actions of the parties and media tone on the Chinese stock market. The trade friction reports are classified into 12 groups based on two dimensions, that is, the actions of the parties and the tone of the state-controlled media. The result shows that the role played by the state-controlled media depends on the actions taken by both the parties, as well as the type of firms. Specifically, when the US took action, either launched attacks or made concessions, adopting a high tone played some role in boosting returns and curbing fluctuations; adjusting reporting strategies also played some role in elevating the liquidity of both types of firms and influencing domestic southbound investments. Market reactions were more influenced by the actions than the official attitudes when China made concessions or when both sides took action (attacks or concessions). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inception of the open-door policy in 1978, China has progressively become more integrated into the global economy through trade, foreign direct investment, and, more recently, outward direct investment. This economic integration has gained momentum with initiatives like the 'Go Global' strategy, China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. China's economic ascent, coupled with its increasing political influence and military power, prompted the United States (US) to initiate a strategy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region, starting with the Bush administration and continuing through the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. During the Trump administration, this rebalancing strategy was supported by decoupling strategy, ultimately leading to a trade war with China. Despite its intention to avoid the initiation of a new Cold War and to adopt a more moderate stance towards China, the US-China trade war has evolved further into a tech war under the Biden administration. Given this context, this article aims to outline the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China during the Biden administration, comparing it to the Trump administration and assessing its impact on both nations. The central argument of this article is that the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China under Biden administration are rebalancing and decoupling, carried over from the policies of the preceding Trump administration, and there are clear signs that these characteristics are deepening. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the extensive decoupling measures enacted by the US have proven effective in diminishing China's role in global industrial and supply chains, particularly in industries related to semiconductors and chipmaking equipment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Tikrit University for Humanities is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of China Tourism Research is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The United States former President Donald Trump announced in July 2018 that the United States had imposed tariffs on specific Chinese goods. This led to increased tensions between the two countries and eventually set the ground for the US-China trade war, as both nations contributed fairly to the rise in import duties on one another's goods. The strife has had serious knock-on effects on global trade. According to the chief economist of the Asian Development Bank, China is expected to lose 0.5% of its Gross Domestic Product, while the United States will lose less than the above-mentioned percentage. The US-China trade war serves as a benchmark for examining the outcomes of conflicts between two major nations of this scale. The objective of this research article is: to analyze war from the perspective of the realistic theory in international relations; to shed light on and identify the opportunities for developing economies to seize a substantial share of United States imports; possible scenarios for developing and struggling economies in case this war prolongs and how much it has impacted the protagonists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Finance Letters / Maliye Finans Yazıları Dergisi is the property of Maliye Finans Yazilari Yayimcilik Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper departs from the Trump administration's main trade policy objective, i.e. to reduce the US trade deficit, which it considered to be harmful to the US economy. The main means for doing so has been to increase in import tariffs, despite most economists' view that a country's trade balance is driven by macroeconomic factors such as savings and investment rather than by trade policy. The paper reviews the various steps taken in the US trade dispute(s), primarily with China, including steps towards de-escalation in the final year of the Trump presidency. It then assesses the economic impact of the US trade dispute with China and the Phase One Deal, using computable general equilibrium (CGE) techniques. Importantly, it does so by updating the database to reflect the consequences of the shale gas revolution on US energy production and trade. Results are presented not only for the USA and China, but also on their trade with third countries by broad product category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence on the effects of US and Chinese trade policies on the 2020 US presidential election. In response to a series of US tariffs imposed on Chinese goods, China imposed retaliatory tariffs, especially on US agricultural products, which largely affected Republican‐leaning counties. The US government then subsidized US farmers by providing direct payments through the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) to mitigate the Chinese retaliatory tariffs. Using the universe of actual county‐level MFP disbursement data, we document that MFP payments relative to the Chinese retaliatory tariff exposure were higher in solidly Republican counties, implying that the Trump administration allocated rents in exchange for political patronage. We also find that MFP payments outweighed the estimated impact of Chinese retaliatory tariffs and led to an increase in the Republican vote share in the 2020 presidential election. Finally, we uncover evidence that China's retaliatory trade policy and the corresponding US agricultural policy exacerbated political polarization in the US, especially the rural–urban divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the breakout of COVID-19, people debated whether the Trump administration or foreign countries (e.g., China and some European countries) were responsible for the global pandemic. The aim of the current study was to examine, based on attribution theory, why people blamed different actors and showed hostility toward them during the pandemic. Scholars have found that information obtained during a crisis could lead people to blame specific targets and that this blame attribution could influence people to show hostility toward those targets. We explored these relationships and tested the moderating roles of political orientation and collective efficacy. Using online survey data, we found that the more people use social media to obtain information, the more they blamed the federal government. Moreover, blaming the federal government positively related to hostility toward the federal government, and we found a stronger association between blame attribution and hostility toward the federal government among individuals with low collective efficacy. However, we found no significant relationship between social media use and hostility toward foreign countries nor any moderating role of political orientation. We found that the positive association between blaming foreign countries and hostility toward them was stronger among individuals with high collective efficacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We contend that the Trump administration mainstreamed far-right politics through its foreign policy on China, the World Health Organization and its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Our Gramscian-Kautskyian theoretical perspective concentrates on elite power, class, and interconnections between advanced global capitalism and domestic inequality. We show that the administration amplified US far-right Sinophobia even as it deepened connections between US and Chinese corporate elites. Its foreign policy strategy attempted to appease transnational capitalist objectives through 'ultra-imperialism' and draw on far-right ideas to shore up its domestic support base. But the administration, much like previous ones, attempted to make China a subordinate 'responsible stakeholder' through integrating and pressuring it in the Liberal International Order. The Gramscian-Kautskyian approach highlights that Sino–US relations are a mix of security and economic competition and interdependency. Over all, we argue that the Trump administration was not such a threat to the establishment as commonly contended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of EurAmerica is the property of EurAmerica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Challenging visions of the US national security "Establishment" as either hamstrung by ideological homogeneity bordering on groupthink, or riven by irreconcilable party political divisions, we deploy multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to uncover empirically the structure of the China segment of the US national security community. MCA—a form of geometric data analysis—finds latent structures in categorical datasets. Using an original dataset of organizations with a strong presence on China issues, we show that the China organizational field is far from homogenous, but is split less between left and right than over degree of political engagement, separating older think tanks and cultural organizations from business-focused research and consulting firms, and academic/research institutions outside from politically oriented groups located primarily within the Beltway. We explore our findings using the Trump and Obama administrations' choice of locations to give speeches and remarks on US–China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the changing role of China in the international human rights order. Topics discussed include the dispute between the U.S. and China and the decision of the administration for former U.S. President Donald Trump to withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the significant improvement in Chinese engagement with international human rights law, and the Western perspective on the sovereigntist approach of China to the human rights order.

This article examines the reasons underlying the re-emergence of the Quad in 2017 and the areas of convergence and divergence between U.S. and Indian views of it especially during the Trump administration. While doing so, it makes the following arguments. First, the current iteration of the Quad emerged because of changing threat perception regarding China among all four Quad countries. Second, President Trump's hard line, bordering on adversarial, position vis-à-vis China was positively received by other members of the Quad and encouraged them to shed their inhibitions. In addition, Trump's delegative style of leadership on the Quad allowed senior and mid-level officials to creatively engage with the other powers. Third, all this notwithstanding, there were still significant divergences, stemming from strategic and diplomatic worldviews, between the perspectives of the Quad countries on the future direction and purpose of the grouping. Put another way, the Quad will always be a work in progress because of the divergences between its member states and its inherently flexible design. The article concludes by analysing the prospects for the Quad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the convergence and divergence between India and the US pertaining to China under the Trump administration. Given Trump's forceful personality and apparent chemistry with Modi, it is tempting to attribute bilateral relations to individual leaders. However, systemic pressures due to shared concerns over China's rise and aggressive behavior played a significant role in keeping relations on track and ultimately deepening them. This led to increasing Indo-US cooperation in the Quad especially after the Galwan Valley cash in June 2020 although India initially feared entrapment. While there was convergence on the broad contours of the threat of a Sino-centric Asia, coming to agreement on specific strategies to prevent it faced its share of challenges with Trump wanting New Delhi to do more to counter China and do it faster. There was also divergence related to India's continuing attachment to strategic autonomy underwritten by a multipolar world order, and Indian and American definitions of the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific and how the priority areas of each differed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Comparative Economic Research is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A multimodal critical discourse analysis of The New York Times and China Daily 's news reports of Covid-19 was conducted to identify the ideologies in Covid-19 news reports. The Covid-19 pandemic was divided into three phases: China's anti-pandemic phase, first global outbreak, and second global outbreak. The NYT and CD's Covid-19 news reports not only conveyed facts but also served different ideologies which shifted over each phase. Both the NYT and CD news media employed lexical devices, images, and metaphors to convey different ideologies, shaping people's perceptions of the pandemic and government measures to control it. The NYT's Covid-19 reporting implied that China's pandemic measures were irrational and extreme, and that the Trump administration's policies during the outbreak were ineffective, while feminism and racism also appeared. CD's news reports of the pandemic portrayed efficiency by the Chinese government's in controlling Covid-19 and a positive attitude toward government officials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On August 6, 2020, then U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order banning WeChat, the most popular social messaging app in China and the fifth most popular in the world. The President evoked national security as the justification for the ban. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising U.S.-China tensions, the public perceived the President's targeting of WeChat--particularly by a politician known for his reliance on social media--as a racialized and politically motivated attack. This Article examines the successful legal mobilization predominantly initiated by five otherwise obscure immigrant and transnational Chinese lawyers in the United States to oppose the WeChat ban. Asian Americans are commonly regarded as model minorities who overcome racial obstacles through hard work and strong families, not through political protest. The Chinese immigrant and transnational lawyers who mobilized against the WeChat ban espoused diverse political beliefs. Yet they developed a sophisticated and coordinated multi-level strategy to claim the protection of their rights. Through oral histories and the analysis of media and legal documents, we examine this unprecedented legal mobilization effort through three sets of issues. First, the WeChat defenders did not have access to the resources of an established civil rights organization. Instead, they relied on the social networks that WeChat fostered in the digital public sphere. Second, this set of actors can be characterized as being both "weak" and "strong" in their access and knowledge of legal political culture, particularly as they experienced political and gendered attacks from within their own ethnic community. Third, the WeChat defenders challenged the model minority representation of Asian Americans by taking on a legal fight against the U.S. President. In doing so, they nevertheless affirmed American exceptionalism by validating the belief that justice is possible within the existing system of political liberalism. The unprecedented efforts of the WeChat defenders reveal how it is possible to defend and claim civil rights for Chinese people in the United States while combating presumptions of being both alien threats and docile subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies a difference‐in‐differences framework to explore the economic consequences of the recent U.S.–China trade war. The average abnormal returns of Chinese listed firms during a period centered on President Trump's announcement on 22 March 2018 are taken as a proxy for the firms' exposure to the potential trade war. Firms more negatively exposed are found, surprisingly, to report higher total revenues in the post‐announcement period. The results indicate that the Chinese firms tend to reallocate their business from overseas to the domestic market. Such within‐firm reallocation is found to be more pronounced among private firms, exporting firms and non‐FDI firms. Besides, firms with higher negative exposure increase total investment and financing but decrease foreign investment after the trade war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I document my COVID-19 quarantine experience in my home country of China. Due to changes to my U.S. immigration status, I had no choice but to leave for China during the COVID-19 outbreak and lockdowns, resulting in separation from my husband. I discuss how my quarantine experience is shaped by the ever-tightening U.S. immigration policies. For example, Trump's executive order banning entry of certain foreign nationals has turned my temporary quarantine in China into an endless wait. This quarantine experience informed my reimagining of diaspora and immigration in the contemporary era. Specifically, I propose that we pay close attention to the transnational aesthetics as a productive way to offer insights into diaspora and immigration, particularly during a time of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging literature shows that rising import exposure resulting from the China shock devastated U.S. manufacturing and contributed to the rise of Donald Trump. However, several studies found that these recent localized economic shocks did not negatively impact the tenure of incumbent politicians, and this outcome remains a puzzle. In this paper, we examine the partisan difference in congressional communication strategies on China and trade‐related issues. We propose a theory of China‐bashing to explain how members of Congress frame the negative impacts of trade to their voters. Using press release data from members of Congress, we show that, even though Chinese import competition impacted both Republican‐ and Democrat‐held districts, Republican politicians in adversely affected districts responded by increasing their anti‐China rhetoric, while there was no similar difference among Democrats. At the same time, there was no difference between Republican and Democratic messaging on general trade issues. In doing so, Republican legislators were able to support trade liberalization during the Bush and Obama administrations while blaming its negative externalities to their constituents on China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trump's earlier statements about China and the US losing out on trade primed his supporters for the "China virus" narratives that epitomized Trump's references to the COVID-19 pandemic. Keywords: Trump; China; victimhood; nationalism EN Trump China victimhood nationalism 882 889 8 10/04/22 20221001 NES 221001 This paper analyses the deployment of victimhood nationalism towards China by Donald Trump during his two presidential campaigns and presidency. [Extracted from the article]

Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) has resolved an impressive number of US–China trade disputes. Over the past few years, however, as tensions between the two have escalated over several trade issues, the WTO has been pushed toward irrelevance since the Trump administration. Alleging that the WTO is "a disaster" and its adjudication is very unfair to the US, former President Trump made no effort to hide his criticism of the WTO and its DSS in particular. Is Trump right about the WTO DSS? Based on an examination of US–China WTO disputes and the WTO adjudicators' highly contentious interpretations of the concept of "public body" under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) as an example, this article shows that the WTO DSS is not particularly unfair to the US. While the WTO adjudicators sometimes did not fully follow the positions advocated by the US, they have adhered to generally accepted rules of treaty interpretation and exercised great caution to remain balanced and flexible in reaching their conclusions, especially on ambiguous issues. Though not perfect, the WTO DSS works as it is intended to. Engaging in the reform of the WTO and its DSS, instead of abandoning or marginalizing the WTO, should be a wiser and more practical choice for the Biden administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US government has been promoting a new cold war against China for some time. It began before former President Donald Trump initiated a trade war against China and has continued under President Biden. The underlying reason for this policy is the drive of the US government to maintain a position of global domination and to prevent any other country from rising to a position of equal, or near equal, economic, political, or military strength with the US. This cold war is unjustified and poses serious dangers for people around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for how non-trade factors attribute to the China-US trade war. Trump's tweets provide us with a unique perspective. After analysing 31,166 Trump's tweets, we have the following findings: (1) It's non-trade factors rather than trade-related factors that can significantly predict whether Trump posts negative tweets involving China's economic and trade issues. For every 1 % increase in Trump's disapproval rating and VIX index, the likelihood of Trump posting negative tweets involving China's economic and trade issues increases by 0.61 % and 0.16 % respectively. (2) Tweeting against China sometimes becomes a tool to divert domestic criticism. After the COVID-19 outbreak, the higher growth rate of cumulative COVID-19 confirmed cases, the higher likelihood of Trump tweeting against China. (3) Tweeting against China can win public support and attention. Holding everything else constant, the number of likes and retweets of negative tweets about China are 10.2 % and 14.6 % more than those of positive tweets about China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked the beginning of a new chapter in US–China relations. His administration's imposition of tariffs and high-level trade negotiations captured the most attention and headlines. But these attempts to coerce China into breaking down key pillars of its 'state capitalist' developmental model have been only one, outward-facing element of his administration's response to China's growing economic and military strength. This article focuses on three inward-facing policy areas, the politics of which have been shaped by China's rise and the evolution of the US economy: (1) the governance of inward foreign direct investment; (2) government procurement and local content requirements; and (3) state projects to promote new technologies and domestic productive capabilities. It finds evidence of modest reforms of government regulations and limited expansions in state capacity but that these may prove to be more significant in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the arrival of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States, that country began an economic and trade war with China which, in addition to the trade implications of this war, calls into question the relevance of the existence of current multilateralism. The trade policies of openness that have flourished since the 1980s seem to have come to an end. This fact forces us to rethink the U.S. and world economic agenda in an environment of uncertainty and in the face of a rival such as China, whose strength and influence is growing. Questions arise as to whether the winner will be rewarded with global economic hegemony? Or, on the other hand, will it be a situation in which two powers coexist with a shared hegemony? At this time it is not possible to anticipate who will be the winner, so the aim of this paper is to try to find trends and developments between the two countries to try to give a possible answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western discourse towards China had been hardening since it became clear to US leaders that their assumption that increasing trade and engagement with China would lead it to become a pale imitation of Western neoliberal financialised capitalisms was coming unravelled and China continued to adhere to its socialist commitments. In waging the US's New Cold War on China with equal if not greater vigour than Trump, Biden merely replaced Trump's "America First" stance with the traditionally hypocritical stance of imperialism that always pretends to do good for the world it seeks to dominate, oppress, exploit and otherwise destroy. The latest version of this discourse is about promoting human rights and democracy. At a time when US and Western democracies are being assailed by a toxic combination of inequality, poverty, distrust, social division and political disaffection and polarisation, at a time when US imperialism's distinctly anti-democratic edge is becoming ever more evident, this stance is only facing mounting contradictions. The present article explores them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trump administration in its vision and strategic orientation, where both view China as the primary strategic challenge and seek to maintain a "free and open" regional order that preserves American hegemony. Nevertheless, contrary to the Trump administration's "America First" and overt unilateralism, the Biden administration values alliances, partnerships and various issue-oriented small groups to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy. In addition, the Biden administration has levered diplomatic, economic, military, and regional governance issues in its comprehensive strategic competition with China. In spite of numerous challenges in view of the increasingly volatile global landscape, inadequate input of resources, divergent strategic orientation and interests among allies and partners, and inherent policy inconsistence in the US political system, the implementation of Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy is still expected to negatively impact China in various ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The recent surge in protectionist sentiment in countries around the world has rekindled the long-standing debate over the determinants of citizens' trade policy preferences. We examine the influence of two understudied but increasingly relevant factors – misinformation and economic threat – on support for international trade in the United States. We first show that more than 6–in–10 Americans endorse a salient misperception about Chinese currency manipulation despite extensive evidence to the contrary. Then, based on a preregistered survey experiment, we show that misinformation can be corrected, regardless of whether the threatening frame is present or not. In contrast to these results on factual beliefs, however, we find that trade policy preferences are considerably stable: neither anti-trade misinformation nor an economically threatening frame significantly reduces support for international trade. These findings suggest that political elites' strategy of 'playing the China card' by using misleading and threatening rhetoric is not so effective in mobilizing opposition to trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-U.S. trade frictions brought about many uncertainties to the Chinese economy. This research investigates whether China's state-controlled media played a role in stabilizing investors' expectations by examining the relations between media tone and Chinese stock market reactions in the context of China-U.S. trade frictions. Firstly, even though the media tone of news on trade frictions did not elicit significant reactions at the market level, those firms heavily exposed to export business with the U.S. produced significant positive reactions to a high media tone of the state media. Secondly, investors, especially SME investors, perceived more uncertainties to the high tones of Chinese media in the early days of Trump's presidency and reacted negatively to the media's high stance, as shown in the volatility. Thirdly, after the war was initiated, higher-tone news released from the state-controlled press eased people's anxieties and stabilized the market, especially for the large caps, leading to lower volatilities in most subsequent stages. Generally, the official media's tone manipulation is partially effective in preventing a market meltdown and easing investors' worries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China has confronted the United States with diplomatic challenges ever since Washington recognized Beijing in January 1979. Basic to this engagement was and continues to be economics, and particularly trade, which elicited American responses ranging from enmity, fear, and uncertainty to cooperation, amity, and hope. Scholarship has not focused enough attention on the ideals and values that undergirded commercial relations as the principal American approach to China. Beginning with President Richard M. Nixon's opening to Beijing and ending with President Donald J. Trump's trade war (with touchstones in the Nixon, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, Barack Obama, and Trump years), this article analyzes how a bilateral trading relationship that so transformed the world evolved from recognition to rivalry. The answer to the wax and wane lies in the near-century long practice of American free-trade internationalism that followed the principles of the "capitalist peace" paradigm, long embraced by the United States as a pillar of its foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans' views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the USA and the countries' bilateral relations. As leaders in both countries have come under public pressure about their policy stances toward the other side, it is critical to fill the gap. This study develops a theoretical argument about how a concern for political legitimacy may allow public opinion to influence foreign policy making in authoritarian countries, and it presents findings from a two-wave public opinion survey in China conducted before and after the 2020 US presidential election. The results show that Chinese evaluations of the bilateral relationship and of the USA slumped during the Trump era but rebounded somewhat after Biden took office. In addition, the majority of Chinese respondents believed their country to be the world's largest and leading economy and favored China being the world's leading power, either by itself or alongside the USA. Furthermore, younger and more educated respondents held more negative views, although these were mitigated by personal connections with and experiences in the USA. These findings have important policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Even though Sino-American relations of the Donald Trump era were perceived as predominately confrontational, with a symbolic trade war between the two, the scale of economic interdependencies between the United States and China results in either a need for collaboration or in serious losses on both sides in the case of lack of cooperation. The paper aims at analyzing economic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China at the time of the Trump presidency. Analysis is based on the complex interdependence theory of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The main hypothesis analyzed in the paper states: Asymmetric interdependence between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America limits the scope, intensity and length of a trade war. For the sake of the paper, economic interdependence will be analyzed. Apart from the reference to the state of the art, the document analysis and descriptive statistics are to be applied in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After taking office, the Trump administration has shifted the U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region from "Asia Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific". This paper attempts to start with critical geopolitics, compare the "Asia Pacific" strategy of the United States with the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, and investigate the changes and dynamics of the geopolitical imagination of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the investigation, it can be found that the strategic transformation from "Asia-Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific" reflects the transformation of the U.S. strategy towards China from "L-shaped defense" to "half-mouth encirclement", as well as the Trump government's attempt to rebuild the U.S. hegemony in various fields through all-round competition, reshape its identity and confidence as a great power by changing its self-identity and consolidating and expanding the alliance of Western style liberal democratic countries by looking for strategic fulcrum to reconstruct the strategic demands of the key geopolitical space. After Biden's administration took office, it has inherited and strengthened the Trump administration's "Indo-Pacific" strategy, which means that the strategic game between the United States and China in the "Indo-Pacific" region and even the global stage will continue for a long time. In order to safeguard China's national interests and effectively respond to the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, China should enhance its influence and maintain the mentality as a great power, adopt social creation strategies to seek identity and recognition, and make plans based on the "Belt and Road Initiative", "Polar Silk Road", "Belt and Road Initiative" and other initiatives; if pushed forward smoothly, it will effectively crack down on the U.S.'s attempt to contain China through the "Indo-Pacific" strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Biden Administration has accepted the Trump Administration's definition of China as a 'strategic competitor', and has retained Trump's tariffs, the 'Quad', and the upgrade in Taiwan's protocol status. But Biden's China policy is different from Trump's in being truly strategic. The key elements of that strategy are focused on improving the United States' competitiveness domestically and in international affairs; cooperation with allies and partners; an emphasis on human rights; partial decoupling of economic and technology relationships; and a search for some areas of cooperation with China. Success for the Biden strategy would consist neither of bottling up China in its current global power position nor in achieving a negotiated condominium in Asia. The Biden Administration would succeed if the United States can maintain its alliance system, keep a robust military presence in East Asia and prevent the forcible integration of Taiwan into China while avoiding major war. Several features of the China challenge make it reasonable to hope that such success is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fighting the COVID‐19 pandemic requires large numbers of citizens to adopt disease‐preventive practices. We contend that national identification can mobilize and motivate people to engage in preventive behaviors to protect the collective, which in return would heighten national identification further. To test these reciprocal links, we conducted studies in two countries with diverse national tactics toward curbing the pandemic: (1) a two‐wave longitudinal survey in China (Study 1, N = 1200), where a national goal to fight COVID‐19 was clearly set, and (2) a five‐wave longitudinal survey in the United States (Study 2, N = 1001), where the national leader, President Trump, rejected the severity of COVID‐19 in its early stage. Results revealed that national identification was associated with an increase in disease‐preventive behaviors in both countries in general. However, higher national identification was associated with greater trust in Trump's administration among politically conservative American participants, which then was associated with slower adoption of preventive behaviors. The reciprocal effect of disease‐preventive behaviors on national identification was observed only in China. Overall, our findings suggest that although national identification may serve as a protective factor in curbing the pandemic, this beneficial effect was reduced in some political contexts. HighlightsPolicymakers should note that national identity serves as a protective factor in curbing the COVID‐19 pandemic. Narratives that highlight the collective agency of people would be useful in promoting disease‐preventive actions as long as they are also endorsed by national leaders.National leaders should provide clear and consistent recommendations in promoting disease‐preventive actions.Practitioners and policymakers should be aware of how the communication strategies they use would be affected by society's political contexts. Mobilizing disease‐preventive actions through a patriotic frame might not be useful when national leaders did not unambiguously promote disease prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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