Search

According to the Damages Directive victims of infringements of competition law are entitled to full compensation. To achieve this goal overcharges, passing-on, and volume effects should play a role in the calculation of damages (for any purchaser who is not yet the final consumer). Whereas the Damages Directive promotes the passing-on defence for the defendants, it does not regulate volume effects in depth. The computation of these effects requires information on counterfactual prices and quantities. Since this information cannot be observed, the size of the volume effect tends to be uncertain. This paper discusses policy-options that aspire to bring compensation closer to full compensation, given uncertainty about the size of the volume effect. Based on the maximin-principle, a principle for decision-making under uncertainty, not allowing a passing-on defence appears to be an attractive option since this may lead to the minimization of the maximum gap between actual and full compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides new evidence on proxy indicators of market power for major European countries. The data show moderately increasing average industry concentration over the last two decades, a considerably increasing proportion of high-concentration industries, and an overall tendency toward oligopolistic structure. Estimates of aggregate profitability also show a sustained increase over the recent decades for European economies. Although the academic and policy debate is not settled as to whether the causes of these trends are policy driven or reflect technological improvement, our findings suggest that competition policy is likely to face more challenges as large companies are becoming more common in more and more industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The term 'competition' is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU's very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations. The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission's annual reports on competition (1971-2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in 'hard' contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in 'softer' contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent - selection of enforcement priorities). While the 'hard' contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the 'soft' contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories. Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that the collection of contributions edited by Rafael Amaro is a most welcome addition to the literature on the topic of private enforcement of competition law in Europe, focusing on the Damages Directive. It mentions that the principle covers the impact of the directive and the main principles established, including disclosure of evidence, the effects of national decisions, limitation periods, quantification of harm and consensual dispute resolution.

Children have the right to grow up free from the hazards associated with tobacco smoking. Tobacco smoke exposure can have detrimental effects on children's health and development, from before birth and beyond. As a result of effective tobacco control policies, European smoking rates are steadily decreasing among adults, as is the proportion of adolescents taking up smoking. Substantial variation however exists between countries, both in terms of smoking rates and regarding implementation, comprehensiveness and enforcement of policies to address smoking and second-hand smoke exposure. This is important because comprehensive tobacco control policies such as smoke-free legislation and tobacco taxation have extensively been shown to carry clear health benefits for both adults and children. Additional policies such as increasing the legal age to buy tobacco, reducing the number of outlets selling tobacco, banning tobacco display and advertising at the point-of-sale, and introducing plain packaging for tobacco products can help reduce smoking initiation by youth. At societal level, health professionals can play an important role in advocating for stronger policy measures, whereas they also clearly have a duty to address smoking and tobacco smoke exposure at the patient level. This includes providing cessation advise and referring to effective cessation services. Conclusion: Framing of tobacco exposure as a child right's issue and of comprehensive tobacco control as a tool to work towards the ultimate goal of reaching a tobacco-free generation can help accelerate European progress to curb the tobacco epidemic. What is Known: • Tobacco exposure is associated with a range of adverse health effects among babies and children. • Comprehensive tobacco control policies helped bring down smoking rates in Europe and benefit child health. What is New: • Protecting the rights and health of children provides a strong starting point for tobacco control advocacy. • The tobacco-free generation concept helps policy-makers set clear goals for protecting future generations from tobacco-associated harms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is undeniable that a 'follow-on damages claim culture' is on the rise in Europe. The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has been acting as a catalyst to ensure that victims of cartel infringements are in a position to effectively enforce their right to damages. Although the path followed by the Court removed many obstacles for cartel victims it has also departed from traditional concepts of tort law, including liability for civil damages. By extending concepts which were traditionally confined to public enforcement to private enforcement - such as the notion of undertaking - national courts will be faced with new challenges. It is inevitable that questions which were previously of minor importance in public proceedings will carry a different weight in civil litigation. This article focuses on recent developments and explores possible consequences on the imputation of liability in private enforcement of EU competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses some new questions that have emerged as a result of the transposition of the single economic unit doctrine to the realm of private enforcement. The doctrine, originally developed in the context of public enforcement of EU competition law, allows liability to be attributed to parent companies for infringements committed by their subsidiaries, thereby disregarding the corporate separateness of the legal entities involved in order to reflect their economic unity in the market. As antitrust damages become more common throughout Europe, the single economic unit doctrine requires further clarification. In particular, it is not evident whether the doctrine may also apply in an inverted or horizontal manner: whether subsidiaries might be held liable for antitrust infringements committed by their parent companies or whether companies might be held liable for antitrust infringements committed by other entities controlled by the same parent company. This question has led to divergent decisions by national courts throughout Europe. This article rejects the idea of group company liability for antitrust infringements and argues against the automatic recognition of horizontal or inverted liability, which is believed to amount to a violation of general principles of EU law and which cannot be justified on grounds of deterrence, nor on the principle of effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to study the effect of electoral regulation on party system development. Using a new database, this study shows existing variation in regulating electoral competition. It further illustrates that, perhaps contrary to electoral regulation design, increases in the amount of regulation about funding and monitoring have a stifling, rather than a stimulating, effect on party system size. More importantly, the paper provides evidence supporting the cartel thesis argument in that the changes allowed by incumbent parties help secure their collective survival, while keeping newcomers out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows how companies can circumvent competition legislation by developing new informal ways of cooperation. We focus on the case of the Nordic pulp and paper industry which was particularly eager to set up cartels. Scholars analysing this sector can utilise exceptionally rich sources that reveal how industrialists reacted to the introduction and development of European competition policies. The article shows that companies defended their collusive practices by making them less transparent and more informal than before, a change that did not automatically lessen their effectiveness. Tougher competition policies also encouraged industrialists to create new giant companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Council Regulation 723/2009 on the Community Legal Framework for European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) provides for the inclusion ofpolicies, including an intellectual property rights policy, in the statutes o f ERICs. The manner in which research infrastructures with ERIC status have responded to this requirement varies. This article reports findings o f a preliminaiy study' ofthe treatment o f intellectual property rights in ERICs (2011-2018). The tension between the existence o f IPRs and their exercise is a familiar one in competition law; the article suggests that the “fifth freedom " imports this issue into the European Research Area and the balance o f rights forms the backcloth o f considerations o f IPRs and ERICs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an economic and legal theory of harm applicable to the case against Google in Europe over search bias. So far, no clear legal and economic theory has yet been delineated by the European Commission, nor consensus in the literature has emerged with regard to the theory of foreclosure that could support the case, or with regard to the specific form of abuse of dominance applicable under European law. The paper shows that the law and economics of tying applies to search bias. From a legal standpoint, it is not necessary to rely on the more formalistic elements of Article 102 TFEU, or to characterize Google as an essential facility, in order to find a valid legal theory of harm. We show that Google's conduct of linking its proprietary vertical (or specialized) search platforms to its horizontal (or general) search platform through visual prominence, as it has done with Google Shopping, fits within the legal boundaries of tying under European law. From an economic perspective, we show that the two-sided nature of both horizontal and vertical search provides compelling reasons why foreclosure of competition may be profitable, and why the single monopoly profit theorem may fail in this context. As we show in the paper, by tying vertical search to general search through visual prominence, Google can attract additional advertisers on its vertical search platform that would have possibly advertised on competing vertical search platforms without a tie. The effect of tying is a restriction on competition in vertical search that deserves antitrust scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of re‐conceptualizing a European social market economy, this contribution considers competition law's position in the European economic constitution. The economic constitution captures the economic foundation of European integration as based on the market mechanism. The contribution asks whether the change towards a 'more economic approach' to competition law implies an alienation of competition law from societal challenges. The contribution considers whether this interpretation, with competition law being such an integral part of the European economic constitution, should change in light of the constitutional goal of a European social market economy. To do so, the article sketches the fundamental place of competition law in the European economic constitution and shows how its interpretation has become more economics‐based. It highlights some of the problematic aspects of this change and analyzes these findings from the perspective of an economic constitution serving a social market economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to shed light on the economic tools, as well as the legal-economic reasoning, which are used by different European antitrust authorities to assess the allegedly anticompetitive practices of a platform operating in a two-sided market (2SM). First of all, we show that despite the flourishing literature on 2SM economics, antitrust authorities are still facing major challenges when taking decisions concerning two-sided platforms (2SPs). Secondly, we perform a cross-country, comparative study of recent competition proceedings towards the 2SP Booking.com and highlight conceptual and practical divergences among antitrust authorities which are bound by and applying a common European legislation. By concretely and thoroughly showing where the differences lie, our study contributes to identifying the issues to tackle to ensure a better harmonized implementation of measures towards 2SPs at the EU level. Finally, building on the results of our work, we propose some alternative approaches which could benefit future antitrust analyses in 2SMs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World Championship ( F1) suggest that its authorities violate European competition law in two ways. First, they allegedly abuse market power by forcing unfavorable contracts on media revenue allocation upon teams as a whole and on smaller teams in particular (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, they allegedly form a cartel with selected teams to the detriment of smaller teams by providing unjustified extra payments to these teams (horizontal allocation of media revenues). In doing so, the cartel members allegedly secure supracompetitive rents from the authorities and cement an unfair competitive advantage over the outsider teams. Employing concentration measures from empirical economics, we present an assessment of whether the current antitrust allegations against F1 may be considered valid or not. We show that the allocation scheme employed in F1 considerably differs from those in other professional sports championships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with an anticompetitive interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. We conclude that there is merit in initiating an in-depth antitrust investigation of Formula One motor racing. ( JEL K21, L12, L40, L83, Z20) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the influential literature that supports the resale price maintenance efficiency view is flawed when it relies on presale services that do not modify the value-in-use of a good. Crucially, we consider that value-in-use may differ from prepurchase perceived value. We apply the value-in-use standard, which exposes the loss in consumer surplus in Bork's model and reveals that even Bork's dissenters significantly underestimate their calculated losses to inframarginal consumers. When consumer surplus is the antitrust/competition policy standard, our results suggest that a rule-of-reason regime where authorities or agencies bear the burden of proof can be unfavourable to consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents abstracts of marketing articles related to international marketing. They include "Organizing for Europe," by Roy Hilbert, "Antitrust Laws in the European Economic Community," by Stefan A. Riesenfeld, and "Red Economists See Need of Advertising," by Carter R. Bryan.

Amazon and Audible are currently being investigated by anti-trust authorities in Europe. Competition complaints were made by the German Publishers and Booksellers Association on the grounds of abuse of dominant position and restrictive practices. The article presents the reasons behind these formal complaints and makes a critical assessment of the approach taken by the anti-trust authorities so far. It raises the concern that investigations should be broadened to include questions of abuse of dominant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market definition is highly relevant in European case practice in competition law. Yet the tools and also the concepts are far from being very sophisticated. The critique of market definition by Richard Markovits is far-reaching: not only is market definition arbitrary, but current approaches also have an in-built bias towards a static snapshot understanding of the economy. Yet it would be wrong to give up this important step in antitrust analysis, since otherwise antitrust loses its function as the fundamental set of governing rules for markets. Instead, it is necessary to develop a more evolutionary concept of markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses provisions of European Competition Law from a consumer welfare to a capability approach with topics including reasons to include non-economic interests in a competition law assessment; values market freedom; and recognizing consumers' capabilities.

A comprehensive debate on the interface between IP (Intellectual Property) and European competition law has emerged over the past 50 years. The initial section of this article examines the gradual development of this conflicting relationship between the two laws. This is followed by an extensive analysis of the relevant precedent, focusing specifically on the significant rulings in Microsoft and IMS Health. The analysis explores the European competition authorities' preference to protect competitors' interests over achieving the general consensus for efficiency in the market and tackles the complex question of whether IP holders should be burdened with the responsibility of safeguarding the commercial wellbeing of their rivals. In light of the pre-existing case-law, various economic proposals are introduced which demonstrate a potential balance between the protection of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) and the intervention of European competition law. It is then assessed which proposal will most effectively resolve the conflict between the two laws, and whether this proposal is a permanent solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examine the relationship between professional sports and antitrust laws in the U.S. and European Union. Topics discussed include no jurisdiction to eliminate sports exemptions in U.S. and EU; origin and parameters of the antitrust exemption for professional sports, and the de facto exemption for professional sports.

Copyright of Bucharest University Annals - Law Series is the property of CH Beck Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

To support an antitrust damages claim a private litigant will seek to rely on documents that are not in his possession. In the absence of any specific EU rules on disclosure, however, a private litigant established in one Member State may be disfavoured as compared to a private litigant established in another. In seeking to establish a common approach to document disclosure, the EU institutions recently agreed upon the Damages Directive. At its core, the Damages Directive provides that national courts should, as a matter of principle, be able to order the disclosure of evidence, whether in the hands of the defendant or claimant, or included in the file of a competition authority. With respect to the latter, in particular, national rules implementing the Damages Directive must ensure that leniency statements and settlement submissions are never disclosed. It would seem that the Pfleiderer case law is no longer applicable to these two categories of documents, but continues to be applicable in other areas. The Damages Directive does not answer all the questions that will come before a judge faced with a request for disclosure, but marks a significant step towards facilitating the bringing of antitrust damages actions in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This survey covers the case law from Luxembourg and Strasbourg on fundamental rights and competition law from 2013. It extends to fundamental rights cases which do not directly concern competition law but are likely to have an impact on it. Arguably, the most novel developments relate to requests for access to documents submitted with a leniency application (Donau Chemie, Energie Baden-Württemberg and Netherlands v Commission) and the proper remedy for unreasonable delay (in particular Gascogne). However, the survey also covers case law concerning a number of other issues such as the standard and extent of judicial control of Commission decisions applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As part of a competitive environment increasingly widespread, under which anticompetitive conducts, with a public or private source, are able to impact the markets in locations beyond state borders where they have been generated; this work expounds the basic characteristics of state aids, because of the skills these have been shown to distort the competitive environment. Explaining also, the importance of structuring an internal antitrust regulatory framework, and a supranational one, which in use of tools, as Free Trade Agreements, discipline the exercise that closer partners can give to these kinds of aids. Using the international precedents that link together countries which recently have strengthened trade ties with Colombia, this work refers to solutions that were raised to curb state subsidies on bilateral relationships that tie up those members, and suggests similar bounds to adhere to the agreements signed between Colombia and those major economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While software interoperability can be achieved under European competition law, there may be a need for more structural measures. Some are envisaged by the European Commission in the Digital Agenda and could be imposed through legislation in the context of intellectual property. In parallel, soft law measures may be adopted to encourage dominant undertakings to give access to their interfaces. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is often "assumed," even among well-informed lawyers and economists, that European competition law is an emulation of the US antitrust law because of American influence on European political and economic debates after the Second World War. However, such an assumption is disputable: in accordance with Professor Gerber, the competition law in Europe is an indigenous product based primarily on ideas developed in Germany by the so-called ordoliberal thought. In this respect, the article 102 TFEU may be considered a proof. The aims of this article are to furnish a critical examination of ordoliberal ideas of anticompetitive conducts and underline the relevance of ordoliberal thought for the development of the modern European competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Passing off is a doctrine created by the UK jurisprudence. The traditional form of passing off appears when one trader presents his good in a fals representation which will create the impression that are made by another trader. In other European national legislation, passing off is a form of unfair competition. In this article, we would like to apply passing off criteria in order to establish if there is a risk of confusion between the concepts of „European patent with unitary effect“ and „European patent“. The three elements that have to be demonstrated in a passing off action are reputation, misrepresentation and damage. With this view in mind, we would like to analyze if these criteria may be applied to this two concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article offers a series of scenarios which can appear as a result of different decisions that are being taken and applied by the Competition Council with implications in the national economy. The scope of the article is for best practices examples to be showcased in order for the procedures of competition law in business to be smoothened out. With this occasion, our aim is to offer a parallel with the Competition Law from Czech Republic and Singapore to have a better understanding of the differences but also its effects which could appear in the Romanian and international business environment once the decisions are being taken by the Council of Competition. Several scenarios are being conducted and analysed from the juridical-commercial perspective and certain recommendations are being formulated for a better development of European Law, in this case the international business law in the context of a broader framework in the European Union, but in Asian and Central American countries as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on two bills restricting reverse payment settlements (RPS) in intellectual property (IP) litigation, the U.S Supreme Court's Actavis ruling and treatment of RPS under European antitrust law. Topics discussed include core anticompetitive concern regarding RPS, framing provisions of the Hatch- Waxman Act and RPS Incentives Created by the Act .It also discusses Actavis ruling which defeated the scope of the patent approach.

The prospect of decentralization in State aid control has been traditionally viewed with scepticism, mostly due to the high potential of political influence at the national level. It has also been regarded as a threat to the consistency and uniformity of the application of State aid rules. In that relation, the European Commission has been granted an institutional 'monopoly' with regard to the assessment of compatibility of State aid measures. While national courts perform some, albeit limited, role in State aid control, national competition authorities have not been vested by EU law with any tasks with regard to examination of State aid. In the area of services of general economic interest, however, there are signs that the decentralization process is already under way. The adoption of the Altmark judgment, and more importantly, the increasing role of Member States in examining State aid compatibility under Article 106(2)TFEU show that, in the future, national authorities could exercise a more substantial and active role in the enforcement of State aid rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the challenges posed by an extraterritorial application of the Chinese anti-monopoly law that avoids trade conflicts. It describes the emergence of extraterritorial application of antitrust law in the U.S. and Europe and presents a comparison of both the approaches. It reflects on the economic implications related with extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.