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How do some large-scale adverse events receive major media coverage and become crises for public actors while others are treated as routine events? This article reinvestigates this question based on a case study of the media treatment in France of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents. Drawing on an original set of media data and an ethnographic study, the article shows how both accidents were subject to forms of opacity that limit their effects on nuclear institutions: Chernobyl has been treated through secrecy that leads to contestation of nuclear institutions, whereas Fukushima has been characterized by "public containment," relying on extensive publication but low-priority and uncontroversial narratives that do not reflect the stakes of a given policy field. This paper explains the role of Fukushima in France through institutional transformations that public actors engaged in following Chernobyl to reestablish the credibility of public information sources and to monitor public debates over nuclear accidents by developing "hybrid" spaces, located at the interface of organizational frontstages and backstages. This case shows how responding to transparency demands may sometimes create new forms of opacity by reducing the epistemic quality of public debates while containing political crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the insurance of nuclear liability risk, from theoretical and applied standpoints. Firstly, we characterize the optimal insurance scheme for a low-probability industrial accident, such as a nuclear catastrophe, when liability is shared between the firm and the State. Using catastrophe bond data, we then evaluate the cost of capital sustaining such an insurance mechanism. Finally, we characterize the individual lotteries associated with the risk of a nuclear accident in France, and we estimate the optimal coverage. We conclude that the liability limit currently in force is likely to be inferior to the socially optimal level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the frame of the France-Japan agreement on nuclear collaboration, a bilateral collaboration agreement on nuclear energy was signed on March 21st, 2017, including a topic dedicated to Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR). This agreement has set the framework to start a bilateral discussion on a joint view of an SFR concept. France (CEA and FRAMATOME) and Japan (JAEA, MHI and MFBR) have carried out these studies from 2017 to 2019. Based on the beginning of the basic design phase of ASTRID project − ASTRID − 600 MWe (ASTRID for Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration), the two countries performed a common work to examine ways to develop a feasible common design concept, which could be realized both in France and in Japan. The subject was then extended and extrapolated with the ASTRID − 150 MWe data (reduced power reactor and enhanced experimental capabilities) in a second phase of this study. France and Japan first focused on design requirements. Common requirements were identified, as well as differences in the safety approach and the structural design requirements, according to national standards and respective site conditions, in particular considering seismic hazards. The teams developed common Top-Level design Requirements (TLRs) to allow common specification data, then joint design. This collaborative work was carried out through the implementation of twelve France-Japan Working Groups, working jointly. This paper is providing a review of this joint synthesis on Sodium Fast Reactor design concept. It is summarizing the context and objectives, then the definition and approaches of the Top Level Requirements. This paper is then dealing with the major design features: the core design and their related safety aspects, and the nuclear island design. Thus, this paper is providing a comprehensive review of this joint work gathering French and Japan nuclear design teams during two full years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the history of governing nuclear accidents in France and internationally. While nuclear disasters posed serious threats to nuclear energy during the Cold War, they have been increasingly perceived as intrinsic and 'manageable' events of nuclear operations, a process that can be described as 'the normalisation of accidents'. This article shows how the end of the Cold War facilitated normalisation, through an internationally shared approach to nuclear safety, based on regulatory organisations, which contributed to displacing the political controversy related to nuclear energy in France and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries rethought their domestic nuclear power programs after the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In fact, even France—which generates half of the European Union’s nuclear electricity—has a new approach to nuclear power and to energy policy. President François Hollande vowed to reduce use of nuclear power, and his administration is moving to close the country’s two oldest reactors at Fessenheim. The government also plans to sponsor a large public debate on the future of energy policy in France, and that discussion is supposed to include all major stakeholders. It remains unclear, however, whether the debate will be a democratic exercise that influences the policy-making process, or if policy will continue to be determined by the technocratic elites who have guided France’s energy and nuclear programs from their outset. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2010, there were more nuclear power units under construction worldwide than in any year since 1988. Even before Fukushima, however, status indicators for the international nuclear industry were showing a negative trend. Fewer countries are operating nuclear fission reactors for energy purposes than in previous years, and many countries are now past their nuclear peak. Worldwide nuclear production is generally declining, and many new projects are experiencing construction delays. Even if reactors can be operated for an average of 40 years, 74 new plants would have to come on line by 2015 to maintain the status quo, which is impossible given current constraints on fabricating reactor components. Developments in Asia, particularly in China, do not fundamentally change the global picture. The dramatic post-Fukushima decisions in two of the four largest economies, Japan and Germany, and in several other nuclear countries could accelerate the decline of a rapidly aging industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of Japan’s nuclear disaster, a major lesson can be learned related to the back end of the fuel cycle: Planning is necessary for the safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. But the topic of storing waste continues to be subject to last-minute solutions, as the experiences of a number of countries besides Japan show. Countries with nuclear power programs need a medium-term strategy for spent fuel storage prior to the long-term plan for spent fuel or high-level waste disposal. Though difficult, the disposal of high-level nuclear waste is possible, and a clear strategy to develop a repository combines both technical and societal criteria in a phased approach. After Fukushima, it is now imperative to redefine what makes a successful nuclear power program—from cradle to grave. Nuclear waste management must be designed from the beginning; otherwise, the public in many countries will reject nuclear as an energy choice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2014, a team of high school students and teachers measured individual exposure doses using D-Shuttle dosimeters. In total, 216 students and teachers participated in the project, with the cooperation of 12 high schools in Japan (six from Fukushima Prefecture), four from France, eight from Poland, and two from Belarus. The participants wore the dosimeters for 2 weeks and recorded their locations in diary charts. The distribution of annual exposure doses for each school and region, estimated from the measured results, overlapped. It was concluded that the external exposure of high school students in Fukushima Prefecture was not markedly higher compared with that of students from other regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of instrumental actualization in mediated conflicts, the mass media tend to exaggerate events consistent with the editorial line. This theory was tested using press coverage in Germany, Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom on the Japanese seaquake, the tsunami it caused, and the nuclear disaster of Fukushima. Within a period of seven weeks after the seaquake, the coverage in the four countries in 27 national newspapers and magazines on the three events was analyzed. As hypothesized from theory, German and Swiss media concentrated on Fukushima and stressed its relevance to domestic nuclear plants, whereas French and British media placed a greater emphasis on the tsunami and rarely related the nuclear catastrophe in Japan to domestic nuclear programs. In addition, there were remarkable correlations between the views of journalists and the bias of statements on nuclear energy presented in their news sections. Findings are discussed and related to the theory of public opinion and political decisions in liberal democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Airborne cesium isotopes ( 134 Cs and 137 Cs) released during the Fukushima nuclear accident were transported all around the world attached to particles and reached France about 12 days after the first explosion. Concentration of cesium isotopes in cloud water sampled at the summit of the Puy de Dôme mountain (1465 m a.s.l.) increased by a factor of at least 40. During the following weeks, the concentrations decreased more slowly in cloud water than in rain and in rain compared with what was found on the aerosol phase. Cesium-134 was detectable in the aerosol phase, in rain and in cloud water for 3 months, 11 months and 18 months after the accident, respectively. These kinetics are consistent with the washout scavenging of aerosol in the lower layers of the atmosphere that leads to a relative depletion of Fukushima-labeled aerosols at ground level. Airborne particles at high altitudes, i.e. where clouds form, have a longer residence time. This finding has implications on the different time scales at which a contamination may be transferred to the ground, depending if it is transferred via dry or wet deposition. This study highlights that cloud water is a relevant type of environmental sample to attest the presence of radionuclides on a longer time scale than for the aerosol phase, provided that the metrology is able to lower usual detection limits. Rainout efficiency was computed for 137 Cs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France’s role in the nuclear revival is analysed by tracing the impact of six categories of norms: cognitive, diplomatic, geopolitical, technological, market, and safety and security. In showing how these normative dimensions shaped the unfolding of the revival process, three development stages are identified. In the first stage, during the late 1990s, in a context of heightened concern over energy security and climate protection, a ‘renaissance’ discourse was constructed by advocates who claimed that nuclear power was cheap and quick to exploit. In the second, new orders for nuclear power plants suggested that the revival was under way. In the third, the revival stalled. Whilst the 2011 Fukushima disaster certainly contributed to the stall by highlighting unmet safety norms, France’s bid to lead the revival was already in difficulties due the impact of market norms, with construction delays and cost overruns revealing the sector’s limited economic viability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Background: The Fukushima nuclear disaster has generated worldwide concern on the risk of exposure to nuclear radiations. In Europe, health authorities had to issue statements about the lack of usefulness of iodine based preventive treatments within their borders. However a lack of confidence in official messages has developed in various European countries due to recent perceived failures in managing public health crises. The lay population preventive behaviors in this context are largely unknown. Consequently, to examine the effects of public health crisis on lay behaviors leading to pharmaceuticals purchases, we studied the sales of iodine-based products in France before, during and after the crisis. Methods: We focused our study on 58 iodine-based drugs available with and without a physician prescription. Our data came from a stratified sample of 3004 pharmacies in metropolitan France. Our study period was from January 2010 to April 2012, with a focus on March-April 2011. We differentiated sales of drugs prescribed by physicians from sales of drugs obtained without a prescription. We used a CUSUM method to detect abnormal increases in sales activity and cross-correlations to assess shifts in sales timing. Results: Sales of iodine-based nutritional complements, and later sales of iodine-based homeopathic remedies, substantially increased (up to 3-fold) during a period of 20 days. Their temporal patterns were correlated to specific events during the crisis. Prescriptions for iodine-based homeopathy increased (up to 35% of all sales). Iodine pills, strictly regulated by health authorities, have also been sold but on a very small scale. Conclusion: These results indicate uncontrolled preventive behaviors resulting in the potentially unjustifiable consumption of available drugs. They have implications in public policy, and demonstrate the usefulness of drug sales surveillance for instantaneous evaluation of population behavior during a global crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The radioactivity levels in the air of the radionuclides released by the Fukushima accident were measured at the Laboratoire Souterrain de Modane, in the South-East of France, during the period 25 March–18 April 2011. Air-filters from the ventilation system exposed for one or two days were measured using low-background gamma-ray spectrometry. In this paper we present the activity concentrations obtained for the radionuclides 131I, 132Te, 134Cs, 137Cs, 95Nb, 95Zr, 106Ru, 140Ba/La and 103Ru. The activity concentration of 131I was of the order of 100 μBq/m3, more than 100 times higher than the activities of other fission products. The highest activities of 131I were measured as a first peak on 30 March and a second peak on 3–4 April. The activity concentrations of 134Cs and 137Cs varied from 5 to 30 μBq/m3. The highest activity concentration recorded for Cs corresponded to the same period as for 131I, with a peak on 2–3 April. The results of the radioactivity concentration levels in grass and mushrooms exposed to the air in the Modane region were also measured. Activity concentrations of 131I of about 100 mBq/m2 were found in grass. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, low-background gamma spectrometry measurements were performed with HPGe detectors at the PRISNA platform located at the CENBG laboratory in Bordeaux, France. Different kinds of samples were collected and measured between March 26 and May 14, 2011. The first fission product observed was 131I with maximum activity values of 2.4 mBq/m3 in atmospheric dusts in air, 3.5 Bq/L in rain water, 15 Bq/kg in grass and 0.9 Bq/L in cow milk. The 134,137Cs isotopes were also detected in air and in grass at a maximum level of 0.2 mBq/m3 and 0.7 Bq/kg respectively, around one order of magnitude less than 131I activity, but they were below detection limits in the other samples. All these activity values were consistent with others measured in France by IRSN and were well below those reported in May 1986 after the Chernobyl accident. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Radioactive fallout due to the Fukushima reactor explosion in Japan was detected in environmental samples collected in France. The presence of 131I in aerosols (200±6μBqm−3) collected at the Pic du Midi observatory, located at 2877m altitude in the French Pyrénées, indicated that the Japanese radioactive cloud reached France between 22 and 29 March, i.e. less than two weeks after the initial emissions, as suggested by a 137Cs/134Cs ratio of 1.4. Cesium radioisotopes (134Cs and 137Cs) were not detected in this sample but they were present in the aerosol sample collected the next week, i.e. between 29 March and 05 April (about 10μBqm−3). We also report 131I activities measured in grass (1.1–11Bqkg−1; fresh weight) and soil samples (0.4Bqkg−1) collected in the Seine River basin between 30 March and 10 April. The 134Cs from the damaged Fukushima power plant was also detected in grass collected in the Seine River basin between 31 March and 10 April (0.2–1.6Bqkg−1 fresh weight, with a 137Cs/134Cs ratio close to 1, which is consistent with Fukushima radioactive release). Despite the installation of a network of nested stations to collect suspended matter in the upstream part of the Seine River basin, 131I was only detected in suspended matter (4.5–60Bqkg−1) collected at the most upstream stations between 30 March and 12 April. Neither 131I nor 134Cs has been detected in environmental samples since the end of April 2011, because of the rapid decay of 131I and the very low activities of 134Cs (about 400 times lower than after Chernobyl accident). [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The recent events at the Fukushima power plants (PP) have brought to light key issues which have to be discussed concerning the position of nuclear energy in the energy mix, in the context of global warming, of waning petroleum resources, of an increasing world population, and of its industrial development. These questions are addressed here from the viewpoint of physical facts; and, without proposing definite choices, this article aims to provide information on the equipment required to benefit from the fission chain reaction, while explaining the possible incidents and accidents, and the possible hidden military misuse of nuclear matter. Specific issues, such as risk assessment and risk management, will be considered, under the constraints of dealing with international non-proliferation safeguards and France energy resources independence. A special emphasis will be given on the fuel cycle, on the variety of time scales involved, and on the requirements of developing the next generation of nuclear power plants, and more specifically the fast breeder option. The lessons to be drawn from the Fukushima accident, resulting mainly from the residual power of used fuel and the loss of cooling source, are outlined, and the consequences to be drawn about the various relevant time scales are emphasized. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In France, the ASTRID prototype is a sodium-cooled fast neutron industrial demonstrator, fulfilling the criteria for Generation IV reactors. ASTRID will meet safety requirements as stringent as for 3rd generation reactors, and take into account lessons from the Fukushima accident. The objectives are to reinforce the robustness of the safety demonstration for all safety functions. ASTRID will feature an innovative core with a negative sodium void coefficient, take advantage of the large thermal inertia of SFRs for decay heat removal, and provide for a design either eliminating the sodium–water reaction, or guaranteeing no consequences for safety in case such reaction would take place. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Copyright of Futuribles is the property of Futuribles SARL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Iodine-131 and various other radionuclides were released into the atmosphere from the damaged Japanese reactors of Fukushima Dai-ichi from 12 to 22 March 2011. The contaminated air mass was detected in France after 24 March; samples of grass, vegetables, and milk have been analyzed for 131I by the IRSN, considering the fact that few values of iodine-131 transfer parameters have been directly measured in situ, due to the radioactive decay of this isotope. Data are compared with calculated values according to the air iodine concentration. The apparent dry deposition velocity of iodine on grass is therefore estimated to range between 1 × 10-3 and 5 × 10-3 m s-1 from site to site. In addition, the grass to milk transfer factors are 2.8 × 10-2 and 3.6 × 10-3 d L-1 for goat's and cow's milk respectively. These parameters fit well with the current values usually considered for radioecological assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Futuribles is the property of Futuribles SARL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Futuribles is the property of Futuribles SARL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article reports that France is now pressing forward with Gen-III nuclear reactors while planning for Gen- IV because of the lessons taken from the tsunami-struck Fukushima I nuclear plant accident in Japan, and the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. As reported, France chose early in the development of its nuclear program in the 1970s to focus on water-cooled pressurized water reactors (PWRs), which have been proved highly effective.

The article offers information on the report from Nuclear Safety Authority (NSA) of France regarding the need for safety upgrades of nuclear power plants in the country. It states that the report was a response to prevent the disaster that happens in the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. It says that part of the recommendations is to impose safety system of last resort that is house in a bunker and trained rapid-response team.

The author reflect on the safety requirements in nuclear power plants in France. The author states that upgrading nuclear safety regulation is being opposed by some nuclear industries. The author cites the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident occurred in Japan in March 2011 as well as the report from the Nuclear Safety Authority regarding the sweeping of safety regulations.