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The article presents a report of the Congressional Research Service to the U.S. Congress on the situation of politics, governance and human rights in Iraq. A summary is provided highlighting the increasingly violent sectarian divisions undermining the fragile stability after U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Topics discussed include an overview of post-Saddam Hussein political transition, sectarian conflict and U.S.-assisted reconciliation, and post-U.S. withdrawal political unraveling.

The article features the legislation enacted by U.S. Congress for the improvement of operational contract support used by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)2007, the DOD is directed to develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting for combat operations and post-conflict operations.

The article focuses on the report "Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress" by the Congressional Research Service, a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress, as of May 17, 2013. Topics discussed include the role of contractors in the U.S. military operations, the U.S. Department of Defense initiative for armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the efforts of the U.S. Congress for operational support.

The article discusses congressional concerns facing the U.S. intelligence community. It highlights the collection capabilities of intelligence agencies that gather quantities of information on a daily basis. It cites the congressional concerns regarding major technical systems especially reconnaissance satellites. It offers information on the intelligence community and Iraq and Afghanistan and also discusses international terrorism.

The article reports on the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community. It highlights the effort of the congressional and executive bran to improve coordination among the different agencies and cites the leadership and managerial challenges in making cooperation effective. Some of the challenges discussed include international terrorism, techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters, and intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The article discusses the U.S. Congressional concerns in terms of collection capabilities, analytical quality, and the intelligence community and Iraq and Afghanistan. It states that there are also Congressional concerns regarding reconnaissance satellites. The intelligence community was criticized for its performance regarding to the aftermath of victory of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the fall of the Saddam Hussein's regime.

The article presents the U.S. Congressional Research Service report "The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress," prepared on February 21, 2011. The report examines current private security contractor (PSC) trends in Afghanistan and Iraq and the impact of using PSC personnel on military operations. It includes a summary, historical background of PSC use and options for legislative action by Congress.

The article discusses the legislation on the establishment of free-mail-to-troops postage benefit. Introduced in the 109th Congress were H.R. 932 or the Mailing Support to Troops Act of 2005 and H.R. 2874 or the Supply Our Soldiers act of 2005. It mentions that in the 110th Congress H.R. 1439 was introduced in March 2007 for establishing free postage benefits to troops in Afghanistan or Iraq, the S. 1444 was introduced in June 2007 and H.R. 1585 was passed on May 2007. It also notes H.R. 704 in the 111th Congress as well as H.R. 707.

The article presents report titled "The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of June 22, 2010. Topics discussed include trends of private security contractor (PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps taken by the U.S. Department of Defense to improve oversight and management and the role of the U.S. Congress over the use of PSCs.

This report examines Department of Defense (DOD) logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan administered through the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), as well as legislative initiatives which may impact the oversight and management of logistical support contracts for the delivery of troop support services. LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilizations. On April 18, 2008, DOD announced the Army's LOGCAP IV contract awards to three companies-DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX, through a full and open competition. The LOGCAP IV contract calls for each company to compete for task orders. Each company may be awarded up to $5 billion annually for troop support services with a maximum annual value of $15 billion. As of March 2010, each company has been awarded at least one task order under LOGCAP IV. Over the life of LOGCAP IV, the maximum contract value is $150 billion. The U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded the first performance task order on September 25, 2008, to Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., for logistical support services in Afghanistan. LOGCAP, an Army program designed to manage civilian contractors, is now in transition. The current LOGCAP III contractor supports the drawdown in Iraq by providing logistical services, theater transportation, augmentation of maintenance services, and other combat support services. According to Army contracting officials, all LOGCAP requirements in Kuwait have successfully transitioned from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV contracts. The transition of requirements is continuing from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV contracts, and will be used for combat support services in Afghanistan. Twelve tasks orders have been awarded under LOGCAP IV, and a total of $1.8 billion has been obligated under LOGCAP IV contracts. Congress is concerned about the federal oversight and management of DOD contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly under programs like LOGCAP. Recent assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Office of the Inspector General (DOD-IG), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Defense Contract Audit Agency reveal a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts. According to the congressional testimony of Charles Williams, director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, there are more than 600 oversight positions still vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress is also concerned about the size of contractor insurance premiums through the Defense Base Act (DBA); such premiums comprise significant costs under LOGCAP. The DBA requires that many federal government contractors and subcontractors provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees who work outside of the United States. The U.S. Army's LOGCAP contract covers costs for DBA insurance and includes significant overheard and other costs beyond the costs of the actual insurance claims. In March 2009, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) appointed a Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform to conduct a systematic review of the defense acquisition system. On March 23, 2010, the panel issued its final report, and provided the HASC its findings and recommendations. Largely as a result of the panel's work, H.R. 5013, the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act (IMPROVE) of 2010, was introduced on April 14, 2010. The bill seeks to improve the management and oversight of DOD's procurement of goods and services. The bill was amended by the HASC on April 21, 2010, discharged by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on April 23, 2010, and reported favorably in a HASC vote of 56-0. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the report "War Bonds in the Second World War: A Model for a New Iraq/Afghanistan War Bond?" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of March 1, 2010. Topics discussed include the legislative bills introduced by the U.S. Congress for issuance of wars bonds in Iraq and Afghanistan, the impacts of economic and financial market conditions during the Second World War and the role of the federal government to control treasury securities.

The United States is relying on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security. Private firms known as Private Security Contractors (PSCs) are hired to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Iraq and Afghanistan DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. As of June 2009, there were over 18,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent contracting trends indicate that the number of such contractors may continue to increase. Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors has raised a number of issues for Congress, including concerns over transparency and accountability. Much of the attention given to PSCs by Congress and the media is a result of numerous high-profile incidents where security contractors were accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately. These actions may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some analysts and DOD officials believe that poor contractor oversight significantly contributed to contractor abuses. As a result, Congress has also focused on whether DOD is effectively managing PSCs and whether improved contractor oversight could have prevented or minimized the impact of these incidents. DOD officials have stated that the military's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with Congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD's attention on the importance of managing PSCs. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees such contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. These steps include tracking contracting data, coordinating the movements of PSCs throughout the battle space, issuing new policy on managing PSCs, and updating DOD doctrine to incorporate the role of contractors. However, these efforts are still in progress and could take three years or more to effectively implement. This report examines current private security contractor trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps DOD has taken to improve oversight and management, and the extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of security contractors into its doctrine and strategy. It also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over the use of PSCs and includes options for Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence "consumers"—ranging from the White House to cabinet agencies to military commanders—must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence "targets" have been neglected. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for Defense Department agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished. International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st century, presents a difficult analytical challenge. Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Whether all terrorist surveillance efforts have been consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has been a matter of controversy. Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members have criticized the performance of the Intelligence Community in regard to current conditions in Iraq, Iran, and other areas. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate, remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is widely agreed, is also essential. Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate, real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations challenges traditional organizational relationships and requires innovative technological approaches. Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing rights or the application of a host countrys laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty (i.e., as an executive agreement or a nonlegal political commitment). Occasionally, the substance and form of a proposed security agreement may become a source of dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In November 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, and contemplated a long-term presence by U.S. forces in Iraq. This announcement became a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern appeared to dissipate when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in an agreement that did not contain a long-term, legally binding security commitment by the United States, but instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. It is likely that future disputes will arise between the political branches regarding the entering or implementation of international security agreements. Regardless of the form a security arrangement may take, Congress has several tools to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background on the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Iraq. The report discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. For more information regarding the U.S.-Iraq security agreements, see CRS Report R40011, U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight, by R. Chuck Mason, and CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Agreements: Congressional Oversight Activities and Legislative Response, by Matthew C. Weed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq since mid- 2003. To date, about $49 billion has been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. Most recently, in June 2008, Congress approved over $4 billion for Iraq reconstruction in an FY2008/2009 supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252). The FY2009 regular foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 111-8, Division H, H.R. 1105, signed by the President on March 11, 2009) provides no economic aid to Iraq with the exception of demining assistance. Security aid and most economic aid are provided in supplemental appropriations bills. Contributions pledged by other donors at the October 2003 Madrid donor conference and in subsequent meetings have amounted to roughly $17 billion in grants and loans. On June 28, 2004, the entity implementing assistance programs, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), dissolved, and sovereignty was returned to Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004, returned control of assets held in the Development Fund for Iraq to the government of Iraq. U.S. economic assistance is now provided through the U.S. embassy, while security aid is chiefly managed by the Pentagon. A significant number of reconstruction activities, especially those involving construction of road, sanitation, electric power, oil production, and other infrastructure, are completed or near completion. Security concerns slowed progress and added considerable expense to these efforts. Reconstruction priorities and funding mechanisms have changed over time. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), the main U.S. assistance account in the first few years, is no longer available, and most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded. However, many small-scale, targeted community-level infrastructure efforts are funded under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The key emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The report will be updated as events warrant. For discussion of the Iraq political situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses U.S. assistance for reconstruction in Iraq, as of March 2009. The topics discussed include U.S. Congress' approval for reconstruction funds in Iraq, the dissolution of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in June 2004 and economic aid for training of Iraqi forces. Also discussed is the United Nations Security Council's resolution related to control of assets in Iraq.

The article focuses on a report released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) for the U.S. Congress as of August 15, 2008 on Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq. Topics discussed include violence and insecurity as a result of terrorism and insurgency in Iraq, refugee situations in Syria and Jordan, and the fear of the development of humanitarian crisis in Iraq after the Iraq War due to post-war insurgency and sectarian violence.

The article focuses on a report released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) for the U.S. Congress as of August 27, 2008 on estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. Topics discussed include governmental and non-governmental sources of Iraqi civilian death statistics, quarterly reports on human rights in Iraq published by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) from 2005-2007 that include civilian casualty figures, and violence-related mortality in Iraq.

The article focuses on the U.S. Congressional response on the U.S.-Iraq strategic framework. Among the enacted and proposed legislation include the Funding Prohibition Concerning Legal Status of U.S. Forces in Iraq, Congressional Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007, and Iraq Strategic Agreement Review Act of 2008. Also mentioned are the hearings conducted by the Congress on the proposed Iraq Agreements.

The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. In light of the "Declaration of Principles,"signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, and the possibility that the United States will enter into a SOFA with the Government of Iraq, there is considerable interest in Congress in SOFAs, what they may cover, and how they have been concluded in the past. Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement; rather, it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements. There has been considerable interest in possible future security agreements between the United States and Iraq. The Administration has indicated that it intends to enter into two distinctive agreements. The first is a non-binding security agreement, and the second is a U.S.-Iraq SOFA. The SOFA may be unique from other SOFAs concluded by the United States in that it may contain authorization by the host government -- the government of Iraq -- for U.S. forces to engage in military operations within Iraq. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. A list of current agreements is included at the end of this report categorized in tables according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion on the second supplemental appropriations for international affairs, military operations and other purposes in the U.S. for fiscal year (FY) 2008. Topics include the action taken by the U.S. Congress on the FY 2008 supplemental appropriations through December 2007, the reconstruction assistance for Iraq, and the remaining and additional supplemental funding requests for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).