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Cultural impacts in planning increasingly receive attention from both academics and practitioners around Europe. However, comparative planning cultures studies face the challenges of lacking systematic comparison and empirical evidence, especially at the micro level of planning actors' behaviour in interaction. This article aims to fill these gaps by (1) operationalizing the concept of planning culture; and (2) measuring and comparing it. We base our operationalization on the culturized planning model (Knieling, J., & Othengrafen, F. (Eds.). (2009). Planning cultures in Europe: Decoding cultural phenomena in urban and regional planning. Farnham: Ashgate). We complement its explanatory power by building a link between planning culture and planning outcome through attitudes of planning actors. This article focuses on three attitudes: risk, trust and co-operation. To measure and compare these attitudes, we adopt three experimental economic games and conduct an experiment with public and private planning practitioners in three European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. Both cross-country and public-private differences in these attitudes are tested in the experiment. Our experimental findings suggest that Dutch planning actors value risk aversion and trust; Norwegian planning actors value cooperation; while (French-speaking) Belgian planning actors do not value these variables that much. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Value capturing is considered a promising additional way of funding public infrastructure development. However, its implementation is often problematic because the instruments that can be used for it (ie, taxes, fees, and other types of fiscal regulation) generally face a lack of support. An alternative approach to value capturing might be to stimulate the stakeholders to bargain over the distribution of the increment values. This paper presents an analysis of bargaining processes with respect to the implementation of value capturing based on concepts drawn from cooperative game theory in partition function form. The institutional setting of location development related to infrastructure development in the Netherlands is used to provide an empirical context to the analysis. As a validation, the game is played with experts in Dutch planning and infrastructure development practice. Our study shows that a game-theoretical approach offers a useful method to conceptualise relationships between different stakeholders and analyse the bargaining and negotiation processes to reach an agreement about an efficient and fair allocation of the increment land values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Land and property development processes obviously can be seen as a social situation in which the interaction of individuals or groups of individuals is one of the essential elements. To study and understand social situations, it is important to analyse how the decisions of actors are interrelated and how those decisions result in outcomes. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical modelling approach to analyse it. Hence, the objective of the paper is to investigate the usefulness as well as the limitations of game theoretical modelling for analysing and predicting the behaviour of actors in decision-making processes with respect to the development of land and property. For that purpose, we have developed game models for the case study of the development of a greenfield residential location in the Netherlands with respect to the implementation of new Dutch legislation on cost recovery. Our study demonstrates that game theory could help us to identify the key strategic decisions of land and property development projects by showing the different payoffs for stakeholders of their chosen strategies and selecting the equilibrium in which all stakeholders involved are best of. We also found many limitations of using game theory in our case study especially regarding the assumptions underlying the model. However, we conclude that game theoretical modelling can be a useful decision support tool in spatial planning, because it provides a way to think about the complexity of strategic interaction and, in particular, about the conflicting structure of collective decision-making processes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]