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Has Vladimir Putin always stood against NATO's eastward enlargement? Detractors claim that Moscow has invariably objected to the transatlantic organisation moving towards its borders. This article challenges the prevailing orthodoxy by demonstrating that at the turn of the century, the Russian head of state was quite comfortable with NATO 'setting up shop' in Eastern Europe. Drawing upon declassified US diplomatic cables and other historical sources, the presented material speaks to selective forgetfulness on the part of the Russian leadership. The first years of 'Putinism' were not marked by assertions that NATO's eastward expansion complicated relations with the West. On the contrary, his public remarks suggested that Russia was not opposed to this process. Simply put, Putin's own words at that time refute his present-day arguments and display of grievances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the University of Latvia. History / Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture is the property of University of Latvia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I explore how the popular image of Baltic 'Westernness,' widespread in the period from the mid-1950s to late 1980s, has undergone discursive reconstruction in Putin's Russia. Using popular geopolitics as a theoretical approach, and critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a method, I demonstrate that among other popular geopolitical visions, the reconstructed image in question has been employed by the state media to articulate Russia's current foreign policy agenda in relation to the Baltic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the debates surrounding the status and role of Russian Émigrés. The full-scale invasion launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 came as a shock to many, including many segments of the Russian population, but the outflux of individuals opposing Putin has been present from the 2014. That said, the invasion transformed this trickle into an outright deluge whereby estimated 700,000 up to 1,200,000 people left Russia. The article gives the historical context, describing the policies towards diaspora communities of the countries in conflict during and after WWII. Then will engage with the dilemmas surrounding the decision either to admit Russian émigrés or close the doors on them. Current and future policies towards Russian émigrés are considered with recommendation to continue giving preference to individual approach in assessing each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the identification and explanation of the threats that the Russian Federation is creating against the Baltic States and their security implications. The research process established that the Russian Federation will destabilize the Baltic States and the regional security environment. Threats to the security of the Baltic States are a consequence of Russian strategic thinking on the offensive use of military force. Serious military challenges to the Baltic States are posed by the Russian Federation's A2/AD multi-domain capabilities located in the Kaliningrad Oblast. The Russian Federation will also try to regain its influence by influencing below the measure short of war through political, economic and informational instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many experts claimed that in Europe there has not been such an assault on the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity since the end of Cold War." Moreover, politicians and researchers urged the U.S. to apply a containment strategy towards Russia once again. Meanwhile, the U.S. president Joe Biden made it clear that the U.S. was moving toward Russia's containment 2.0: he called Putin's actions "a naked aggression" and vowed to make Russia pay "economically and strategically." The article examines Russia's containment strategy in Biden's administration foreign policy and its implications to the Baltic states. What vision about Russia's containment strategy does the Biden administration have in terms of goals, instruments, and challenges? How does the administration implement its plans? Has the containment strategy been transformed and adapted to the new circumstances of the 21st century? What role does the Biden administration foresee for the Baltic States in Russia's containment strategy? What risks and opportunities does this idea present for the Baltic States? These are the questions that the article addresses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1991, when they regained their independence, the Baltic States have made a concerted effort to become part of the Western alliance system. The article is based on the idea that the primary reason for this orientation cannot be explained solely by normative elements such as identity or culture. Undoubtedly, the West has always been a world to which these countries in question did not belong. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the main priority of the Baltic States, which are categorised as small states, is to preserve their independence. As a result of their historical experiences, Russia is the biggest obstacle that the Baltic countries see in front of these goals. In order to balance the renewed and intensely felt Russian threat, the West has been seen as the only real strategic choice for the region's countries. This article argues that the countries of the region have no alternative option in this process, which resulted in membership in NATO and the EU. Indeed, historical experience has shown that these countries' strategic choices, such as bandwagoning to preserve their independence, which would mean aligning with the threatener, or avoiding being the centre of attention of the adversary by remaining neutral have not yielded results. Therefore, this article aims to try to understand the logic of the Baltic states' strategic choices based on the balance of threat theory. This is because by turning towards the West, the countries of the region have sought to balance not Russian power but the threat they perceive from this country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sweden was one of the very few Western countries officially to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR in 1940 as lawful. While this naturally had a detrimental effect on the reputation of Sweden in Baltic liberation activist circles during the end stage of the Cold War, it also meant that Swedish diplomats did not have their hands tied to the same extent as those states that had not recognized the annexations. The first permanent Swedish 'department office' was already established in Tallinn in December 1989, and Swedish diplomats such as Lars Fredén and Dag Sebastian Ahlander could experience the rise of the Baltic liberation movement first-hand and at an early stage. This article focuses on Swedish diplomatic reporting from the emerging Baltic states and Russia in 1989–1991 as a source of the pro-Baltic policy shift in Swedish foreign policy, which challenged the dominant policy discourse in Sweden that prioritized appeasement of the USSR/Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of this article is the function of sport in Russia's bilateral relations with the Baltic States. The author attempts to define the goals which the Russian Federation wants to accomplish by using sport as a 'soft power' in relations with the Baltic States. The concept of the article is based on an analysis of three forms of sport politicisation described in the subject literature - as a collector (a carrier of certain values or ideas), a catalyst (a factor initiating processes or events) and a facilitator (the means facilitating communication and understanding). The examples provided as an illustration of the theses relate to the events that took place from 2002 to 2018. The source material consists predominantly of information obtained from online information portals, such as Delfi, RIA, Nowosti and Postimees. The analysis has showed that, in its relations with the Baltic States, Russia tries to use sport to strengthen its position and improve its image internationally. It also attempts to implement a historical policy at sporting events as well as use sporting rivalry as a demonstration of its power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Acta Historica Tallinnensia is the property of Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

During the second half of the nineteenth century, statistics attracted significant attention from government officials and educated elites as a method of quantifying socioeconomic change and rendering human and natural resources visible through data. However, we still know little about how local communities responded to changing methods of gathering statistical data during the gradual shift away from forms of enumeration based on legal estates and households toward modern methods of individual enumeration by census. Rarely do we approach the history of censuses from the perspective of the census subjects to consider the experiences of those being counted. This article analyzes interactions between census organizers and local populations in the three Russian imperial Baltic provinces (Estland, Livland, and Kurland) in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a form of administrative intervention, censuses opened up a space for local populations to articulate opinions and question the overlapping layers of authority within the empire between local elites, the provincial administration, and tsarist government. Examining the history of censuses from the perspective of local communities in the Russian Empire demonstrates how attitudes and resistance to censuses were closely tied to particular local issues and concerns. The Baltic case study adds nuance to existing discussions on forms of census resistance by broadening the focus beyond identity politics and conflict over forms of confessional, linguistic, and national classification. Instead, census subjects in the Baltic voiced concerns about how the local authorities might use individual enumeration as a form of administrative surveillance and social control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia once again pushes its way to emerge as a major power in the international order after losing this status in the modern 'time of troubles' in the 1990s. Its political and military strategic leaders demonstrated willingness to employ all instruments of power as means of escalation to achieve this goal. Meanwhile, tactical military commanders are the ones in direct control of military escalation means and therefore their motivations, agility and rationality are also important factor in the Russian escalation processes towards the West. This research will look at these processes through lenses of game and decision-making theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Relations / Medzinarodne Vztahy is the property of University of Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of International Relations and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Stratum Plus Journal is the property of P.P. Stratum plus and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Defender 2020 military exercise and its related deployments look fairly reasonable and rational from the perspective of the Baltic States and NATO, but when theoretically analyzing its options left, the Russian political leadership could react severely or enact a series of policies from such an initial "provocation". More importantly, Russia could perceive that the Baltic Sea Region is being transformed into a potential area for confrontation from which also they could benefit from additional escalation. In the broadest sense, the article tries to both clarify and join the intentions of NATO and the reaction of Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the Western sanctions on Russia and endeavours to evaluate the medium-term implications of these sanctions for post-communist neighbours of Russia. Growth spillovers are examined via VAR model. This model reveals that the Western sanctions against Russia have significant impact on Russia's post-communist neighbours: the accumulated response of CIS GDP to a 1% shock to Russian GDP is −0.72, while the accumulated response of CEE GDP is −0.22. Export, remittance and FDI links of these countries with Russia are examined using panel regressions. Almost all CEE countries are less integrated with Russia compared to CIS countries. Oil and gas exporting CIS countries are not directly dependent on Russia. The remaining CIS countries are the most vulnerable group, and the remittance channel retains its importance for their economies. Costs of Western sanctions for the CIS countries can be minimised by integrating these implications to the design and implementation process of sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's rule in Russia 20 years ago, Russia has lost much of the leverage that it previously enjoyed in the Baltics. On the one hand, Russia has antagonized Baltic states through its wars in Georgia and Ukraine, on the other hand, deep integration in the EU and NATO has pulled the Baltic states from the Russian zone of influence. This article discusses the gradual decrease of Russia's influence in the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania while considering the increased NATO presence in the region, Baltic energy security, and Baltic Russian-speaking communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Istanbul Commerce University Journal of Social Sciences / İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Istanbul Commerce University Journal of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study discusses differences between Russia and the Baltic States in terms of their strategic narratives, as well as how they interpret key terms and concepts in the field of security. To frame the scope of the study, the strategic narrative of Russia for the Baltic countries and the Baltic strategic narrative(s) for Russia are compared and analysed. Both sides are also locked within the bigger framework of European Union's economic sanctions against Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance's deterrence concept. On the other hand, the Baltic States and Russia have a lot to gain from possible improvements in economic relations and reduction of regional security tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to reveal the themes, intensity and reasons for the securitization of the Baltic States building on the analysis of the public rhetoric of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in 2008-2017. The current bilateral relations between Russia and the Baltic States happen to be hostile, often involving mutual criticism, aggressive rhetoric from the Russian side, and the security policy of the Baltic States is often seen in Russia as a threat to its national security. The results of this study make it possible to identify the publicly declared interests of Russia and their evolution vis-à-vis the Baltic States and to see the importance of the Baltic States in Russia's common foreign and security policy. The theory of constructivism serves as a theoretical basis for this study. On the basis of this theory, the author has developed a model for the study of the securitization of the Baltic States, which helps to highlight the context in which the Baltic States recur most frequently and to assesses the goals pursued by the securitization of the Baltic States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will introduce the term "pribaltification", designating the tendencies in the Soviet Union and Russia to imagine and represent the Soviet Baltic republics - and later the independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - as a largely uniform political and cultural entity, and to significantly blur the cultural and linguistic distinctions between the natives of these republics/countries. Analyzing the narrative and semiotic systems that underpin design and production strategies in an audio-visual text of a Russian television serial Gastrolery [Guest Performers], I will demonstrate that representations/ metageographies of Lithuania and Lithuanians articulated in the film closely align with the principle of "pribaltification". Thus, an image of Lithuania and Lithuanians appears to be employed synecdochically, whereby one specific state embodies onscreen all three Baltic countries as a whole. I will also suggest that "pribaltification" in Gastrolery may not be driven exclusively by popular Russian metageographies of the Baltic States. Thus, analysis of the serial may make it possible to observe traces of the Russian state's geopolitical discourse on the Baltic States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latvian--Far Eastern cross-cultural relations in the early modern period and late modern period were determined by the changing socioeconomic, political, and religious situation of the Baltics. This was related to the particular European (and Western) understanding of Asia, the strong link between Russia and the Far East, and the specific and heterogeneous situation of Latvian society. In this context, Korea works as a kind of litmus test and even mirror of the Latvian world outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every now and then, somewhere in the world events take place that are regarded as having International news value. Nowadays, it is easy to become a mediated observer and to have an opinion about something that happens on the other side of the world. In September 2017, the Russian Federation's Zapad military exercise was an event which gained widespread media attention on an international scale. It brought unusually large media coverage to the Baltic States due to their geographic closeness to the exercise area and the fact that the Russian Federation is their most important security threat. The study researches the messages that spread in Western online news media which have a strong potential to influence the perception of the Baltic States among the allies and their societies at large. The aim of this study is to examine how the Baltic States were presented in the Western media in the context of the Zapad-2017 excercise and indicate lessons for strategic communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As early as 1994, scholars, analysts and policymakers began to wonder the extent to which the Baltic States mattered in the relationship between Russia and the West. The general consensus for the following 20 years was that the Baltic States matter considerably, especially following their inclusion in both the EU and NATO in 2004. However, in the past few years two trends have emerged which begin to call this accepted knowledge into question. First, the relationship between Russia and the West has turned more hostile following nearly 20 years of detente. The West insists (especially NATO) insists that it is within its right to protect states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union/Russia's "near abroad". Russia, on the other hand, insists that NATO incursion into the "shared neighborhood" is a violation of trust and overstepping normal geopolitical bounds. Second, the Baltic States who once presented something of a united front for the West against Russia, no longer appear to have a common approach to foreign policy. While Estonia leans toward Scandinavia, and Lithuania leans toward Poland and Ukraine, Latvia is a bit of an odd man out with nowhere to turn. Furthermore, even other states in the Shared Neighborhood no longer seem to see Latvia as a valuable ally within the West. Considering this state of affairs, this paper considers whether Latvia matters anymore in regional geopolitics, or whether they are losing relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Next to the growing tensions in global economic arena, the challenges for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are often related to Russia's actions and ambitions. Mutual economic relations have been particularly tense at the beginning of the 1990s, in 1995-1997 and then in 2007-2009, when Russia has imposed sanctions against the Baltic countries and has been putting economic, political or propagandist pressure on them. The current "sanctioning war" is seriously testing the mutual economic relations again and is raising the question whether there is a hope for normalization of trade relations in the nearest future between the Baltic countries and Russia. Thus, the article focuses on the trade dynamics between the Baltic countries and Russia over the period 2004-2016 and analyses the main factors that have influenced this trade dynamics. The article will also debate the outlook for trade relations to be normal again in the light of the sanctioning war between Russia and the EU and its allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the rumours that circulated in the Russian army in Chechnya in the first decade of the twenty-first century, one of the most widespread involved women-snipers, former biathlon champions from the Baltic states, who allegedly fought alongside Chechen militants. More than ten years later, the rumour surfaced once again in Ukraine. This article explores the different aspects of a war legend that was born among soldiers, was embodied in fiction and popular culture, and used in official propaganda. It shows that the focus on Baltic mercenaries allows to present Russia simultaneously as the successor of the Soviet Union fighting against fascism, and as a state besieged by Islamic terrorism and American expansionism. The fact that women served as snipers in the Soviet army in the Second World War may give to the legend its particular post-Soviet characteristics, but the strength of the legend comes also from its embodying the fear of threatened masculinities. The conclusion reflects on the possible impact of the legend for civilians in areas torn by war, and on the ethical issue it raises for the researcher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A requirement of the entry of the Baltic countries to the EU was to bring the state of transport infrastructure in line with the requirements of the integration group. For the purpose of integrating the Baltic States into a common European space, a transport strategy was developed for the Baltic Sea Region in the early 1990s. The main goal of this study is to research the advantages and disadvantages of Rail Baltica's (RB) implementation and its prospects for the Baltic States and Russia. The authors applied logical analysis, a comparative method to the primary information. A SWOT-analysis was carried out to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the project, as well as the opportunities and threats of its realisation. The main goals of RB are the development of high quality passenger and freight transportation between the Baltic States and other European countries (via a transport node in Warsaw with a route to Berlin) and the encouragement of regional development in Poland and the Baltic States. Construction of the Rail Baltica railway will extend the capacity of cargo transport on the railway and develop freight traffic to/from European countries (via a new freight route North - South), it may also reduce travel time, traffic flow on ViaBaltica, Polish and German motorways as well, and ecological friendly rail transport will be developed. Thus, there will be new opportunities to develop transport and logistics services and tourism too. Via Rail Baltica is intended to transport at least 13 million tons of cargos and five million passengers a year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses a key legal debate that the Baltic NATO members ought to engage in: what constitutes an "armed attack" and what interpretation should be made of this concept in order to deter recent Russian hybrid warfare strategies. These questions are considered in connection with a more general issue regarding the law of self-defence: the question of what constitutes an armed attack in international law. This article will try to present a broad definition and context of Russian hybrid warfare and how it is challenging traditional jus ad bellum paradigms. Too few policy-makers have paid detailed attention to the new Russian "lawfare" in Ukraine, using specific military and non-military tactics in order to blur the lines between "armed attack" and mere political intervention. Meanwhile, legal scholars detach their analysis from actual policy-serving considerations and tend to acquiesce to some very restrictive theories of the use force in self-defence. For some countries, like the Baltic ones, facing strategic exposure - because of both threatening neighbours and low military capacities - the jus ad bellum paradigm should not be construed as another layer of obstacle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indigenous village of Bykovskiy is located 40 km from Tiksi, the administrative center of Bulunskiy District (Ulus), in the northern part of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), Russia. Founded as a Soviet fishing cooperative, it became home to Indigenous Sakha, Evenkis, Evens, as well as to Russian settlers and political prisoners from the Baltic states. Post-Soviet transformations, coupled with escalating environmental change processes, has been altering the local economy and subsistence activities since the 1990s. Although our interlocutors directly observed and experienced such changes, they seemed to ignore the visible problem of severe coastal erosion that was destroying a local cemetery. This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the study region in 2019, and combines approaches from the anthropology of climate change with reception and communication studies. It examines "ignorance" as a strategy of adaptation to multiple stressors under historically reproduced colonial structures of governance., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

The Baltic States are once again worried that their security is under threat. The US and NATO have responded with air patrols, joint exercises, and battalion-sized ground-force deployments. As important as these efforts have been, they do not fully address Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and precision strike capabilities, both of which undermine NATO’s stratagem for deterring aggression in the first place. Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A Hunzeker assess the current military imbalance and describe two conflict scenarios to show how A2/AD and precision weapons threaten extended deterrence. They conclude with a discussion of the policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs that several Baltic States including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia has become members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004, while there not included in practice, and also mentions Russia's effort to influence the internal and external policies of the three states.

From the very beginning of the Soviet regime, Baltic states had a different place and issue in the Russian agenda. They had reacted harshly Soviet practices although they have some inevitable links with Russia from the political, commercial, sociological points of views. Unlike other Soviet republics, these states are members of NATO and the European Union. These affiliations have added some new dynamics in the relationships that are worthwhile to scrutinize. The study tries to trace the causes of concerns and interests of the Russia- Baltic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the Russian military policy concerning the Baltic area including Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and discusses the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine, which erupted in 2014. Other topics mentioned in this article include the role of the NATO, the annexation of the Crimea, and the Ukraine government policy.

The review is compiled on the basis of the results of the total ozone (TO) monitoring in the CIS and Baltic countries that functions in the operational regime at the Central Aerological Observatory (CAO). The monitoring system uses the data from the national network of M-124 filter ozonometers under methodological supervision of the Main Geophysical Observatory. The quality of the functioning of the entire system is under operational control that bases on the observations obtained from the OMI satellite equipment (NASA, the USA). The basic TO observation data are generalized for each month of the fourth quarter of 2014, for the quarter as a whole, and for the whole year. The results of regular observations of surface ozone content carried out in Moscow region and Crimea are also considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to describe a platform of interconnected international shell companies operated through Baltic banks, used for trade-based money laundering (TBML) across Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Design/methodology/approach -- This is a case study that draws extensively on the results of journalist investigations and court cases to describe one example of a money-laundering platform. Findings -- Platforms of international shell companies operated through Baltic banks play a key role in TBML for the post-Soviet countries. They are created for systematic laundering of revenues from tax evasion, tax fraud, corruption and criminality across the post-Soviet space, and also globally. Research limitations/implications -- This study implies that TBML for the post-Soviet space is a specialized industry, hosted by collaborating banks centered in the Baltic states, in conjunction with mass use of international shell companies. Practical implications -- This study implies that analysis of suspicious transactions cannot remain on the level of single companies but has to take into account the interconnected payment patterns produced by such a platform. Originality/value -- Provides the first study of a trade-based money-laundering platform operating in the post-Soviet space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyzes Russia’s ‘aggressive’ nationalist energy transit policy in the Baltic Sea region to offer an alternative understanding of the consequences for the Baltic states. Four case studies will be used to analyze Russia’s energy transit policy in the Baltic Sea region. First, the 2003 closure of the oil pipeline in the port city Venstpils in Latvia, second, the closure of the Druzbha oil pipeline in Lithuania in 2006, third, the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, and finally, the construction of new Russian ports in Ust-Luga and Primorsk. The case studies will be carried out using a theoretical framework based on Alexander Wendt’s constructivist works as well as David Lake’s works on hierarchy in international relations. This article concludes that Russia has accepted the fact that the Baltic states were not willing to enter into a hierarchical relationship and that Russia recognizes the Baltic states as independent neighbours. While this does not improve the energy security situation for the Baltic states, it does suggest progress in the normalization of Baltic-Russian relations which could lead to an improved security environment in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents remarks made by the author at a 2013 conference on international relations and European integration. It is stated that the primary cause of tensions between the European Union (EU) and Russia over the status of the Baltic states results from EU efforts to reduce the role of Russia's energy industries in supplying power resource exports to those countries.

The review is compiled on the basis of the results of the operation of the total ozone (TO) monitoring in the CIS and Baltic countries functioning in the operational regime at the Central Aerological Observatory (CAO). The monitoring system uses the data from the national network of M-124 filter ozonometers under the methodological supervision of the Main Geophysical Observatory. The quality of the functioning of the entire system is under operational control based on the observations obtained from the OMI satellite equipment (NASA, the United States). The basic TO observation data are generalized for each month of the fourth quarter of 2013, for the quarter as a whole, and for the whole year. Some results of regular observations of surface ozone content carried out in Moscow region and Crimea are also considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politologija is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the strengthening of absolutism during the reign of Catherine II the pressure on the autonomy of the landed gentry in the Baltics was intensified as well. The Baltic provinces, especially Vidzeme (Liefland), were able to offer the empress the necessary conditions for progressive reforms which were lacking in other provinces of Russia or which even prevented implementation of these reforms. From that time on a lasting, politically unsettled situation set in between the Russian central government and the Baltic provinces Vidzeme and Estonia. A situation arose where the central government strived towards closer integration of the Baltics in the structure of the Russian Empire, but at the same time it was unable to cancel the autonomy of the Baltics in a radical way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]