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This symposium began with a call for papers "reassessing the validity of the Chicago School's assumptions about competition and considering whether a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement is now warranted." That framing uncritically accepts the premises of antitrust's new populist movement:first, that "the Chicago School" marked an abrupt break from prior academic analysis of antitrust law, and second, that its adherents shared acommonpositive agenda fundamentally at odds with robust antitrust enforcement. Both of those premises are false. The Chicago School represented alogical continuation of the antitrust analysis developed over the preceding decades, and its members shared no positive doctrinal agenda. Instead, they shared acommitment only to promoting consumer interests by means of rigorous economics. Of course, that commitment influenced how the economics profession and antitrust policymakers thought, and progressive "post-Chicago" scholarship today shares the same commitment to consumer welfare and economic rigor. Such scholarship thus has farmore in common with Chicago School scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s than with today's populist movement, which abandons any coherent framework altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics from both the right and the left claim that modern antitrust doctrine, rooted in consumer welfare, is inadequate to handle the challenges of the twenty-first century economy. They express nostalgia for 1960s antitrust, when the field had no clear objectives and cases were decided on impressionistic notions of "fairness" and good corporate citizenship. This article exposes the intellectual void at the heart of this new populist movement and begins by following Justice Holmes' tenet that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." More than 80 years ago, the A&P grocery chain was a vertically integrated retailer that made use of unprecedented scale and innovation to offer consumers a wider range of products than the competition and at lower prices. Yet A&P's very success, which came at the expense of smaller and less efficient competitors, triggered a backlash: first from Congress, in the form of the Robinson–Patman Act, and then from the Justice Department, in the form of successful prosecution under the Sherman Act. These attacks on A&P bear an eerie resemblance to attacks today on leading online innovators. Increasingly integrated and efficient retailers—first A&P; then "big box" brick-and-mortar stores; and now online retailers—have challenged traditional retail models by offering consumers lower prices and greater convenience. For decades, critics across the political spectrum have reacted to such disruption by urging Congress, the courts, and the enforcement agencies to stop these American success stories by revising antitrust doctrine to protect small businesses rather than the interests of consumers. Using antitrust law to punish pro-competitive behavior makes no more sense today than it did when the government attacked A&P for offering consumers too good a deal on groceries. In addition, antitrust doctrine does not need an overhaul. It is shaped by many economic perspectives, follows no one "School," and is flexible enough to address any monopoly abuses in today's economy. It is also well-calibrated to serve its central function: promoting consumer welfare. It does so not only by prohibiting conduct that harms consumers in the long run, but also by avoiding interference with conduct that might appear problematic to non-economists but that demonstrably benefits consumers over time. Antitrust remains a work in progress, but it is far superior to any alternative that the critics propose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1975, particularly Section 13(b) regarding redress. Topics include jurisdiction under the Act, how the FTC can compel compliance, and the prosecution of fraud. Information is provided on the legislative history of the Act and the powers of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

The article discusses the 1930 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case United States v. Standard Oil of California in relation to government policies, politics, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as of March 2012. The formation of the U.S. Oil and Gas Price Fraud Working Group is addressed, along with investigations into allegations of anticompetitive conduct. FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch is mentioned, along with Section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act and consumer welfare.

The article focuses on the Chicago School of Antitrust and why it should not apply to antitrust law post-2000. Topics include price theory, how economic theory influences U.S. antitrust law, and the Chicago School of Economics. Information is provided on per se legality, broad safe harbors, and the plausibility standard.

In a concurrently published comment in this journal, Professor Wright mischaracterizes both the legal basis and the factual context of the FTC's Three Tenors opinion, recently affirmed by Judge Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Neither opinion relies on the timing of the moratorium agreement. Under either opinion, the agreement to eliminate advertising and price competition would have been proscribed even had it occurred at the formation of the joint venture. Moreover, the factual underpinnings of the case differ from Professor Wright's assertions. In particular, the facts demonstrate that the joint venture did not attempt to promote the combination of various Three Tenors (3T) products. The only coordination with the first two albums was a restriction on their discounting and advertising. In fact, there was none of the usual production, distribution, and promotion among these three albums that is normally associated with an integrated effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses clarifications of the U.S. state action and Noerr-Perrington doctrine exemptions in March 2004. Issues with regard to the Noerr doctrine; Interpretation of the clear articulation requirement; Elaboration of the standards for the active supervision requirement; Consideration on the explicit recognition of a market participant exception to the state action doctrine.

Discusses Robert Pitofsky's role as one of the key founding fathers of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Recognition that consumer welfare is the agency's reason for being; Pitofsky's achievements as director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection; Market-based approach to the regulation of advertising; Application of consumer protection principles to the Internet.

Examines how the contemporary engagement of antitrust with economics began in 1977 with the United States Supreme Court's ruling on 'Schwinn Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.' Endorsement of the court decision of the economic approach to antitrust; Role of empirical evidence in antitrust; Controversy over the decision on when truncated analysis is appropriate or not.

Argues on the rule of reason as contained in the United States Supreme Court announcement on the case California Dental Association (CDA) v. Federal Trade Commission. Necessity and empirical foundation of categorization; Steps of truncated analysis; Consistency of the CDA with the pronouncement on the appropriate rule of reason analysis.

Presents a response to an article regarding anticompetitive effects of monopolization cases in the United States. Position of the Federal Trade Commission regarding the issue; Discussion of the chronology of agency statements regarding monopolization during the second half of 1998; Consideration on the alleged price/output test.

Focuses on budget deficits during the term of President Ronald Reagan in the United States. Claims of critics against the budget and economic plans of Reagan; Characterization of Reagan administration as Rosy Scenario; Inaccuracy of the forecast in administration deficit; Causes of discrepancy in the deficit forecast.

Argues that the position of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on monopolization law is wrong. Role of experience in antitrust law in truncated analysis; Factual problems with the agency's analysis on so-called relational contracts and history of monopolization cases; Sample of cases regarding relational contracts.

Comments on the article which argued that the U.S. Congress controls agency decisions. Influence of the Congress over the Federal Trade Commission; Role of committee preferences in agency policymaking; Problem in the choice of variables regarding credit cases.

Presents the text of the speech made by Timothy J. Muris, professor at George Mason University School of Law, during the 39th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law in on April 10&mdash12;, 1991 in Washington D.C., on the topic of economics and consumer protection.

Examines the application of the rule of reason to antitrust law cases in the U.S. Views of courts on price-fixing and market division; Issues on the existence of market power; Impact of competition on the industry.

Presents a text of the speech given by Timothy J. Muris, director of the U.S. Bureau of Consumer Protection, on consumer protection.

The article focuses on the costs of U.S. President Bill Clinton's health care reform plan. In the 1990 budget agreement, the U.S. Congress and President Bush claimed that they were cutting health programs by $35 billion over five years and saving $7.5 billion by extending the current policy regarding patient payment of premiums for Part B of Medicare. Since the 1990 agreement, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has revised the cost of these programs nine times. Although the direction of the mistakes should be random, with as many overestimates as underestimates, the CBO has consistently underestimated these costs. In short, although the Clinton administration's plan implies that the projected rates of growth can be obtained without a major change in provider and patient incentives, such change appears highly unlikely to be accomplished, especially in Medicare and Medicaid.