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The article examines the legal aspects of the practice of heckling, particularly whether heckling is protected free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a violation of free speech or both. It also examines the philosophical background of heckling in the works of philosopher John Stuart Mill and the U.S. Supreme Court case In re Kay. The concepts of liberty and political choreography are also discussed.

Courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, make important decisions about rights by voting, and often the decision is determined by a bare majority. But the principle of majority decision (MD) for courts has not been much reflected on. There is very little scholarly literature on this and only a handful of articles proposing alternatives to MD in the judicial context. So what justifies judges' reliance on MD? In democratic contexts, MD is usually defended on one of three grounds: (i) as a decision-procedure that is efficient; (ii) as a way of reaching the objectively best decision; or (iii) as a way of respecting the principle of political equality. However, it is difficult to see how any of these arguments really explains or justifies MD in the case of judicial decision-making. Regarding (i), other efficient procedures are available: we want to know why this sort of efficiency should be valued. On (ii), epistemic arguments for MD do not work well for the sort of bare majorities that we see in Supreme Court decision-making. And, on (iii), it is hard to rig up an argument based on political equality or political fairness that works for unelected judges as opposed to ordinary citizens or their elected representatives. After reflecting on these possibilities, the Essay concludes that, at the very least, defenders of judicial authority should be more tentative in their denunciations of democratic majoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stare decisis remains a controversial feature of the legal systems that recognize it. Some jurists argue that the doctrine is at odds with the rule of law; others argue that there are good rule-of-law arguments in favor of stare decisis. This Article considers one possible good rule-of-law argument. It suggests that we should approach stare decisis in a layered way, looking at what the rule of law requires of the various judges involved in the development of a precedent. One rule-of-law principle, the principle of constancy, counsels against lightly overturning such precedents as there are. But that is not in itself an argument for stare decisis since it presupposes that precedents have already been created. However, there is another principle, the principle of generality, which requires all judges to base their decisions on general norms and not just leave them as freestanding particulars. A third principle, the principle of institutional responsibility, requires subsequent judges not to give the lie to the use by precedent judges of certain general norms to determine their decisions. And finally, the fundamental principle of fidelity to law requires the precedent judge to approach her decision as far as she can by trying to figure out the implicit bearing of such existing law as there is on the case in front of her. Together, these principles make up a layered case--not an absolute case, but a strong and productive case--for stare decisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case of Roper v. Simmons, regarding Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's perception of applying foreign laws to U.S. courts. She expounds that despite foreign precedents are not authoritative and set no binding precedent for U.S. judges, however, they add to the store of knowledge in context to the solution of trying questions. Other Supreme Court judges of the U.S. including Stephen Breyer joined Ginsburg in her defense of this practice.

The article presents a speech delivered by Jeremy Waldron during the symposium titled "The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century," held at the Boston University School of Law on November 14 and15, 2008, in which he discussed ways that make legislation an attractive mode of lawmaking.

The article presents the author's response to criticisms on his book "Law and Disagreement." The book is about disagreements on thoughts about political legitimacy and legal and political institutions. It is argued that a liberal theory and a theory of politics should be formed. The author claimed that the practice of judicial review of legislation in the U.S. is not an appropriate or respectful of way of resolving good faith disagreements about rights in a modern democratic community.

Discusses the use of foreign law for the court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the U.S. in 2005. Distinction between the law of nations and natural law; Information on how the law of nations approach might bear on the juvenile death penalty; Capability of U.S. jurisprudence in recognizing the law of nations.

In recently published memoranda, Justice Department lawyers have suggested that it is not in all circumstances wrong or unlawful to inflict pain in the course of interrogating terrorist suspects. Also, at least one legal scholar has suggested that the United States might institute a system of judicial torture warrants, to permit coercive interrogation in cases where it might yield information that will save lives. The shocking nature of these suggestions forces us to think afresh about the legal prohibition on torture. This Article argues that the prohibition on torture is not just one rule among others, but a legal archetype-a provision which is emblematic of our larger commitment to nonbrutality in the legal system. Characterizing it as an archetype affects how we think about the implications of authorizing torture (or interrogation methods that come close to torture). It affects how we think about issues of definition in regard to torture. And it affects how we think about the absolute character of the legal and moral prohibitions on torture. On this basis, the Article concludes not only that the absolute prohibition on torture should remain in force, but also that any attempt to loosen it (either explicitly or by narrowing the definition of "torture ") would deal a traumatic blow to our legal system and affect our ability to sustain the law's commitment to human dignity and nonbrutality even in areas where torture as such is not involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author discusses issues related to the invocation of the Rule of Law during the counting and recounting of votes in the State of Florida in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections. The author cites several examples about the uncertainty and controversies surrounding the content and implications of the Rule of Law to modern political institutions. He suggests that the way in which the Rule of Law was invoked in Florida, aroused doubts about whether the Rule consists of litigation or self-restraint, judicial supremacy or judicial deference, rules or standards, mechanical judgment or reasoned discretion. The authorization of recounts by the Florida courts appeared to some the antithesis of the Rule of Law, so long as no clear rules were laid down to govern the counting. But others said that the careful opinions of the Florida judges gave comfort to those who cherished the Rule of Law, because they had evidently done the best they could to balance the competing interests of the voters, the campaigns, and the officials concerned. A sort of fake legalism can be imagined that makes up an argumentation about the Rule of Law just to give political decision-making a spurious legitimacy under this head. The author feels that there might be greater reason for optimism even when it seems that such argumentation is taking place.

Analyzes observations on the relation between homelessness and community in California, derived from experiences with the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities. Community control of public places; Cost-benefit analysis of homelessness; Relation between the visibility of homelessness and the broken windows theory of community policing.

Discusses the status of the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States. Comments on the book `Freedom's Law,' by Ronald Dworkin; Effect of constitutional adjudication on the character of public debate.

This article comments on an article about judicial review. Judicial review of legislation is now such a familiar feature of U.S. political culture that U.S. citizens are inclined to accept its democratic credentials without question. But it is a live and open issue in other countries, most notably in the Charter 88 campaign for constitutional reform in Great Britain. Describing judicial review in procedural terms might seem a bit of a provocation. After all, the author said several times in his paper that judicial review is a means for insuring that fundamental equal rights are respected and maintained in the ordinary processes of government, and he said this despite the observations on imperfect procedural justice. The author's definition of a procedural conception of democracy is, a procedural conception of democracy involves no substantive restriction upon the outcomes reached by legislative determinations. Adapting this slightly, in can be said that a procedural conception of judicial review is one that involves no substantive restriction upon the outcomes reached by the judges on a duly constituted court. Not only is judicial review to be understood in purely procedural terms, but it is to be understood in terms of a majoritarian procedure.

Comments on the urge to a judicial review of democracy in the U.S. Right of the public to deserve a forum for working through the disagreements on the issue; Processes involved in the approach of the Supreme Court in reaching decisions involving constitutional controversies; Differences between the courts strategy of coming up with a decision and the approach of legislators in giving their votes.