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Deleuze's philosophy is permeated with the problem of the continuum. The idea that the coexistence of durations is implied in the concept of duration itself allows Deleuze to offer a fresh perspective on multiplicity, which is distinct from Bergson's approach, and which proposes new perspectives on the continuum. While Deleuze critiques Leibniz's view on this concept by highlighting the non-uniform nature of the continuum, the infinitesimal still plays a significant role in his analysis. However, in his late reading of Leibniz, Deleuze emphasises that folds, rather than infinitesimals, should be considered as the smallest components of the continuum's labyrinth. This implies that there is a union of indiscernible cuts in the continuity, cuts that do not create gaps or breaks in the overall coherence, but rather a labyrinth. I will show how, in exploring this problem, Deleuze and Guattari draw inspiration from Kafka, in order to relate continuity to contiguity. This relation reveals an internal difference that defines the distinction between what is continuous and what is contiguous. This, in our view, marks a considerable shift between Deleuze's early reading of Bergson and his late reading of Leibniz, and it allows Deleuze to further develop his idea of the continuum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is Immanuel Kant’s critique of the proofs of God’s existence accurate? In order to answer this question, I analyse Leibniz’ proof in his “Monadology” and I determine the relation between the cosmological and the ontological version of this proof. Since Kant often refers (implicitly) to Leibniz’ argument, I examine Kant’s critique of rational theology in the Critique of Pure Reason in the light of Leibniz’ strategy. Kant’s critique of Leibniz’ argument is partly biased by his own concept of “transcendental idealism” and fails to reject it. On the other hand, many questions in Leibniz’ attempt remain still open.

The idea of automation of reasoning in science, which is extremely high-ranking nowadays in connection with the development of computer technology and research into artificial intelligence has been presented in the history of mind since taking up a cohered with the idea of mechanization of reasoning. It is therefore proper to present the greatest enthusiast every of this idea on the threshold of the contemporary science, who treated the idea of mechanization in reasoning very widely, assuming that every mind process can be expressed in some physical manner – Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

Throughout his correspondence and writings, Leibniz made a number of passing references to the religion of the Mohammadans (Islam) and to several Islamic commentators. Recent literature on these references has placed them in the context of Leibniz’s political and historical interests that largely reflect his Eurocentric prejudices. The purpose of this paper is to extract a more detailed and systematic view of Leibniz’s knowledge of and interest in the religion, through Leibniz’s remarks on Islam in relation to Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, through the commentary of Maimonides and the Christian Averroists, and through a (partly speculative) comparison of three types of theodicy. The paper concludes that while Leibniz knew very little about Islam’s actual doctrines, and that he was subject to the prejudicial views of his time, he understood Islam, as he did Christianity, as largely in conformity with natural (rational) religion. At the same time, his interest in its specific doctrines was primarily instrumental, that is, as correctives to certain abusive practices and misunderstandings persisting within Christianity, which could then explain for him why Islam prevailed in the East.

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz’s engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz’s discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz’s case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration.

The focus of this paper is a suite of Latin papers from 1685, some of which are still unpublished, in which Leibniz writes in the guise of a Catholic in order to defend Catholicism and counter Protestant objections, and this despite him being a lifelong Lutheran. After providing an overview of these writings (which I refer to as Leibniz’s “Catholic” writings) and the grounds for dating them to May–June 1685, I consider their purpose, arguing against the claim that they were intended to support Church reunion and suggesting instead that they were apologetic in nature, intended as a reactivation or reimagining of Leibniz’s earlier “Catholic Demonstrations” project. I identify the patron Leibniz had in mind for these writings as Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels and support this by a detailed comparison of the “Catholic” writings with the Leibniz-Landgrave correspondence and the Landgrave’s still-unpublished essays. This reveals that the Protestant arguments Leibniz uses in the “Catholic” writings are the very ones that he himself used when writing to the Landgrave, and that the responses Leibniz gives to these arguments are the very ones that the Landgrave used. I also consider the context of the writings, suggesting they were crafted during a period of personal uncertainty for Leibniz and possibly aimed at securing a position under the Landgrave.

The aim of this paper is to show how the understanding of Leibniz’s notion of toleration in matters of faith should be considered not merely as a pragmatic, but also as an epistemologically and metaphysically relevant concept. Following Maria Rosa Antognazza’s account, I will argue that Leibniz’s view on the belief of mysteries is ‘above reason’ and the relation between faith and experience plays an important role in his discussion of transubstantiation with Des Bosses, but also that Leibniz allows for presumptions based on faith to enter metaphysical discussions. Doing so, despite the fact that we cannot achieve certainty in these matters and have to accept a variety of different beliefs regarding the same objects, enriches our understanding of the world and of God—and also gives us reason to take seriously Leibniz’s engagement with corporeal substances, albeit only as presumptions rather than as necessary consequences of his basic metaphysical system. Finally, I will illustrate this point by showing how it is also in play in Leibniz’s response to Tournemine regarding the mind-body-union.

For the mature Leibniz, the organic bodies of living beings or substances are “machines of nature” containing both infinitely many (a) functional bodily organs and (b) further substances. These latter substances are said to be dominated by or subordinate to the original substance. I show that commentators have tended to conflate subordinate substances with organs, thus committing Leibniz to the position that organs are individual subordinate substances, i.e., living beings. Against this view, I argue for a “Dual Component” account of Leibnizian organic body according to which Leibniz distinguished organs and subordinate substances as distinct types of organic bodily parts. On this account, organs are not equivalent to individual subordinate substances, and are, in fact, aggregates of such substances. I thereby shed light on the metaphysical relationships of domination between substances as well as the mechanical structure of Leibnizian organic body.

In this paper I argue that there is a structural parallelism between law and physics in Leibniz since his early years, which has significant influence on the formation of his views. I start by examining Leibniz's early physical system and an analogy with juridical laws that he uses to explain the structure of physical laws. Then, I argue that this analogy stems from an envisioned parallelism between law and physics. Finally, I illustrate the significance of this legal-physical parallelism by arguing that it underlies some of Leibniz's mature views. Most importantly, I argue that the parallelism explains the origin of architectonic principles or optimality principles in Leibniz's mature physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to examine and respond to Leibniz's objection to E1p2 and E1p5. The objection is well known: it is false, according to Leibniz, that two substances of different attributes have nothing in common (i. e., E1p2) and, consequently, that in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same attribute (i. e., E1p5). Here I claim that E1p2, and therefore E1p5, resist Leibniz's objection. To do so, I first address the meaning and function of E1p2 in order to determine two possible contexts in which the demonstration is valid: the context delimited by the Cartesian doctrine of the principal attribute, and the scholastic context of the logical doctrine of essential diversity. Second, I examine Leibniz's objection, by which I determine more precisely the epistemic framework of both E1p2d and Leibniz's objection. Third, I propose a critical analysis of Leibniz's objection to show that, although this objection has some semblance of validity, if we consider only what Spinoza stated in the definitions and axioms prior to E1p2, it entails a contradiction. Finally, I indicate the most difficult point in the proof of E1p2 in order to propose a small rectification that renders it immune to Leibniz's objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz claims that for every possible substance S there is an individual concept that includes predicates describing everything that will ever happen to S, if S existed. Many commentators have thought that this leads Leibniz to think that all properties are had essentially, and thus that it is not metaphysically possible for substances to be otherwise than the way their individual concept has them as being. Against this common way of reading Leibniz's views on the metaphysics of modality, this essay develops a model in which individual concepts are innocent; that is, individual concepts are divine ideas that permit God to know everything that will ever happen to all possible substances, if created, but these individual concepts neither require that all properties are had essentially nor require that it is metaphysically necessary for substances to be the way their individual concepts have them as being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metafísica y Persona. Revista Sobre Filosofía, Conocimiento y Vida is the property of Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla A.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article offers a reconstruction of Derrida's critique of Leibniz. It suggests that in attempting to fit Leibniz into his conception of the history of metaphysics and the all-embracing notion of logocentrism that underwrites it, Derrida presupposes two regimes of logocentrism: one subjective, the other theological. Subsumed into this second mode, Derrida casts Leibniz as a progenitor of structuralism and the new sciences and technologies of information in order to expose their logocentric foundations. However, in doing so, he ends up sidelining the aspect of Leibniz's ideas that anticipates the specificity of the new epoch of writing he claims to historicise. The article goes on to argue that to grasp this specificity one must look beyond the "expressivist" schema of exterior representation, which Derrida draws from Husserl's theory of meaning, and instead look to Leibniz's own formal-combinatorial concept of expression, which exceeds Derrida's critical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant's legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of "tabula rasa" and "unplowed virgin soil," first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country's "absolute metaphors to live by" up to present time. Several known and unknown episodes from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant's life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its "subject," occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

El presente artículo se centra en el esclarecimiento de las nociones de percepciones inconscientes («petites perceptions»), percepciones y apercepciones en la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz con el fin de responder dos preguntas: 1) Ad intra, es decir, intra-sustancialmente: ¿Cómo un evento inconsciente se vuelve consciente dentro de una misma sustancia simple?; 2) Ad extra, es decir, inter-sustancialmente: ¿dónde puede decirse que surge la conciencia en la jerarquía de mónadas? Para responder estas preguntas, seguiré la siguiente metodología. En primer lugar, presentaré la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz enmarcada en su visión metafísica. Presentaré a su vez los pasajes más conflictivos y el problema que surge al momento de definir la conciencia. En segundo lugar, presentaré las interpretaciones más comentadas que existen actualmente acerca de este problema. Me centraré en las posturas de Rocco J. Gennaro, Larry M. Jorgensen, Christian Barth y Alison Simmons. Finalmente, propondré una interpretación propia de la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz.

In the XXI century, network communication generates its own philosophical discourse of thinking. However, network discourse and network interaction appeared at the dawn of axial time, first, in the Eastern philosophy and, eventually, in the Western one. The authors used the information and communication approach, as well as the historical method, to trace the network discourse from traditional Chinese philosophy all the way through Leibnizianism and classical German philosophy. The research also covered the manifestations of triadic network thinking in the Western philosophy of the XX century, including the Russian philosophy of the new and modern history. It featured the Taoist and Confucian categories of trace, void, and dynamic stability, which were rediscovered by Postmodernism. When the network discourse took over the linear one, it opened up prospects for new, digital thinking. The obtained data develop the ontological aspects of network existence and facilitate the applied studies of network communications.

Leibniz’s jurisprudence and theory of natural law, which began development as early as the 1660s, has implications for his mature theodicy. In this essay, it is shown that based on an analysis of a few key jurisprudential texts, the Nova Methodus (1666), the Elementa Juris Naturalis (1670–1671), and the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), Leibniz developed the legal term ‘obligatio’ from Roman Law and the Spanish Jesuit traditions, but that his usage shifted at different stages of his life. Nevertheless, these views are compatible and provide a grounding for his philosophical optimism. It is further shown that Leibniz took the concept of obligatio to provide something like legal standing (locus standi or klagebefugnis) so that rational minds can undergo the theodicean project, that is, because God has obligations to substances, they can seek an explanation for their suffering from God. And because human reason is analogous to divine reason, according to Leibniz, God provides the explanation that the actual world is the best possible world. The goal, then, is to prove that we should take Leibniz’s insights into jurisprudence more seriously, at least in part, because they help to explain his philosophical optimism.

Este artigo tem como objetivo apontar alguns problemas lógicos ilustrativos das dificuldades que a linguagem pode acarretar, quando aplicada a propósitos científicos, para justificar o surgimento da filosofia da linguagem. Os comentários aqui realizados, porém, se restringem à tradição da lógica clássica, destacando as contribuições de Aristóteles, Leibniz e Frege. Mas busca-se mostrar também que, posteriormente, houve uma grande elevação da complexidade das questões envolvidas, dado o aprofundamento do vínculo da lógica com a matemática.

La presente contribución se propone investigar las variaciones que se han producido en la elaboración teórica de la teodicea – entendida en sentido clásico como el tratamiento del problema del mal frente a la bondad y la justicia de Dios – en la filosofía moderna, desde Leibniz hasta Rosmini. Para la comprensión de la teodicea leibniziana resulta de importancia fundamental la evolución moderna de la ontología de la posibilidad, en relación con el ser real. El cuadro teórico es ingeniosamente reconsiderado por Rosmini sobre el fondo de su metafísica de las tres formas categoriales del ser, gracias a la cual el filósofo roveretano puede dar mayor solidez a las perspectivas delineadas, superando algunos puntos críticos de la concepción leibniziana.

In the literature, it is usually assumed that Leibniz described proof for the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (FTC) in 1693. However, did he really prove it? If the answer is no from today's perspective, are there works in which Leibniz introduced arguments that can be understood as formulations and justifications of the FTC? In order to answer this question, we used a historiographic methodology with expert triangulation. From the study of Leibniz's manuscripts describing the inverse problem of tangents and its relationship with the quadrature problem, we found evidence of a geometrical argument from which the FTC can be inferred. We present this argument using technological resources and modern notation. This result can be used to teach the FTC due to the existence of dynamic and geometrical software, which makes it suitable for the classroom. Moreover, it provides another interpretation of the FTC complementary to the interpretation using Riemann sums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present what Aristotle wrote on identity in a leisurely manner, which is much more than is generally known, save among the cognoscenti (Aristotle scholars), and mutatis mutandis about the introduction of the identity-symbol (=). We add two codas, one on the so-called Leibniz' Law, which is different (but resembles) what passes for it in logic and philosophy, and one on the status of identity, as accepted by mathematicians and logicians, in physics. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work we study Leibniz algebras whose second-maximal subalgebras are ideals. We provide classification based on solvability, nilpotency, and properties of the Frattini subalgebra. We give several specific descriptions of Leibniz algebras with these properties and include necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-nilpotent case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite drives' importance for Nietzsche's explanation of individuals' values, controversies persist over how to interpret Nietzsche's attribution of normative capacities to the drives themselves. On one reading, drives evaluate their aims and recognize the normative authority of other drives' aims. On another, drives' normative properties reduce to nonnormative, causal properties. Neither approach is satisfying. The former commits Nietzsche to the homuncular fallacy by granting drives complex cognitive capacities. The latter reading either commits Nietzsche to the naturalistic fallacy, having him derive normative conclusions from descriptive premises, or eliminates normativity from his thought altogether. In response to this impasse, this article advances a Leibniz-informed interpretation of Nietzsche's drive psychology. By construing the normative and efficient causal orders as parallel modes of explanation distinguished by one's perspective, a Leibniz-informed reading captures the benefits of extant interpretations while avoiding their drawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Leibniz's use of the concept of "automaton" to characterize the nature of souls and bodies of living beings constitutes a systematic critique of Descartes' earlier use of automata. Whereas Descartes conceived non-human animals in terms of mechanical automata, he also denied that the human rational soul can be modeled on the nature of an automaton. In contrast, Leibniz understood living things to involve both an organic body, or "natural automaton," as well as an immaterial soul, or "spiritual automaton," that spontaneously produces its own perceptions. In extending the concept of the automaton to souls, Leibniz rejected key Cartesian assumptions about animals and free will and draws on the concept of the automaton to understand a range of cognitive capacities including volition. Leibniz thus occupies a distinctive place in the history of the use of automata to understand the nature of living things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 20th century, Leibniz studies flourished in Italy, as attested by the large number of scholarly articles and translations of his main works. Articles on Leibniz’s philosophy were published in the Archivio di Filosofia, which has long been the journal of the Italian Philosophical Society. This paper examines articles on Leibniz published in Italy, and notably in the Archivio di Filosofia. It is divided into three parts. The first one examines Italian research on Leibniz from 1900 to 1930. The second one takes into account articles on Leibniz published in Archivio di Filosofia from 1930 to 1945. The last part is dedicated to Leibnizian studies published in the same journal after 1945.

The attention paid in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana to the major exponents of seventeenth-century philosophical rationalism, from its foundation by Giovanni Gentile in 1920 until 1979, reveals important changes that provide us with interesting information on Italian Neo-idealism. The small number of articles on Descartes can be interpreted as the result of an overall approach – sanctioned by Gentile – different from that of Hegel, who considered Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy. For Gentile, Descartes represents a stage in the history of philosophy spanning from Humanism to Spinoza, and, in a more particular Italian perspective, from Campanella to Vico. This interpretative scheme persisted also under the direction of Ugo Spirito, when Cartesianism continued to receive little theoretical and historical attention, with the exception of Eugenio Garin’s contributions. In the years from 1945 to 1979, the Giornale critico emphasized instead the interest for Spinoza, a very important author for Gentile, up to the double monographic issue published on the occasion of the third centenary of Spinoza’s death (1977). In turn, the lack of interest for Leibniz was constant and evident from the small number of articles published from 1920 to 1979, which were furthermore not particularly connected with the international, coeval Leibniz scholarship.

Examining the period from the 1920s to the 1970s, one of the key features of the Rivista di filosofia is a lasting interest in the Renaissance and Vico, while the focus on seventeenth-century metaphysics is significantly more time-bound and linked to the activity of some prominent figures in the journal such as Piero Martinetti, Eugenio Colorni, and Gioele Solari. The rise of the Neo-Enlightenment caused a radical change in the editorial choices, and turned the journal’s focus toward the empiricist tradition and the debate on historiographical methodologies.

Immanuel Kant has addressed the problem of evil in many of his works. The neglected part of Kant’s thought -especially among Muslim scholars- is his philosophical objections and defenses regarding the problem of evil in pre-critical and early critical periods. Many of his ideas in this subject remained unchanged until the end of his scientific life and were inspiring for the formation of his later theories. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines the principles of Leibniz’s Theodicy (i.e., evil as privation, theory of the best of all possible worlds, natural evil as punishment, and linking moral evil to free will) from Kant’s viewpoint and shows their role in the formation of his Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Contrary to Leibniz, he defends the positive reality of evil by distinguishing between logical contradiction and real contradiction. Moreover, based on the principles of Newtonian physics, Kant does not consider natural evil as punishment. However, he is in agreement with Leibniz in justifying moral evil according to mankind’s free will. Regarding the best of all possible worlds theory, it plays the most important role in Kant’s Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Although some objections to this theory are found in Kant’s articles, he seriously has upheld it even at the beginning of the critical period and after his Copernican revolution.

Cet article analyse l’idée Leibnizienne d’une caractéristique universelle, partant du livre de Genèse 2, 19 : ‘’Yahvé Dieu modela encore du sol toutes les bêtes sauvages et tous les oiseaux du ciel, et il les amena à l’homme pour voir comment celui-ci les appellerait : chacun devrait porter un nom que l’homme lui aurait donné. Cet acte de nomination sera dans la Bible dévolu, à Adam avant le péché. La Bible fait ressortir l’affirmation selon laquelle l’imposition des noms n’est pas l’apanage de tout le monde. C’est l’œuvre du premier homme : législateur ou l’Adam de la Bible, d’où sortira la langue adamique chère aux mystiques.

G. W. Leibniz fue un lector frecuente de la obra filosófica de Suárez, lectura que dejó una huella profunda en su metafísica. En concreto, el uso que Leibniz hace de los principios se puede ver como una aplicación práctica del tratamiento que hace Suárez de los principios en las Disputaciones metafísicas.

En este artículo se presenta la recepción que tuvo en la modernidad la teoría de Leibniz conocida como doctrina del optimismo. Aunque son las interpretaciones de Kant y de Hegel las que nos van a ocupar, para contextualizar la doctrina del mejor de los mundos posibles, será imprescindible referirnos a la acogida inmediata que la tesis tuvo en la Ilustración. A continuación, se analizará el texto de Kant «Algunas observaciones sobre el optimismo» y su defensa de las tesis de Leibniz. Dedicamos el último apartado del artículo a la lección que Hegel dedicó a la cuestión del optimismo de Leibniz en sus Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía.

En el presente artículo, se tratará de dilucidar la caracterización del Barroco europeo que Deleuze propone en El pliegue, con miras a aislar los rasgos idiosincrásicos que comparte con el Barroco hispano, definitorios como son de un ethos encaminado hacia una Modernidad alternativa a la que finalmente se impuso. Transitaremos así de la interpretación de la filosofía leibniziana del sujeto como un «manierismo» que ofrece Deleuze a la caracterización graciana del héroe y el mundo, con miras a mostrar que en ambos planteamientos hay una ontología de la potencia que desmiente el esencialismo a propósito del sujeto característico de la Modernidad de cuño cartesiano, en provecho de una evaluación interna o inmanente del sujeto conformada en tiempos de crisis y con una marcada inspiración estoica.

This paper is a reaction to Watumull and Roberts (2023, https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.12393).

La question de la relation entre le point et l'étendue en géométrie résonne, dans la pensée de Leibniz, avec celle du lien entre la substance simple avec le corps matériel dont elle est l'élément constitutif d'un point de vue métaphysique. En effet, comment ce qui est indivisible et sans dimension pourrait-il être le principe de ce qui se présente, au contraire, comme toujours divisé et étendu? Si la philosophie tardive de l'auteur, une fois devenue monadologie après 1700, rencontre en cela un problème presque insurmontable, il ne semble pas en être de même dans les années 1690. Cet article propose de montrer comment, vers 1695, une solution originale en est fournie qui renvoie aux innovations mathématiques de cette période, au sujet du point, de l'étendue et, de façon centrale, de la continuité, étoffant ainsi la toile qui unit les mathématiques de Leibniz avec sa philosophie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the French Cartesians of the second half of the seventeenth century, Géraud de Cordemoy stands out as the most radical. He was one of the first to argue that Cartesian metaphysics imply occasionalism, and he was alone in arguing that those same metaphysical commitments lead to atomism. This paper addresses the second of these positions. Following a discussion of what is taken to be the strongest version of his argument for atomism, consideration will turn to an objection against Cordemoy, one that was raised in his own day by Gottfried Leibniz and more recently by Steven Nadler. The paper concludes with a response offered on Cordemoy's behalf. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Paradigma is the property of Universidad Pedagogica Experimental Libertador and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes Butler's theory of performative acts and her criticism of a substantialist or essentialist theory of gender through the Leibnizian theory of intentional action, with the aim of showing that we cannot dissociate performativity of intentionality, nor, consequently, of a practical understanding of personal identity. To achieve this goal, I proceed as follows: first, I analyze Butler's theory of gender and her notion of performativity through her critique of naturalistic or essentialist theories of gender; second, I confront her theory of performativity with the Leibnizian theory of intentional actions and his notion of moral agency; third, I sketch two conclusions: 1) we can only talk about performativity in terms of intentionality, and 2) talking about performative acts does not imply dissociating gender from our personal identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's manuscripts on perspective geometry remained unpublished and unknown until very recently. Among them, Scientia perspectiva stands out as the most complex and the most original. In this paper, we offer a thorough analysis of this manuscript, showing how Leibniz moves from perspective concepts fairly common at that time to a completely new idea of the practice that could have affected its entire history. This new science represents not only Leibniz's unique contribution to the development of perspective but also casts a new light on his own notion of space and geometry and their philosophical grounding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of Leibniz's view of the relation between God and nature in 1675–1676 has split commentators into two competing camps. According to some scholars, Leibniz was a pantheistic substance monist in these years. However, other scholars think that he was neither a substance monist nor a pantheist. This paper advocates a middle ground between these two interpretations. With scholars in the first camp, it is argued that Leibniz was a substance monist in 1675–1676. However, it is also argued that he was not a pantheistic substance monist, but rather a panentheistic one. This interpretation has at least a twofold virtue vis-à-vis the anti-monistic and pantheistic readings. For one thing, unlike the anti-monistic reading, the panentheistic interpretation is in keeping with the weight of textual evidence, which strongly indicates that in 1675–1676 Leibniz did embrace, and actually argue for, the idea that God is the only substance. For another, unlike the pantheist interpretation, it can accommodate the fact that, while endorsing monism in 1675–1676, Leibniz at the same time rejected necessitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a rebuttal to Gärtner (2023, https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.11715).