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In the 1990s the Cuban regime displayed two unexpected characteristics. One was survival. The other was the implementation of uneven economic reforms, meaning that some sectors of the economy were revamped, while others remained untouched. This article connects these two outcomes by arguing that uneven eco- nomic reforms explain regime survival. Uneven economic reforms served to strengthen the power of the state vis-a-vis society, and within the state, the power of hard-liners. This new type of state, which I call "the gatekeeper state," dominates society through a new mechanism—it fragments the economy into different sectors of varying degrees of profitability and then determines which citizens have access to each respective sector. While some authoritarian regimes stay alive by providing widespread economic growth, the Cuban regime in the 1990s survived instead by restricting access to capitalist rewards. This has permitted the incumbents to navi- gate through societal pressures and postpone regime transition. The continuity of the Cuban political regime in the 1990s has amazed most Cubanologists of every persuasion (e.g., Hawkins 2001; Suchlicki 2000; Aguirre 2000; Dilla 1997; Bengelsdorff 1994; Ritter 1994; Dominguez 1993b). Despite the demise of dictatorships in Latin America and most of the Soviet Bloc, Cuba's regime has remained unabashedly authoritarian. This continu- ity in politics contrasts with the discontinuities in economics. Between 1993 and 1996, Cuba opened new sectors to foreign direct investment (FDI), liber- alized farm markets, legalized the possession of U.S. dollars and new forms of self-employment, and reduced the fiscal deficit by cutting spending. Compared to economic reforms elsewhere in Latin America, Cuba's reforms were timid. Cuba fell short of privatizing any state-owned enterprises, liberalizing financial markets, and permitting full-scale profit making, as most aggressive reformers in Latin America did in the 1990s. 1 Cuba also fell short in comparison to Communist China 1. By 1999, the accumulated privatization revenues of the top nine privatizing coun- tries in Latin America amounted to 9.1 percent of GDP, among the highest in the world (based on Lora 2001). Average private investment in Latin America increased from 13.6 to 16.5 percent of GDP between 1989 and 1998 (based on Everhart and Sumlinski 2001).

Zealand, Paraguay, Romania, Spain, and Zambia, statist parties won elections, often running on a traditional platform of state intervention in the economy, only to discover that their very own governments were ready to jettison this platform in favor of market-oriented economic reforms. These turnarounds not only contradicted the parties' historical platforms, but also penalized important constituents of the parties in the short term. Invariably, these parties reacted to these reforms with utter dismay. This dislocation in executive-ruling party relations is a recurrent and understudied political issue in every process of market-oriented economic reform. In contrast to prevailing theories on the subject, which view reform implementation as contingent on struggles between the executive and antireform interest groups and opposition parties, this article argues that the key conflict to resolve is between the executive and the ruling party. If left unchecked, executive-ruling party dislocation will hamper the capacity of governments to implement reforms. This article elaborates the reasons why market-oriented economic reforms produce dislocation in executive-ruling party relations. However, it also suggests that this dislocation is resolvable, depending on the strategies adopted by the executive. Three possible responses to these dislocations are discussed. The first is a partyneglecting approach: the executive simply neglects the concerns of the party and attempts to implement the reforms by bypassing the ruling party. The second approach is party-yielding: the executive cedes to the demands of the party, in essence abandoning the reform program. The third approach is party-accommodating: the executive negotiates some compromise with the party, granting political concessions in return for the party's consent to implement reforms. All of these responses affect the politics of reform implementation. Specifically, they affect two variables: political stability during the reform process and depth of reform implementation. A party-neglecting approach engenders the highest degree of instability and, hence, implementation difficulties. The party-yielding approach might placate tensions in executive-ruling party relations, but at the expense of reform implementation. Whether reform abdication will improve stability in overall

Usando la metodología process tracing, se analizaron los mecanismos causales que intervinieron en las interacciones societales y las interacciones socio-estatales, relacionados con diferentes eventos de cambio legal en Perú y Ecuador en el período 1980 – 2018. Los resultados del análisis de cada caso fueron usados para un análisis comparado. Siguiendo las teorías interaccionistas, la sociología procesual y la filosofía del derecho, se sostiene que el cambio legal sobre diversidad sexual es resultado: i) de solidaridades y acuerdos, movilizados por un grupo diverso de actores sociales, capaces de negociar diferentes alternativas de cambio legal; ii) por interacciones de enseñanza/aprendizaje; iii) por la capacidad de innovación en la presentación de las demandas; iv) la acción de actores de las tres ramas del poder público, de las jerarquías y de los demás niveles de la burocracia; v) de la capacidad de generar convencionalidad sobre los temas de diversidad sexual. Se encontró que ambientes de renovación democrática son propicios para el cambio legal. Using the process tracing methodology, the causal mechanisms that intervened in societal interactions and socio-state interactions, related to different events of legal change in Peru and Ecuador in the period 1980 - 2018 were analyzed. The results of the analysis of each case were used for a comparative analysis. Following interactionist theories, procedural sociology and the philosophy of law, it is argued that legal change on sexual diversity is the result: i) of solidarity and agreements, mobilized by a diverse group of social actors, capable of negotiating different alternatives of legal change ; ii) by teaching / learning interactions; iii) for the capacity for innovation in the presentation of demands; iv) the action of actors from the three branches of public power, hierarchies and other levels of bureaucracy; v) the ability to generate conventionality on issues of sexual diversity. It was found that democratic renewal environments are conducive to legal change.