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Throughout most of the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC" or "Commission") history, the agency has been condemned as ineffective. Indeed, the prestigious 1969 American Bar Association Report said that the FTC should either change or be abolished. The disastrous decade of the 1970s followed, in which the FTC tried to become the second most powerful legislature in Washington. The Commission then finally developed a bipartisan regulatory program, recognizing that the FTC was not the star player in the economy but had an important role in enforcing the rules that facilitate market interactions. Following the ABA report's recommendation, the program's consumer protection foundation was a systematic and aggressive attack on consumer fraud. This Article discusses this modern FTC, providing details on programs involving fraud, conventional advertising, and privacy. We explain how, embracing a more limited role and recognizing its past mistakes, the FTC became one of the world's most widely respected government agencies. Unfortunately, the agency has recently lost its way in regulating traditional advertising, threatening to restrict truthful information to consumers that is vital to the optimal performance of competitive markets. We also discuss the newest part of the FTC's mission, protecting consumer privacy. The heart of the program has been to prevent harmful misuse of sensitive information, most notably the National Do Not Call Registry, one of the most popular government initiatives ever. In attempting to broaden the basis for protection of privacy, the agency currently threatens to impede rapidly evolving information technology markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1975, particularly Section 13(b) regarding redress. Topics include jurisdiction under the Act, how the FTC can compel compliance, and the prosecution of fraud. Information is provided on the legislative history of the Act and the powers of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

The article discusses the 1930 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case United States v. Standard Oil of California in relation to government policies, politics, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as of March 2012. The formation of the U.S. Oil and Gas Price Fraud Working Group is addressed, along with investigations into allegations of anticompetitive conduct. FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch is mentioned, along with Section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act and consumer welfare.

The article offers brief information on the benefits and potential costs of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-style regulation in protecting the consumers.

In a concurrently published comment in this journal, Professor Wright mischaracterizes both the legal basis and the factual context of the FTC's Three Tenors opinion, recently affirmed by Judge Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Neither opinion relies on the timing of the moratorium agreement. Under either opinion, the agreement to eliminate advertising and price competition would have been proscribed even had it occurred at the formation of the joint venture. Moreover, the factual underpinnings of the case differ from Professor Wright's assertions. In particular, the facts demonstrate that the joint venture did not attempt to promote the combination of various Three Tenors (3T) products. The only coordination with the first two albums was a restriction on their discounting and advertising. In fact, there was none of the usual production, distribution, and promotion among these three albums that is normally associated with an integrated effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ignoring the facts of the Three Tenors case and the transactions costs of legal rulemaking, Professor Goldberg would unnecessarily complicate antitrust law to the detriment of consumers. Contrary to his assertions, the FTC's opinion does not favor ownership over contract. The parties could have chosen to coordinate Three Tenors products and promote a "brand," but they did not. Indeed, their contract explicitly provided otherwise. For a small class of cases -- in which the parties restrain basic forms of competition such as price or advertising without a legitimate claim of consumer benefit -- antitrust law avoids the costs of finding market power. In any event, the facts of the Three Tenors case provide a natural experiment revealing that the agreement the Commission proscribed in fact harmed consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]