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Sovereignty over the Tokto Islets is heatedly contested between South Korea and Japan. The Korean government and citizenry have responded to this dispute by inserting the islets into their national collective memory in multifarious ways in an attempt to strengthen their nation’s claim to Tokto. The islets are included in the material culture and public memory of the nation in ways that make them part of everyday life for millions of Koreans. Korea’s claim to Tokto is currently taught in schools, presented in museums, found in popular songs, and exploited by businesses for profit. The deeper Tokto becomes entrenched in Korean society, the less likely a compromise can be reached with Japan over the islets.

How do states determine which geographical areas will be included in their territorial and maritime claims? This article uses an in-depth case study of Taiwan's South China Sea claim to argue that national identity, as played out through party politics, is a dominant factor shaping Taiwan's territorial and maritime claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the first complete release of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Territorial Claims dataset, which covers all interstate territorial claims between 1816 and 2001. Territory can have substantial tangible and intangible value for states, and competing claims for control of territory represent one of the leading sources of interstate conflict. The dataset identifies 843 territorial claims and includes measures of the salience of the claimed territory, as well as details of the militarization and ending of each claim. Beyond a discussion of the structure and contents of the dataset and the coding procedures that were used to generate it, this article also presents descriptive analyses of the dataset. These analyses highlight important patterns across time and space, including changes in the prevalence, frequency of initiation, salience, militarization, and resolution of territorial claims. Notable patterns include recent declines in the frequency with which claims tend to become militarized and a lower prevalence of tangible salience measures such as natural resources. The regional distribution of claims has also shifted markedly over time, from a historical concentration in Europe towards Asia, where by 2001 claims were far more prevalent than in any other region. The article concludes with suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article describes the first complete release of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Territorial Claims dataset, which covers all interstate territorial claims between 1816 and 2001. Territory can have substantial tangible and intangible value for states, and competing claims for control of territory represent one of the leading sources of interstate conflict. The dataset identifies 843 territorial claims and includes measures of the salience of the claimed territory, as well as details of the militarization and ending of each claim. Beyond a discussion of the structure and contents of the dataset and the coding procedures that were used to generate it, this article also presents descriptive analyses of the dataset. These analyses highlight important patterns across time and space, including changes in the prevalence, frequency of initiation, salience, militarization, and resolution of territorial claims. Notable patterns include recent declines in the frequency with which claims tend to become militarized and a lower prevalence of tangible salience measures such as natural resources. The regional distribution of claims has also shifted markedly over time, from a historical concentration in Europe towards Asia, where by 2001 claims were far more prevalent than in any other region. The article concludes with suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In autocracies, nationalism appears to have merged with geopolitical thinking. In light of this geopoliticisation of nationalism, it is surprising that the literature has paid virtually no attention to the role of territorial disputes as a conditioning factor. The present study seeks to further enhance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes in triggering different expressions of nationalism. It develops an analytical framework for typologies of nationalism according to four territorial disputes: China's dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea, China's dispute with Japan over maritime territory in the East China Sea, Vietnam's dispute with Cambodia over territorial border demarcations, and Vietnam's dispute with China over maritime territory in the South China Sea. The respective disputes of China and Vietnam are analysed and tested against criteria of expressions of nationalism in autocracies. We find that territorial disputes and therefore external context are important conditioning factors of nationalism in autocracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although territorial disputes are one of the most fraught issues among states, how public opinion on territorial disputes varies within states and what explains the variation are often overlooked. This paper argues that citizens who prioritize economic considerations are more likely to support compromises over such disputes, while those who prioritize a country’s reputation tend to reject any compromise. Further, the paper hypothesizes that such variation in individual preferences can be explained by proximity to disputed territories. Counterintuitively, residents closer to disputes are more likely to support a compromise than those who live further away, because they are more affected by economic considerations. Those far from the disputed territory can afford to focus on its political aspects, which leads to a more hawkish stance. By using an experimental approach within Japan, this paper examines the validity of the spatial argument, and tests the relative salience of economic and political aspects of territorial disputes. The findings, based on original survey data, show that distance from disputed territories shapes individual preferences, and under some conditions, people living further away from disputed territories are more hawkish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study I analyze Taiwan's policy toward the South China Sea dispute. I also examine two options that Taipei may wish to consider to address the growing instability in the area. I suggest that while some minor adjustments in policy might be warranted, it appears likely that Taiwan will resist significant changes to its present policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute escalated recurrently? This study examines the sources of the 2010 and 2012 escalations in territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. We review existing explanations and their limitations and introduce new hypotheses based on the effect of political leaders' interests in the escalation of territorial disputes. We argue that when competition among leaders intensifies or leaders' political vulnerability increases, it is more likely that leaders who are seeking to retain or take office will behave more assertively in claiming rights over territories; therefore, a territorial dispute is more likely to escalate. We find that when Japanese leaders have needed to strengthen their political position during elections, they have adopted aggressive strategies in the dispute to avoid criticism from both the public and political oppositions about their weak postures against China. In China, the succession process has intensified political struggles and has led leaders to pursue a hardline policy with respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Chinese government and the media have also fueled anti-Japanese protests to increase internal cohesion for successful leadership transition. This study not only provides a domestic political explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, but also serves as supporting evidence or process tracing for the theoretical proposition that leadership change is associated with the escalation of territorial disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this research paper is to prove that China's policy towards the South China Sea represents a preemptive measure based on reducing China's energetic security threat concerning a potential blockade of the Malacca Strait by the US or India, in case of conflict escalation. By proving so, researchers will better understand the issues concerning the South China Sea and give insight into a perspective that is not largely debated. The strategy that was approached in this research and the methodology used was descriptive, analytical deductive. We followed to analyze a wide range of books and articles that are references in the domain. The results seem to prove that China's policy towards the South China Sea is directed towards multiple goals, such as avoiding containment, fighting for resources, protection of its energy security in the Malacca Strait and establishing itself as hegemon in the region. In those aspects, China's action in the South China Sea can be explained on the basis of achieving the means of attaining those certain goals. The hypothesis seems to stand to the degree in which a war would break out. Achieving sovereignty over the region, would endanger the passage of essential energetic inputs for relevant regionals actors and for the US, and can be used as a back-up plan of blackmailing those actors in the situation in which China's oil ship imports would be blocked in the Malacca Strait. Until then, China's actions in the South China Sea can be seen as the necessary steps to achieve this leverage in their position with the US and other regional powers. Therefore, we can state that China's policy towards the South China Sea can represent a preemptive measure based on reducing China's energetic security threat concerning a potential blockade of the Malacca Strait by the US or India, in case of conflict escalation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between the major economic states of Asia have increased since Japan made public a growing number of Chinese government vessels and coastguard forces sailing near the disputed islands in the East China Sea. Chinese activities in the region occurred after a period of sustained pressure on Beijing in connection with its activities in the South China Sea. The article aims at building a geopolitical analysis relevant from the perspective of international relations. It examines specific aspects of international relations like the relations of power, spheres of influence, the balance of power, interdependence, etc. and identifies the changing dynamics from a regional perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does a small power respond and adjust to a fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balancing by major powers generated by a territorial dispute? This paper observes that notwithstanding the major powers' mistrust, suspicion, and rivalry, such precarious stability in the South China Sea dispute is sustained by a balance-of-power system. This system is an offshoot of the small littoral states' (in this case, the Philippines') policy of engaging the external maritime powers (the United States and Japan) to counter China's heavy-handedness in dealing with this territorial row. Apprehensive of China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the United States and Japan are increasing their strategic involvement in the maritime territorial row. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. To cope with China's heavy-handedness, the Philippines builds up the deterrence capability of its armed forces and forges security partnerships with the United States and Japan. The Philippines hopes that this move will ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the regional balance of power. In conclusion, the paper considers the Philippines' policy as myopic, since it overlooks the fact that the volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea might be the proverbial 'calm before the storm.' It is crucial that the Philippines puts its house in order, economically keeps pace with its more dynamic Southeast Asian neighbors, increases its defense spending, formulates a coherent national security strategy, and concentrates on building a credible armed forces to avoid free-riding on its allies, and more importantly, to enable the country to weather the approaching storm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholars are often interested in nominal dependent variables, and commonly analyze such variables with multinomial logit (MNL) models that treat status quo outcomes (e.g. “peace”) as a homogeneous baseline-choice category. However, recent studies of zero-inflation processes within international relations suggest that these baseline cases may often arise from two distinct sources. Specifically, some status quo responses are likely to correspond to observations that actively opted for this choice over all others, while the remaining status quo outcomes are likely to arise from observations that were unable to realistically register a non-status quo choice under any reasonable circumstances. Including both sets of responses within an MNL model’s baseline category can bias the estimated effects of covariates, leading to faulty inferences. As a solution to this problem, this study considers a recently proposed baseline-inflated MNL (BIMNL) model that explicitly estimates and tests for heterogeneous populations of status quo observations. After discussing the model and its theoretical underpinnings, I demonstrate the BIMNL’s utility through replications of two existing studies of political violence and cooperation within the areas of international relations and civil war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the jurisdictional issues that arose from the LOSC Annex VII Arbitral Award of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom). In this case, the arbitral tribunal for the first time answered the long-debated question of whether it has jurisdiction to hear a dispute concerning territorial sovereignty issues. This article argues that in the process of answering this question, the arbitral tribunal managed to identify the steps in order to determine the extent to which its jurisdiction extends to sovereignty disputes. However, the manner in which the tribunal, and the dissenting arbitrators, proceeded with each of these steps left much to be desired in terms of clarity and coherence. The Arbitral Award nonetheless managed to clarify the scope of Article 297 regarding the limitations to compulsory jurisdiction and in determining the threshold for the fulfilment of Article 283 on the obligation to exchange views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces different aspects of the present-day juridification and judicialization of indigenous lives using the example of the Tupinambá Indians of north-eastern Brazil. The Tupinambá’s identity is being increasingly bureaucratized by public administration and is constantly being questioned by public and private agents to deny the Tupinambá’s constitutional land rights. In the course of the still ongoing process of the demarcation of the Indigenous Territory Tupinambá de Olivença, indigenous inhabitants are facing a plethora of civil actions, and Tupinambá leaders are being persecuted and criminalized by the police and the judiciary. This article exposes the legal intricacies of possessory actions against indigenous people in Brazil and discusses the different acts and attitudes of the actors of the Brazilian ‘juridical field’ as regards the indigenous rights. It suggests a view of law, law enforcement and law suits as means of social sense making, that is, a public staging, interpretation, imagining and ‘mapping’ of Brazil’s ‘indigenous question’, which has, ultimately, to be legitimized by society at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Other than the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, the Philippines in 2015 faced the same conditions as in 1996: keeping a sustainable peace in Mindanao, presidential elections, and a promising economy. The year was capped by the country's hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. Chinese assertiveness challenged ASEAN's unity and made closer Philippine ties to Washington and Tokyo an imperative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paraguayan or Triple Alliance War is generally known for its terrible destructiveness and loss of life, essentially unequalled in the history of modern Latin America. What is less well known are the efforts made to create a new regime as the government (and army) of Marshal Francisco Solano López was breathing its last in the eastern forests of Paraguay. The following article discusses the events surrounding this process of nation-building, noting how a key Brazilian diplomat had the unenviable task of defending his own country’s geopolitical interests while attempting to put the Paraguayan Humpty-Dumpty back together in 1869–70. Here it is argued that he succeeded with the first but only partially with the second. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the causal associations between domestic Japan's socio-psychological indices and people's perceptions toward territorial disputes with China and South Korea. The triangulation analyses do not support most of the hypotheses except the explanatory variables of age, level of educational attainment, and Japan's future projection: The higher the age group, the stronger the territorial sovereignty conviction; the higher the level of education, the weaker the support for the Japanese government's hawkish policy; and the more pessimistic the future confidence of Japan, the bigger the threat perception of China. The causality could be established only when the probability level was relaxed from 0.05 to 0.10. This research finds a weak overall causal association between domestic state of affairs and territorial perceptions. The public opinion on territorial claims remains more or less the same largely independent of domestic socio-economic conditions. This observation leads to a call to revise the conventional conflict cycle theory (i.e., status quo > provocation > rise of tension > conflict relaxation) in order to reflect more of simultaneous and interactive nature of inter-state conflict (i.e., action [tension/status quo/reconciliation] > reaction [tension/status quo/reconciliation]). The intra-state affairs have become more vulnerable to unexpected and hard-to-control contingencies which defy the procedural progression of conflict management. This implies that the elites can no longer monopolize the decision on foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive. MAIN ARGUMENT Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth. POLICY IMPLICATIONS Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many studies have examined the formation of interstate rivalries, but few provide a theoretical mechanism capable of explaining why some neighboring states experience protracted conflict while others do not. To address this question, we theoretically link bargaining theories of conflict with issue-based explanations of conflict to offer a novel application of the commitment problem mechanism. We argue that when neighboring states disagree over border territory endowed with a potential source of power (i.e. strategic or economic value), it is difficult for either side to commit credibly in the future to comply with agreements made today. Consequently, neighboring states may be reluctant to make concessions that could enhance their adversary's future bargaining power. This reluctance, in turn, increases the likelihood of bargaining failure, thereby also increasing the likelihood that the dispute festers and the relationship evolves into a rivalry. Using recently reported data on border settlement and three measures of rivalry, we find systematic evidence for our theoretical expectations. Unsettled borders increase the likelihood of rivalry onset. This relationship, however, seems driven by border territory containing strategic and economic endowments - the exact type of territory that theoretically drives commitment problems. We therefore conclude that not all territory matters for the onset of contiguous rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, South Korea and Japan came very close to signing a bilateral security agreement that would help to address mutual security threats: China's rise in power and North Korea's missile testing and nuclear status. Yet the South Korean government halted the signing of the agreement due to domestic opposition, putting a stop to this and other future security agreements for now. Why have South Korean governments been unable or unwilling to pursue security agreements with Japan? This research first examines whether the security agreements are necessary, and second, the role of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets territorial dispute as a major symbolic deterrent for such security agreements. I argue that security agreements are necessary, yet domestic accountability in South Korea regarding the Dokdo islets and related tensions with Japan strongly oftentimes impedes furthering security relations with Japan. An examination of Korean domestic public opinion, actions of civil society groups, and actions and decisions of South Korean politicians demonstrate that domestic accountability has played a major role in preventing further security relations with Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite frequent talk of conflict and even war, economic and strategic factors suggest that the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea will not erupt into hot conflict, at least for the time being. However, for domestic reasons, overt cooperation remains a distant prospect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the relationship between territorial disputes, militarized conflict, and economic integration occurs at the intersection of two large research programs in international relations: one linking territorial disputes to violence, and another exploring the effects of conflict on trade and vice versa. Although we know that territorial disputes fuel conflict and that conflict dampens trade, we know less about whether the prospects of economic gains contribute to the settlement of disputes and subsequent compliance with those settlements. I argue that research in this area could profitably adopt an emerging view of borders as institutions that not only distribute territory but also allow cooperation and the production of joint gains. This review identifies gaps in the existing literature on the resolution of territorial disputes and helps to reframe a persistent methodological challenge in this area: missing and noisy data on trade flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyses an intuitive and influential conceptual framework by which to understand state strategy in territorial conflicts. According to this framework, a state in a territorial dispute can pursue one of three general strategies: threaten or use force; offer territorial concessions; or delay. This article argues that it is problematic to regard these three candidate strategies as mutually exclusive. It is argued that not only can a strategy of escalation be compatible with one of delay, but many uses of force can be employed instrumentally in service of delaying. The framework, this article contends, does not so much capture "strategy" as it does certain aspects--or outcomes--of strategy, which while appropriate for certain analytical tasks is less so for others. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident is examined and China's strategy during the event is scrutinized with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework to an analysis of narrower scope. Lastly, it is argued that a framework for conceptualizing state strategy in territorial disputes should not be confined to three alternatives; it should be more broadly constructed, allowing for more nuance and taking seriously all the domains of statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]