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Copyright of Discurso is the property of Universidade Aberta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on the ontology, dethroned epistemology in the humanities and social sciences. It further discusses philosophical rebellion against the idealism of the linguistic turn and the theorists of the 1968 generation; Marxism and phenomenology to psychoanalysis and deconstruction and correlationism; and Spinozist monism over Cartesian dualism and ontology's rejection of human exceptionalism.

It seems reasonable to suppose that educational practices should be informed by philosophical and scientific understandings of the character and operation of mental processes. Clark and Chambers' 1998 'The Extended Mind' is a seminal paper in the philosophy of mind, but has received limited attention by educational researchers. Their Extended Mind Theory (EMT) provocatively claims that the assumption the mind is restricted to the head is unjustified, and that objects in the environment can function as parts of the mind. Clark and Chamber wrote that the human organism can be "linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right". So, EMT challenges the assumption that the demarcation of skin and skull determines the boundaries of cognition, and demands a radical rethink of the nature of learning. This paper introduces and critiques EMT, initially by way of a discussion of embodiment, an intermediate step in the argument towards extension. It highlights inconsistencies in Clark and Chambers' account, but concludes that the concept of a mind that extends into and interacts with its body and environment is both plausible and helpful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Varieties of Reference, Evans makes two parallel claims about thought and perception. He argues that both our capacity to self‐ascribe thought and our capacity to self‐ascribe perception are fallible. The essay focuses on his claim about perception and examines its relation to Evans's project of rejecting a Cartesian conception of the mind. In his theory of perception, I argue, Evans embraces a conception of first‐person authority that he seeks to reject in his account of thought. He is thus not able to extend to perception the critique of Cartesianism that he develops in the context of his analysis of thought. My intent is not exclusively critical. By working through the difficulties that Evans's argument raises, I seek to shed light on whether and, if so, how criticisms of a Cartesian conception of thought may be extended to the philosophy of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the recently discovered Cambridge manuscript, widely regarded as an early draft of Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does not describe the mind as a 'purely spiritual' force 'distinct from the whole body'. This has led some readers to speculate that Descartes did not embrace mind-body dualism in the Cambridge manuscript. In this article, I offer a detailed interpretation of Descartes's mind-body dualism in the established Charles Adam and Paul Tannery edition of Rules, and argue that, while differences between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version of Rules are significant, the relevant passages in the Cambridge manuscript preclude interpretation along both materialist and hylomorphic lines. I then offer an account of the development of Descartes's mind-body dualism between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version of Rules. What the Cambridge manuscript reveals is not Descartes before dualism, but rather Cartesian dualism in its barest form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the problem of Jacques Rohault's Cartesianism. It aims to enrich the current portrayal of Rohault (1618–72) as a Cartesian natural philosopher concerned with experimentation. The modern evaluation of Rohault as an experimentalist can benefit from another explanatory layer, emphasizing the mathematical physics that shapes his natural philosophy. In order to argue for this complementary account, I focus on an early episode in Rohault's career, represented by his reply to Fermat's attacks against Descartes's law of refraction (1658). The source has been discussed, so far, solely as part of the dispute in optics between Fermat and the Cartesians. The reading endorsed here explores the source from a different angle, suggesting an alternative account grounded on a more contextual understanding of Rohault's contribution to Cartesianism. More diverse dimensions of Rohault's intellectual formation are revealed, which in turn provides a more complex picture of this strain of Cartesian natural philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind-body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here, we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts' spacing (Crutch and Warrington, 2007; Strappini et al., 2017b). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, which impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here, we define a psychological property of restored object identification, and we cross-reference the data of visually impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy, six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e., restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. Whereas the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus, similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Relações Internacionais no Mundo is the property of Relacoes Internacionais no Mundo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld's early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes' concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of 'reflexio virtualis' which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes' views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is phenomenology a metaphysics of its own type? This is the question that L, szl0 Tengelyi interprets affirmatively in his last oeuvre. Such a type can be characterized as a metaphysics of transgressiveness in contrast to the metaphysics of potentiality. According to Tengelyi, phenomenology must therefore be thought of in the form of a diacritique of world and infinity, which can be seen as the metaphysical architectonics of the transfinite. By relating the difference between thing and world to the difference between transfinite and absolute infinite, it is to be proven that the actual infinite belongs to the reality of the world, precisely in the sense of phenomenology. We want to critically appreciate this attempt of radicalization by confronting it with another radicalization approach: Marc Richir's phenomenology. This will show that in the starting point of the thing-world difference a subtle subjectivism or quasi-Cartesianism is inherent, which does not do justice to the infinity of the world, one which even includes the radical sense of uninhabitability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The influence of Eugen Fink on Jan Patočka is undeniable. Fink was his first advisor in questions concerning the phenomenology of the late Husserl in the mid-1930s. But as one can see in the correspondence between Patočka and Fink, there are also some hints to divergences, which this paper tries to make explicit, mainly on the basis of some later works and manuscripts by Patočka. They concern the status of the whole of the world (Weltganzes) as being different from the human lifeworld (Menschenwelt) and the double concept of appearing in the cosmology of Fink, which Patočka - in the early 1970s - confronts with a project of an "asubjective" phenomenology. This project, introduced by an unambiguous criticism of the Cartesianism in Husserl, still maintains a certain proximity to Husserl, defining itself as a formal transcendentalism of appearing as such that is not divided into two modes of appearing as in Fink. It can be read as Patočka's radicalization of the originary Husserlian project of phenomenology, rather than as its cosmological abandonment in an accordance with Fink. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metafísica y Persona. Revista Sobre Filosofía, Conocimiento y Vida is the property of Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla A.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ethos (0860-8024) is the property of John Paul II Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía UIS is the property of Universidad Industrial de Santander and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Retos: Nuevas Perspectivas de Educación Física, Deporte y Recreación is the property of Federacion Espanola de Asociaciones de Docentes de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

New materialist and posthuman thinking denote a range of approaches that have in common a focus on materialities as a turn against the persistence of Cartesian dualisms (mind/body, subject/object, nature/culture, for example). In this article, we explore how the feminist new materialism of Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, and Rosi Braidotti, among others, may provide openings to research in our field, especially when considering what is recurrently taken up as one of its central problems: the positioning of the child in a world ruled by adults. We first discuss recent approaches in children's literature studies that show interest in these theories and then use these to offer a toolbox of terms and notions – from ethico-onto-epistemology to diffraction – that may open possibilities for research in more-than-human environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are few philosophers who have been so influential in their own lifetimes and had so much influence, only to be subsequently ignored, as Henri Bergson (1859-1941). When in April 1922, Bergson debated Einstein on the nature of time, it was Bergson who was far better known and respected. Now Einstein’s achievements are known to everyone, but very few people outside philosophy departments have even heard of Bergson. Following Friedrich Schelling and those he influenced, Bergson targeted the Cartesian dualism that permeates the culture of modernity. In doing so, he challenged deep assumptions rooted in and cemented in place by Descartes’ philosophy. It this article I will argue that Bergson made considerable progress in this attack on Cartesian dualism, and diverse philosophers subsequently built on his ideas. However, failure to appreciate the source of these ideas has weakened their impact, being scattered among different disciplines by diverse philosophers and scientists who drew upon Bergson’s work while forgetting details of his philosophy. This article is an effort to rectify this situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is easy enough to see that this thesis entails Stoljar's no-entailment thesis, at least if we understand phenomenal truths in such a way that if there is no conscious experience (or no conscious being) there are no phenomenal truths. If we have a good argument for dualism about smell experience, dualism about dogs' experience, and dualism about future humans' experience, then we have established mind-body dualism. The view I am most inclined to accept is neither a purely phenomenal spatial functionalism (with only phenomenal roles) or nonphenomenal spatial functionalism, but a combined phenomenal/nonphenomenal spatial functionalism (combined spatial functionalism for short) where reference to space is fixed by both phenomenal and nonphenomenal roles. This response is closely related to Stoljar's objection 5, which says Stoljar's dilemma can be avoided by appealing to a nonphenomenal spatial functionalism. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Phainomena is the property of Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Kant's Refutation targets what he calls the problematic idealist. This is understood by the mainstream of Kantian scholarship as the global skeptic that Descartes briefly adumbrated in his first Meditation. The widespread view in the literature is that the fate of the Refutation is tied to its success as an argument against this Cartesian global skepticism. This consensus is what I want to question in this paper. I argue that Kant's opponent – the problematic idealist – is not the Cartesian global skeptic, but rather what I prefer to call here the Cartesian problematic external-world idealist. According to Cartesian global skepticism we cannot know whether our commonsensical beliefs are true until we rule out the skeptical hypotheses are false. In contrast, the Cartesian external-world idealist sees as problematic the assumption that the underlying nature of outer things of which we have ideas is mind-independent rather than caused by our own thinking being. My aim here is to disentangle Cartesian global skepticism from Cartesian problematic external-word idealism and show that, if measured against global skepticism, Kant's Refutation is doomed to fail; while against problematic idealism, it is at least a promising argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discurso is the property of Universidade Aberta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although Descartes has in some ways become a symbol of academic isolation, we can dispel this misunderstanding by taking into consideration the holistic nature of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes understood the various branches of philosophy as constituting an organic totality of knowledge that, because of its dependence on imagination and sensation, remains irreducible to intellectual comprehension. Ethics holds a particularly significant place in Cartesian philosophy, and this essay both demonstrates the spiritual nature of Cartesian ethics and explains why Descartes saw ethics as "the ultimate degree of wisdom" so as to illustrate how we can interpret Cartesian philosophy as a spiritual practice. This takes place through a discussion of the distinctions and interconnections of Descartes's three primary notions (soul, body, and the union of soul and body) and concludes by reflecting on the specific temporality of nobility as well as addressing several objections to Cartesian ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores connotations of 'heresy' in theological traditions before and during Descartes's life. Lutheran and Reformed Protestants, themselves considered heretics by the Church of Rome, adopted the patristic heresiology while designating sixteenth-century antitrinitarian and Anabaptist teachings as heresies. Francisco Suárez and Gisbertus Voetius knew the late medieval conceptuality (e.g., Council of Konstanz, 1418). Voetius possibly thought of Descartes when describing certain philosophical views as "smacking of heresy." This was not, however, an outright charge of heresy. In fact, Descartes's readiness to be corrected contradicted the traditional heretical quality of "stubbornness." Plempius's expression "Cartesian heresy" seems to have been rare. For anti-Cartesians, the rich vocabulary of error made the complex term 'heresy' easily avoidable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers who hold the compatibility of reason and faith, are vulnerable to the charge of opening the way to atheism and heterodoxy. This danger was particularly acute when, in the wake of Cartesianism, the philosophy of Spinoza and Hobbes necessitated a resetting of the relationship of philosophy with religion. My paper discusses three English philosophers who illustrate the difficulties for the philosophical defence for religion: Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway, for all of whom philosophical and religious truth were deeply intertwined. But each of them also subscribed to heterodox religious beliefs. This raises questions of whether there is a direct the relationship between their philosophy and religious heterodoxy—whether they exemplify the charge that philosophy undermines religion, or indeed whether their defence of religion was a cover for heterodoxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The usual reading of Descartes' "anthropological" perspective classifies it as a radical dualism with a distinction between two substances, mind and body, which experience major interaction difficulties. Through a contextualization of Descartes' physiological and psychological thought as well as through a less fragmented reading of his work, we intend to review this traditional interpretation, thereby showing its distorted character. When we pay attention to passion, a new Descartes' image as a sort of phenomenal monism appears, which is markedly different from the legendary image typically associated with him, even today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. (Non-epiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum, etc.) in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no teleportation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy (momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time (space). Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation harder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are Descartes's views on the body and how do they change? In this article, I try to make clearer the nature of the shift towards an increased focus on the body as 'my' body in Descartes's Passions of the Soul. The interest in the nature of passions, considered from the point of view of the 'natural scientist', is indicative of a new approach to the study of the human. Moving beyond the infamous mind-body union, grounded in his dualist metaphysics, Descartes begins developing a philosophical anthropology centred on the notion of power and better suited to practical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis focuses on the centrality of the mind and the mental, and their relationship with the notion of discourse in International Relations theorizing. While many forms of discourse theory are linked with anti-materialist idealism, the article develops an alternative argument, that is, that discourse theory should primarily be situated 'beyond the mind'. The analysis starts with a discussion of prominent International Relations work on ideas and discourse and argues that that a large segment of International Relations work is insufficiently clear on these crucial notions. I therefore contend subsequently that this state of the art is reflected in how the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the mind have been treated in prominent International Relations work by following a particular version of Cartesian rationalism. It is on this basis that the article proposes to transcend the antinomies between mind and world as well as ideas and materiality by advancing a political ontology that stresses a particular concept of discourse in the final section. On that basis, it will become possible in the conclusion to summarize a path towards International Relations beyond the mind that engages in the study of the political more seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss how the theological turn within phenomenology has contributed to the further development of discussions concerning Husserl's distinction between the lived body (Leib) of the "flesh" and the extrinsically manifest "seen" body (Körper) by re-appropriating Christianity's emphasis upon incarnation, as exemplified in the work of Michel Henry and Emmanuel Falque. For Henry, an additional "reduction to the flesh" must be enacted in order to overcome the dualistic opposition between "phenomenal body" on the one hand, and the living medium of flesh on the other, for the sake of returning to the original givenness of life. Yet, Falque criticizes Henry's position as a kind of monism, just as problematic as the very dichotomy which it aims to criticize. Falque argues instead that the flesh must always be incorporated, "given back" to the body as a unity, possessing not only affect and life, but also solidity and visibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Philosophica Estonica is the property of University of Tartu (Tartu Ulikool) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Immaterial is the property of BAU, Centro Universitario de Diseno de Barcelona and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the name of a certain theory of race inferiority, the imperialist powers have instituted the slave trade which will annihilate the countries of the Third World, and mainly those of the African continent. They will impose their vision of the world through the universalization of a Cartesian philosophy which has considerably encroached on the local histories of subordinate peoples. Even today, categories of people continue to suffer from the depreciative stereotypes constructed by the settler. For African novelists, the historical truth must be recognized. They therefore write with the aim of restoring the authentic values of these peoples. It is in this perspective that Seydou Badian inscribes his work entitled Sacred Weddings where he magnifies an African tradition which only asks to be recognized as an absolute and autonomous value, through a decolonial writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Música Hodie is the property of Revista Musica Hodie and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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