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The article discusses the relation of the fungal endophyte Epichloe festucae var. lolii to the freezing tolerance of perennial ryegrass (Lolium perenne L.). Topics include the importance of winter hardiness for perennial ryegrass, the use of non-isogenic hosts in research, and genetically differing populations of perennial ryegrass.

The article discusses research on U.S. and Canadian consumer preferences for turfgrass, noting possible market segmentation. Topics include the views of consumers regarding maintenance attributes, the opportunity for greater production of low-input species by the turfgrass seed industry, and generational differences among turfgrass consumers.

Consumers need adequate information about turfgrasses attributes and lawn maintenance practices when they choose what types of turfgrasses to grow in their home lawns. We conducted online surveys with 2167 homeowners from the United States to explore what information sources they consider as trustworthy and useful regarding lawn care. We found turfgrass consumers trusted information from families, University extensions, and garden centers/hardware stores the most; these information sources were equally trusted. Whereas, they ranked garden centers/hardware stores, followed by families and then lawn care companies as the most useful information sources. Information from University extensions and regional water management authorities were considered as trustworthy but less useful. Other information sources (such as the Internet, books, manufacturer websites, and third party reviews) were considered as the least trustworthy and least useful sources. Homeowners' socio-demographic backgrounds affected their attitude toward lawn care information sources. The results of the study have important marketing implications for turfgrass suppliers and can help guide outreach efforts by University extension educators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are grateful to Stefanie Grüne and Andrew Chignell for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. Both focus their remarks on the issue of ‘givenness,’ which could seem like a relatively narrow topic within the much broader subject matter of cognition that we have attempted to describe in our paper. However, we think that givenness, properly understood, plays an important role in Kant’s account of cognition, since it is central to both of the conditions that Kant places on cognition (which we call the ‘givenness condition’ and the ‘thought condition’). In particular, we maintain that givenness is an independent condition on cognition, one that has a meaning and function distinct from what it contributes to the thought condition. Full consideration of the givenness condition allows one to see more clearly how it gives expression to one of Kant’s most fundamental concerns in the first Critique. For, in our view, the primary role of givenness is to help to explain how it is that representations can refer, or fail to refer, to objects in a specific, cognitively significant way, an achievement that Kant is marking with the term ‘cognition.’ To make good on these claims and to substantiate this picture of the broader significance of givenness within Kant’s account of cognition, we address Grüne’s paper first, then Chignell’s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we offer an overview of the basic structure of Kant’s account of cognition, of the conditions on the notion of cognition most central to the first Critique, and how they are satisfied in the case of human beings. Our primary aim in this regard is to provide a comprehensive (albeit not exhaustive) framework for understanding Kant’s account of (theoretical) cognition. In the course of doing so, we argue for various interpretative claims, which, taken together, amount to a novel understanding of Kant’s account of cognition. First, we argue that cognition is a mental state that determines a given object by attributing general features to it. Second, we explain what it means for Kant for an object to be given: givenness in the relevant sense involves an immediate relation to an existing object. These first two claims imply that cognition (Erkenntnis) is distinct from knowledge (Wissen), both in Kant’s sense and in our modern sense. Third, we note some fundamental ambiguities about what sensibility and understanding are, and point out that purely causal interpretations of these faculties are problematic. Fourth, we distinguish between an intuition and an intuitive representation (analogous to the distinction between a concept and a discursive representation) in such a way that an intuition is one specific kind of intuitive representation. Fifth, we describe two different accounts of concepts (‘logical’ and ‘psychological’) and explain how they complement each other (despite their distinctness). Sixth, we diagnose several confusions regarding whether Kant is or is not a non-conceptualist about intuitions (though without attempting a definitive resolution to that debate). Finally, we show how our analysis of cognition clarifies what the most promising lines of argument are for Kant’s claim that we cannot have cognition of the objects of traditional metaphysics (while still allowing for limited kinds of knowledge of things in themselves). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]