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Mission 204, a mixed British and Australian force, operated in Nationalist China from 1942 to 1945 with the objective of training Nationalist guerrillas. Historians have tended to focus only on the mission's record in 1942, when British and Australian commandos deployed to eastern Jiangxi Province and suffered from a high incidence of disease. This paper not only reframes the narrative concerning 1942, but also argues that the mission met with success from 1943 to 1945, due to adaptations in the mission’s force structure and an increased willingness to suit Chinese desires. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past eight years the authors have been engaged in a debate with Dr. Brian N. Hall regarding the role of British continuous wave (CW) wireless in WWI. Dr. Hall contended the British army did as well as could be expected in applying this technology to warfare. The authors compared British developments to much faster, although later, American development. The French army, however, deployed this technology much earlier than either. New evidence shows that though aware of the French achievement the British chose not to exploit it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The First World War (1914-18) saw the role of sport in British military and civil society closely dissected and widely discussed. Popular journalism, memoirs, novels, and poetry provided the British public with a regular diet of war stories and reportage in which athletic endeavor and organized games featured prominently. A study of this contemporary literary material sheds light on how far the image of the sporting warrior, and the association between games and combat, survived the horrors of industrialized killing between 1914 and 1918. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1963 to 1966 Britain and Indonesia clashed in a low-intensity conflict known as the Confrontation. Orthodox perspectives have coded this conflict as a tremendous British victory. Revisionist authors have demonstrated the contingent and questionable nature of this conclusion. This article re-assesses the outcomes of Confrontation by using an alternative methodological framework: five key themes drawn from the wider literature on military victory. Using such a lens supports many aspects of the revisionist case, but also shows that the outcomes of Confrontation are even more complex. Confrontation in fact provides an object lesson in the difficulties in assessing categorically the outcomes of war. As such, its importance to our understanding of the problems in defining victory in war has been greatly under-valued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A reprint of the article "The Formation of the Commonwealth Division, 1950-1951," by Jeffrey Grey, which first appeared in the no. 1 ( January 1987) volume of this journal, is presented. It discusses the creation of the Commonwealth Division of the United Nations Forces on 28 July 1951, during the Korean War, after roughly a year of negotiation among British Commonwealth nations of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

Although it waged the largest and most costly of Britain's Second World War campaigns, RAF Bomber Command was not mentioned in Prime Minister Churchill's 1945 Victory Speech and its Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, was left off the Victory Honours List. The crowning insult to Bomber Command veterans was the lack of a campaign medal for the strategic air offensive. This article uses case studies of the campaign medal saga, still very much alive today, and the perceived reluctance of the wartime Air Ministry to acknowledge the RAF's resort to area bombing to test the argument of some historians that this slight of Bomber Command was due to "official squeamishness" in the Air Ministry and elsewhere in the government in the aftermath of the bombing of Dresden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1966, Britain triumphed in a little-known low-intensity war against Indonesia. Orthodox assessments of what was known as the "Confrontation" have lionised British achievements during the campaign, especially the role played by Operation Claret: a campaign of secret, deniable cross-border operations. This article argues that, in fact, British deniable operations were extremely problematic and, indeed, increasingly unpopular with senior military officers. The argument highlights, in particular, the re-occurrence of a perennial problem in the use of military force: the difficulty in measuring during campaigns the extent to which tactical- and operational-level military successes actually translate into strategic political success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has often been claimed that British prisoners behaved better than American prisoners during the Korean War (1950-1953). This assertion has tended to be the result of speculative assumption rather than detailed analysis, however, and does not hold up well when examined closely. As a very broad generalization, furthermore, it masks significant variations in the conduct of British prisoners of war themselves. The primary aim of this article is to test various hypotheses to explain why, from the Chinese perspective, the captive British contingent at Chongson (Camp 1) was much more troublesome than its counterpart at Pyoktong (Camp 5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks afresh at the decision by Britain to despatch an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941 to oppose the much-anticipated decision by Hitler, to end by German invasion the inept Italian campaign against Athens. The existing work on this topic emphasises the geo-political motives behind the campaign, especially Churchill's need to impress American public opinion by going to the aid of the Greeks, often with an assumption that British military leaders committed themselves to the venture against their better judgement. What these accounts overlook is what British planners thought was operationally possible. This article is based on new archival research, which indicates that key British leaders, throughout the chain of command, thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating the success of armoured warfare achieved by the Germans in France. In considering this material, the article sheds new light on the failure of British military leaders to fully understand the possibilities of armoured warfare, and thus adds to our understanding of the doctrinal reasons for poor British battlefield performance in the 1940-42 period more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Army of the Second World War does not retain a positive reputation in the field of operational and tactical battle doctrine, particularly so in armoured warfare. Many historians argue that in Normandy in the summer of 1944, British armoured forces had still failed to grasp many essential elements of modern combat. This article demonstrates that in reality the British Army's loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexible attitude that allowed the armoured forces in Normandy to adapt and modify their battle doctrines in the heat of battle quickly and effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the First World War found Britain in dire economic straits, burdened with the costs of converting a wartime economy and straining under an enormous load of debt. As is often the case in such situations, politicians and the public looked to the budgets of the armed services for a large portion of the savings that would presumably enable economic recovery and restore fiscal rectitude. The Royal Navy was a major target of the cost-cutters in post-1918 Britain. Their demands for steep reductions in its budget, however, ran counter to the navy's pursuit of parity with its new major rival, the USA, and its mission of two-ocean imperial defence. This article examines the budget battle that ensued through a close study of the 1919-1922 debates over Royal Navy appropriations bills in the British Parliament and in the British public at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional narratives of World War I generally overlook a misunderstood but important part of the conflict: information warfare. Both Great Britain and Germany understood the significance of information as a force multiplier and as a valuable financial and diplomatic tool in the larger geostrategic environment. Britain's systematic wartime destruction of Germany's prewar network occurred on a much larger level than historians have recognized. Germany's simultaneous but hidden campaign against Allied communications has escaped historical notice. Greater understanding of this missing element, both in World War I and beyond, will deepen our understanding of the larger economic, political, intelligence, and military dimensions of modern conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combined operations in Britain's pre-1914 strategy have been portrayed as fantastical, envisioning troop landings on Germany's Baltic coast. These plans were apparently much in vogue during Admiral Sir John Fisher's first term as first sea lord. Recent interpretations have also argued that Fisher never seriously considered amphibious projects over an economic strategy. This article will demonstrate that amphibious plans were central to the royal navy's strategy against Germany but were limited to supporting a North Sea/Baltic observational blockade. Significantly, in 1905 and 1908, it was the army that proposed landings in northern Germany and Denmark, not the admiralty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The campaign fought by predominantly British Commonwealth forces in North Africa during the Second World War, in many respects, represented a final example of imperial solidarity and unity. Whilst the United States participated during the final stages prior to the surrender of Axis forces in May 1943, it was Britain and its Empire that provided most of the resources and manpower and contested most of the battles. Canada, however, played only a relatively minor part and this paper seeks to examine the associated decision-making process that took place in London and Ottawa and discuss the tensions that arose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the history of Australia's Cold War engagement with East Asia during 1950 to 1974. Topics discussed include Canberra's Cold War policy of forward defence in Southeast Asia, the security treaty of Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) signed in 1951, and the Australian governments efforts through the1950s and 1960s to keep the British and Americans militarily engaged in Southeast Asia.

This paper provides an insight into the complex relationship between Britain’s amateur cavalry regiments – the Yeomanry Cavalry – and their political and military masters during the reforming of the Territorial Army in the early 1920s. It discusses the force’s use of its influential political lobby to shape its future in the face of a determined restructuring exercise of the whole Territorial Army, but argues against the suggestion it was simply reactionary or anachronistic in its approach. As a county institution with a pedigree stretching back more than 125 years, the Yeomanry was naturally opposed to the fundamental changes being forced upon it: being dismounted to rebalance the Territorial Army with more artillery and a number of armoured car regiments. However, despite the interference of powerful advocates and elements of the force itself, and the eventual minor alterations to the original General Staff plan, the vast majority of regiments converted successfully to new arms, with only one voluntarily disbanding. This analysis finishes by highlighting the considerations that have always limited political interference with the Territorial Army, providing a cautionary historical example of the dangers of asking too much from the voluntary system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the strategic relationship between Britain and Jordan, during the 1948 War that followed the establihment of Israel, Britain supplied arms just to protect the Hashemite regime in Jordan and not to be used in the war in Palestine against the Jews. This opposed the position of the commander of the Arab Legion General Glubb Pasha, who demanded weapons for the war in Palestine. Moreover, Britain implemented the Security Council's decision on the Embargo in May 1948, and did not transfer arms supplies to the Arab Legion. The shortage of weapons and ammunition in the Arab Legion as a result of the United Nations embargo forced Jordan to end the war with Israel in July 1948, just two months after it had officially begun. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the numerous adolescents, many from the South London boroughs of Lewisham and Deptford, who lied about their age when joining the 11th (Lewisham) Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment in 1915. It focuses on their motivations for enlisting underage, highlighting the 'push' effects of particular features of working-class family life and the local labour market and the 'pull' effects of army recruitment policies and the increasing militarization of society as the war proceeded. Despite a minority causing the army major problems during the period of training, most of them conformed to military discipline and became useful recruits. Parents' objections to the enlistment of their sons were muted, at least until the battalion was sent overseas in May 1916, after which the army authorities tried, not always successfully, to keep the under-aged out of the firing line. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the British campaign in Mesopotamia between 1914 and 1916 during World War I. The author argues that Great Britain feared for its empire's prestige in the Middle East after Ottoman Turkey declared war, explores how British prestige influenced commanders within the Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEFD), and analyzes the advance of Major-General Sir Charles Townshend in Baghdad, Iraq, during 1915.

The transport network in France was responsible for providing everything the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] required in order to both survive and conduct operations on the Western Front. The appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to the position of Director-General of Transportation in the autumn of 1916 is now widely accepted as having provided the BEF with the logistical platform from which to build the war-winning machine of 1918. Yet prior to Geddes' arrival in France, the BEF had already begun engaging with Britain's transport experts. This article examines the work of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway [SECR] at the port of Boulogne during 1915. It illustrates that the BEF, far from being insular, was highly active in harnessing civilian support. However, due to the as yet incomplete understanding of the character of the war, the long-term contribution of the SECR was severely restricted by the short-term inability of the company, and the BEF, to adequately comprehend the colossal material effort required for victory on the Western Front. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the centenary of the First World War as an opportunity to re-examine a major element of the existing literature on the war-the strategic implications of supposed British decline-as well as analogies to the contemporary United States based upon that interpretation of history. It argues that the standard declinist interpretation of British strategy rests to a surprising degree upon the work of the naval historian Arthur Marder, and that Marder's archival research and conceptual framework were weaker than is generally realized. It suggests that more recent work appearing since Marder is stronger and renders the declinist strategic interpretation difficult to maintain. It concludes by considering the implications of this new work for analogies between the United States today and First World War-era Britain, and for the use of history in contemporary policy debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of French Canadians in the Conscription Crisis of 1917. Topics discussed include proposal for Canada's high commissioner in London, England George Perley to introduce Royal Montcalm regiment during World War I, how the 86th regiment in Trois-Rivieres in Canada was disbanded during the war, and issue of language raised by British generals involved in commanding Canadian Militia between 1874 and 1904.

This article examines the connection between sport and the First World War. It challenges the conventional wisdom that the athleticism associated with a public school education made a significant contribution to the British war effort. Additionally it argues that athleticism had a negligible influence on elementary school pupils who comprised the bulk of the military forces. It also suggests that while army authorities eventually accepted that sport had a positive role to play and made it a compulsory element of military training, it also existed as an escape from hostilities rather than just preparation for them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Indo-Burma frontier witnessed one of the fiercest battles of the Second World War. Geographically considered as ‘impenetrable’, the jungle-clad mountainous frontier was part of what was constitutionally known as the ‘Excluded Areas’ or ‘Scheduled Areas’ and directly administered by the governor of Burma. It was an important field for Christian missions, where combined colonial-missionary efforts, albeit not at all time, established Christianity and western education from the late nineteenth century. This article argues that, amid enticing propaganda from the Japanese, it was from these indigenous peoples of the Indo-Burma frontier that the British generated their ‘staunch allies’ who, as ‘irregulars’ or ‘levies’, gathered intelligence, worked behind the enemy lines, performed prodigies of valour and paid heavy prices for the cause of their colonial masters. However, at the end of the day, the British did not keep their promised to protect the interest of their staunch allies by undermining their constitutional status as ‘Scheduled Areas’ and rather compromised with the Burman nationalists. This article is a case study of the Zo (Chin) of Chin Hills in western Burma. It is an attempt to situate local events in the geo-political struggles between the British and Japanese empires and wider political implications in the context of building post-war Burma which has often been overlooked in existing historiography of the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Local studies of military service in the First World War have traditionally focused on ‘Pals’ or other units known to be linked to a specific area. However, the availability of new records online has revolutionized the way in which local studies can be carried out. A ‘military history from the street’ approach can now document and analyse service by all those from a local area who served. The article explains how such socio-military methods, as used in the author’s monograph on West Belfast (Belfast Boys, London, Continuum, 2009), can be adapted to other areas, with a particular focus on employment data not included in that study. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the clandestine "Stay Behind" strategy of European countries, in which their military forces stayed behind enemy lines during the Cold War. Topics include the revelation of the strategy during the 1990s, the lack of literature regarding this phenomenon, and the origins of the program in Great Britain and the United States while fighting against the Soviet Union. The application of "Stay Behind" in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) strategy is discussed.

The First World War is surmised to have been a formative event for Canada. Conventional wisdom denotes that the war invoked what Philip Buckner has termed a 'colony-to-nation framework', whereby Canada entered the war as a Dominion of Britain and emerged a nation in its own right. This, however, is a contested viewpoint. It is also argued that, although important, the war did not significantly alter the sense of national identity in Canada. Using the location of Bexhill-on-Sea, East Sussex as a case study, this article will show that while there did appear to be a greater sense of attachment to Canada as a result of the war, this was not at the expense of an attachment to the Empire. There was, as Buckner has argued, scope for parallel identities. Nevertheless, despite this attachment, literature produced at Bexhill showed that the war had exacerbated divisions between English and French Canadians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the historiography of Great Britain's involvement in World War I, or the Great War, including in regard to historians' perspective on the 1915 British campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey. The article also discusses the comparative historiography regarding Great Britain's involvement in World War I and in World War II.

Winston Churchill is commonly considered to have written some of the greatest speeches of the twentieth century, yet few of them have been analyzed in any depth. This essay attempts to examine in detail one of the most famous and, indeed, most important of these speeches, the "we shall fight" oration, given in the House of Commons on June 4, 1940, at the end of the evacuation of British and French troops from Dunkirk. It considers the differing audiences that Churchill was writing for and the message he was attempting to give to each. It also studies the different levels that the prime minister sees to the conflict: the concrete one in which he describes the actual combat and the abstract one in which Good battles Evil on a cosmic stage. On the first level, Dunkirk is a disaster that cannot be denied or hidden from the British people. On the second, however, it is a victory--a moral one only but one that has its own importance for Churchill. The context of the time is also examined. In particular, the famous last paragraph is given an in-depth analysis that leads to some rather surprising results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970 and 1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al Bu Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the Yeomanry regiments of the British Territorial Force, with a particular focus on their military readiness and demographic makeup in 1913. According to the author, the Yeomanry was seen as more attractive than the infantry and was made up of men from a variety of trades and socioeconomic backgrounds. Details on training camps for the Yeomanry and on the challenges presented by a shortage of horses are also presented.

In February 1947, the British government made a number of policy decisions which led to withdrawal from India, Palestine and Greece. The paper seeks to demonstrate that although economic constraints highlighted the need to reduce overseas commitments, these pressures did not predetermine the choice or timing of the withdrawal decisions. The consequences of the retreats in terms of reduced military overstretch, balance of payments alleviation and the diminution in Britain's international status are also examined. It is concluded that the Attlee administration shed a range of military burdens as rapidly and in as orderly a fashion as political and strategic circumstances permitted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]