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Under the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) model, banks should fully recognize expected lifetime credit losses upon loan origination while gradually recognizing interest revenues. This timelier recognition of losses versus gains (i.e., conditional conservatism) makes banks more capital constrained. To mitigate this, banks may (1) offset timelier credit losses by lowering conservatism in other earnings components and (2) reduce credit losses by demanding greater borrower conservatism. We find that, under CECL, banks increase conservatism in loan losses but decrease conservatism in other earnings components, making overall conservatism only marginally increase. In sharp contrast, their borrowers increase conservatism by 40 percent, and borrowers' increase is twice that of banks. This substantial spillover effect suggests that, by greatly increasing borrowers' conservatism, CECL may strengthen debt governance of a broad scope of firms in the economy, thereby having economy-wide consequences beyond the banking industry and potentially enhancing the stability of the entire economy. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study. JEL Classifications: G21; M41; M48. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects of the new post‐financial crisis regulatory regime – risk‐based capital ratios (RBC) and stress tests – on banks' off‐balance sheet activities (OBS). We use a panel of US bank holding companies over the period 2001–2018 to examine the relationship between banks' capital levels and OBS activities. Our major finding is that banks significantly reduced their OBS exposure following the introduction of the new capital regulatory framework requirements. In particular, we show that tighter regulatory RBC resulted in a reduction of OBS activities in well‐capitalised banks. Conversely, we find that under‐capitalised banks increased their OBS activities, which suggests the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political influence on bank credit allocation is often viewed as being necessary to address social problems like income inequality. We hypothesize that such influence elicits bank capital responses. Our hypothesis yields three testable predictions for which we find supporting evidence. First, when banks observe election outcomes that suggest greater impending political credit-allocation influence, they reduce capital to increase fragility and deter political influence. Second, banks subject to greater political influence nonetheless increase lending that politicians favor, and household consumption consequently increases. Third, these banks exhibit poorer post-lending performance. Our study has implications for the interaction between politics, household consumption, and bank risk through a specific channel—the interplay between credit-allocation regulation and bank capital structure. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04056. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this research is to investigate whether taxation affects the leverage decisions of banks and if the response of leverage to tax increases depends on profit-shifting opportunities available to individual banks. This topic remains controversial since it is often believed that banking regulation is such an essential driver of leverage choices that little room is left for other considerations studied in the corporate finance literature. Using a difference-in-differences setup encompassing the period from 2006 to 2017, we exploit two exogenous income tax rate increases applicable to 225 Brazilian banks, employing novel identification strategies based on the intricacies of local taxation rules and on the distinctions between individual banks and financial conglomerates. We find stark differences in the behavior of banks around the two events, with a substantial increase in leverage following the first tax hike but no leverage response following the second. In addition, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects based on the amount of profit-shifting opportunities available to individual banks. Regulatory concerns possibly became more relevant for leverage decisions during the period around the second tax hike because it coincided with the implementation of stricter capital requirements associated with the Basel III framework. Taken together, our results suggest that financial institutions balance considerations regarding the tax-shield benefits of debt against regulatory concerns specific to the banking industry when making capital structure choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the effects of higher bank capital requirements. Using new firm-lender matched credit data from South Korea, we document that Basel III coincided with a 25% decline in credit from regulated banks, and an increase of similar magnitude from non-bank (shadow) lenders. We use our data to estimate the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, and the spillover effect of the reform on non-bank lending. We then build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks and firms that replicates these micro estimates. We find that Basel III can account for most of the observed decrease in regulated bank lending and about three quarters of the increase in shadow lending. The latter is driven exclusively by general equilibrium effects of the reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Purpose Financial inclusion aims to provide affordable financial services, including banking, loans, equity, and insurance products, to underserved populations. This study aims to examine the moderating effect of a bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on the nexus between financial inclusion (FI) and a bank’s financial performance (FP) in the Egyptian setting. Design/methodology/approach The study uses two empirical linear mixed models (LMM) to test the moderation effect of a bank’s CAR on the association between FI and FP. The study sample comprises 360 bank quarter-observations of 10 listed banks in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) from 2013 to 2021. Findings The findings show that the bank’s CAR strengthens the association between FI dimensions, namely, deposit growth, loan growth, and the number of employees, and the bank’s FP with contradicted directions. Research limitations/implications This study provides policymakers insights into the crucial role of complying with banking regulation, namely, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and expanding financial inclusion practices to enhance and improve the bank’s FP. Thus, encouraging more strategies and facilities toward financial inclusion. Originality/value Due to the scarcity of financial inclusion literature in emerging economies, this paper extends FI literature by highlighting the moderation impact of a bank’s CAR on the relationship between FI dimensions and FP in the Egyptian banking sector. Consequently, this study clarifies this beneficial relationship, which may have significant implications for restoring the challenges faced by the Egyptian economy following the critical events it went through, which, in turn, impacted the country’s poor and vulnerable.

Purpose: Financial inclusion aims to provide affordable financial services, including banking, loans, equity, and insurance products, to underserved populations. This study aims to examine the moderating effect of a bank's capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on the nexus between financial inclusion (FI) and a bank's financial performance (FP) in the Egyptian setting. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses two empirical linear mixed models (LMM) to test the moderation effect of a bank's CAR on the association between FI and FP. The study sample comprises 360 bank quarter-observations of 10 listed banks in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) from 2013 to 2021. Findings: The findings show that the bank's CAR strengthens the association between FI dimensions, namely, deposit growth, loan growth, and the number of employees, and the bank's FP with contradicted directions. Research limitations/implications: This study provides policymakers insights into the crucial role of complying with banking regulation, namely, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and expanding financial inclusion practices to enhance and improve the bank's FP. Thus, encouraging more strategies and facilities toward financial inclusion. Originality/value: Due to the scarcity of financial inclusion literature in emerging economies, this paper extends FI literature by highlighting the moderation impact of a bank's CAR on the relationship between FI dimensions and FP in the Egyptian banking sector. Consequently, this study clarifies this beneficial relationship, which may have significant implications for restoring the challenges faced by the Egyptian economy following the critical events it went through, which, in turn, impacted the country's poor and vulnerable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research mapping is essential to describe the topic and appropriate references before conducting research, including Islamic letters of credit. This research aims to review the literature on Islamic letters of credit. This research is a literature review using bibliometric methods with the Dimensions database. The keyword used in the article search is Islamic letter of credit. The data found and processed was 56 articles published from 2010-2023. The data was processed using Microsoft Excel and Bibilioshiny R programs. This research shows that most of the most productive writers come from Malaysia and Turkey. A topic that can be developed for further research is Islamic economic contracts linked to Islamic letters of credit. This research can be used as a reference for future research, as well as information regarding research gaps and an overview of research conditions regarding Islamic letters of credit, which will be developed to be broader and more varied.

This study examines the effect of corruption, regulations, and transparency on banking sector performance using a sample of 309 banks from 15 Asian countries over the period 2010 to 2020. Banking sector performance is measured in terms of both bank profitability and bank stability in the present study. Generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation procedure is applied for empirical analysis. The findings of the study suggest that transparency has positive effect on both bank profitability and bank stability, while regulation has positive effect only on banks stability. In contrast, corruption is negatively related to both bank profitability and bank stability. Furthermore, the findings reveal that corruption indirectly increases bank crisis by decreasing bank's lending through excessive risk. In addition, the significant role of macroeconomic shocks in determining banking sector performance is observed in Asian countries. The study is in favor of effective regulatory system to control the adverse effect of corruption on banking sector performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many transmission channels of monetary policy have been proposed to enrich and deepen the understanding of its mechanisms. However, some channels have not been clarified, particularly for those unconventional quantitative policies implemented after 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, we develop a unified model of a credit economy where bank regulations and decisions and loanable funds market are placed at a central position, while stocks and flows are incorporated with each other to formulate banks' credit creation and circulation. We find that bank regulations can induce some new channels of monetary transmission by imposing credit constraints, including the new bank capital channel, the credit supply channel, the new bank balance sheet channel, and the new bank risk-taking channel. Comparing these channels with the traditional ones, we underscore the impact of bank regulations on monetary transmission. As aggregate demand can be decomposed into two monetary flows generated by money circulation and bank lending respectively, the direct channels of monetary transmission to aggregate demand can be renewed as follows: the money channel, the narrow money circulation channel, the new bank lending channel, and the repayment channel. In addition, based on the relevant data from the United States, we have conducted vector autoregressive (VAR) impulse response analysis to confirm the effectiveness of some direct channels. Our work not only aids in revisiting the monetary transmission from a credit view but also facilitates the assessment of efficiency of monetary policy.

We develop and evaluate an accounting-based Loan Portfolio Risk (LPR) variable that captures time-varying contagion effects in default risk for a portfolio of bank loans. Our results show that an Equity-to-LPR ratio (ELPR) is additive in predicting bank failure up to five years in advance, after controlling for all the capital adequacy, asset quality, management experience, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risks (CAMELS) variables as well as other fundamental-based bank risk measures from prior studies. Further, we find that publicly listed banks with higher ELPR have lower market-implied costs of capital, especially under market stress conditions. We conclude that ELPR captures key aspects of bank risk that are missing in current Basel Committee risk-weighted-asset calculations. JEL Classifications: E32; G14; G21; K23; M41; M48. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this research is to investigate whether taxation affects the leverage decisions of banks and if the response of leverage to tax increases depends on profit-shifting opportunities available to individual banks. This topic remains controversial since it is often believed that banking regulation is such an essential driver of leverage choices that little room is left for other considerations studied in the corporate finance literature. Using a difference-in-differences setup encompassing the period from 2006 to 2017, we exploit two exogenous income tax rate increases applicable to 225 Brazilian banks, employing novel identification strategies based on the intricacies of local taxation rules and on the distinctions between individual banks and financial conglomerates. We find stark differences in the behavior of banks around the two events, with a substantial increase in leverage following the first tax hike but no leverage response following the second. In addition, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects based on the amount of profit-shifting opportunities available to individual banks. Regulatory concerns possibly became more relevant for leverage decisions during the period around the second tax hike because it coincided with the implementation of stricter capital requirements associated with the Basel III framework. Taken together, our results suggest that financial institutions balance considerations regarding the tax-shield benefits of debt against regulatory concerns specific to the banking industry when making capital structure choices.

We provide new estimates of the association between the level of capital and the cost of capital for US banks by using the implied cost of capital as a measure of the cost of equity and by factoring in the effect of the cost of debt. With the important exception of the largest banks, we find that the cost of equity declines when the level of capital increases. This negative association is stronger after the onset of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Banks' cost of debt also declines when the level of capital increases. However, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) remains unaltered when capital increases. The analysis of a sample of large banks yields different results: there is no discernible association between the level of capital and the costs of equity and debt for large banks, and their WACC increases with the level of capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank credit in 23 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries and their low- and middle-income groups from 1995 to 2017. The long-run results indicated that stringent entry barriers and supervisory power reduced lending, but supervisory power mitigated the negative effect of entry barriers. Furthermore, positive shocks to entry barriers impacted negatively on bank credit, while negative shocks to capital requirements had an adverse impact on lending. In the short run, positive shocks to entry barriers, activity restrictions and capital regulations led to increases in bank credit, particularly in low-income SSA economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response to the latest financial crisis, the Basel Committee published the Basel III accords which intensify micro- and introduce macro-prudential instruments to enhance the resilience of the financial market. One crucial aspect that the regulatory reforms do not address is the diversity of the banking sector. We introduce a heterogeneous agent-based model that develops a housing and a capital market to assess the ability of Basel III rules to mitigate mutual feedback effects and dampen instability. Computational experiments reveal that the most stable markets are achieved if the financial market is diversified and consists of different types of financial intermediaries that need to comply with type-specific capital adequacy requirements. The results point out that capital adequacy requirements are, in principle, effective in stabilizing the banking sector. However, the stability of housing and share prices and the solidity of the banking sector can be increased if capital adequacy requirements are aligned to the individual business models of financial intermediaries and their institutional frameworks. These findings advocate in favor of a diversified banking sector and heterogeneous capital adequacy requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks strategically choose and dynamically restructure deposits and nondeposit debt in response to the minimum requirements on total capital and tangible equity. We derive the optimal strategic liability structure and show that it minimizes the protection for deposits conditional on capital requirements. Although, given any liability structure, regulators can set capital requirements high enough to remove the incentive for risk substitution, the strategic response to the capital requirements always preserves this incentive. Banks reduce leverage but increase the proportion of nondeposit debt if regulations raise the capital requirements. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4570. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has examined how investors view asset securitizations, and shows that investors treat securitizations as borrowings, even when GAAP treats them as sales. Upon the adoption of two new accounting standards relating to securitizations, some off-balance-sheet securitized assets were consolidated back onto firms' balance sheets. This study investigated how investors viewed assets that firms consolidated under the new standards and those that firms left unconsolidated. I found that investors differentiated between these two types of securitizations, treating the consolidated assets as borrowings and the unconsolidated assets as sales. I conclude that the new accounting standards are more consistent with equity investors' views of securitizations. I also found that, for the consolidated assets, investors did not distinguish between securitizations going through two different accounting structures. Lastly, this study provides evidence on one information channel that investors use to distinguish between securitizations that may have the economic substance of borrowings versus sales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central role of Value-at-Risk (VaR) within bank market risk regulation received significant criticism from financial media and government investigations into the events of the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Impending reform of bank market risk regulation under the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) demotes VaR, replacing it with a layered framework centred on expected shortfall (ES). However, many of these criticisms assume full integration of internal and regulatory market risk models and further, a linear relationship between risk models and regulatory capital. We examine bank practitioners' perspectives and experienced realities to better understand the operational relationship between internal and regulatory market risk models, and between risk models and capital. This has important policy implications for the efficacy of the reforms to banking regulation, financial stability and navigating the dichotomy of private and public interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a tractable general equilibrium model of banking under aggregate risk. Our novel framework includes the main tools of banking regulation—capital and liquidity requirements, deposit insurance and transfers—and shows how they interact and jointly emerge as an optimal response to the inefficiency of the equilibrium of the unregulated economy. This enables us to contribute to several ongoing debates between proponents and opponents of stricter bank regulation. We show that, for low levels of aggregate risk, the general efficient allocation of the economy can be implemented via deposit insurance and transfers alone with no need for capital or liquidity requirements. When aggregate risk exceeds a threshold, however, all four regulatory instruments are essential for efficiency. Capital and liquidity requirements become stricter as aggregate risk increases. Our results, therefore, support the views of opponents of stricter bank regulation when aggregate risk is moderate, but validate the views of proponents when aggregate risk is high. In contrast with recent proposals to reduce or eliminate depositor subsidies to constrain bank leverage, our analysis also demonstrates that depositor subsidies are necessary for efficiency under aggregate risk as they achieve optimal risk-sharing among agents and mitigate underinvestment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate-related physical and transition risks are at the top of the financial regulators, supervisors and the financial institutions' (FI) agendas. The financial regulators/supervisors' objective is to keep the system safe and sound during the transition to a greener economy. The key initiatives include incorporation of climate-related risk into risk and capital management frameworks and the related Pillar III Financial Disclosures. Macroprudential stress tests to investigate how climate-related risks propagate through the real economy and the financial system have been, and are being, published. This paper examines these initiatives and challenges and makes the argument that while these initiatives are necessary, they are not sufficient. A systemic solution is needed. The expected transition to a lower-carbon economy is estimated to require around US$1tn in investments each year for the foreseeable future. This makes the role of the financial sector during the transition imperative. The paper argues that the policy objective should be not only that the financial system simply remains resilient during the transition, but that it also helps facilitate the transition. This facilitation must be on an equal playing field for FIs and should emerge as the natural outcome of their profit maximising behaviour in a competitive marketplace. A solution is proposed to do so. It effectively frontloads the longer term environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks and benefits into the current capital and, thus, pricing and profitability frameworks. Numerical examples are provided to explain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews an emerging experimental literature that uses laboratory methods to both identify causes of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and to assess the effectiveness of policies implemented in response. Papers reviewed include experiments conducted to evaluate central bank and Treasury responses to the crisis, experiments that study the consequences of interconnectedness between financial firms on financial system stability, and experiments conducted to evaluate policies intended to more effectively regulate specific types of financial institutions. Laboratory methods are ideally suited to investigating the consequences of untested policies in new environmental circumstances – just the situation provoked by the crisis. The continually evolving structure of the financial system suggests an expanded future role for laboratory methods in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to Ben S. Bernanke, Douglas W. Diamond, and Philip H. Dybvig "for research on banks and financial crises". This article surveys the contributions of the three laureates and discusses how their insights have changed the way that academics and policymakers understand banks and their roles in financial crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study utilizes logistic regression to identify annual financial statement and performance ratio factors that influenced the failure rate of U.S. small banks before and after the Financial Crisis identified during December 2007 through June, 2009. The study includes rates of small bank failure before and Financial Crisis spanning the years 2001 through 2014. The aim of the paper is to describe in large increase in U.S. small bank failure after the Financial Crisis. The Financial Crisis created drastic sustained changes of the financial system that were designed for large financial institutions. These changes may have created undue hardship for small banks and elevated the rate of small bank failures in the post-Financial Crisis period. Post-Financial Crisis bank failures had lower capital ratios and increased loan portfolio risk relative to the prior period. The combined effect of expansionist monetary policy, increased regulatory costs, and possession of illiquid real estate assets contributed to the higher rate of failure. The identification of factors that contribute to the increase in small bank failures after the Financial Crisis should assist bank managers, policy analysts, and scholars in developing alternative solutions for the future.

This paper challenges the validity for bank regulation of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) Theorems. We argue that the Modigliani–Miller analysis cannot be applied to banks because when lending creates deposits the asset side of banks varies together with the liability side and equity behaves more like a sticky variable. Hence, from an endogenous money point of view and Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), much of the debate on bank capital adequacy rules is misleading because: First, it is not at a bank's discretion to decide the mix of its funding when it provides credit. Secondly, bank liability management might have implications for financial stability as far as it reduces the liquidity in the economy. Bank regulation in the lines of MM Theorems misses both points as long as it disregards the endogenous process of money supply and the effects of financial fragility. In this sense, refutation of the validity of MM Theorems for bank regulation lends support to a Minskian cash-flow oriented bank regulation for the detection of Ponzi finances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounting conservatism is a quality of earnings positively associated with the strength of banking regulation and supervision and also high market discipline, but there still remains the unresolved question of the way these three pillars of Basel II interact with each other. We analyse how regulatory and supervisory regimes in the banking industry clearly interact with market discipline measures, such as listing status, ownership, market concentration and disclosure requirements between ten years before Basel II fails, drawing upon data from 14,651 bank year observations from 54 different countries. According to our findings, there is a clear correlation between the strength of the enforcement of regulation and supervision and accounting conservatism success in countries where market discipline fails. That is to say, the supervisory power reinforces the effect of listing status, ownership and concentration on conservatism whereas the capital regulatory system mitigates the effect of market discipline on conservatism. We also evidence that in a powerful regulatory system, more disclosure requirements are associated in less conservatism policies in financial entities. Strong increases in regulation, its enforcement and supervisory power introduced in the Basel III mechanism is subject to the debate posed in this paper. The quality of accounting earnings can be improved to prevent bank failures through the application of strong Pillars I and II, i.e., regulation and supervision. Having said that, market discipline still remains a key factor in achieving financial stability.

We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress-test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly Too Big to Fail—face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks' portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The papers of this special issue investigate the persistent challenges to European Banking Union and explore the tensions between broader financial stability objectives and national political and socio-economic pressures through a diversity of lenses. In this introduction, we examine two main issues that need to be addressed in order to strengthen Banking Union: the incomplete institutional design of Banking Union and the difficulties encountered in applying the different elements of Banking Union to loosen sovereign-bank ties. These elements include the so-called 'single' rulebook, supervision, resolution, and financial mechanisms to support and resolve banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of bank regulation and ownership on the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions in the MENA region. We test the hypothesis that the effect of regulation on bank risk depends on the type of ownership structure. The public and private views of bank regulation are used to explain the relationship between regulatory measures and bank risk. We find that the official supervisory index exerts a positively associated with bank credit risk which is in line with 'private interest view' of bank regulation; however, private monitoring does have an opposite effect. The analysis of the regulatory measures impact on bank insolvency risk provides further support of the private interest view regarding the impact of market discipline. In addition to regulations, ownership structure (e.g., ownership concentration and foreign ownership) also plays a significant role in shaping the risk-taking behavior of banks in the MENA region. Our analysis reveals that the effect of banking regulations on risk-taking behavior strongly depends on the type of ownership structure prevailing in each banking system (Islamic and conventional). Our findings inform regulatory authorities concerned with improving the financial stability of banking sectors in the MENA countries and other emerging economies where Islamic and conventional banks co-exist, to carefully tailor banking reform initiatives depending on the type of the banking system as they may pursue different risk management strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulators frequently relax accounting rules during a financial crisis as a means of regulatory forbearance. The new accounting options provide banks with an opportunity for an accrual-based increase in their regulatory capital. The use of such an accounting option helps reduce the costs of government interventions such as bailouts and avoid the dilution of existing shareholders' ownership rights. We examine the introduction of the reclassification option for financial assets during the 2008 financial crisis and study the position of accrual-based options in the pecking order of banks' recapitalization measures. The findings suggest that the accrual-based increase in regulatory capital is temporary and does not provide permanent relief. Consistent with the long-term costs of accrual-based measures, investors perceive the accounting choice as a negative signal. If banks do not complement their use of the accounting option by other corrective actions that result in a real capital increase and a liquidity injection, they continue to suffer from low capitalization and financial difficulties in the following years. Ultimately, government interventions in accounting regulation are unlikely to offer a sustainable solution to capital shortfalls in the banking sector if they are not supported by the concurrent enforcement of real corrective actions. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Project-ID 403041268-TRR 266) as well as from IAAER and KPMG under the "Research Informing the IASB Standard Setting" grant. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4364. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the impact of bank regulation on the risks of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) between 2004 and 2015 by employing 455 CBs and 95 IBs from 22 countries where IBs and CBs coexist. Since the objective of Basel regulations is to achieve a stable banking sector by mitigating risks, we examine the impact of bank regulations on various risks of IBs and CBs by using a regression framework. We examine solvency risk, credit risk, idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk by using capital oversight, restriction on activities, private monitoring and supervisory power bank regulation data provided by the World Bank. The findings show that though the Basel regulations were originally developed for CBs, our results imply that they are effective for IBs as well as CBs. However, our study also shows that regulations affect IBs and CBs differently as their business models are different. More targeted regulations towards IBs would be necessary to support IBs. Additionally, in regions with higher economic freedom indexes, banking regulations can mitigate the risk of IBs and CBs to a greater extent. Our results imply that the combination of free economic policies and banking supervision addresses risks in banking effectively. Finally, the bank regulations did not appear to be able to control the risk of the sample banks during the 2007–2009 crisis. Hence, the Basel committee needs to rethink about regulations during crisis times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aims of the paper are to explore the recent liquidity stress situations encountered by the regional banks in the United States of America (with a particular focus on Silvergate Bank and Silicon Valley Bank, both headquartered in California) and to provide a descriptive viewpoint on the regulatory framework, prudentiality and financial management issues, including accounting aspects and corporate governance. The research methodology pertains to the cause-effect analysis and the dynamics of changes over time and to the synthesis of documented authentic public resources of information, giving substance to the main findings. The paper explores the causes and the consequences of the failing banks from the perspective of implications to the current regulatory environment and prudential requirements, with a view to the financial markets functioning. It analyses the business models and the rootcauses that led to the recent distress in the first quarter of the year 2023 in the US banking system. The conclusions draw evidence on how clustered liquidity stress and fast-unfolding bank runs became risk factors, in a context where regulatory environment allowed for a more relaxed supervisory stance on banks and the rising interest rates in an inflationary economy affected the market value of financial instruments as means of liquidity in banks' portfolios. Still, despite some particular situations pertaining to some US banks, the US banking sector remains resilient, with significant risk-absorbing capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance to characterize the optimal levels of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. The key model tension is the policymaker's dynamic tradeoff between building a fund to discourage moral hazard and insulate taxpayers from large fiscal shortfalls, and allowing banks to productively invest their deposits. We find that risk-adjusted premiums reduce moral hazard, enabling the policymaker to increase the share of covered deposits to total deposits by 12.5 percentage points and decrease the share of expected annual bank failures from 0.74% to 0.60%. The model predicts a fund-to-covered-deposits ratio that matches the data and declines in taxpayers' income due to taxpayers' risk aversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks have so far weathered well the financial turbulence caused by COVID-19 while at the same time being central in the economic and financial response. As the crisis moves from its initial phase as a short-term liquidity shock, the financial sector is facing increasing volumes of non-performing loans, raising the spectre of a banking solvency crisis. In economies already burdened with low-quality assets, the COVID-19 fallout is intensifying existing problems with legacy loans heightening the risk of a banking crisis. These issues are now being worsened by the impact of inflation and the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, addressing increasing volumes of bad loans, while supporting the proper functioning of the financial system, is a major challenge with systemic repercussions for a range of economies. This paper identifies a great paradox: since the bank rescues of the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis there has been a disproportionate focus on the liability side of bank balance sheets through resolution measures such as bail-in and the accumulation of bail-inable debt. Post-crisis bank resolution regimes have overlooked solutions lying within the asset side of bank balance sheets. This paper analyses historical evidence to argue that concentrating on a liability-focused approach to the exclusion of asset-side solutions is ill-conceived. An excessive accumulation of non-performing loans on the asset side of bank balance sheets inevitably renders resolution interventions on the liability/equity side ineffective or at the very least insufficient to maintain banking system viability and financial stability. Bank asset restructuring involving the use of asset management companies, asset protection schemes and even capital injections can play a critical role in achieving an expeditious restoration of banking systems' health following a major macroeconomic, sustainability or financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the development of non-performing loans (NPL) held by European banks along the economic cycle. During the global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, banks from all European countries experienced a substantial increase in NPLs. We find that these increases are mainly associated with macroeconomic determinants and characteristics of banks' business models. Substantial differences across countries exist in the duration and efficiency of the NPL resolution after the crisis. We exploit cross-country and time-variant differences in insolvency and contract enforcement procedures to document that the outcome of NPL resolution is associated with the duration and the costs of insolvency and contract enforcement during the economic recovery phase. Our findings suggest that the design of a country's legal regime can ensure a swift NPL resolution during the recovery phase while the build-up of NPLs during a crisis is mainly attributable to economic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]