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This is part 2 of an rigorous analysis of the judgment of the Hague District Court in Milieudefensie v. Shell. Part 1 was published in the previous issue of European Energy and Environmental Law Review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To protect the inhabitants of The Netherlands against 'dangerous climate change', the Hague District Court (the 'Court') in the 'climate case of the century' (Milieudefensie v. Shell, 2021) resorted to paradoxical lex ferenda interpretations of Dutch tort law. The court found binding 'unwritten' corporate norms in documentation without any legal status, while it acknowledged that the corresponding multitude of demanding 'written' (i.e., statutory) norms are nonbinding, do not apply to private entities, and do not reflect custom. In dictating corporate climate policymaking, the court rewrote Dutch tort law, ignored its limits, and expanded it in ways that are not consistent with the Dutch Supreme Court's rulings. Based on the proposition that CO2 emissions cause 'dangerous' climate change, which is not a term used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the judgment is a lengthy, but in the end circular argument: there is a duty of care because emissions cause danger, and emissions cause danger because there is a duty of care. Milieudefensie's case was built chiefly on a Dutch tort law case known as the 'Cellar Hatch' case. In the Cellar Hatch case, the Dutch Supreme Court first articulated the endangerment doctrine that resembles Learned Hand's negligence calculus. In Milieudefensie v. Shell, the Hague District Court applied the endangerment doctrine, but constructed a climatespecific version. To enforce the urgent CO2 emission reductions deemed scientifically necessary, the Court circumvented the logical consequences of the applying the Cellar Hatch's endangerment doctrine by referring to human rights, consensus and the concept of 'partial responsibility'. The judgment does not fit into the system of Dutch civil law, and reasons away all barriers to imposition of the remedy sought by Milieudefensie, including causation requirements. With the Court's moral reconstruction of the endangerment doctrine to 'save the planet', the Court opened the hatch, and fell into the dark cellar, along with the entire body of Dutch tort law, democracy, the rule of law, the rights and interests of citizens and the economy. In short, based on court-made 'unwritten' law, the Court concocted a result-oriented mix of science, law and expanded 'soft laws' to find an unlawful act without duly considering its plausible lawfulness and justification, entertained a vague, multi-faceted concept of climate-related damage without carefully examining its coherence, and constructed a causal link between the act and the damage based on the act's presumed unlawfulness. Ironically, given the way markets work, the court's judgment may well increase CO2 emissions, and thus not have any favourable effect on the climate, but it will restrict citizen's rights to participate in public affairs and impose a potentially large burden on the economy. Endorsing perceived consensus around a moral imperative to reduce emissions, the Court did not confirm, but merely assumed the effectiveness of the remedy and ignored its multiple adverse consequences. The reality is that to comply with the court order, in 2030, Shell could simply spin off its fossil fuel business. Regrettably, the court disposed of virtually the complete body of Dutch law to secure a pyrrhic victory for the climate movement that is likely to harm the environment. This article is published in two parts. This is part 1. Part 2 will be published in the next issue of European Energy and Environmental Law Review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's ruling in the Urgenda climate case requires that the Netherlands government step up the fight against climate change to reduce CO2 emissions by the end of 2020 by 25% (relative to 1990). Urgent action against 'dangerous climate change' was deemed scientifically necessary to safeguard the right to life of Netherlands residents. Upon close analysis, however, this revolutionary judgment appears to be based on uncritical examination of the factual evidence presented by Urgenda, judicial misappropriation of legislative power, expansive interpretations of the applicable law, careless or incomplete reasoning, and intentional omissions. Due to these deficiencies, the court's ruling will have serious consequences for future policy-making in The Netherlands and the liability exposure of companies in relation to climate change. This article analyses the judgment and discusses its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the potential liability of governments in relation to negligence and omissions with respect to COVID-19 measures. The focus is on China and The Netherlands. State liability can arise if governments have been negligent in addressing the threat of the COVID-19 epidemic, specifically where they have created risks due to not implementing restrictions or not doing so in a timely manner, or otherwise have failed to protect public health and human lives.

The article discusses risk regulation and its reality. Topics discussed include tentative definition of risk regulation and its boundaries, the future of risk regulation and the role of facts, values and preferences, and the importance of risk regulation research which is used to expose disguise and hide strategies.

The article discusses the standing requirements for private parties, rationale and justification for the current restrictive conditions under the law of the European Union (EU). It outlines the effects of expanded standing for private parties on the legality, quality and effectiveness of EU risk regulation. It notes the functional characteristics of judicial review and elaborates how the issues are different for risk regulation.

The article presents the author's views on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. It is opined that the definitions of climate change under the Paris Agreement's policy and science sphere are inconsistent and apocryphal, which impedes the scientific enterprise of climate research. It is stated that climate science is policy-led instead of climate policy being science-led, as the Paris Agreement seems to require.

The article presents the author's views on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, concluded at COP-21 in December 2015. It is opined that the Paris Agreement would appear to be a procedural framework for future, flexible climate policy- making by the parties, dressed up with some non-binding language that emphasizes ambition and progression.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber) of 5 March 2015 In Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13, preliminary ruling in the proceedings Boston ScientificMedizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt — Die Gesundheitskasse (C-503/13), Betriebskrankenkasse RWE (C-504/13)1 On 5 March 2015, the European Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling on two issues arising under the EU Product Liability Directive,2 which imposes objective, no-fault or strict liability, but not absolute liability, for defective products. Despite the wide range of issues arising under this directive, the Court has had only a few occasions to construe its ambiguous terms. This case, however, provided an opportunity to the Court to settle key issues relating to the defect test and the scope of damages compensable under the directive. As in other civil law cases, the question arises whether the Court's light treatment will provide a sound basis for the further development of product liability in Europe. The Court did not answer the questions posed by the referring court, but in some respects went beyond these questions and in other respects avoided the difficult issues raised thereby. As discussed in this note, the Court paints with a broad brush, and the test set forth in its judgment to determine whether a product is defective, may itself be defective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the opinion delivered by German Advocate General Juliane Kokott of the European Union Court of Justice on February 12, 2015 on the concept of articles under the 2006 Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation. Topics include whether component-article is an article itself, the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) guidance, and substances of very high concern listed on the Candidate List (SVHCs).

The REACH Regulation establishes several chemical regulatory regimes, which operate, by and large, as stand-alone, but ostensibly complementary programmes. The two key REACH programmes for direct 'command and control' regulation of chemical risk are 'restriction' and 'authorization'. In the case of substances of very high concern, both restriction and authorization are available as risk management measures. Because REACH fails to establish an independent, coherent and unbiased framework for chemical risk assessment and policy analysis of these alternative regulatory options, their deployment has been fraught with difficulties. This article reviews the REACH provisions governing the restriction and authorization programmes, and the differences, similarities and interrelations between them. In the second part, the problems arising in the application of the two regimes are illustrated with reference to the case of dipolar aprotic solvents. This case study demonstrates that the most appropriate regulatory instrument may be a regime other than REACH. The third part sets forth some recommendations to improve current practice and move towards a predictable, reasonable and balanced REACH application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews recent developments in nanotechnology regulation in the European Union and some of its Member States. The authors discuss efforts to address nanotechnology under the EU's REACH Regulation, cosmetics legislation, biocides regulation, and proposed medical devices regulation. The authors also analyze initiatives for the establishment of nanomaterial registries at the national and EU level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case ATC and Others v Commission which involves Animal Trading Co. It states that animal trading deals with the duties of the institutions in administrative proceedings, precautionary principle, and proportionality principle. It says that the European Union (EU) has enjoyed a wide discretion in deciding what measures could be imposed to control risks correlated with avian flu.

The article discusses the transparency in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The significant opportunity of the TTIP for creating a process for regulatory cooperation, harmonization, and convergence is tackled. The Europe precautionary principle's (PP) relation to post-modernism, and its influence on European Union (EU) regulatory procedure and science is also explored.

At the international and European levels, there is no shortage of laws, regulations and guidelines for medical research involving human beings. In addition to this, there are also international and European Union regulatory instruments on medical human research. A series of principles relevant to medical research involving human beings are listed. The three common principles which could be identified are a) the autonomy principle b) the proportionality principle c) the principle of prior authorization.

Challenges the views that environmental liability should pursue an insurance objective and the environmental liability is insurable. Overview of the concept of risk spreading as the ultimate objective of insurance; Benefits provided by insurance; Discussion of the context of insuring against natural resource damage.

The European Union has established a comprehensive legislative privacy framework aimed at protecting data pertaining to individuals. The EU is currently in the process of amending and supplementing its data protection legislation to prepare for the information society. In this article, Professor Lucas Bergkamp questions the desirability and necessity of the EU’s data protection regime in the information society. He examines the “other side” of data protection law and identifies its paradoxical and adverse effects. Based on a thorough analysis of how privacy law affects markets, he argues that data protection restricts consumer choice and freedom, and results in consumers receiving outdated, lower quality products and services at higher prices. The author proposes possible alternative approaches to data protection in Europe, and identifies the groundwork that needs to be conducted to devise a sensible, balanced privacy framework for the information society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]