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In this paper, we examine a supply chain consisting of a supplier with capital constraint and multiple retailers with no working capital. The retailers can get either trade credit from the supplier or loan from banks. All the retailers are differentiated by their credit scores, which measure the possibility that they default. We show that when the retailer's default probability is high compared with the marginal cost, the retailer cannot get financial support. If the retailers only get money from banks, the more reliable a retailer is, the higher the wholesale price the supplier may charge him. We also find out that the supplier has the motivation to provide trade credit even when the retailers can get money from banks. And no matter where the retailers get money from, when the initial capital is a little insufficient, the supplier will reduce the quantity of the products provided to all retailers. As the initial capital becomes less, the supplier will cut off all the supply to the lowest-score retailer first no matter whether the supplier undertakes the default risk or not. In other words, when the retailers are heterogeneous, for supplier, it is not always the more retailers, the better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study theoretically explores the impact of market segmentation uncertainty on producers’ production decisions and their subsequent effects on producers’ profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This uncertainty creates a mismatch between the producer’s supply and consumer demand, while also decreasing the producer’s market power. An uncertain market segment incentivizes the producer to pursue higher-quality information, which generates conflicts between the producer and consumers when the producer faces capital constraints. Conversely, when the producer has no capital constraints, the interests of both parties align and obtaining higher-quality information improves consumer welfare outcomes.

Blockchain technology (BCT) has the potential to revolutionize the supply chain financing (SCF) system and mitigate the detrimental effects of demand volatility on SCF. As one of the first to examine the effects of BCT implementation in SCF from the perspective of demand volatility, we focus on the impacts of BCT on equilibrium and whether the retailer has the incentive to adopt BCT. We perform a comparative analysis of the Stackelberg game involving three parties under scenarios with and without BCT adoption. We find that when the demand volatility reduction coefficient is sufficiently large, BCT can facilitate a reduction of the ordering quantity while still sustaining the same service level, thus avoiding excessive inventory, and reducing the associated risk of bankruptcy. Additionally, the decreased bankruptcy risk enabled the bank to reduce interest rates. The adoption of BCT can improve the profit of the retailer when the adoption cost of BCT is sufficiently low. Our findings provide management insights into when the small and medium‐sized enterprises should adopt BCT and the interactive decision‐making of all parties in the SCF business after BCT adoption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The application of blockchain technology solves the trust problem between core enterprises (CEs), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and commercial banks, facilitating CEs and commercial banks to provide guarantee for SMEs and finance them, respectively. This study considers a three-level supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a capital-constrained retailer, and explores the operational strategies of blockchain platform finance (BPF), a supply chain finance mode enabled by blockchain technology. First, optimal decision solutions are obtained through decision and parameter sensitivity analyses. Second, by comparing the BPF and SME independent finance (SIF) modes, we obtain the applicable BPF mode conditions; for instance, when the retailer's initial capital is low and the production cost is high, BPF is the better option for the manufacturer, distributor, and retailer compared to SIF. Third, we find that risk sharing improves the financing efficiency of the BPF mode. This study provides a theoretical basis for decision makers to implement blockchain supply chain finance at three levels: joint financing and operation decision-making, financing mode selection, and financing efficiency improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) frequently face challenges in obtaining financial assistance from traditional banks. Platform Supply Chain Finance (PSCF) has emerged as a promising solution for financing issues among SMEs, with an added focus on integrating sustainability aspects. This study focused on a two-tier supply chain as its primary research topic to find strategies to enhance supplier financial viability and improve the efficiency and profitability of the main manufacturing enterprise. In this study, we establish three distinct hypotheses corresponding to the three models involving supplier and manufacturer participation, encompassing parameters such as production batch size, pricing, and supply chain profit. First, it examined financing decisions through the lens of core enterprise-led platform finance. Second, it applied the Stackelberg game theory to investigate financing decisions in three distinct modes: traditional finance, platform internal finance, and external platform finance. Suppliers, manufacturers, and banks can be seen as participants in a Stackelberg game. In this game, suppliers act as leaders, making production and procurement decisions first, while manufacturers and banks act as followers, adjusting their behavior based on the suppliers' decisions. Finally, it performed a comparative analysis of decisions and supply chain efficiency across these modes. When the risk regulation cost coefficient falls below a certain threshold, suppliers are willing to set up their own PSCF and there is an optimal level of risk regulation effort within the interval (0, 1). We compare platform finance with traditional finance and find that the traditional finance model maximizes profits for suppliers, while the external financing model maximizes profits for manufacturers and the overall supply chain profit. Findings provide insights for platforms, suppliers, manufacturers, and banks to implement optimal financing and channel structures to increase their profits and promote the sustainable development of the financial supply chain. In addition, future research on blockchain platform models would be highly meaningful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore optimal strategies of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one capital-constrained retailer and one bank, where the bank provides loans to the retailer due to credit guarantees. However, there are default risks if the retailer can not repay the loans. Using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) to describe risk aversion of the retailer, optimal order quantities of the retailer and optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer are obtained by solving a Stackelberg game model, where the manufacturer is a leader and the retailer is a follower, respectively. Our numerical results show that the default probability of the retailer are proportional to optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer. It implies that when the default probability of the retailer is high, the manufacturer should reduce the default risk by setting higher wholesale prices to avoid a burden of a substantial guarantee. Thus, our results can serve as insights for decision-makers of supply chain management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aiming at the financing mode selection problem of a closed‑loop supply chain consisting of a retailer, a recycler, and a capital constrainted manufacturer, the revenue functions of the manufacturer, retailer, recycler, and closed ‐ loop supply chain are constructed when the capital constrained manufacturer can get financing from the retailer (internal financing) or the bank (external financing), respectively, and based on the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and return rate strategies under two financing modes are given. On this basis, by comparing the optimal decisions and revenue of the recycler, retailer, manufacturer, and closed ‐ loop supply chain under different financing modes, the financing mode selection strategies are given from different perspectives. The research results show that under certain conditions, the retailer providing financing services are beneficial for the manufacturer, retailer, recycler and closed ‐ loop supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To reduce environmental pollution and promote sustainable development, more and more suppliers are committed to producing more environmentally friendly products such as green electrical appliances through a green supply chain (GSC) system. However, some suppliers are often limited by a lack of funds in the production and supply process. In this paper, buyer-supported purchase order financing (BPOF) and advance payment discount (APD) are adopted to help the supplier successfully produce green products in a GSC system consisting of a financially constrained supplier and a reputable retailer. Moreover, the salvage values of unsold inventory in most traditional models are fixed, but in real life, the salvage value tends to be time dependent. Therefore, how the time-varying salvage value affects the operation and financing decisions as well as the profit risks is studied. We find that the clearance time of the unsold items affects the optimal order quantity and the supplier's discount rate and the financial institution's optimal interest rate. In addition, the financing equilibrium is BPOF under certain conditions, and the profit risks of the retailer and the entire supply chain are increasing with the order quantity and the clearance time. Finally, our results are verified through numerical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines market entrance and pricing strategies for a remanufacturer with capital constraint and competition from an original equipment manufacturer. In the study, the remanufacturer is divided into two types, namely the H-type and L-type, and is assumed to have access to bank loans and equity financing to ease the capital constraint. With the Nash game, it is found that (i) if remanufacturing is costly, the remanufacturer will choose partial remanufacturing and not enter into the remanufacturing market until the equity financing ratio excesses a certain threshold. (ii) A H-type remanufacturer is more flexible in term of market entrance than a L-type remanufacturer. (iii) The remanufacturer's profit increases first and then decreases in the equity ratio. (iv) Equity ratio and interest rate have opposite effects on the pricing of the new and remanufactured products. Furthermore, with some research extensions, it is exhibited that the results and managerial implications developed in the paper hold well for different financing modes and the random demand setting, and hence are robust to a good extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – This study aims to focus on the optimal green R&D of a capital-constrained supply chain under different channel power structures as well as the impact of capital constraint, financing cost, channel power structure and cost-reducing efficiency on green R&D and supply chain profitability. Design/methodology/approach – A two-echelon supply chain is considered. The upstream firm engages in green R&D but has capital constraints that can be overcome by external financing. Green R&D is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase consumer demand. Based on whether or not the upstream firm is capital constrained and dominates the supply chain, four models are developed. Findings – Capital constraints significantly lower green R&D and supply chain profitability. Transferring leadership from the upstream to the downstream firms leads to higher green R&D levels and downstream firm profitability, whereas the upstream firm's profitability is increased (decreased) if green R&D investment efficiency is high (low) enough. Greater financing costs reduce green R&D and downstream firm profitability; however, the upstream firm's profitability under the model in which it functions as the follower increases if the initial capital is sufficient. More importantly, empirical analysis based on practice data is used to verify the theoretical results reported above. Practical implications – This study reveals how upstream firms in supply chains decide green R&D decisions in situations with capital constraints, providing managers and governments with an understanding of the impact of capital constraint, channel power structure, financing cost and cost-reducing efficiency on supply chain green R&D and profitability. Originality/value – The major contributions are the exploration of supply chain green R&D by taking into consideration channel power structures and cost-reducing efficiency and the validation of theoretical results using practice data.

The paper aims to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We consider an uncooperative ordering model in a supplier-Stackelberg game and coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract for a loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer. We drive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions under bank financing and revenue-sharing contract. We also develop a series of propositions and corollaries to determine the optimal solutions and offer some managerial insights. The key contribution of the paper is to deepen and expand the revenue-sharing contract under the risk-neutral assumption, and to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We find that the revenue-sharing ratio of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer and the expected utility of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer under coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cap-and-trade regulation is a primary market-based mechanism for controlling carbon emissions. In this framework, governments allocate carbon permits to supply chain participants, which can be exchanged either within the supply chain or externally in the broader carbon market. This research employs a Stackelberg game model to examine a two-tier supply chain, including a single supplier and manufacturer. The study explores emission reduction strategies, notably considering the manufacturer's capital limitations under cap-and-trade. Assuming the leading manufacturer holds surplus carbon permits and the upstream supplier experiences a shortage, we evaluate the dynamics of carbon trading within the supply chain. To facilitate emission reductions and alleviate the manufacturer's capital constraints, the two parties engage in a cost-sharing contract and supplier financing mechanism. Our findings indicate that an increase in the impact coefficient of the emission reduction rate correlates with a rise in the internal carbon price, resulting in a decrease in the sales price. Under the cost-sharing model, a higher external carbon trading price boosts the carbon emission reduction rate for both parties. The manufacturer realizes optimal profit with the supplier financing model when external carbon prices are low. However, the cost-sharing contract proves more advantageous as prices increase. The preference among these mechanisms depends on the coefficient of the emission reduction rate on the internal carbon price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital constraints are a major obstacle that holds back cash-poor households from purchasing a home. A workaround is to compromise the housing size and quality by buying a starter home one can marginally afford first. This study aims to investigate how capital constraints distort the pricing of starter homes. In Hong Kong, the government builds subsidized starter homes, which can be resold either to any households at full market prices through the privatized submarket or to households of limited affordability at lower prices through the affordable submarket. The subsidy in the latter case comes from the equity contribution of the government. If there were no capital constraints, the price gap between the two submarkets should simply be the government's equity. However, our empirical analysis reveals a much smaller price gap, indicating that households with limited affordability are willing to pay a starter home premium in order to relax their capital constraints. Our estimation shows that the premium is in the range of 4.5% to 6.8%, and enlarges when the housing market becomes more unaffordable. The pricing of starter homes is based not only on their quality but also on their ability to relax capital constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on a multi‐period inventory problem with capital constraints and demand uncertainties. The multi‐period inventory problem is formulated as an optimization model with a joint chance constraint (JCC) requiring the purchase cost for each period not to exceed the available capital with a probability guarantee. To hedge against demand uncertainties, an affinely adjustable robust optimization approach is used to convert the developed model into a robust counterpart. By approximating the JCC under a budgeted uncertainty set to which the demands belong, the robust multi‐period inventory model with the JCC is transformed into a linear programming model, which can be solved efficiently. Numerical studies are reported to illustrate the robustness, practicality, and effectiveness of the proposed model and the solution approach. The numerical results show that the proposed model and solution approach outperform the sample average approximation approach. Numerical studies are used further to analyze the impact of the budget coefficient and the upper bound parameter on the inventory costs and the realized capital constraint satisfaction rate. The proposed model and solution approach are further extended to the multi‐product case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reverse factoring, a financial scheme in which established retailers facilitate financing for suppliers, is becoming an increasingly important tool in the industry. Normally, an SME supplier, a core retailer and a bank participate in the reverse factoring scheme. A three-level Stackelberg game is proposed in this study to investigate the interaction of the participants. The closed-form equilibria of the retailer's replenishment decision, the supplier's payment term decision and the bank's financing decision are derived from the theoretical model. To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt which takes banks into account and endogenises their interest rates in the modelling of reverse factoring. The reverse factoring scheme is compared with commercial loans and traditional factoring. Compared to commercial loans, the introduction of factoring can lower credit risk, but fraud risk still exists. Reverse factoring solves this fraud problem and further decreases the financing cost for the supplier. Consequently, reverse factoring benefits the retailer through a significantly increased payment extension granted by the supplier. The numerical results also indicate that the utility of the bank significantly improves by 8–50% under varying levels of default risk compared with traditional factoring. Our study provides incentives and guidelines for supply chain participants to adopt such schemes when faced with capital constraints and the credit risk of the supplier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a supply chain with two competitive online sellers, in which the seller who suffers from capital distress may borrow from a commercial bank or an e-commerce platform. We consider three different supply chain models depending on how many sellers suffer from capital distress. We characterize the sellers' optimal production decisions and the lenders' optimal interest rates, and further examine the sellers' financing preferences. We demonstrate that the e-commerce platform will charge a zero interest rate to the financially constrained seller if the production cost is beyond a certain threshold. It is observed that the financially constrained seller's financing preference is correlated with the capital status and financing choice of its rival. Specifically, if only one of the sellers is financially constrained, it is always optimal for the capital-constrained seller to borrow from the e-commerce platform. In contrast, if both sellers suffer from capital distress, the two sellers prefer e-commerce platform financing when the e-commerce platform's commission rate is relatively high or when the commission ratio is low while the production cost is high. Furthermore, it is more profitable for the bank or e-commerce platform to provide financing service to both capital-constrained sellers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study explores the operation decisions of a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer, an e-commerce platform (ECP), and a third-party logistics company (3PL). This study first proposes two game models to obtain the equilibrium solutions of the supply chain members. Then, it compares and analyzes the equilibrium strategies under the two financing modes. This study has obtained the following interesting findings. The increase of the ECP interest rate will reduce the profit of the unit product in the distribution channel. However, the total income of the ECP will increase with the increase in the financing income. Under the 3PL financing mode, if the transportation fee of the direct sales channel is lower than that of the distribution channel, the ECP will reduce the sales price to compete with the direct sales channel of the manufacturer. Under the same conditions, the ECP financing mode is more competitive than the 3PL financing mode, and ECP financing services are the dominant strategy for the manufacturer, ECP, and consumers. If a 3PL company wants to win in the financing service, lowering interest rate or implementing differentiated transportation charges are important measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In e-commerce, sellers can disclose product information (such as quality, size information, function, and so on) to make consumers understand the products. However, in the process of information disclosure, consumers often fall into information distortion or information loss. Because of its immutability and traceability, blockchain can help e-commerce sellers improve information disclosure and ensure the efficiency of information transmission. We study a duopoly competitive e-commerce market in which two e-commerce sellers compete in information disclosure. According to whether to apply blockchain, we divide the sellers' decision-making into four research scenarios (NN, BN, NB, BB). Based on the above four scenarios, we get the market demand of different products depending on the consumer utility, and further establish the game model in the competitive environment. This paper explores the impact of blockchain on information disclosure and consumer surplus, and achieves the Nash equilibrium of blockchain application for both sides. In the expansion model, we study e-commerce sellers' risk aversion and capital constraints, and further explore their impact on blockchain in practice. Finally, combining with blockchain's characteristics, we also analyze the impact of the application of blockchain at other aspects on the supply chain. We find that when consumers' trust in information is low or the cost of blockchain applications is low, all e-commerce sellers in competition will adopt blockchain. In addition, when consumers have low trust in information, it will be difficult to achieve complete equilibrium in the application of blockchain as their risk aversion increases. For capital constrained sellers, when the cost of blockchain application is low, it will be difficult to achieve full equilibrium for blockchain applicants as the bank financing rate increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A supply chain made up of a financially constrained retailer and a well-financed manufacturer is constructed considering the showroom effect. The financing strategy choice of the retailer and the operational decisions of the supply chain members are investigated, in which the retailer can solve the capital constraint problem through a single financing strategy (ML and BL) and a combined financing strategy (MBL and BTL). Meanwhile, the impact of the showroom effect on the optimal decision and profit of supply chain members under different financing strategies and the optimal financing strategy decision is analyzed by numerical examples. The study shows that: (1) the increasing showroom effect has not inhibited retailers' enthusiasm to offer showroom services; on the contrary, it has prompted them to improve the level of showroom services. (2) The price of the products grows with the increases in the showroom effect, but the sales price of the online channel is more greatly affected. In addition, the showroom effect has a greater impact on the sales prices of online and offline channels and wholesale prices under the BL strategy than in other financing strategies. (3) When the showroom effect is small, the optimal strategy for retailers is to choose the ML strategy or the MBL strategy, while the BTL strategy is superior to the MBL strategy only when the equity financing ratio is very small. However, where the showroom effect exceeds a certain threshold, the BL strategy is the optimal funding strategy for retailers. (4) When the bank loan rate is too high, the ML and MBL strategies are better if the retailer's initial capital level is not too low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the impact of two insurance mechanisms: loan guarantee insurance and yield insurance, on a capital‐constrained contract‐farming supply chain where the farmer is risk‐averse and faces yield uncertainty. Using the sequential model, we derive the farmer's optimal farm size, the agrodealer's optimal wholesale price and the insurance company's optimal premium rate. The result shows that under both insurance mechanisms, premium subsidies can promote the farmer to increase the farm size. However, we find that under loan guarantee insurance, when the premium subsidy is relatively high, the farmer's farm size increases with the poor harvest risk. Under yield insurance, the farmer's conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) value increases with respect to the premium subsidy rate. Under loan guarantee insurance, the premium rate increases with respect to the premium subsidy. As a result, the farmer's CVaR value decreases with respect to the premium subsidy rate when it is relatively high. Further analysis indicates that with the same government subsidy expenditure, the efficiency of premium subsidies to increase the farmer's production quantity is better under loan guarantee insurance mode, but the efficiency of premium subsidies to increase the farmer's CVaR value is better under yield insurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when low-carbon life has become an important global issue, the decarbonization of manufacturing enterprises cannot be delayed in the face of the government's green policy and other objective conditions. Under these circumstances, how to arrange the production plan before and after the implication of low-carbon policies is an urgent issue to be settled, especially for the capital-constrained news vendors. To address these problems, this paper firstly builds a stylized supply chain model consisting of two different types of manufacturers (i.e., low-carbon type and traditional type) with capital constraints, then obtains equilibrium production and business strategies resorting to Stackelberg game theory, and lastly conducts an analysis of how the key factors affect manufacturers' green transition decisions under different scenarios of carbon policy. With the study's structure, some interesting and important results and managerial insights are derived. For example, but not limited to, it is found that: (i) compared with traditional products, the price fluctuation of low-carbon products is greater than that of traditional products with the increase in consumers' low-carbon awareness. And consumers have more tolerance for price increases for low-carbon products. (ii) When producing low-carbon products is cost-effective, it is a wise choice to produce more low-carbon products. When producing low-carbon items is costly, producing more low-carbon products is still a dominant strategy until the expenditure difference between low-carbon and traditional ones exceeds a certain threshold. (iii) When the expenditure on low-carbon production is moderate, the manufacturer first prefers the traditional strategy, then the low-carbon one, with an increase in consumers' low-carbon awareness. When the expenditure on low-carbon production stays at a low or high level, the low-carbon strategy always dominates the traditional one with a certain condition satisfied. This study can enrich the theory of green supply chain management and provide decision support for enterprise managers in the green transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the role of trade credit in coordinating a Capital Constrained Supply Chain in the presence of retailer Effort (CCSCE), essentially because of the impact of its related default risks on the relationship between the chain's members. We consider a CCSCE consisting of a supplier and a retailer where the retailer may exert costly promotional efforts to increase the market demand but has limited capital and no access to bank financing due to low credit rating. Conversely, the supplier has adequate funds to offer trade credit to the retailer without borrowing from external channels. We then examine whether the existing coordination contracts can still coordinate the CCSCE under trade credit. Our result shows that these contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain when the interest rate of trade credit is competitively priced. Nevertheless, this position cannot always be reached. That's why we propose a generalised contract based on risk compensation to coordinate the CCSCE. Using our proposed coordinating contract, the supplier perfectly coordinates the retailer's decisions for the largest joint profit, and arbitrarily allocates the maximised joint profit among supply chain members. Finally, the numerical study allows to verify this finding. From managerial insights, our results provide the supply chain managers with novel insights on how to combine trade credit with the existing coordination contracts in order to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain as well as the individual member. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In reality, due to the low credit rating of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), it is difficult for them to obtain sufficient financing from a single financier. This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer, an e-commerce platform (ECP), a third-party logistics company (3PL) and consumers. There are two innovations in this paper: the manufacturer obtains sufficient production funds through hybrid financing of the ECP and 3PL, and consumers want to know product information and compare prices. The contributions of this paper are to investigate new applications of blockchain in both hybrid financing and meeting consumer information search needs.Methodology: We discuss the operation and pricing decisions of supply chain in two scenarios. These two scenarios are without adopting blockchain (N) and with adopting blockchain (B). Then, we compare the equilibrium decisions in two scenarios.Results: The results show that the supply chain will adopt blockchain when certain conditions are met. The initial adoption of blockchain is bad for the ECP and 3PL. Further, we find that with the increase of financing ratio, the optimal financing interest rate of the ECP decreases, while the optimal financing interest rate of the 3PL increases.Discussion: The numerical analysis shows that the adoption of blockchain can be more profitable when the cost of information search is high.Management insights: In order to achieve supply chain coordination, the manufacturer should give subsidies the ECP and 3PL.

The intelligent transformation of logistics plays a significant role in meeting the diverse needs of customers, improving operational efficiency, and reducing carbon emissions in logistics activities. Therefore, to achieve sustainable development, logistics enterprises need to face the decision-making problem of intelligent logistics transformation. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game model between a financially constrained logistics-service provider (LSP) and a well-funded logistics-service integrator (LSI) and discuss the impact of the wholesale price contract, the cost-sharing contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-part tariff contract, and the hybrid cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract on the intelligence level of logistics services, the profits of supply-chain members, and the channel for logistics-service demand. We found that the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply-chain members. In addition, the increase in bank-loan interest rates would seriously weaken the level of intelligence and market demand for the entire logistics service. However, when consumers do not have high requirements for the intelligence of logistics services, the two-part power–price contract can create a win–win situation for supply-chain members and increase market demand within a certain range; on the contrary, a hybrid contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing is the best choice. Moreover, in the process of contract design for the intelligent transformation of logistics services, it is necessary to pay attention to the influence of the price-sensitivity coefficient on decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the potential of carbon-abatement cost-sharing contracts in optimizing the joint economic–environmental benefit of a green supply chain. One-way and two-way cost-sharing contracts were investigated, respectively, in scenarios in which a capital-constrained manufacturer has a dominant downstream retailer or a dominant upstream supplier. The manufacturer obtains financing from a competitively priced bank to fulfill its production, carbon-abatement investment, and even insufficient emission permit purchase given the fact that the cap-and-trade regulation exists. Results show that in both one-way and two-way cost-sharing cases, cost sharing of carbon abatement has no effect on the manufacturer's output or its counterparty's wholesale price decisions; however, it improves the carbon abatement level of the supply chain. As a result, such cost-sharing of carbon abatement is proven to hamper the profit of the overall supply chain, but it improves the joint "economic-environmental" benefit of the supply chain if the cost-sharing coefficient is properly chosen. Furthermore, this problem is studied in the case of consumers' green preferences, and carbon-abatement cost sharing is also verified to have the potential to optimize joint economic–environmental benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the emissions trading mechanism, this article explores optimal manufacturing/remanufacturing decisions considering the carbon credits buy-back policy by focusing on the value of carbon assets. First, two non-linear programming models are formulated under the cases with/without the carbon credits buy-back policy and solved using the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions (KKT). This article then systematically investigated the impacts of the carbon credits buy-back policy and related crucial parameters on production quantities, selling quantity of carbon quotas, total profits and total carbon emissions resorting to the theoretical analysis and numerical analysis. The results show that the carbon credits buy-back policy could improve operating situations, while specific implementation effect also depends on some factors. Among them, the higher value of the carbon savings of unit remanufactured product could strengthen the advantages of the carbon credits buy-back policy, and the rising carbon savings more significantly promotes the remanufacturing activities. Furthermore, both the carbon price and carbon quotas have significant effects on manufacturing/remanufacturing decisions under the carbon credits buy-back policy. Meanwhile, the carbon price can more effectively adjust production and emissions reduction activities, and consequently controls carbon emissions while protecting production activities. Finally, the results proposed in this paper provide guidance suggestions to manufacturers and policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The difference in carbon emissions has an important impact on the decision-making of dual-channel fresh produce supply chain financing. We set up a Stackelberg game model of a dual-channel supply chain under the financing strategy of banks and retailers to study the optimal operation decision and financing strategy selection. Our analysis results show that when the retailer’s interest rate and the carbon emission difference met certain conditions, the supplier always chooses the financing strategy of retailers.

In this paper, we study the financing decision for an emission‐dependent supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which are financially constrained and in need of short‐term financing for emission abatement. Three kinds of financing strategies are considered: (1) bank financing separately (BFS), (2) the manufacturer obtains partial loans from the bank, and borrows from the supplier (MPB), (3) the supplier obtains partial loans from the bank, and borrows from the manufacturer (SPB). The BFS is viewed as a noncollaborative financing strategy, and the MPB and SPB are collaborative financing strategies. The financing strategies are obtained at the point where wholesale price, production quantity, and emission reduction are endogenously determined. We found that the collaborative financing strategy is beneficial to the supplier and the whole supply chain compared with the noncollaborative financing strategy, the SPB strategy may outperform the MPB strategy for the supplier and the whole supply chain, depending on sharing proportion. The advantage of the MPB and SPB strategies relative to the BFS strategy mainly depends on sharing proportion from the manufacturer's perspective. We demonstrated that the collaborative financing strategy is the equilibrium strategy of the emission‐dependent supply chain under certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of trade credit insurance in a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer faces stochastic market demand and seeks trade credit from the supplier. The supplier, who is the Stackelberg game leader, decides the production quantity and the insurance coverage rate. We find that when the supplier's initial capital is not sufficient, the use of trade credit insurance may reduce the trade quantity and the expected profit of the retailer. However, when the initial capital of the supplier is sufficient, the use of trade credit insurance will always increase the trade quantity. In the extension, we assume the supplier will face a potential financing cost if the net income is lower than the threshold. We find that if the insurance company has to keep its expected return positive and has no way to invest the insurance premium, the supplier will never buy the trade credit insurance no matter how much the marginal financing cost is when threshold is outside a certain range. Both the results and the methods in this paper can help businesses achieve a balance of funds and the logistics of the supply chain and risks, thereby improving the effectiveness of the supply chain operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Asset leasing versus bank credit for battery swap service provider (SSP) financing. • Players in game theoretical modeling: battery supplier, lessor, SSP, and consumers. • Choice between two financing strategies depends on various equilibrium factors. • Battery supplier likely champions asset leasing, followed by battery lessor and SSP. • Numerical and extended analyses on incentives deepen insights for policymakers. Battery swapping provides a quick electric vehicle (EV) replenishment solution to time-sensitive consumers. To meet the growing demand, a significant investment in establishing swap stations is needed, and fund shortage becomes a bottleneck for swap service providers. To cope with this issue, a swap service provider may partner with a battery lessor, and such a new financing strategy deserves a close look. Compared with traditional bank credit as the benchmark strategy, asset leasing through battery lessors is more flexible and less burdensome. This study establishes a game-theoretical model of a three-tier market comprising one battery supplier at the producer level, one battery lessor and one swap service provider at the vendor level, and heterogeneous end-users at the consumer level. The model compares the swap service provider's profit across bank credit and asset leasing strategies to determine when the battery lessor should be involved. It also examines the impacts of asset leasing on swap station establishment, other stakeholders' profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Numerical analyses assess the effectiveness of asset leasing strategy together with four types of incentives: swap operation, station establishment, battery procurement, and battery recycling. Concerning the sustainable development of the EV market, the findings yield managerial implications for supply chain members as well as helpful insights for policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on financing choices and information-sharing strategies in the capital-constrained supply chain. We model four scenarios with the capital constraints of the respective manufacturer and retailer using bank credit financing (BCF) and trade credit financing (TCF) approaches to address financing problems, and investigate the retailer’s willingness to share demand forecasting information. We find that TCF is an equilibrium financing choice for a capital-constrained supply chain. However, when a capital-constrained member chooses TCF, sharing demand information over the supply chain becomes more difficult. The interactions between the choices of financing approach and information sharing based on the game equilibriums, as well as the conditions that encourage the well-funded member to offer TCF in the capital-constrained supply chains, have also been analytically explored and numerically verified. Additional managerial insights are provided for discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two financial schemes, i.e., purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF), have been proposed for small and medium-sized manufacturers. This study considers a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer who faces the random yield and has a probability of credit default, a well-capitalized retailer, and a bank. We find that the manufacturer prefers POF scheme if the unit production cost is high and the default risk is low, and BDF scheme otherwise. Whereas the retailer benefits from POF when the unit production cost is small. Thus, the retailer, as the leader, has an incentive to distort the purchase price to induce the manufacturer's financing strategy towards the retailer's preference. Furthermore, only BDF can achieve a Pareto improvement since the retailer plays a dual role (i.e., buyer and lender) under BDF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers a low-carbon supply chain which consists of a capital constrained manufacturer and a retailer. We consider the retailer takes part in low-carbon cost sharing when the manufacturer faces capital constraints due to increasing investment in low-carbon production technologies. We further construct and analyze the performance of the supply chain under three financing strategies: capital constraint without financing (NF), trade credit financing (TCF), and bank credit financing (BCF). Our model provides a financing decision-making model for a low-carbon supply chain with capital constraints, and we design a cost-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain and strengthen the cooperation between enterprises. Moreover, through numerically analyzing the impact of cost-sharing ratio, low carbon preference coefficient of consumers, and interest rate on supply chain decisions and profits, we find (i) the profit of low-carbon supply chain members with capital constrain under TCF strategy is always better than BCF strategy; (ii) cost-sharing contract can increase the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer; and (iii) the low carbon preference coefficient of consumers is also a positive factor in the optimal profit of the manufacturer and retailer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrated inventory management coordinates all party's replenishment policies to provide optimal benefits. Many models have been developed, but none of them have considered capital and warehouse constraints comprehensively. It may cause the model which cannot be applied, since it has exceeded the capacity. This study developed an integrated inventory model that consisted of one vendor, multi-buyer, and one type of item. The main objective was to minimize the joint total expected cost by considering warehouse, capital, and service level constraint. The optimal formula was constructed by using the Lagrange multipliers method. The results showed that with an increment in holding cost, the vendor tends to reduce lot size to minimize joint total expected cost. It is vice versa to the increment in set up cost. An increment in buyer service level can increase lot size and reduce order frequency. The buyer capacity is essential to determine its capability to apply the optimal replenishment policy.

This study investigated a green supply chain comprising a single supplier with financial constraints and a single retailer, while also considering the supplier's degree of risk aversion. A supplier-retailer Stackelberg game model was established under different financing situations, namely, bank financing and retailer's advance payment, and optimal decisions were derived for both the supplier and the retailer. The analysis examined the influence of the degree of the supplier's risk aversion, pricing and financing strategies on optimal decisions. The results show that high supplier risk aversion is not conducive to the supply chain green development. When the supplier has less initial capital, the strategy of advance payment provided by the retailer will be prioritized within the supplier's financial constraints. When the supplier's initial capital is more, he should use the initial capital for production. The study's consideration of the supply chain green level as an endogenous variable, as well as of the supplier's risk aversion, contributes to its novelty.

In this paper, we explore how a monopoly manufacturer chooses the market strategies and decides the optimal price to obtain maximum profit. We divide the market into the C-type market and the N-type market, and analyze the profitability of the monopoly manufacturer who takes the pure-selling, pure-leasing and hybrid strategy respectively, considering consumers' capital constraint and the life span of the durable goods in an indefinite time horizon model. (1) We find that a larger proportion of the consumers with capital constraint has a more significant impact on the prices and it could slow down the development of the rental market. When the scale of the group attains up to a threshold level, it would greatly influence the customers' demand and their marketing strategy, and encourages more manufacturers to take the leasing strategy. (2) In the Hybrid Strategy, we see explicit growth in the overall profit with both the leasing channel and the selling channel working together, although the former outperforms the latter. The suppressed selling channel, in fact, has to lower the price to keep the market coverage, with an independent market structure. (3) Finally, we find that a leasing agent may help the manufacturer at first and then become a tough competitor. These findings provide new insights for the operation of large construction machinery manufacturing companies. subject classification numbers as needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer are risk-averse decision makers. The capital-constrained retailer may adopt two mixed financing modes: (1) bank credit and equity financing (BEF) and (2) trade credit and equity financing (TEF). Using a mean-variance framework, we analyze the supply chain members financing and ordering decisions in two cases: symmetric and asymmetric retailer risk aversion threshold information. In the case of symmetric information, we characterize the conditions under which both the supplier and the retailer prefer BEF or TEF. In the case of asymmetric information, we demonstrate that the retailer has an incentive to pretend to be less risk averse. To prevent this distortion behavior, we design a minimum quantity contract for the supplier. Finally, we extend our model to a bank loan-trade credit-equity mixed financing mode (BTEF) in which the retailer can borrow from the bank and the supplier and seeks financial support from investors. The numerical simulations support our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we consider a two-echelon supply chain, where two capital constrained suppliers compete to sell their products through a common retailer. The retailer may provide advance payment to one or two suppliers. We show that whether the retailer considers merging with only one supplier depends upon the revenue sharing ratio and the additional administrative costs of the revenue sharing contract. Meanwhile, the supplier who drops out of the market may adopt a hybrid financing scheme by combining bank credit with equity financing to return to the market. We find that the deselected supplier can be allowed to participate in the market when the bank loans ratio is below a certain threshold. We further investigate the impact of the bank loans ratio and competition intensity on the players' decisions and profits. In addition, we find that there exists an optimal bank loans ratio for the deselected supplier. Specifically, it is optimal for the deselected supplier to adopt pure bank credit if the production cost is sufficiently low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We first consider a supplier-retailer supply chain in which only the capital-constrained retailer is risk-averse while the supplier and the bank both are risk-neutral. The newsvendor-like retailer may fund its business by two portfolio financing schemes to satisfy uncertain market demand: (1) bank loans and the supplier's equity investment (BCF-SI) and (2) bank loans and the supplier's credit guarantee (BCF-SG). Using CVaR criterion, we model the behaviour of the risk-averse retailer to analytically derive the portfolio financing equilibrium in a Stackelberg supplier-led game separately for two portfolio financing schemes. We characterize the conditions under which the supplier and the retailer reach Pareto improvement under two portfolio financing schemes compared with the non-financing benchmark. Moreover, we extend the model to the case in that the supplier and retailer both are risk-averse while only the bank is risk-neutral to further investigate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal financing scheme selection. The numerical examples verify our theoretical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In reality, supply chain member may apply for loan from bank when he∖∖she is capital-constrained, or may deposit idle capital to bank when he∖∖she is well-funded. This study focuses on the Stackelberg pricing policy considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain. First, the market demand is given, and then the profit functions of supply chain members are built. According to Stackelberg game, the four pricing models are constructed for four scenarios. By solving models, optimal pricing policies of supply chain members for each scenario can be determined. Finally, impacts of the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments, deposit rate and loan rate on optimal pricing policies are analyzed. The research results show that, in manufacturer capital-constrained situation, these rates can affect optimal pricing policies and profits; in retailer capital-constrained situation, deposit rate and loan rate have no effect on them, but the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments can still affect them. Our study provides a feasible way for supply chain members in pricing decision considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain, and contributes to the theoretical research on the capital-constrained supply chain management and the management practice for capital-constrained supply chain members with bank' deposit and loan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]