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INTRODUCTION 418 I. THE SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION OF BIOMETRICS 421 A. BIOMETRICS IN THE MODERN WORLD 422 B. MODERN RISKS IN THE BIOMETRICS FIELD 424 C. STATE BIOMETRIC REGULATION 427 [...]

There is no risk-free way to engage in bank-like activities. Entities that take deposits, transmit money, or otherwise provide custody of funds all generally engage in maturity transformation, a process that turns short-term debts into longer-term investments. Maturity transformation is inherently dangerous. Firms that engage in these activities also face moral hazard, whereby they may act contrary to their customers' interests. Without government intervention and a backstop, institutions that engage in these activities are liable to run, harming their customers. For that reason, the government heavily regulates bank, serves as their lender of last resort, and provides their depositors with insurance. Scholars have long been wary of 'shadow banks:' nonbanks that perform bank-like activities without the guardrails that protect bank depositors. Shadow banks are not just limited to the largest financial institutions, like those that helped exacerbate the great financial crisis. Retail consumers send and receive payments with P2P platforms, purchase and hold stablecoins, and make deposits in crypto and imitation banks--all of which require maturity transformation--without understanding these institutions' inherent instability and the risks of loss that they pose. Although consumers have seen runs, deposit insurance means they have likely never been harmed by one, and they do not understand the differences between their banks and the 'consumer shadow banks ' that perform the same or similar functions. In this paper, we argue that consumer shadow banks can be 'abusive' and should be regulated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Accordingly, we urge the CFPB to enact regulations providing minimum standards for their provision, including capital, liquidity, lending limits and limits on extending credit to insiders, safety and soundness standards, and stress testing where appropriate, and subject these firms to supervision., INTRODUCTION 227 I. BANK-LIKE ACTIVITIES CAN BE RISKY FOR CONSUMERS 233 A. There is no risk-free way to take deposits, transmit money, or custody client funds without government backstops 233 [...]

I. Introduction Americans are spending more money for worse health outcomes compared to peer nations. (1) According to the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, the 'United States has one of the [...]

Can property law have a consumer protection purpose? One of the most important consumer law concerns today is the limited control consumers have over the digital assets and software-embedded products they purchase. Current proposals for reform focus on classifying the transaction as either license or sale and rely mostly on contract law and consumer protection regulation with a few calls for restoring ownership rights. This Article argues that property law can protect consumers by establishing a minimum bundle of rights for consumers: the 'consumer's bundle.' Working with property theory and an analysis of property values, this Article explains the importance of users' ability to use and alienate digital and technological assets as part of a new property category for consumers. These assets represent a new emerging resource that is currently managed and controlled by manufacturers and platforms. The suggested 'consumer bundle' would limit platforms control and protect the rights to use, alienate, and repair., INTRODUCTION I. TECHNOLOGICAL PROPERTY: FROM PROPERTY TO LICENSES A. Limited Consumer Control over Digital and Technological Products B. Proposed Reforms: Contracts, Torts, and Consumer Protection II. THE PROPERTY APPROACH III. [...]

I. Introduction Investment advice is designed to be tailored to the risk profiles of clients as they navigate their personal financial situations and goals. (1) But how can investment advice [...]

I. Introduction In October 2021, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ('CFPB') announced a $6 million settlement with JPay, (1) a leading provider of financial services in prisons and jails. (2) [...]

I. Introduction Consider this scenario: a consumer receives a social media advertisement for a discounted price of a service. They sign up for the service thinking it was a one-time [...]

I. Introduction When students begin law school, they quickly encounter a ubiquitous legal concept called 'reasonableness;' this ubiquity cannot be overstated--reasonableness is a cornerstone of the law, popping up in [...]

I. Introduction Debit cards are used to make over $4 trillion in purchases every year, and over 80% of Americans have at least one. (1) In 2018, 70% of transactions [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 715 I. INJUNCTION, INJUNCTION: WHAT'S YOUR FUNCTION? 718 A. A Brief History of Injunctions 718 B. The eBay and Winter Decisions and Subsequent Court 720 Rulings [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 304 I. AN EMBATTLED CONSUMER 306 LAW ENFORCEMENT REGIME A. The Supreme Court Has Hobbled the Private Enforcement Regime 306 1. Mandatory Arbitration 307 2. Heightened [...]

Over the last seven decades, mainstream U.S. torts jurisprudence shifted dramatically from rigid formal rules-focused on duty and culpability--to more flexible norms and principles of accountability. This shift was part of a general transformation of tort law that can be observed in the case law, the Restatements, and academic scholarship. Recently, however, where internet platforms such as Amazon are involved, courts appear to have reverted to a formalistic approach to limit duty, and hence liability, for personal injuries caused by the sale of defective products using the platform. With a few notable exceptions, courts have focused on the word 'seller' in [section] 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts and have concluded that Amazon is not a 'seller' when it facilitates a sale between a customer and a third-party merchant. This Article is the third in a series of articles that develop a functional, control-based approach to platform liability. It proceeds in five steps. First, we develop the general tort principles that govern liability for transactions in defective consumer products. Second, we show how Amazon, as a platform situated squarely between a third-party seller and the customer, has control over both sides of that transaction. This places Amazon in a position where they should be held accountable as a non-manufacturing seller, where the third-party seller is not amenable to suit. Third, we give an example of how courts have resisted this conclusion, taking shelter in formal concepts of title rather than traditional understandings of culpability and loss allocation. Fourth, we develop a functional approach to platform liability that uses traditional tort principles to evaluate the platform's role in a transaction and apply those principles to Amazon. Lastly, we consider how these principles should apply to platforms generally., Article Contents Introduction I. Accountability for the Sale of Standardized Products A. The Citadel of Privity Crumbles B. Seller as a Functional Concept C. Pretzel Privity for Internet Platforms: Manipulating [...]

According to the sole normative foundation for trademark protection--'search costs' theory--trademarks transmit useful information to consumers, enabling an efficient marketplace. The marketplace, however, is in the midst of a fundamental change. Increasingly, retail is virtual, marketing is data-driven, and purchasing decisions are automated by AI. Predictive analytics are changing how consumers shop. Search costs theory no longer accurately describes the function of trademarks in this marketplace. Consumers now have numerous digital alternatives to trademarks that more efficiently provide them with increasingly accurate product information. Just as store shelves are disappearing from consumers' retail experience, so are trademarks disappearing from their product search. Consumers may want to buy a product where the brand is the essential feature of the product such that the brand is the product, but they no longer need the assistance of a trademark to find the product. By reflexively continuing to protect trademarks in the name of search costs theory, courts give only lip service to consumer interests without questioning whether trademarks are fulfilling any useful information function. In many cases, trademarks may actually misinform consumers by masking the identity of the producer or its distanced relationship with the trademark owner. Without having deliberately decided to do so, trademark law is now protecting 'brands as property' without any supportive normative rationale. Removing the veil of search costs theory will enable courts to consider whether trademark protection is justified in particular cases., INTRODUCTION I. THE NORMATIVE RATIONALE FOR TRADEMARKS A. Why Protect Trademarks? B. Trademarks Convey Source of Origin Information to Consumers C. Trademarks Reduce Consumers' Search Costs II. UNDERMINING TRADEMARK'S RATIONALE [...]

Millions of Austr alians give th eir online banking cr edentials to th ir d par ties so as to gain access to financial products and services enabled by the analysis of the data in their bank accounts. This practice of Screen Scraping ('SS') has contributed significantly to the rise of the FinTech industry. While the risks SS entails are significant, nowhere has the practice been formally outlawed despite the availability of safer data transfer arrangements under Open Banking regimes. We examine approaches to SS in the European Union, the United Kingdom and Australia, and argue that the practice should be prohibited here. Such a ban would have two salutary effects it would protect consumers in financial hardship who use payday loans and it would accelerate uptake of the Consumer Data Right., I INTRODUCTION By 2017, when the Australian Government announced its intention to roll out an economy wide Consumer Data Right ('CDR'), over two million Australians were giving away their bank [...]

This article considers the current state of the motor vehicle add-on insurance industry in New Zealand in the light of the Commerce Commission's 2021 review of motor vehicle financing and add-ons. It suggests the current way the industry functions does not promote competition and facilitates several issues detrimental to consumers. The issues are the inadequacy of consumer awareness and understanding of add-on products (brought about by an insufficiency of information), a point of sales advantage enjoyed by providers of primary products, and an unsuitable dealer incentive system. These issues are producing negative consumer outcomes, as demonstrated by quantitative and qualitative industry evidence. The article considers how comparable jurisdictions, namely Australia and the United Kingdom, have corrected similar issues to increase consumer protection within their equivalent industries. It advocates similar industry reform for New Zealand. Industry reform should act in a preventative way to eliminate the creation of issues, as this best protects consumers. The primary reform that is recommended is the adoption of an industry-wide deferred sales model for add-on products., I INTRODUCTION Motor vehicles are a major asset for millions of New Zealanders. The New Zealand Commerce Commission has recognised that '[a]fter a house, a vehicle is often the biggest [...]