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This paper describes Advanced Space Transportation Concepts and Propulsion Technologies for a New Delivery Paradigm. It builds on the work of the previous paper "Approach to an Affordable and Productive Space Transportation System". The scope includes both flight and ground system elements, and focuses on their compatibility and capability to achieve a technical solution that is operationally productive and also affordable. A clear and revolutionary approach, including advanced propulsion systems (advanced LOX rich booster engine concept having independent LOX and fuel cooling systems, thrust augmentation with LOX rich boost and fuel rich operation at altitude), improved vehicle concepts (autogeneous pressurization, turbo alternator for electric power during ascent, hot gases to purge system and keep moisture out), and ground delivery systems, was examined. Previous papers by the authors and other members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) focused on space flight system engineering methods, along with operationally efficient propulsion system concepts and technologies. This paper continues the previous work by exploring the propulsion technology aspects in more depth and how they may enable the vehicle designs from the previous paper. Subsequent papers will explore the vehicle design, the ground support system, and the operations aspects of the new delivery paradigm in greater detail.

All programs have requirements. For these requirements to be met, there must be a means of measurement. A Technical Performance Measure (TPM) is defined to produce a measured quantity that can be compared to the requirement. In practice, the TPM is often expressed as a maximum or minimum and a goal. Example TPMs for a rocket program are: vacuum or sea level specific impulse (lsp), weight, reliability (often expressed as a failure rate), schedule, operability (turn-around time), design and development cost, production cost, and operating cost. Program status is evaluated by comparing the TPMs against specified values of the requirements. During the program many design decisions are made and most of them affect some or all of the TPMs. Often, the same design decision changes some TPMs favorably while affecting other TPMs unfavorably. The problem then becomes how to compare the effects of a design decision on different TPMs. How much failure rate is one second of specific impulse worth? How many days of schedule is one pound of weight worth? In other words, how to compare dissimilar quantities in order to trade and manage the TPMs to meet all requirements. One method that has been used successfully and has a mathematical basis is Utility Analysis. Utility Analysis enables quantitative comparison among dissimilar attributes. It uses a mathematical model that maps decision maker preferences over the tradeable range of each attribute. It is capable of modeling both independent and dependent attributes. Utility Analysis is well supported in the literature on Decision Theory. It has been used at Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for internal programs and for contracted work such as the J-2X rocket engine program. This paper describes the construction of TPMs and describes Utility Analysis. It then discusses the use of TPMs in design trades and to manage margin during a program using Utility Analysis.

In defining a space vehicle architecture, the propulsion system and related subsystem choices will have a major influence on achieving the goals and objectives desired. There are many alternatives and the choices made must produce a system that meets the performance requirements, but at the same time also provide the greatest opportunity of reaching all of the required objectives. Recognizing the above, the SPST Functional Requirements subteam has drawn on the knowledge, expertise, and experience of its members, to develop insight that wiIJ effectively aid the architectural concept developer in making the appropriate choices consistent with the architecture goals. This data not only identifies many selected choices, but also, more importantly, presents the collective assessment of this subteam on the "pros" and the "cons" of these choices. The propulsion system choices with their pros and cons are presented in five major groups. A. System Integration Approach. Focused on the requirement for safety, reliability, dependability, maintainability, and low cost. B. Non-Chemical Propulsion. Focused on choice of propulsion type. C. Chemical Propulsion. Focused on propellant choice implications. D. Functional Integration. Focused on the degree of integration of the many propulsive and closely associated functions, and on the choice of the engine combustion power cycle. E. Thermal Management. Focused on propellant tank insulation and integration. Each of these groups is further broken down into subgroups, and at that level the consensus pros and cons are presented. The intended use of this paper is to provide a resource of focused material for architectural concept developers to use in designing new advanced systems including college design classes. It is also a possible source of input material for developing a model for designing and analyzing advanced concepts to help identify focused technology needs and their priorities.

Influence diagrams are relatively simple, but powerful, tools for assessing the impact of choices or resource allocations on goals or requirements. They are very general and can be used on a wide range of problems. They can be used for any problem that has defined goals, a set of factors that influence the goals or the other factors, and a set of inputs. Influence diagrams show the relationship among a set of results and the attributes that influence them and the inputs that influence the attributes. If the results are goals or requirements of a program, then the influence diagram can be used to examine how the requirements are affected by changes to technology investment. This paper uses an example to show how to construct and interpret influence diagrams, how to assign weights to the inputs and attributes, how to assign weights to the transfer functions (influences), and how to calculate the resulting influences of the inputs on the results. A study is also presented as an example of how using influence diagrams can help in technology planning and investment. The Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) used this technique to examine the impact of R&D spending on the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a space transportation system. The question addressed was the effect on the recurring and the non-recurring portions of LCC of the proportion of R&D resources spent to impact technology objectives versus the proportion spent to impact operational dependability objectives. The goals, attributes, and the inputs were established. All of the linkages (influences) were determined. The weighting of each of the attributes and each of the linkages was determined. Finally the inputs were varied and the impacts on the LCC determined and are presented. The paper discusses how each of these was accomplished both for credibility and as an example for future studies using influence diagrams for technology planning and investment planning.

Programs such as space transportation systems are developed and deployed only rarely, and they have long development schedules and large development and life cycle costs (LCC). They have not historically had their LCC predicted well and have only had an effort to control the DDT&E phase of the programs. One of the factors driving the predictability, and thus control, of the LCC of a program is the maturity of the technologies incorporated in the program. If the technologies incorporated are less mature (as measured by their Technology Readiness Level - TRL), then the LCC not only increases but the degree of increase is difficult to predict. Consequently, new programs avoid incorporating technologies unless they are quite mature, generally TRL greater than or equal to 7 (system prototype demonstrated in a space environment) to allow better predictability of the DDT&E phase costs unless there is no alternative. On the other hand, technology development programs rarely develop technologies beyond TRL 6 (system/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment). Currently the lack of development funds beyond TRL 6 and the major funding required for full scale development leave little or no funding available to prototype TRL 6 concepts so that hardware would be in the ready mode for safe, reliable and cost effective incorporation. The net effect is that each new program either incorporates little new technology or has longer development schedules and costs, and higher LCC, than planned. This paper presents methods to ensure that advanced technologies are incorporated into future programs while providing a greater accuracy of predicting their LCC. One method is having a dedicated organization to develop X-series vehicles or separate prototypes carried on other vehicles. The question of whether such an organization should be independent of NASA and/or have an independent funding source is discussed. Other methods are also discussed. How to make the choice of which technologies to pursue to the prototype level is also discussed since, to achieve better LCC, first the selection of the appropriate technologies.

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

The Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS) is a structured, modular breakdown of every function that must be addressed to perform a generic mission. It is also usable for any subset of the mission. Unlike a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), the FBS is a functionoriented tree, not a product-oriented tree. The FBS details not products, but operations or activities that should be performed. The FBS is not tied to any particular architectural implementation because it is a listing of the needed functions, not the elements, of the architecture. The FBS for Space Transportation Systems provides a universal hierarchy of required functions, which include ground and space operations as well as infrastructure ‐ it provides total visibility of the entire mission. By approaching the systems engineering problem from the functional view, instead of the element or hardware view, the SPST has created an exhaustive list of potential requirements which the architecture designers can use to evaluate the completeness of their designs. This is a new approach that will provide full accountability of all functions required to perform the planned mission. It serves as a giant check list to be sure that no functions are omitted, especially in the early architectural design phase. A significant characteristic of a FBS is that if architecture options are compared using this approach, then any missing or redundant elements of each option will be identified. Consequently, valid Life Cycle Costs (LCC) comparisons can be made. For example, one architecture option might not need a particular function while another option does. One option may have individual elements to perform each of three functions while another option needs only one element to perform the three functions. Once an architecture has been selected, the FBS will serve as a guide in development of the work breakdown structure, provide visibility of those technologies that need to be further developed to perform required functions, and help identify the personnel skills required to develop and operate the architecture. It also will allow the systems engineering activities to totally integrate each discipline to the maximum extent possible and optimize at the total system level, thus avoiding optimizing at the element level (stove-piping). In addition, it furnishes a framework that will help prevent over or under specifying requirements because all functions are identified and all elements are aligned to functions.

Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continually by managing to these requirements. Cost control of the non-recurring side of life cycle cost has traditionally been implemented in both commercial and government programs. The government uses the budget process to implement this control. The commercial approach is to use a similar process of allocating the non-recurring cost to major elements of the program. This type of control generally manages through a work breakdown structure (WBS) by defining the major elements of the program. If the cost control is to be applied across the entire program life cycle cost (LCC), the approach must be addressed very differently. A functional breakdown structure (FBS) is defined and recommended. Use of a FBS provides the visibifity to allow the choice of an integrated solution reducing the cost of providing many different elements of like function. The different functional solutions that drive the hardware logistics, quantity of documentation, operational labor, reliability and maintainability balance, and total integration of the entire system from DDT&E through the life of the program must be fully defined, compared, and final decisions made among these competing solutions. The major drivers of recurring cost have been identified and are presented and discussed. The LCC requirements must be established and flowed down to provide control of LCC. This LCC control will require a structured rigid process similar to the one traditionally used to control weight/performance for space transportation systems throughout the entire program. It has been demonstrated over the last 30 years that without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will be achieved.