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This paper argues that Indian policymakers are pursuing a larger governance role in international organizations in order to have a larger say in shaping the rules that govern international interactions in specific issue areas. In the short term, they are trying to maximize the diplomatic and negotiating resources they have by focusing on institutions in which they have been members. In seeking this enhanced global governance role, they are constrained by the international environment within which they operate as well as domestic constraints such as coalition politics and administrative capacity. The research is based on interviews with key decision-makers and stakeholders, archival research based on government documents, newspaper articles and speeches by key players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the defensive position of India at World Trade Organization negotiations on agriculture, as of September 2004. Significance of the stance of India to beliefs regarding the impact of international trade in agriculture on local farmers; Background on the representation and articulation of agricultural interests in India; Analysis of the trade policymaking apparatus in the country.

Despite recurrent last minute defections, developing countries such as India continue to rely on forming coalitions with other like-minded countries during multilateral trade negotiations. This paper seeks to explain why they do so and to assess the extent to which such a strategy brings benefits by looking at India?s experiences during 1995-2001. It argues that in India?s case coalition formation should be seen within the context of India?s search for a new strategy for multilateral trade negotiation after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The impetus for the new strategy came from the perceived ?selling-out? of India?s interests during the Uruguay Round. That experience also generated a negative perception in India about the World Trade Organization, a perception that was further strengthened as its agenda was sought to be expanded by the United States and the European Union beginning in 1995-96. The attempt at enlarging the agenda also strained the meager negotiating resources that India had at the time. On each of the new issues that were proposed, India?s position was farthest from that of the US and the EU. It was obvious that India would have to work hard to protect its interests and in the absence of adequate resources of its own, working in coalitions turned out to be an obvious choice. The strategy has allowed India to have a much larger voice in these negotiations than what we would expect looking at its global trade share. In the area of furthering Indian interests, the success of the strategy has been more modest. . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do developing states deal with pressure from international actors such as the WTO and western states within the context of multilateral negotiations? The literature on two-level games theorizes that statesmen/women use international negotiations to ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the findings of a research project that investigates the political and economic challenges that thwart reform of the fertilizer sector in India. Fiscal, distributional and environmental concerns make the case for such reform quite compelling. While international organizations have consistently advocated reforms in this sector and successive administrations have attempted changing policies for a decade and a half, actual change has been sporadic and incremental and has had little impact on the burgeoning fertilizer subsidy bill. This paper unpacks the international, national, state-level and societal factors that have shaped policy change. Predictably, the strong fertilizer lobby and representation by large farmers present substantial hurdle in initiating and implementing proposed changes. Domestic institutional factors such as bureaucratic politics and center-state politics have shaped the reform process substantially. Global hydrocarbon prices as well as pressure from international organizations play important roles in the reform process. However, the paper concludes that while the factors mentioned above are important, the strongest explanation for lack of reform is ideational. Based on the literature on discourse coalitions, this paper argues that two distinct coalitions with different world-views on the role of state and markets in the economic arena are engaged in the discourse on policy change. Policy change has not occurred because the coalition for change continues to be much smaller and less articulate about the benefits of change as compared to the coalition in favor of the existing policy framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How states behave in the context of a negotiation can best be understood within a domestic-international framework such as two-level game which focuses on international and domestic-level inputs simultaneously and attempts to understand the strategic interaction between them. However, the literature on two-level games, with some exceptions, focuses primarily on bilateral negotiations between developed states. Studying developing country responses in the context of multilateral negotiations requires us to both modify certain assumptions and question some of the conclusions. The existing literature looks at cases where the negotiations are initiated by the executives of states engaged in the negotiations and thus assumes that at least at the agenda-setting phase, the executive has substantial autonomy. This paper, which compares the processes through which India?s negotiating agenda on agriculture and services were arrived at, focuses on negotiations, which were not initiated by the Indian executive but were mandated by the WTO. The very fact that the executive is responding to an international regime stirs up domestic political actors, including but not restricted to specific interest groups whose interests may be affected. India?s negotiating agenda in the two sectors were thus shaped simultaneously by international political and economic factors as well as domestic politics within India. Contrary to the literature?s finding that the executives prefer not to tie their hands, the Indian government made an explicit attempt to involve relevant stakeholders. The paper analyzes how such domestic-international interactions and the executive?s attempt at involving stakeholders have shaped India?s negotiating response and in process, suggests modifications in the two-level game framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes trade policymaking in India in the context of the ongoing negotiations on trade in agriculture at the WTO. During the past decade, the overall direction of India's trade policy has become more liberal. However, India's position on liberalization of trade in agriculture at multilateral trade negotiations is dominated by its defensive/protectionist interests expressed in terms of a focus on livelihood security rather than its aggressive/liberal interests in gaining market access. This presents a puzzle for existing trade theory which would expect India's farm trade policy to be more liberal, given that about 80% of India's farm prices are globally competitive. This paper adopts an institutional perspective, and argues that the policy is ultimately a product of the existing domestic agricultural policies and the new consultative trade policy-making apparatus. Reform of existing policies has proved difficult and the Ministry of Agriculture resists liberalization because it sees itself primarily as a protector of farmers' interests. At the same time, the government has changed the institutions for making trade policy since 1998, giving the protectionist Ministry of Agriculture greater voice in decisions at the expense of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The former has often vetoed more liberal positions advocated by the Commerce Ministry. The Parliament, unlike in the west, plays a minor role in setting the tone of the policy since its ratification is not required. Moreover, although in India's federal system state governments could have used their power to shape policy, they have not organized politically to press for liberalization, instead supporting the protectionist views espoused by the agriculture ministry.This paper also shows that conventional institution-based explanations of trade policy, mainly based on the US and West European experience, need to be modified when being applied to developing countries like India. For example, institutional theories suggest an association between democracies and liberal trade policies, but this case shows that democracies can sometimes be more protectionist. Discussions of the role of bureaucracies focus on the relation between bureaucratic autonomy and trade liberalization. However, some relevant bureaucracies are not autonomous, and some autonomous bureaucracies may not support liberalization. This research suggests that bureaucracies should not be treated as unitary actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although economists have argued that India has a comparative advantage in several farm products, IndiaÂ’s position in the WTO negotiations in agriculture has been primarily defensive. This paper explains IndiaÂ’s defensive posture by tracing it to a new consultative mechanism for decision-making on WTO issues that explicitly recognizes the role of the agriculture ministry in agenda-setting. IndiaÂ’s definition of its core interests and its ability to maintain its defensive position have also been shaped by the multilateral trade regime itself and by the changing coalitions within it. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]