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We would like to thank Dolega and Dewhurst (2015) for a thought-provoking and informed deconstruction of our article, which we take as (qualified) applause from valued members of our audience. In brief, we fully concur with the theatre-free formulation offered by Dolega and Dewhurst and take the opportunity to explain why (and how) we used the Cartesian theatre metaphor. We do this by drawing an analogy between consciousness and evolution. This analogy is used to emphasize the circular causality inherent in the free energy principle (aka active inference). We conclude with a comment on the special forms of active inference that may be associated with self-awareness and how they may be especially informed by dream states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues both rapid eye movement (REM) and non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep contribute to overnight episodic memory processes but their roles differ. Episodic memory may have evolved from memory for spatial navigation in animals and humans. Equally, mnemonic navigation in world and mental space may rely on fundamentally equivalent processes. Consequently, the basic spatial network characteristics of pathways which meet at omnidirectional nodes or junctions may be conserved in episodic brain networks. A pathway is formally identified with the unidirectional, sequential phases of an episodic memory. In contrast, the function of omnidirectional junctions is not well understood. In evolutionary terms, both animals and early humans undertook tours to a series of landmark junctions, to take advantage of resources (food, water and shelter), whilst trying to avoid predators. Such tours required memory for emotionally significant landmark resource-place-danger associations and the spatial relationships amongst these landmarks. In consequence, these tours may have driven the evolution of both spatial and episodic memory. The environment is dynamic. Resource-place associations are liable to shift and new resource-rich landmarks may be discovered, these changes may require re-wiring in neural networks. To realise these changes, REM may perform an associative, emotional encoding function between memory networks, engendering an omnidirectional landmark junction which is instantiated in the cortex during NREM Stage 2. In sum, REM may preplay associated elements of past episodes (rather than replay individual episodes), to engender an unconscious representation which can be used by the animal on approach to a landmark junction in wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the Cartesian theatre as a metaphor for the virtual reality models that the brain uses to make inferences about the world. This treatment derives from our attempts to understand dreaming and waking consciousness in terms of free energy minimization. The idea here is that the Cartesian theatre is not observed by an internal (homuncular) audience but furnishes a theatre in which fictive narratives and fantasies can be rehearsed and tested against sensory evidence. We suppose the brain is driven by the imperative to infer the causes of its sensory samples; in much the same way as scientists are compelled to test hypotheses about experimental data. This recapitulates Helmholtz's notion of unconscious inference and Gregory treatment of perception as hypothesis testing. However, we take this further and consider the active sampling of the world as the gathering of confirmatory evidence for hypotheses based on our virtual reality. The ensuing picture of consciousness (or active inference) resolves a number of seemingly hard problems in consciousness research and is internally consistent with current thinking in systems neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology. In this formalism, there is a dualism that distinguishes between the (conscious) process of inference and the (material) process that entails inference. This separation is reflected by the distinction between beliefs (probability distributions over hidden world states or res cogitans) and the physical brain states (sufficient statistics or res extensa) that encode them. This formal approach allows us to appeal to simple but fundamental theorems in information theory and statistical thermodynamics that dissolve some of the mysterious aspects of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dream thought is both impoverished and non-logical. While some inferential reasoning is present in dreaming, many illogicalities that would demand cognitive attention during waking go unnoticed during sleep. The physiological basis of this illogicality may include frontal lobe inactivation and amionergic demodulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dreaming has fascinated and mystified humankind for ages: the bizarre and evanescent qualities of dreams have invited boundless speculation about their origin, meaning and purpose. For most of the twentieth century, scientific dream theories were mainly psychological. Since the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the neural underpinnings of dreaming have become increasingly well understood, and it is now possible to complement the details of these brain mechanisms with a theory of consciousness that is derived from the study of dreaming. The theory advanced here emphasizes data that suggest that REM sleep may constitute a protoconscious state, providing a virtual reality model of the world that is of functional use to the development and maintenance of waking consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Thinking is known to be state dependent but a systematic study of how thinking in dreams differs from thinking while awake has not been done. The study consisted of analyzing the dream reports of 26 subjects who, in addition to providing dream reports also provided answers to questions about their thinking within the dream. Our hypothesis was that thinking in dreams is not monolithic but has two distinct components, one that is similar to wake-state cognition, and another that is fundamentally different. We found that cognition within a dream scenario was similar to that of wake-state cognition, but that thinking about the scenario itself was deficient and very different than wake-state thinking. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Bill Domhoff (2005) has challenged the activation synthesis model of dreaming on the basis of a misreading of the neurobiological literature and an individualistic view of dream psychology. The author begins his reply by clarifying and emphasizing the formal approach to dream cognitions. Instead of focusing on the individual aspects of dreaming that interest Domhoff activation synthesis strives to identify and measure the generic differences that characterize all dreams and that are likely to correlate with the neurobiological findings. He then goes on to point out that such formal features as the visuomotor imagery, the emotional intensification, and the defective cognition of dreams do correlate with the cellular and molecular neurobiological data from animal studies and with the brain imaging and lesion data from human studies. individual differences may also exist but these are not relevant to the main task of sleep psychophysiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dreaming consciousness can be quite different from waking consciousness and this difference must depend upon the underlying neurobiology. Our approach is to infer the underlying brain basis for this difference by studying dream reports and comparing them with waking. In this study we investigated mentation during dreaming by asking subjects to provide us with dream reports and by asking them to create a dream log. In the dream log, the subjects recorded all implausibility, illogicality or inappropriateness of character during the dream narrative when compared to the character's real-life waking counterpart. Thus, the dream acted as its own control in comparing waking and dreaming mentation. Our results showed that recognition of the implausibility of a character occurred far less often during the dream than outside of the dream when the subject compared the dream character to its real-life waking counterpart. Further, not all kinds of implausibility were equally likely to occur in the dream. The most common implausibility both during the dream and when compared to the character's real-life counterpart was a character's behaviour. Calling on existing imaging data of the brain in REM sleep, we speculate on the brain-basis of these results in terms of the inaccessibility of episodic memory during dreaming and the diminished role of the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex during REM sleep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sleep can be addressed across the entire hierarchy of biological organization. We discuss neuronal-network and regional forebrain activity during sleep, and its consequences for consciousness and cognition. Complex interactions in thalamocortical circuits maintain the electroencephalographic oscillations of non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. Functional neuroimaging affords views of the human brain in both NREM and REM sleep, and has informed new concepts of the neural basis of dreaming during REM sleep ? a state that is characterized by illogic, hallucinosis and emotionality compared with waking. Replay of waking neuronal activity during sleep in the rodent hippocampus and in functional images of human brains indicates possible roles for sleep in neuroplasticity. Different forms and stages of learning and memory might benefit from different stages of sleep and be subserved by different forebrain regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To appreciate the neural underpinnings of sleep, it is important to view this universal mammalian behaviour at multiple levels of its biological organization. Molecularly, the circadian rhythm of sleep involves interlocking positive- and negative-feedback mechanisms of circadian genes and their protein products in cells of the suprachiasmatic nucleus that are entrained to ambient conditions by light. Circadian information is integrated with information on homeostatic sleep need in nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus. These nuclei interact with arousal systems in the posterior hypothalamus, basal forebrain and brainstem to control sleep onset. During sleep, an ultradian oscillator in the mesopontine junction controls the regular alternation of rapid eye movement (REM) and non-REM sleep. Sleep cycles are accompanied by neuromodulatory influences on forebrain structures that influence behaviour, consciousness and cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with a study which identified wakefulnes and different stages of sleep in rats using polygraphic and behavioral signs. Background of sleep research; Methodology; Results and discussion.

Assesses the state of dream sciences, such as phenomenology, psychophysiology, neurobiology, neuropsychology, models and philosophy and learning and memory as of 2000. Bizarreness of dreams; Neurobiological explanations on formal dream features; Discussion on whether dreaming is the subjective correlate of rapid eye movement sleep physiology.

Discusses whether rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. Discussion on dreaming; Description of the activation-synthesis model; Early findings on the distinct difference between REM and NREM mentation.

Summary This study presents new findings of carbachol-induced long-term ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) enhancement lasting five days, but without REM sleep enhancement. A quantitative analysis of the number and types of bilateral PGO wave events during slow wave sleep with PGO activity (SP) and REM was performed in each of four cats over a period of six days following a single unilateral microinjection of carbachol nanospheres into the caudolateral peribrachial area. The results demonstrate increases in the summed total of all PGO wave events to continue for five days postcarbachol reaching a peak sixfold increase on day three in SP and REM. The tendency of PGO waves to occur in clusters of greater than three waves increased sevenfold on day three in SP and fourfold during REM. These findings indicate a dissociation of long-term PGO enhancement from long-term REM enhancement, and suggest that even a sixfold increase in PGO activity alone is not, in itself, sufficient to produce the cholinergic orchestration of REM sleep enhancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies the brain during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep in order to understand its basis in the altered neurophysiology of REM. Recognition that all distinctive and pathological features of dreaming are organically determined; Assessment of mental states; Dreaming as a healthy psychosis; Activity of norepinephrine and serotonin inside the brain during sleep.

Compares three explanations of physical motions in dreams. Measurement of physical movements in dream reports; Dream theories; Functional importance of dreamed motion; Implications to Freudian explanation of dream movement.

Presents the abstracts of papers presented to the 9th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Psychophysiological Study of Sleep, held in Boston, Massachusetts on March 20-23, 1969. Psychological correlates of phasic and tonic events during sleep; Phasic events and mentation during sleep; Dream content and physiological functioning; Time-related changes in physiological characteristics of rapid eye movement.

Sleep is a widespread biological phenomenon, and its scientific study is proceeding at multiple levels at the same time. Marked progress is being made in answering three fundamental questions: what is sleep, what are its mechanisms and what are its functions? The most salient answers to these questions have resulted from applying new techniques from basic and applied neuroscience research. The study of sleep is also shedding light on our understanding of consciousness, which undergoes alteration in parallel with sleep-induced changes in the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on the causes of parasomnias, a sleep disorder. How parasomnias occur; Familiar types of parasomnias; Explanation on the non-rapid eye movement (NREM) and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep disorders.

Focuses on the brain and the activities which take place during sleep especially in REM (rapid eye movement). Views of Delia, a prolific dreamer and diligent dream journalist.

Discusses the theory on the self-organization of the human brain. Self-organized structures called emergent properties of the system; Dreams as emergent properties originating in random, chaotic signals issued by neurons in the brain stem; Qualitative features of dreams.

Comments on several studies which discussed the influence of Sigmund Freud's dream theory on the dream theory of Mark Solms. Claims of Solms that Freud was right in postulating wishes and emotions as dream instigators; Details on the brain processes associated with dreaming in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep; Flaws in the arguments that dreaming is disassociated with the REM sleep brain process.

Abstract: It is not known how the brain modifies its regulatory systems in response to the application of a drug, especially over the long term of weeks and months. We have developed a model system approach to this question by manipulating cholinergic cell groups of the laterodorsal and pedunculopontine tegmental (LDT/PPT) nuclei in the pontomesencephalic tegmentum (PMT), which are known to be actively involved in the timing and quantity of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. In a freely moving feline model, a single microinjection of the cholinergic agonist carbachol conjugated to a latex nanosphere delivery system into the caudolateral PMT elicits a long-term enhancement of one distinguishing phasic event of REM sleep, ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves, lasting 5 days but without any significant change in REM sleep or other behavioral state. Here, we test the hypothesis that cholinergic activation within the caudolateral PMT alters the postsynaptic excitability of the PGO network, stimulating the prolonged expression of c-fos that underlies this long-term PGO enhancement (LTPE) effect. Using quantitative Fos immunohistochemistry, we found that the number of Fos-immunoreactive (Fos-IR) neurons surrounding the caudolateral PMT injection site decreased sharply by postcarbachol day 03, while the number of Fos-IR neurons in the more rostral LDT/PPT increased >30-fold and remained at a high level following the course of LTPE. These results demonstrate a sustained c-fos expression in response to pharmacological stimulation of the brain and suggest that carbachol''s acute effects induce LTPE via cholinergic receptors, with subsequent transsynaptic activation of the LDT/PPT maintaining the LTPE effect. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Internal deliberations (focused thoughts) and endogenous percepts (hallucinations) vary in a reciprocal manner across the states of waking and sleep, paralleling changes in regional brain activation. As subjects go from waking through sleep onset to NREM sleep and then to REM sleep, they report progressively more hallucinoid imagery and progressively less thinking. We have investigated whether this reciprocity in cognition between NREM and REM is maintained throughout the night. To do so, we analyzed 229 REM and 165 NREM reports collected with the Nightcap sleep monitoring system from 16 participants in their homes over 14 nights. The reports were scored for the presence of hallucinations and directed thinking by external judges. As predicted, hallucinations were more frequent in REM than in NREM for each segment of the night, and directed thinking was more frequent in NREM in the first 5 h of the night. Late in the night, directed thinking was equally infrequent in NREM and REM. At the same time, hallucinations increased within both NREM and REM as the night progressed, whereas directed thinking decreased in NREM and remained at a stable, low level in REM. These findings suggest that a reciprocal shift in focused thinking and hallucinating is a general property of cognitive activity across the wake–sleep cycle. Biological evidence supports the hypothesis that these cognitive changes are governed by specific state regulatory and neurocognitive processes at several levels of the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, the term ‘memory consolidation’ refers to a process whereby a memory becomes increasingly resistant to interference from competing or disrupting factors with the continued passage of time. Recent findings regarding the learning of skilled sensory and motor tasks (‘procedural learning’) have refined this definition, suggesting that consolidation can be more strictly determined by time spent in specific brain states such as wake, sleep or certain stages of sleep. There is also renewed interest in the possibility that recalling or ‘reactivating’ a previously consolidated memory renders it once again fragile and susceptible to interference, therefore requiring periods of reconsolidation. Using a motor skill finger-tapping task, here we provide evidence for at least three different stages of human motor memory processing after initial acquisition. We describe the unique contributions of wake and sleep in the development of different forms of consolidation, and show that waking reactivation can turn a previously consolidated memory back into a labile state requiring subsequent reconsolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The activity that takes place in memory systems during sleep is likely to be related to the role of sleep in memory consolidation and learning, as well as to the generation of dream hallucinations. This study addressed the often-stated hypothesis that replay of whole episodic memories contributes to the multimodal hallucinations of sleep. Over a period of 14 days, 29 subjects kept a log of daytime activities, events, and concerns, wrote down any recalled dreams, and scored the dreams for incorporation of any waking experiences. While 65% of a total of 299 sleep mentation reports were judged to reflect aspects of recent waking life experiences, the episodic replay of waking events was found in no more than 1 – 2% of the dream reports. This finding has implications for understanding the unique memory processing that takes place during the night and is consistent with evidence that sleep has no role in episodic memory consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental data indicate a role for the prefrontal cortex in mediating normal sleep physiology, dreaming and sleep-deprivation phenomena. During nonrandom-eye-movement (NREM) sleep, frontal cortical activity is characterized by the highest voltage and the slowest brain waves compared to other cortical regions. The differences between the self-awareness experienced in waking and its diminution in dreaming can be explained by deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during REM sleep. Here, we propose that this deactivation results from a direct inhibition of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortical neurons by acetylcholine, the release of which is enhanced during REM sleep. Sleep deprivation influences frontal executive functions in particular, which further emphasizes the sensitivity of the prefrontal cortex to sleep. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Flexible or ‘fluid’ cognitive processes are regarded as fundamental to problem solving and creative ability, requiring a specific neurophysiological milieu. REM-sleep dreaming is associated with creative processes and abstract reasoning with increased strength of weak associations in cognitive networks. REM sleep is also mediated by a distinctive neurophysiological profile, different to that of wake and NREM sleep. This study compared the performance of 16 subjects on a test of cognitive flexibility using anagram word puzzles following REM and NREM awakenings across the night, and waking performances during the day. REM awakenings provided a significant 32% advantage in the number of anagrams solved compared with NREM awakenings and was equal to that of wake time trials. Correlations of individual performance profiles suggest that REM sleep may offer a different mode of problem solving compared with wake and NREM. When early and late REM and NREM awakening data were separated, a dissociation was evident, with NREM task performance becoming more REM-like later in the night, while REM performance remained constant. These data suggest that the neurophysiology of REM sleep represents a brain state more amenable to flexible cognitive processing than NREM and different from that in wake, and may offer insights into the neurocognitive properties of REM-sleep dreaming. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The purpose of this study was to develop an inexpensive, simplified home monitoring system for prescreening certain sleep complaints and for long-term home-based experiments. Four subjects slept in the laboratory for 3-4 nights. In addition to a standard polysomnogram, piezoelectric ceramic transducers were attached to both hands, both feet, and over the right eyelid. The sleep from 2 nights of each subject was staged according to the standard criteria. The limb transducers identified major and minor body shifts and were used to signal possible state changes. The data from the eye movement sensor was used to develop a REM-state algorithm. Using this algorithm, REM and NREM sleep were identified with 92% (SD=0.091) and 91% (SD=0.076) accuracy, respectively. The ultimate goal is to have a bedside device programmed with the algorithm that would either store information or score the data on-line for waking, NREM, and REM states. We conclude that a system monitoring eye movements and major body shifts is a promising approach to an economical and accurate home recording system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and 'forces' that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to current trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observations, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sampling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory gaps in generative models of the world, thereby reducing uncertainty and satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model selection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invariances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hallmarks of "aha" moments. This formulation moves toward a computational account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable knowledge (i.e., con: "together"; scire: "to know"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Performance on a visual discrimination task showed maximal improvement 48?96 hours after initial training, even without intervening practice. When subjects were deprived of sleep for 30 hours after training and then tested after two full nights of recovery sleep, they showed no significant improvement, despite normal levels of alertness. Together with previous findings that subjects show no improvement when retested the same day as training, this demonstrates that sleep within 30 hours of training is absolutely required for improved performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exclusion of thinking from recent studies of sleep mentation has hindered a full appreciation of how cognitive activity differs across the states of waking and sleep. To overcome this limitation, this study investigated thoughts and hallucinations using experience sampling, home-based sleep-wake monitoring, and formal analyses of the psychological data. The prevalence of thoughts decreased gradually from waking through sleep onset and non-REM sleep, to reach its nadir in REM sleep, whereas hallucinations increased sharply across these states. Furthermore, multiple occurrences of hallucinations but not of thoughts increased significantly from sleep onset through non-REM sleep, to a peak in REM sleep. This reciprocity in thoughts and hallucinations might reflect a progressive shift from high to low aminergic-to-cholinergic neuromodulatory ratios across wake-sleep states, accompanied by an array of changes in the regional activation patterns of the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five cocaine-dependent individuals completed a 22-day inpatient study of sleep and cognition. Following 3 days of drug-free baseline, participants underwent 3 days of twice-daily smoked cocaine base self-administration (6 50-mg doses, 14 minutes apart), followed by 15 days of abstinence. Each morning and afternoon, the CDR repeatable, multiple-version, computerized cognitive battery (whose stability following practice has been documented) was administered. During abstinence, performance deteriorated on vigilance tasks (especially reaction time) as well as on immediate and delayed verbal recognition tasks but not on working memory tasks. Declines were most evident in the afternoon. Data suggest that abstinence can unmask cognitive deficits induced by chronic cocaine use and circadian factors may mediate their severity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A precipitous decline in eyelid movements (ELMs) has been shown to be a highly reliable indicator of sleep onset. While ELMs correlate well with eye movements during waking and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the eye sensor remains silent during the period of slow eye movements (SEMs) typical of sleep onset. If the ELM density (e.g. ELMs per minute) dropped simultaneously with the appearance of SEMs prior to sleep onset, it could be a promising tool for identifying decreases in alertness prior to overt sleep onset. The present study was designed to determine whether the presence of SEMs in the transitional period preceding stage 1 sleep is reflected in decreases in ELM density. ELM densities were computed for 2.5-s epochs with and without SEMs, as well as for 15-s epochs. Decreases in ELM density not only were an excellent correlate of the appearance of SEMs during wakefulness with closed eyes, but also a good predictor of their occurrence ( c. 82% accuracy) at a time resolution of 2.5 s. Based on these results, we conclude that ELM density reliably predicts moderate changes in the level of alertness during quiet wakefulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Improvement in motor skill performance is known to continue for at least 24 hr following training, yet the relative contributions of time spent awake and asleep are unknown. Here we provide evidence that a night of sleep results in a 20% increase in motor speed without loss of accuracy, while an equivalent period of time during wake provides no significant benefit. Furthermore, a significant correlation exists between the improved performance overnight and the amount of stage 2 NREM sleep, particularly late in the night. This finding of sleep-dependent motor skill improvement may have important implications for the efficient learning of all skilled actions in humans. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Clinical lore and a small number of published studies report that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) intensify dreaming. This study examines the dream effects of paroxetine and fluvoxamine in order to both increase clinical knowledge of these agents and to test an important potential method for probing the relationship between REM sleep neurobiology and dreaming in humans. Fourteen normal, paid volunteers (4 males, 10 females; mean age 27.4 year, range 22–39) free of medical or neuropsychiatric symptoms as well as of psychotropic or sleep affecting drugs completed a 31-day home-based study consisting of: 7 days drug-free baseline; 19 days on either 100 mg fluvoxamine (7 Ss) or 20 mg paroxetine (7 Ss) in divided morning and evening doses; and 5 days acute discontinuation. Upon awakening, subjects wrote dream reports, self-scored specific emotions in their reports and rated seven general dream characteristics using 5-point Likert scales. Dream reports were independently scored for bizarreness, movement and number of visual nouns by three judges. REM sleep-related measures were obtained using the Nightcap ambulatory sleep monitor. Mean dream recall frequency decreased during treatment compared with baseline. Dream report length and judge-rated bizarreness were greater during acute discontinuation compared with both baseline and treatment and this effect was a result of the fluvoxamine-treated subjects. The subjective intensity of dreaming increased during both treatment and acute discontinuation compared with baseline. Propensity to enter REM sleep was decreased during treatment compared with baseline and acute discontinuation and the intensity of REM sleep increased during acute discontinuation compared with baseline and treatment. The decrease in dream frequency during SSRI treatment may reflect serotonergic REM suppression while the augmented report length and bizarreness during acute SSRI discontinuation may reflect cholinergic rebound from serotonergic suppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]